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Abstract						Law’s	rule	 is	animated	by	an	 irresolvable	contradiction.	By	definition	 ‘the	rule	of	law’	 is	 opposed	 to	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 humans’;	 and	 yet	 law	 remains	 an	 inter-subjective	phenomenon,	 enlivened	by	 the	 very	humans	 over	whom	 it	would	 rule.	 Thus	 the	rule	of	law,	set	against	the	rule	of	humans,	cannot	be	instituted	in	a	way	that	finally	separates	law	from	its	subjects.		This	problem	is	a	familiar	one.	In	political	theory,	 it	underlies	the	paradox	of	how	both	law-maker	and	made-law	can	be	sovereign	at	the	same	time.	In	legal	theory,	it	underlies	the	concern	over	how	judges,	as	the	ultimate	authority	of	law,	can	 render	 impartial,	 dispassionate—objective—legal	 decisions,	 in	 service	 of	 the	rule	of	law.	For	sociologists	and	anthropologists,	and	those	working	in	the	fields	of	peace-building	 and	 development,	 it	 underlies	 the	 debate	 over	 how	 to	 institute	 a	legal	order	that	upholds	the	rule	of	law	in	socially	diverse	situations.	In	addressing	 this	problem,	 the	 thesis	 takes	up	 the	challenge	set	down	by	Desmond	 Manderson	 in	 Kangaroo	 Courts	 and	 the	 Rule	 of	 Law	 (2012):	 to	 take	seriously	the	contradiction	in	the	rule	of	law	as	its	animating	condition.	This	means	approaching	 the	 contradiction,	 not	 as	 a	 problem	 to	 be	 resolved,	 but	 as	 the	 very	index	of	the	life	of	law’s	rule.	However,	whilst	the	humanities	provide	the	means,	and	literature	the	locus,	of	Manderson’s	seminal	study,	the	social	sciences	provide	the	primary	means	of	this	thesis,	with	Liberia	as	its	locus.	Thus	 it	 is	by	asking	 the	question,	what	 takes	place	 in	 the	rule	of	 law?,	 and	more	specifically,	what	is	taking	place	in	the	rule	of	law	in	Liberia?,	that	the	thesis	undertakes	a	study	of	the	life	of	 law’s	rule	 in	a	country	that	 is	on	the	frontline	of	the	 global	 spread	 of	 powerful	 ideologies.	 With	 Theodor	 Adorno’s	 negative-
	 	 	 	
	
	
viii	dialectical	philosophy	as	guide,	and	based	on	fieldwork	carried	out	in	Liberia	and	the	United	States	in	2013,	the	thesis	examines	how	these	ideologies	inform	the	rule	of	law,	and	how	the	rule	of	law	provides	a	medium	for	them	to	take	place.	Part	 I	 begins	 with	 a	 reading	 of	 Adorno’s	 negative-dialectical	 philosophy	(Chapter	1),	before	examining	the	origins	of	the	contradiction	as	a	condition	of	law	(Chapter	2),	to	show	how	this	opens	the	rule	of	law	to	animation	by	different	logics	which	 inform	 how	 it	 takes	 place	 (Chapter	 3).	 Part	 II	 then	 moves	 to	 Liberia	 to	examine	how	the	rule	of	law	is	taking	place	there,	mediated	by	the	logics	of	capital	(Chapter	 4),	 security	 (Chapter	 5),	 and	 liberalism	 (Chapter	 7),	whilst	 providing	 a	medium	 for	 these	 logics	 to	 take	 place.	 Critically,	 however,	 the	 thesis	 also	 shows	how	the	rule	of	law	and	its	institutional	logics	do	not	become	identical,	leaving	the	rule	 of	 law	 open	 to	 take	 place	 otherwise	 (Chapter	 6).	 The	 thesis	 concludes	 by	returning	to	the	question	of	what	this	means	for	the	rule	of	law	in	theory	and	in	the	practice	of	trying	to	institute	it	around	the	world.			 	
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2	
Central	Prison,	Liberia,	21	August	2013		The	Training	and	Development	Officer	 from	the	Corrections	Advisory	Unit	of	 the	United	Nations	Mission	 in	 Liberia	 is	 standing	 outside	 the	 prison	 gate,	 her	white	skin	marking	her	out	as	much	as	her	blue	UN	 insignia.	 I	have	crossed	 this	 street	innumerable	 times	 before	 but	 have	 never	 noticed	 the	 ‘corrections	 facility’.	 Its	towering	perimeter	wall	blends	into	the	Ministry	of	Defence	and	military	barracks	that	run	alongside,	but	even	 these	do	not	stand	out	 in	Monrovia;	 this	could	have	been	 any	 other	 international	NGO	 compound.	 The	urban	 streetscape	 of	 Liberia’s	capital	city	is	dominated	by	walls	topped	with	razor	wire	and	patrolled	by	private	security	 guards.	 Perhaps	 originally	 built	 to	 keep	 out	 war-time	 looters,	 they	continue	 to	 be	 built	 ten	 years	 after	 the	 cessation	 of	 armed	 violence	 by	 every	household	and	business	with	enough	capital	to	fear	redistribution	of	their	wealth.	Standing	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 squatter	 settlements	 that	 serve	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 city’s	nearly	 two	million	 inhabitants—who	reside	 in	 the	hollowed	out	 remains	of	war-torn	 buildings	 or	 in	 recycled	 shacks	 crowded	 into	 vacated	 plots	 of	 land	 and	swamp—these	walled	compounds	are	one	of	most	visible	markers	of	urban	life	in	post-war	 Monrovia,	 revealing	 in	 stark	 aesthetic	 form	 the	 equally	 stark	 socio-economic	cleavage	that	runs	deep	through	‘the	peace’.		 After	I	greet	the	UN	officer	outside	the	prison	gate,	she	asks	me	to	remind	her	about	the	purpose	of	my	visit	to	Liberia’s	Central	Prison.	I	explain	that	it	is	to	help	give	context	 to	what	 is	 taking	place	 in	Liberia’s	post-war	rule-of-law	reform	process.	She	offers	a	few	statistics	on	the	prison	before	leading	me	to	the	main	gate	where	a	Liberian	man	stands	guard.	She	signs	me	 in	and	escorts	me	through	the	outside	perimeter.	Inside,	we	come	to	the	gate	of	a	second	walled	perimeter	where	another	 Liberian	 man	 stands	 guard.	 A	 UN	 Formed	 Police	 Unit	 contributed	 by	Jordan	 is	 stationed	 in	 the	 narrow	 yard	 between	 these	 two	 walls,	 to	 provide	additional	 support	 to	 the	Liberian	Corrections	Officers	 in	 case	of	 unrest.	 Passing	through	this	second	gate,	we	come	to	a	third	perimeter,	a	high	metal	fence	with	a	gate	that	opens	into	the	main	prison	yard.		In	the	centre	of	this	sandy	yard	I	am	introduced	to	two	male	UN	corrections	officers	 who	 act	 as	mentors	 to	 their	 Liberian	 ‘counterparts’.	 As	 they	 offer	more	statistics	 about	 the	 individuals	who	 are	 contained	 in	 the	 prison,	 to	 illustrate	 the	object	of	their	rule-of-law	mission,	I	become	distracted	by	the	sight	of	the	shipping	
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3containers	that	serve	as	their	office.	There	is	something	about	these	structures,	in	their	constancy,	in	their	iterability—capable	of	being	hauled	away	at	any	moment,	loaded	 on	 the	 back	 of	 a	 ship,	 to	 be	 set	 down	 in	 another	 country,	 in	 another	hemisphere,	to	be	of	service	again	at	any	time—that	jars	with	what	I	am	being	told	by	the	UN	officers	about	the	need	to	address	the	plight	of	the	individuals	contained	in	the	prison…	but	before	I	can	develop	that	thought,	the	Superintendent	arrives,	and	I	am	called	to	attention.	A	young	Liberian	man,	the	Superintendent	leaves	the	impression	 of	 a	 fair	 and	 hardworking	 officer,	 with	 good	 intentions	 but	 limited	resources.	 It	 is	 unfortunate	 that	 his	 warm	 smile	 is	 framed	 by	 the	 main	 prison	building	 behind	 him,	 the	 glare	 reflecting	 off	 its	 concrete	 surface	 bleaching	 the	man’s	portrait	as	we	talk.	After	 the	 introductions,	 the	UN	 officer	 and	 a	 prison	 guard	 escort	me	 into	this	building,	a	two-story	structure,	the	few	clothes	hanging	from	the	rusty	bars	of	its	 second-story	windows	offering	 the	 only	 hint	 of	 life	 inside.	 It	 has	 several	 cell-blocks,	including	two	for	armed	robbery,	plus	the	juvenile	block.	All	of	the	men	in	this	building	are	‘pre-trial	detainees’;	although,	of	the	more	than	960	men,	women,	and	 children	 in	 the	 Central	 Prison,	 some	800	 are	 pre-trial	 detainees.	Many	 have	been	 in	 here	 for	 months	 and	 years,	 many,	 if	 not	 most,	 without	 access	 to	 legal	representation	or	contact	with	the	outside.	The	cells	are	also	overcrowded,	often	with	five	or	six	or	more	men	in	a	bare	three-meter	by	three-meter	cell.	There	are	no	beds,	and	I	do	not	see	mattresses	for	them	to	sleep	on.		As	we	pass	through	a	corridor	a	man	calls	out	to	me	from	behind	the	bars	of	his	 cell.	 He	 is	 highly	 articulate,	 with	 a	 North	 American	 rather	 than	 a	 Liberian	English	accent,	and	with	a	cutting	wit.	He	demands	to	know	who	I	am	and	what	I	am	 doing	 there.	 I	 explain	 that	 I	 am	 a	 researcher	 from	 a	 university	 studying	 the	legal	system	reform	process.	His	answer	holds	me	in	contempt:	‘What	more	has	to	
be	 studied?	 You	 don’t	 need	 to	 do	 more	 research	 to	 see	 that	 the	 justice	 system	 is	
broken	here’.	He	underlines	 this	 sentence	with	his	own	experience	as	 a	 ‘pre-trial	detainee’:	 being	 detained	 for	 months	 (or	 was	 it	 years?),	 with	 neither	 trial	 nor	access	to	a	lawyer	nor	contact	with	anyone	beyond	these	walls—‘and	you	speak	of	
“the	justice	system”?	There	is	no	justice	system	here!’					
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Figure	1.	‘Nimba	County	Prison	Inmates,	Liberia’1		With	his	voice	still	 reverberating	 through	the	corridor,	 the	UN	officer	and	prison	guard	escort	me	 into	a	second,	smaller	building.	 It	 is	even	more	chilling	than	the	first.	 As	 I	 enter	 I	 am	 struck	 by	 an	 odour	 of	 stagnation,	 of	 living	 bodies	 slowly	rotting—of	men	struggling	to	stay	alive.	When	my	eyes	get	accustomed	to	the	dim	light	I	see	the	condition	of	the	cells,	perhaps	one-and-a-half	meters	wide	and	two-and-a-half	meters	long.	Without	space	on	the	floor	for	each	of	the	cell’s	five	or	six	inhabitants	 to	 sit	 and	 sleep	 together,	 the	 men	 have	 set	 up	 a	 system	 of	 layered	hammocks,	three	hammocks	high,	one	above	the	other,	the	top	hammock	strung	up	three	or	four	meters	off	the	ground.	The	hammocks	have	been	made	by	hand	out	of	sacking,	 felt,	 and	 other	 recycled	materials.	 I	 am	 told	 they	 break	 every	 now	 and	again.		Unlike	the	other	building,	the	walls	in	this	one	are	covered	in	drawings.	One	piece	 in	 particular	 catches	 my	 eye	 as	 we	 are	 leaving.	 Drawn	 on	 the	 wall	 of	 an	alcove	off	 the	main	 corridor,	 it	 is	 an	 exact	 representation	of	 the	Liberian	 coat	of	arms,	with	its	image	of	a	ship	sailing	towards	the	west	African	shore	carrying	the	‘free	 people	 of	 colour	 of	 the	 United	 States’	 who	 would	 establish	 what	 would	become	the	Republic	of	Liberia.	Hanging	over	this	coat	of	arms	is	a	slightly	larger	
																																																						1	[image	omitted	from	digital	version]	
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5than	usual	banner—and	here	the	prisoner’s	hand	must	have	lingered	a	moment,	a	flicker	of	a	smile	must	have	crossed	his	face,	for	a	moment,	if	not	a	great	burst	of	laughter,	 shaking	 the	 foundations	 of	 the	 Central	 Prison	 as	 he	 reprinted	 the	 line:	‘The	love	of	liberty	brought	us	here’.		 		
	
Figure	2.	Liberian	coat	of	arms2	
	
	
	 	
																																																						2	Source:	http://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=8342459.	
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6		 ∞		A	week	later	I	receive	an	email	 from	the	Assistant	Minister	of	 Justice	responsible	for	the	Bureau	of	Corrections	and	Rehabilitation.	It	comes	in	reply	to	an	email	I	had	sent	thanking	her	for	enabling	my	tour	of	the	Central	Prison:3		 Dear	Mr	Chalmers:	As	we	strive	to	provide	safety	and	security	for	the	inmate	population,	communities	and	the	Liberian	society,	we	want	you	to	understand	how	far	we	have	come	after	years	of	conflict	and	destruction.	We	will	continue	to	improve	access	to	justice	and	the	rule	of	law	for	all.	I	wish	you	a	safe	flight	back	home.		I	am	struck	by	the	final	sentence.	I	wonder	if	the	Assistant	Minister’s	hand	lingered	over	 it	as	she	wrote,	 like	the	hand	of	 the	prisoner	who	drew	the	Liberian	coat	of	arms	on	the	prison	wall.	Both	sentences—I	wish	you	a	safe	 flight	back	home;	The	
love	of	liberty	brought	us	here—perform	a	piercing	double	act,	setting	down	a	fact	in	a	way	that	it	cannot	escape	its	 judgment.	I	am	reminded	of	Shoshana	Felman’s	definition	of	irony,	as	what	‘precisely	consists	in	dragging	authority	as	such	into	a	scene	which	it	cannot	master,	of	which	it	is	not	aware	and	which,	for	that	reason,	is	the	scene	of	its	own	self-destruction.’4	Just	as	the	man	who	drew	the	Liberian	coat	of	 arms	 on	 the	 prison	 wall	 condemned	 the	 institution	 that	 detained	 him,	 by	pointing	 to	a	contradiction	at	 its	core—an	 institution,	brought	by	 foreigners	as	a	promise	of	 justice	 to	 come,	 set	 in	opposition	 to	 the	enslavement	of	black	bodies,	which	 had	 become	 the	 opposite,	 an	 institution	 in	which	 those	 very	 bodies	were	being	 detained	 without	 trial—so	 too	 the	 Assistant	 Minister’s	 words	 condemned	me,	as	an	extension	of	a	long	history	of	intervention	by	white	men	who	arrive	by	ship	and	plane,	to	study	and	advise,	on	a	situation	‘you’	have	not	lived	and	will	not	live,	in	any	sense	of	the	longue	durée.	Both	sentences	serve	to	remind:	your	place	is	elsewhere,	and	yet	you	judge	us.	I	 cannot	 avoid	 the	 sentence,	which	 hangs	 over	 this	 thesis	 like	 the	 banner	over	the	coat	of	arms.		
																																																						3	[text	omitted	from	digital	version]	4	Cited	in	Desmond	Manderson,	Kangaroo	Courts	and	the	Rule	of	Law	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2012),	127.	
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7As	I	close	the	Assistant	Minister’s	email,	my	mind	returns	to	the	scene	of	the	Central	 Prison,	 an	 institution	 that	 is	 being	 rebuilt	 to	 serve	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 law’,	containing	 subjects—children,	 women,	 men—whose	 inclusion	 within	 it	 is	 still	deferred.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	these	women,	children,	and	men	have	been	brought	within	its	institution,	as	‘detainees’.	Thus	in	the	most	physical	way	they	are	subject	to	 it,	 as	beings	detained;	 the	bodies	 rotting	 in	 the	damp	pit	of	 its	deepest	 recess	testify	to	that	fact.	And	yet,	there	they	remain,	outside	the	institution	as	a	matter	of	right,	being	detained	‘pre-trial’	not	simply	in	the	sense	that	they	have	yet	to	see	a	lawyer,	 that	 they	are	yet	 to	 see	a	 judge,	 that	 they	are	yet	 to	 see	a	 law,	but	being	detained	pre-trial	also	in	the	sense	that	they	are	yet	to	be	included	as	a	normative	matter	 within	 the	 institution	 that	 would	 judge	 them.	 The	 prisoner’s	 remark	 to	me—that	 ‘there	is	no	justice	system	here’—recalled	the	violence	of	an	institution	that,	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 subjects	 that	 find	 themselves	 within	 its	jurisdiction,	represents	an	endless	deferral	of	justice.5	I	 am	 reminded	 of	 Franz	 Kafka’s	 parable	 of	 the	 countryman	 who	 is	 left	waiting	outside	the	gate	of	the	law,	his	access	perpetually	deferred	despite	the	gate	being	created	for	him.6	Where	Kafka’s	countryman	remains	suspended	in	his	own	‘pre-trial’	limbo,	the	children,	men,	and	women	in	Monrovia’s	Central	Prison	have	passed	through	three	of	its	gates	only	to	find	themselves	in	the	same	position.7	But	it	 is	 also	 not	 the	 same	 position;	 it	 is	much	worse:	 a	 depersonalised	 position,8	 in	which	the	bodies	of	these	men,	children,	and	women	have	been	brought	forcefully	inside	the	law,	made	identical	with	its	institution	in	the	most	visceral	way,	whilst	their	subjectivity	remains	outside,	non-identical	 in	 the	most	violent	way.	Thus	as	subjects,	 they	 remain	 pre-trial,	 whilst	 as	 empirical	 individuals,	 their	 bodies	undergo	the	most	intense	trial	every	moment	of	day	and	night.		
																																																						5	See	Jacques	Derrida,	‘Force	of	Law:	The	"Mystical	Foundation	of	Authority"’,	Cardozo	Law	Review,	vol	11	(1989-1990).	6	See	Franz	Kafka,	Before	the	Law,	trans	Ian	Johnston	(Online:	http://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/kafka/beforethelaw.htm,	2015	[1915]).	I	include	an	extended	extract	of	Kafka’s	parable	in	Part	2	of	Chapter	2.		7	The	term	‘country	people’	is	also	commonly	used	in	Liberia	to	refer	to	‘traditional’	African-Liberians	in	distinction	to	‘modern’	Americo-Liberians.	8	In	psychiatry	the	concept	of	‘depersonalisation’	refers	to	feeling	unreal,	a	‘disorder’	characterised	by	‘estrangement	from	the	self,	body,	or	surroundings’:	see	‘Depersonalization/Derealization	Disorder’	in	American	Psychiatric	Association,	Diagnostic	and	
Statistical	Manual	of	Mental	Disorders,	Fifth	Edition:	DSM-5	(Arlington:	APA	Publishing,	2013).	
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8	 Kafka’s	parable	evokes	a	terrific	mental	 image	of	what	I	will	 later	argue	is	the	 contradictory	 condition	 of	 law.	 But	 when	 I	 entered	 the	 cell-blocks	 of	Monrovia’s	Central	Prison,	it	smelt	 like	I	had	entered	an	epicentre	of	what	Achille	Mbembe	has	called	a	 ‘death-world’—a	 form	of	 ‘social	 existence’,	 created	 through	an	 expression	 of	 sovereignty,	 ‘in	 which	 vast	 populations	 are	 subjected	 to	conditions	of	 life	conferring	upon	them	the	status	of	 living	dead.’9	When	my	eyes	grew	accustomed	to	the	dim	light,	 the	sight	only	reinforced	the	smell.	Describing	how	 ‘necropower’	 operates,	 Mbembe	 recalls	 Frantz	 Fanon’s	 description	 of	 ‘the	town	belonging	to	the	colonized	people’.10	What	I	saw	fit	his	description,	of	‘a	place	of	ill	fame,	peopled	by	men	of	evil	repute’,	‘a	world	without	spaciousness;	men	live	there	on	top	of	each	other’,	 ‘starved	of	bread,	of	meat,	of	shoes,	of	coal,	of	light’.11	What	I	saw	was	a	prison	whose	inmate	population,	by	legal	definition	people	of	ill	fame,	is	kept	alive	on	one	meal	a	day,12	deprived	of	exercise	in	the	yard,13	stacked	one	 on	 top	 of	 the	 other	 in	 their	 cells.	 And	 what	 I	 heard	 was	 a	 sound	 that	 still	reverberates	 through	 the	 prison’s	 corridors,	 questioning	 the	 justice	 of	 the	institution	that	detains	these	men,	women	and	children.	I	 recall	 the	shipping	containers	 that	serve	as	 the	offices	of	 the	UN	rule-of-law	 reformers	 in	 the	 Prison.	 They	 appear	 to	manifest	 the	 logic	 of	 a	 necropower	that	 treats	 humans	 in	 an	 exchangeable	 manner,	 in	 which	 full-fledged	 subjects	become	 numerous	 bodies—a	 logic	 that	 appears	 to	 animate	 the	 prison,	 its	institution	 populated	 by	 bodies	 that	 give	 it	 life	 as	 an	 institution	 while	 it	simultaneously	 denies	 their	 subjectivity	 as	 human	 beings.	 Thus	 the	 inmate	population	 is	 kept	 alive	 on	 one	meal	 a	 day;	 strategic	 plans	 are	 implemented	 to	ensure	they	are	not	killed	by	Ebola14—whilst	justice	remains	deferred.	The	result	
																																																						9	Achille	Mbembe,	‘Necropolitics’,	Public	Culture,	vol	15,	no	1	(2003):	40	(italics	in	original).	10	Cited	in	ibid,	26-27.	11	Ibid.	12	As	I	was	told	during	my	tour	of	the	Central	Prison,	during	which	I	also	visited	the	outdoor	kitchen	where	the	day’s	meal	was	being	prepared.		13	As	I	was	also	told	during	the	tour	of	the	Central	Prison,	the	threat	of	riots	and	prison	breaks,	combined	with	the	lack	of	corrections	officers,	meant	that	prisoners	were	being	denied	regular	exercise	in	the	yard.	14	See	the	interview	with	Catherine	Marchi-Uhel,	Principal	Rule	of	Law	Officer,	United	Nations	Mission	in	Liberia,	in	which	she	answers	the	question,	‘What	is	UNMIL	Rule	of	Law	doing	to	support	the	government	and	people	of	Liberia	in	the	fight	against	Ebola?’:	www.youtube.com/watch?v=moxxYytokNg.	See	also	UN	Security	Council,		‘Twenty-ninth	progress	report	of	the	Secretary-General	on	the	United	Nations	Mission	in	Liberia’,	UN	Doc	S/2015/275	(23	April	2015),	para	52.	
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9is	 a	 twisted	 answer	 to	 Mbembe’s	 critique	 of	 the	 West’s	 seeming	 inability	 to	appreciate	 that	 all	 humans—including	 Africans—‘have,	 concretely	 and	 typically,	the	same	flesh’.15	Systematically	this	critique	has	been	turned	around	by	a	logic	of	exchange	that	operates	on	every	body	in	the	same	way.	What	Mbembe’s	‘flesh	and	body’	was	supposed	to	signify—‘the	 idea	of	a	common	human	nature,	a	humanity	
shared	with	others’—has	been	stripped	of	 its	humanity,	 leaving	an	approach	 that	concretely,	and	typically,	deals	in	bodies	but	not	subjects.16	I	 am	 left	 to	 consider	how	 this	 scene	 is	both	metaphorical17	 and	very	 real,	representing	 something	 general—a	 common	 experience—and	 something	particular—the	 singular	 experience	 of	women,	 children,	 and	men	who	 are,	 here	and	now,	being	detained	in	Liberia’s	Central	Prison.	Because	of	this—because	the	prison	 scene	 also	 points	 to	 something	more	 than	 a	 particular	 problem	with	 this	prison,	 for	 these	 individuals,	 right	now—the	answer	 too	must	 lie	both	 inside	and	outside	 these	 prison	 walls.	 If	 so,	 the	 problem	 will	 not	 be	 resolved	 by	 fixing	Liberia’s	 Central	 Prison.	 Fixing	 the	 infrastructure	 of	 the	 legal	 system,	 processing	the	back-log	in	cases,	hauling	the	bodies	of	these	men,	women,	and	children	before	a	judge:	this	will	not	resolve	the	problem	of	being	detained	‘pre-trial’.		Since	 the	 declaration	 that	 founded	 the	 republic	 of	 Liberia,	 the	overwhelming	majority	of	Liberia’s	‘country	people’	have	been	pre-trial	detainees,	included	 as	 a	 factual	 matter	 within	 the	 bounds	 of	 the	 republic	 whilst	 being	excluded	 as	 a	 normative	 matter	 from	 its	 institutions.	 History	 has	 shown,	 the	problem	is	not	just	how	to	strengthen	the	objective	conditions	of	the	legal	system,	so	the	bodies	of	its	subjects	might	access	it	more	easily;	but	how	to	respond	to	the	dissonance	 in	 its	 institution,	 not	 just	 in	 Liberia	 but	 as	 a	 common	 experience,	whereby	law	remains	separate	from	the	humans	who	enliven	it	as	its	subjects	and	yet	takes	place	in	and	through	them?		
																																																						15	Achille	Mbembe,	On	the	Postcolony	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	2001),	2.	16	Ibid,	2	(italics	in	original).	This	result	resembles	Mbembe’s	later	work	on	necropolitics,	where	he	develops	his	concern	with	‘figures	of	sovereignty	whose	central	project	is	[…]	the	generalized	
instrumentalisation	of	human	existence	and	the	material	destruction	of	human	bodies	and	
populations’,	and	how	these	figures	of	sovereignty	‘are	what	constitute	the	nomos	of	the	political	space	in	which	we	still	live’:	Mbembe,	‘Necropolitics’,	14	(italics	in	original).	17	‘Metaphorical’	in	the	sense	that	the	prison	scene	is	‘representative	or	suggestive	of	something	else’:	‘metaphor,	n.’,	OED	Online,	March	2016.	
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1	 The	rule	of	law	and	Liberia		
‘What	more	has	 to	be	 studied?	You	don’t	need	 to	do	more	 research	 to	 see	 that	 the	
justice	system	is	broken	here!’1			There	 is	a	 towering	 literature	on	the	concept	of	 the	rule	of	 law,2	and	yet	 there	 is	relatively	little	scholarship	on	the	life	of	the	concept,	on	the	material	ways	in	which	this	proposition—‘the	rule	of	law’—takes	place.3	There	is	even	less	scholarship	on	law’s	 rule	 that	 combines	 social-scientific	 research	 with	 the	 critical	 theoretical	insights	 of	 the	 humanities,	 from	 cultural	 studies	 to	 aesthetic	 theory	 and	philosophy.	But	that	does	not	answer	the	prisoner’s	question;	quantitative	analysis	never	answers	the	question	of	why.	Regardless	of	how	much	has	been	written,	the	reason	for	another	study	has	to	be	qualitative,	and	ethical:	the	answer	must	speak	to	 the	 prisoner	 in	 his	 cell—speak	 to	 him	 directly,	 face	 to	 face,	 and	 find	 its	justification	in	that	exchange.		The	challenge	I	take	up	in	this	thesis	is	exactly	that:	to	answer	the	prisoner’s	question	 in	 a	way	 that	 speaks	 to	 his	 experience.	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	 thesis	 aims	 to	examine	two	problems.	The	first	is	a	general	theoretical	problem	with	‘what	takes	place	 in	 the	 rule	 of	 law’.	 The	 second	 is	 a	 particular	 historical-material	 problem	with	‘what	is	taking	place	in	the	rule	of	law	in	Liberia’.		
																																																						1	See	Prelude.		2	See	Tom	Bingham,	The	Rule	of	Law	(London:	Penguin	Books,	2011);	Albert	V	Dicey,	Introduction	to	
the	Study	of	the	Law	of	the	Constitution	(London:	Macmillan,	1948);	Bob	Fine,	Democracy	and	the	
Rule	of	Law:	Liberal	Ideals	and	Marxist	Critiques	(Sydney:	Pluto	Press,	1984);	James	E	Flemming,	ed	
Getting	to	the	Rule	of	Law:	Nomos	L	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	2011);	Friedrich	Hayek,	
Law,	Legislation	and	Liberty,	vol	1	(Oxon:	Routledge,	1973);	Martin	Krygier,	‘The	Rule	of	Law’,	in	
Oxford	Handbook	of	Comparative	Constitutional	Law,	ed	Michel	Rosenfeld	and	András	Sajó	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2012);	Franz	Neumann,	The	Rule	of	Law:	Political	Theory	and	the	Legal	
System	in	Modern	Society	(Leamington	Spa:	Berg,	1986);	Joseph	Raz,	The	Authority	of	Law,	2	ed	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009);	Michel	Rosenfeld,	‘The	Rule	of	Law	and	the	Legitimacy	of	Constitutional	Democracy’,	Southern	California	Law	Review,	vol	74	(2001);	Ian	Shapiro,	ed	The	Rule	
of	Law:	Nomos	XXXVI	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	1994);	Brian	Z	Tamanaha,	On	the	Rule	
of	Law:	History,	Politics,	Theory	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2004);	Jeremy	Waldron,	
The	Rule	of	Law	and	the	Measure	of	Property	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2012).	3	On	this	lack	of	attention	to	the	life	of	the	rule	of	law,	see	Erik	G		Jensen	and	Thomas	C	Heller,	eds,	
Beyond	Common	Knowledge:	Empirical	Approaches	to	the	Rule	of	Law	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2003).	More	generally,	there	is	considerable	literature	on	the	life	of	law,	if	not	its	‘rule’.	See	Lawrence	Douglas,	Austin	Sarat,	and	Martha	Merrill	Umphrey,	‘Theoretical	Perspectives	on	Lives	in	the	Law:	An	Introduction’,	in	Lives	in	the	Law,	ed	Austin	Sarat,	Lawrence	Douglas,	and	Martha	Merrill	Umphrey	(Ann	Arbor:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	2006);	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns,	‘The	Cultural	Lives	of	Law’,	in	Law	in	the	Domains	of	Culture,	ed	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns	(Ann	Arbor:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	1998);	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns,	eds,	
Law	in	Everyday	Life	(Ann	Arbor:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	1993).	
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Aim	 one—the	 general	 problem.	By	 ‘what	 takes	 place	 in	 the	 rule	 of	 law’	 I	mean	 two	 things.	 On	 one	 hand,	 I	 mean	 how	 does	 this	 proposition—the	 rule	 of	law—manifest	in	everyday	life?	The	aim	here	is	to	examine	the	general	dynamics	or	 form	of	 the	 rule	of	 law	as	 a	material	 concept,	 circumscribed	by	people,	place,	and	 time.4	But	 this	 is	not	 just	about	how	 law’s	 rule	 ‘takes	place’.5	 It	 is	also	about	what	 takes	 place	 in	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 Rather	 than	 approach	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 as	 a	coherent	concept	 that	 takes	place	 in	different	ways,	 I	am	interested	 in	how	law’s	rule	 is	 itself	 inherently	 contradictory	 as	 a	 concept.	 Thus	 by	 asking	 ‘what	 takes	place	in	the	rule	of	law’,	I	aim	to	enquire	into	both	what	animates	law’s	rule	(giving	it	form	and	substance)	and	how	law’s	rule	manifests	(as	a	physical	reality).	
Aim	two—the	particular	problem.	At	the	same	time,	because	nothing	takes	place	 in	 general,	 this	 line	 of	 enquiry	 can	 only	 extend	 as	 far	 as	 a	 theoretical	understanding	of	the	dynamics	of	the	life	of	law’s	rule.	This	might	provide	a	critical	lens	 with	 which	 to	 examine	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 as	 a	 common	 experience,	 but	 what	
actually	 takes	 place	 in	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 remains	 circumstantial:	 mediated	 by	 the	contexts	 that	 surround	 it	 in	 space	 and	 time.	 That	 is	 why	 I	 ask	 the	 second,	historical-material	question,	of	‘what	is	taking	place	in	the	rule	of	law	in	Liberia’.6	The	 aim	 here	 is	 to	 create	 a	 singular	 portrait	 of	 the	 life	 of	 law’s	 rule	 through	 a	sociological	study	of	the	rule	of	law	in	Liberia.		 I	set	out	these	two	problems	in	more	depth	below.	Before	I	do,	however,	it	is	 helpful	 to	 state	 the	 overall	 arguments	 I	 make	 in	 examining	 these	 problems	through	 the	 thesis.	 I	 make	 three	 arguments:	 on	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 general,	 as	 a	common	 experience;	 on	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 Liberia,	 and	 its	 particular	 experience	there;	and	on	the	study	of	the	rule	of	law.			
																																																						4	On	the	‘place’	of	law,	see	Austin	Sarat,	Lawrence	Douglas,	and	Martha	Merrill	Umphrey,	‘Where	(or	What)	Is	the	Place	of	Law?	An	Introduction’,	in	Place	of	Law,	ed	Austin	Sarat,	Lawrence	Douglas,	and	Martha	Merrill	Umphrey	(Ann	Arbor:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	2003).	On	law	and	space,	see	also	Franz	von	Benda-Beckmann,	Keebet	von	Benda-Beckmann,	and	Anne	Griffiths,	‘Space	and	Legal	Pluralism:	An	Introduction’,	in	Spatializing	Law,	ed	Franz	von	Benda-Beckmann,	Keebet	von	Benda-Beckmann,	and	Anne	Griffiths	(Abingdon:	Ashgate,	2013).	On	law	and	time,	see	Keebet	von	Benda-Beckmann,	‘Trust	and	the	Temporalities	of	Law’,	Journal	of	Legal	Pluralism	and	Unofficial	
Law,	vol	46,	no	1	(2014).	5	I	use	the	terms	‘rule	of	law’	and	‘law’s	rule’	interchangeably	to	refer	to	the	notion	of	the	sovereign	position	of	law,	and	not	to	a	particular	conceptual	schema	that	describes	its	achievement	(whether	‘thick’	or	‘thin’)	or	a	political	ideal.	Similarly,	by	the	‘institution	of	the	rule	of	law’	I	mean	the	attempt	to	institute	the	sovereign	position	of	law.	6	The	question	of	‘what	is	taking	place’	is	an	historical-materialist	one	in	the	sense	that	it	is	concerned	with	what	Walter	Benjamin	describes	as	‘the	relation	of	what-has-been	to	the	now’:	see	Walter	Benjamin,	The	Arcades	Project,	trans	Howard	Eiland	&	Kevin	McLaughlin	(Cambridge:	Belknap	Press,	1999),	463.	
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Argument	 one—on	 the	 general	 problem.	 I	 develop	 the	 first,	 general	argument	in	answer	to	the	question	of	‘what	takes	place	in	the	rule	of	law’.	There	are	two	parts	to	this.	The	first	part	of	the	argument	is	that	the	concept	of	the	rule	of	law	 is	 enlivened	by	a	 struggle	 to	make	 law	predominant	over	 its	 subjects,	 at	 the	same	time	as	law	is	given	form,	and	takes	form,	in	and	through	those	subjects’	lives	and	 interactions.	 To	 really	 understand	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 law’,	 one	 must	 see	 this	contradictory	affair	as	the	beating	heart	of	the	concept—indeed	as	the	very	life	of	law’s	rule.	However,	my	aim	is	not	just	to	examine	how	the	concept	is	animated	by	a	 contradiction	 that	makes	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 law’	 both	 separate	 and	 inseparable	 from	‘the	rule	of	humans’.	What	makes	this	argument	critical	is	that	it	enables	one	to	see	how	 law’s	 rule	 can	 be	 instituted	 in	 a	 way	 that	 makes	 it	 hostile	 to	 life,	 whilst	remaining	open	to	its	ethical	possibilities	as	a	social	institution.	This	is	the	second	part	 of	 the	 argument:	 that	 the	 contradiction	 in	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 makes	 it	 an	essentially	lively	concept,	for	worse,	but	always	also	for	better.		
Argument	 two—on	 the	 particular	 problem.	The	 argument	 I	make	 through	the	case	study	of	the	rule	of	law	in	Liberia	also	has	two	parts.	On	one	hand,	I	argue	that	 different	 logics	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 inform	 the	 institution	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	Liberia.	On	 the	other	hand,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 rule	of	 law	can	be	 seen	 to	provide	a	medium	for	these	logics	to	take	place	in	the	country.7	More	specifically,	I	argue	that	the	institution	of	the	rule	of	law	is	at	the	epicentre	of	a	colonising	power	in	Liberia	that	 makes	 subjects	 into	 living	 dead	 through	 acts	 of	 sovereign	 expression.	 This	‘colonising	power’	is	not	a	state,	or	an	organisation,	or	an	institution.	It	is	a	logic—specifically,	the	logic	of	capital.8	Operating	through	law	as	its	forceful	medium,	this	logic	renders	subjects	as	mere	objects,	creating	the	kind	of	death	world	described	by	Mbembe.9	At	the	same	time,	I	argue	that	other	logics	are	informing	the	rule	of	law	 in	 Liberia,	 whilst	 taking	 place	 through	 its	 institution.	 One	 is	 the	 logic	 of	security,	which	makes	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 into	 an	 institution	 for	 securing	 order	 and	
																																																						7	By	‘logic’	I	mean	informative	reasoning,	that	is,	reasoning	that	informs	social	constructions.	8	I	address	the	logic	of	capital	in	Part	1	of	Chapter	4.	In	short,	by	‘capital’	I	mean	power	over	life.	This	understanding	goes	back	to	Roman	law,	where,	‘Of	Public	Judgments,	some	were	1.	CAPITAL;	in	which	the	Punishment	prescribed	was	Death;	which	Death	was	(1)	Natural;	such	as	took	away	the	Life	of	the	Criminal.	(2)	Civil;	such	as	took	away	his	Liberty,	or	his	Citizenship.’	Samuel	Hallifax,	An	
Analysis	of	the	Roman	Civil	Law,	Compared	with	the	Laws	of	England	(Cambridge:	printed	by	J	Archdeacon	Printer	to	the	University,	1774),	116-117.	As	a	logic,	‘capital’	is	not	material	in	itself	and	is	merely	informative,	acquiring	its	materiality	through	other	mediums—such	as	the	institution	of	the	rule	of	law.		9	See	note	9	in	Prelude.		
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stability—indeed	 for	 securing	 the	 regime	 of	 capital.10	 Another	 is	 the	 logic	 of	liberalism,	which	makes	the	rule	of	law	into	an	instrument	of	social	change.		Taken	together,	 these	three	 logics	(of	capital,	security,	and	 liberalism)	can	be	seen	to	inform	what	is	taking	place	in	the	rule	of	law	in	Liberia.	And	yet	the	rule	of	 law	 never	 becomes	 identical	 with	 its	 institutional	 logics.	 This	 returns	 to	 the	general	 argument	 of	 the	 thesis—that	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 is	 defined	 by	 a	 restless	struggle	 to	make	 law	 predominant	 over	 its	 subjects,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 law	 is	given	form,	and	takes	 form,	 in	and	through	those	subjects’	 lives	and	 interactions.	As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 contradiction	 in	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 its	 institution	 is	 never	completely	closed	to	its	subjects,	who	remain,	as	the	very	life	of	law’s	rule.		
Argument	 three—on	 the	 study	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 The	 third	 overarching	argument	that	I	pursue	through	the	thesis	is	a	methodological	one.	The	argument	is	 for	 an	 approach	 to	 research	 that	 brings	 the	 critical	 theoretical	 insights	 of	 the	humanities	to	bear	on	social	scientific	research,	bringing	the	subjective	experience	and	 construction	of	 reality	 together	with	 its	 objective	 examination	 in	 a	way	 that	makes	each	critical	to	the	other.	There	 are	 four	 parts	 to	 this	 Introduction.	 In	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 first	 part,	 I	address	in	more	depth	the	two	main	problems	of	the	thesis,	on	the	rule	of	 law	in	general	 and	 in	 Liberia,	 and	 the	 argument	 I	make	 in	 examining	 them.	 In	Part	 2,	 I	address	 the	 third	 argument	 on	 theoretical	 approach.	 I	 then	outline	 in	Part	 3	 the	research	design	and	methods	used	to	examine	the	rule	of	law	in	the	case	of	Liberia.	Finally,	in	Part	4,	I	outline	the	chapters	of	the	thesis.		A	 What	takes	place	in	the	rule	of	law?		As	the	‘index	of	non-identity’,11	the	logical	contradiction	marks	the	fissure	between	positive	and	negative—between	what	is	posited	and	what	remains	as	the	negation	of	that	position.	As	an	imperfect	separation	that	enables	the	two	sides	to	interact	without	 absolutely	 converging	 or	 diverging,	 this	 fissure	 has	 the	 structure	 of	 a	chasm:	both	chaotic,	 its	opening	denying	 closure	and	 therefore	 stable	order,	 and	
chiastic,	 the	 inseparability	 of	 the	 opposed	 sides	 forming	 a	 stable	 order.	 Like	 the	
																																																						10	By	‘regime’	I	have	in	mind	what	the	Oxford	English	Dictionary	describes	as	a	‘system	of	rule,	governance,	or	control;	a	system	of	organization;	a	way	of	doing	things,	esp.	one	having	widespread	influence	or	prevalence’:	‘regime,	n.’,	OED	Online,	December	2015.	11	See	Theodor	W	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	trans	Dennis	Redmond	(2001),	16-18.	
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15abyss	of	ancient	cosmology—the	primordial	ocean	that	underlies	the	earth,	upon	which	the	ground	takes	its	place—the	chasm	is	an	unfathomable	space	of	energy,	of	destruction	and	creativity.	As	 a	 ‘reflection-category’,12	 the	 contradiction	 allows	 one	 to	 locate	 this	fissure	in	an	apparently	solid	position	and	peer	inside	the	chasm.	That	is	the	focus	of	this	thesis:	to	peer	through	the	crack	in	the	rule	of	law.	What	this	shows,	I	argue,	is	 an	 irresolvable	 contradiction	 in	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 The	 contradiction	 is	 that,	 by	definition	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 law’	 is	 opposed	 to	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 humans’—an	 opposition	considered	so	essential	to	its	institution	that	an	elaborate	modern	mythology	has	been	constructed	 in	 the	West	 to	ensure	 the	 two	remain	separate,	 so	 the	humans	who	inform	the	law	are	not	seen	to	corrupt	its	rule;13	and	yet	law	remains	an	inter-subjective	phenomenon,	enlivened	by	the	humans	over	whom	it	would	rule.14	Thus	the	rule	of	 law,	set	against	the	rule	of	humans,	cannot	be	instituted	in	a	way	that	finally	separates	law	from	its	subjects.		This	contradiction	is	not	particular	to	the	rule	of	law,	however.	It	is	the	very	condition	 of	 modern	 institutionalisation,	 when	 an	 institution	 cannot	 depend	 on	God,	tradition,	or	any	other	transcendental	source	to	secure	its	foundations,	which	ultimately	 come	 to	 rest	 upon—or	 rather	 in,	 and	 through—its	 subjects.15	 This	inserts	a	contradiction	into	the	basis	of	the	institution:	‘it’	can	never	be	absolutely	identical	with	its	subjects,	whose	difference	defies	such	unity	and	closure;	and	yet	it	can	never	be	absolutely	separate	from	its	subjects,	who	constitute	its	grounds	as	an	entity.16		The	result	for	the	institution	of	the	rule	of	law	is	a	familiar	one.	In	political	theory,	 it	 underlies	 the	 paradox	 of	 how	 both	 law-maker	 and	 made-law	 can	 be	
																																																						12	Ibid,	148-149.	13	See,	eg,	Paul	Kahn,	The	Reign	of	Law:	Marbury	v	Madison	and	the	Construction	of	America	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1997).	14	In	other	words,	‘law	gains	its	sustenance’	through	persons:	Douglas,	Sarat,	and	Umphrey,	‘Lives	in	the	Law:	An	Introduction’.	On	the	‘everyday	life	of	law’,	see	also	Sarat	and	Kearns,	Law	in	Everyday	
Life;	Daniel	Jutras,	‘Legal	Dimensions	of	Everyday	Life’,	Canadian	Journal	of	Law	and	Society,	vol	16	(2001).	For	a	seminal	sociological	study	of	law’s	life	on	the	ground,	see	Eugen	Ehrlich,	Fundamental	
Principles	of	the	Sociology	of	Law,	trans	W	L	Moll	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	1936).	15	See	Jacques	Derrida,	‘Declarations	of	Independence’,	in	Negotiations:	Interventions	and	Interviews,	
1971-2001,	ed	Elizabeth	Rottenberg	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2002),	46-54.	16	See	ibid,	47-48.	On	the	problem	of	institutional	integrity,	see	also	Philip	Selznick,	The	Moral	
Commonwealth	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1992),	Chapter	12.	
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sovereign	 at	 the	 same	 time.17	 For	 sociologists	 and	 anthropologists,	 and	 those	working	 in	 state-building	 and	 development,	 it	 underlies	 the	 debate	 over	 how	 to	build	 a	 legal	 order	 that	 upholds	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 when,	 as	 Thomas	 Carothers	observed	in	his	critique	of	the	field	of	international	rule-of-law	promotion,	‘law	is	also	 a	 normative	 system	 that	 resides	 in	 the	minds	 of	 the	 citizens	 of	 a	 society’.18	Perhaps	most	familiar	of	all,	in	legal	theory,	it	underlies	the	concern	over	the	act	of	judging,	or	more	broadly	articulations	of	‘the	law’.	Put	simply,	the	concern	is	how	to	deal	with	the	fact	that	 judges,	as	the	last	 instance	or	ultimate	authority	of	 law,	are	 supposed	 to	 render	 impartial,	 dispassionate—objective—legal	 decisions,	 free	from	bias,	 from	political	 persuasion,	 free	 indeed	 from	any	 subjective	 influence.19	Since	Aristotle,	to	achieve	this	is	to	achieve	the	rule	of	law.20		In	 each	 case	 that	 is	 the	 problem,	 at	 least	 from	 one	 perspective:	 how	 to	achieve	this—how	to	finally	separate	the	rule	of	law	from	the	rule	of	humans	and	institute	 the	 former	 in	 a	way	 that	 ensures	 it	 is	 law,	 ultimately,	 that	 rules.	 From	another,	critical	perspective,	such	an	end	is	seen	to	be	futile	at	best,	and	dangerous	at	worst,	in	that	its	achievement	would	be	no	more	than	a	delusional	state	in	which	the	 rule	of	 law	serves	 to	mask,	or	wig,	 the	 rule	of	particular	humans	 (with	what	remains	subjective	masquerading	as	objective).	From	this	perspective,	the	ideal	of	the	rule	of	law	should	be	abandoned	and	replaced	with	another.21	Neither	 of	 these	 responses	 to	 the	 problem	 is	 satisfactory.	 As	 Desmond	Manderson	writes	 in	Kangaroo	Courts	and	 the	Rule	of	Law,	neither	actually	deals	
																																																						17	For	discussion	of	this	problem,	see	Brian	Z	Tamanaha,	‘The	Rule	of	Law	for	Everyone?’,	Current	
Legal	Problems,	vol	55,	no	1	(2002):	105-109.	18	Thomas	Carothers,	‘The	Problem	of	Knowledge’,	in	Promoting	the	Rule	of	Law	Abroad:	In	Search	
of	Knowledge,	ed	Thomas	Carothers	(Washington:	Carnegie	Endowment	for	International	Peace,	2006),	20.	19	On	how	this	is	not	the	case,	see,	eg,	Susan	U	Philips,	Ideology	in	the	Language	of	Judges:	How	
Judges	Practice	Law,	Politics,	and	Courtroom	Control	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1998).	For	another	examination	of	the	tensions	this	creates,	and	how	these	tensions	animate	the	rule	of	law,	see	Keith	J	Bybee,	All	Judges	Are	Political—Except	When	They	Are	Not:	Acceptable	Hypocrisies	and	
the	Rule	of	Law	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2010).		20	As	Manderson	notes,	in	discussing	Aristotle’s	differentiation	between	rule	by	‘the	best	men’	and	rule	by	‘the	best	laws’:	‘The	intrusion	of	subjectivity	and	discretion	into	decision-making	was	for	Aristotle	precisely	the	unwelcome	influence	of	“a	wild	animal”—meaning	a	human	being—whose	“appetite”	and	“passion”	would	undermine	the	process	of	pure	reason.	For	Aristotle	then,	the	neutral	application	of	prior	laws	by	a	process	of	pure	deduction	was	necessary	to	a	sound	polity.’	Desmond	Manderson,	Kangaroo	Courts	and	the	Rule	of	Law	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2012),	71.	21	See	ibid,	2-3.	Manderson	uses	the	term	romanticism	‘to	identify	this	appeal	to	some	transcendent	idea	or	ideal	capable	of	overcoming,	exceeding	or	curing	the	law’,	giving	as	examples	politics,	ethics,	and	literature:	ibid,	3.	
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17with	the	challenge	posed	by	the	contradiction.22	The	first	evades	 it	by	dismissing	the	problem	as	not	a	real	one;	the	second	simply	accepts	it	as	a	fatal	flaw.	But	if	the	rule	of	law	is	to	be	taken	seriously,	the	challenge	is	not	to	find	a	way	to	overcome	its	contradictoriness	once	and	for	all,	for	fear	of	its	implications;	nor	is	it	to	find	a	more	perfect	ideal	to	replace	that	of	the	rule	of	law.	Rather,	as	Manderson	writes,	the	 challenge	 is	 ‘to	 address	 more	 seriously’	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 problem,23	which	means	taking	seriously	the	contradiction	as	the	condition	of	law’s	rule.		That	is	the	challenge	I	take	up	in	this	thesis:	to	examine	the	implications	of	the	contradiction	in	the	rule	of	law,	as	its	animating	condition.	My	purpose	in	this	is	not	to	shine	a	light	on	its	indeterminacy,	however,	to	show	that	its	grounds	are	essentially	 fluid.	As	a	proposition,24	 the	grounds	of	the	rule	of	 law	are	essentially	fluid,	but	what	makes	this	of	critical	importance	is	the	forms	of	violence	it	enables	as	well	as	the	ethical	possibilities	it	holds	out.25	By	peering	through	the	crack	in	the	rule	 of	 law,	 my	 concern	 is	 therefore	material:	 to	 see	 how	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 takes	place,	 and	 how	 its	 chasmic	 structure	 enables	 it	 to	 take	 place	 in	 multiple	 and	contradictory	ways,	for	worse,	but	always	also	for	better.	For	worse,	because	this	means	the	rule	of	law	can	become	animated	in	ways	that	are	hostile	to	life,	despite	the	 best	 intentions;	 always	 also	 for	 better,	 because	 this	 makes	 such	 ordering	unstable	and	therefore	disposed	to	transformation,	and	moreover,	it	ensures	law’s	rule	remains	open	to	the	subjects	who	make	the	concept	a	lively	one.26	Revisiting	the	scene	of	Liberia’s	Central	Prison	at	the	beginning	of	the	thesis	reveals	an	extreme	 instance	of	 this	 concern.	As	a	 ‘corrections	 facility’,	 the	Prison	can	be	seen	to	be	a	response	to	the	radical	separation	between	the	national	law	of	Liberia	and	its	subjects,	a	deviancy	that	contradicts	the	definitive	rule	of	 law.	For	those	 who	 are	 concerned	with	 upholding	 the	 sovereign	 position	 of	 the	 national	law,	the	prison	provides	a	resolution	to	the	problem	of	violations	of	the	 law.	The	
																																																						22	See	ibid,	Chapter	1.	23	Ibid,	2.	Manderson	then	proceeds	‘to	build	a	distinct	conception—a	truly	modernist	conception,	and	ultimately	a	literary	conception—of	a	post-positivist	and	post-romantic	rule	of	law’:	ibid,	4.	24	One	implication	of	the	chasmic	structure	of	an	institution	is	that	it	makes	its	position	a	pro-
position,	or	a	becoming-position.	This	means	the	rule	of	law	is	always	obtaining	its	form	in	response	to	an	openness	that	negates	its	given	form.	I	discuss	this	in	Chapter	3.	25	This	engages	with	the	work	of	Walter	Benjamin,	Jacques	Derrida,	and	Peter	Fitzpatrick	in	particular,	as	well	as—although	in	an	indirect	way—that	of	Theodor	Adorno.	See	Chapters	2	and	3.	26	As	Manderson	writes:	‘ceaseless	movement	and	chronic	instability	do	not	mark	the	collapse	of	the	rule	of	law.	It	is	its—and	our—predicament	and	virtue.’	Manderson,	Kangaroo	Courts,	7.	
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prison	provides	the	corrections	facility—the	institution	that	facilitates	the	removal	from	society	of	those	who	contradict	the	definitive	rule	of	the	national	law.27		As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 response,	 law’s	 supremacy	 over	 its	 subjects	 is	 being	physically	 reinforced;	and	yet	 this	does	not	 resolve	 the	underlying	contradiction.	Offensive	 bodies	 might	 have	 been	 brought	 within	 the	 law,	 but	 as	 subjects	 they	remain	outside.	The	result	is	a	form	of	civil	death,	with	the	body	kept	alive	whilst	being	 denied	 its	 rightfulness	 as	 a	 subject.28	 What	 is	 more,	 in	 this	 form,	 the	institution	of	the	rule	of	 law	might	serve	a	regime	that	requires	 living	bodies	but	not	subjects.29	This	might	reaffirm	the	sovereign	position	of	‘the	law’,	but	it	fails	to	resolve	the	underlying	contradiction,	which	becomes	a	concrete	part	of	law’s	rule	in	its	manifest	form.	Not	only	does	this	not	resolve	the	separation,	it	makes	it	less	visible,	 by	 sequestering	 the	 women,	 men,	 and	 children	 who	 embody	 the	contradiction	and	whose	physical	presence	in	the	community	exposes	to	view	the	crack	in	the	rule	of	law.		The	scene	of	Liberia’s	Central	Prison	thus	shows	how	law’s	rule	can	become	fortified	 in	 a	 way	 that	 makes	 it	 hostile	 to	 life,	 and	 how	 this	 is	 informed	 by	 the	response	to	its	contradictoriness	as	a	proposition.	This	returns	to	Mbembe	and	the	question	 of	 how	 the	 institution	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	might	 be	 at	 the	 epicentre	 of	 a	colonising	 power	 that	makes	 subjects	 into	 living	 dead	 through	 acts	 of	 sovereign	expression.30	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 contradiction	 that	 makes	 the	 rule	 of	 law	potentially	 hostile	 to	 life	 is	 also	 a	 source	 of	hope.	What	makes	 the	 contradiction	hopeful	 is	 that	 it	 ensures	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 law’	 is	 never	 equivalent	 with	 the	 ways	 in	which	it	takes	place.	The	rule	of	law	as	a	proposition	never	becomes	identical	with	the	rule	of	law	as	instituted.	Instead,	law’s	rule	remains	open	to	take	place	other-wise,	that	is,	in	other	ways.	Because	the	contradiction	is	never	actually	resolved,	its	fortification	remains	unstable	and	therefore	disposed	to	transformation.	This	is	its	
																																																						27	See	also	Benjamin’s	discussion	of	the	‘possibility	that	the	law’s	interest	in	a	monopoly	of	violence	vis-à-vis	individuals	is	explained	not	by	the	intention	of	preserving	legal	ends	but,	rather,	by	the	intention	of	preserving	the	law	itself;	that	violence,	when	not	in	the	hands	of	the	law,	threatens	it	not	by	the	end	that	it	may	pursue	but	by	its	mere	existence	outside	the	law.’	Walter	Benjamin,	‘Critique	of	Violence’,	in	Walter	Benjamin:	Selected	Writings,	Volume	1,	1913-1926,	ed	Marcus	Bullock	and	Michael	W	Jennings	(Cambridge:	Belknap	Press,	2002),	239.		28	Recall	the	meaning	of	‘capital’	introduced	on	note	8	above.	In	Roman	Law,	civil	death	was	a	form	of	capital	punishment	that	potentially	resulted	in	a	loss	of	citizenship.	I	discuss	this	in	Chapter	4.	29	On	what	I	mean	by	‘regime’,	see	note	10	above.	30	See	Prelude.	
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19ethical	 possibility	 as	much	 as	 its	 threat:	 its	 ‘illimitable	 openness’	 to	 the	 subjects	who	enliven	it.31		Thus	it	is	by	asking	the	general	question	of	‘what	takes	place	in	the	rule	of	law’	 that	 the	 thesis	 sets	 out	 to	 examine	 how	 the	 rule	 of	 law	obtains	 its	 form	 (is	
informed,	as	a	physical	matter)	through	the	different	responses	to	its	contradiction,	as	well	as	how	it	provides	a	medium	for	these	responses	to	take	place.	However,	whilst	this	is	useful	for	understanding	as	a	theoretical	matter	the	general	dynamics	of	what	takes	place	in	the	rule	of	 law	as	a	common	experience,	 it	reveals	nothing	about	 the	 singular	ways	 in	which	 law’s	 rule	 actually	manifests	 in	 any	 particular	instance.	 That	 is	 why	 I	 ask	 the	 second,	 historical-material	 question,	 of	 ‘what	 is	taking	place	in	the	rule	of	law	in	Liberia’.		B	 What	is	taking	place	in	Liberia?		Liberia’s	 first	 settlements	 were	 established	 in	 the	 early	 1820s	 by	 the	 American	Colonization	 Society,	 a	 philanthropic	 organisation	 established	 with	 the	 aim	 of	transporting	 ‘the	 free	 people	 of	 color	 of	 the	 United	 States’	 to	 ‘Africa	 (or	elsewhere)’.32	 When	 Liberia	 declared	 itself	 a	 ‘Free,	 Sovereign	 and	 Independent	State’	 in	 1847,33	 it	 did	 so	 as	 an	 African-American	 republic.	 The	 Constitution	 the	Americo-Liberian	 rulers	 adopted	 at	 independence	 therefore	 unsurprisingly	recalled	the	US	Constitution,	including	its	national	legal	system	and	Common	Law	tradition.34	This	Constitution	provided	the	foundation	for	the	national	law	for	the	next	137	years.		
																																																						31	On	law’s	‘illimitable	openness’	or	‘responsiveness’,	see	Fitzpatrick’s	work	on	law,	eg,	Peter	Fitzpatrick,	Modernism	and	the	Grounds	of	Law	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2001);	Peter	Fitzpatrick,	‘Why	the	Law	is	also	Non-Violent’,	in	Law,	Violence	and	the	Possibility	of	Justice,	ed	Austin	Sarat	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2001);	Peter	Fitzpatrick,	‘Foucault's	Other	Law’,	in	Re-Reading	Foucault:	Law,	Power,	Rights,	ed	Ben	Golder	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2013);	Ben	Golder	and	Peter	Fitzpatrick,	Foucault's	Law	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2009).	On	how	law’s	inter-subjective	foundations	can	pose	a	threat	to	the	rule	of	law,	see	Brian	Z	Tamanaha,	Law	as	a	Means	
to	an	End:	Threat	to	the	Rule	of	Law	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006).	For	a	response	to	Tamanaha’s	argument,	see	Manderson,	Kangaroo	Courts,	82-85.	32	See	constitution	of	‘The	American	Society	for	Colonizing	the	Free	People	of	Color	of	the	United	States’,	in	A	View	of	Exertions	Lately	Made	for	the	Purpose	of	Colonizing	the	Free	People	of	Color,	in	
the	United	States,	in	Africa,	or	Elsewhere	(Washington:	printed	by	Jonathan	Elliot	1817),	11–12.	33	Declaration	of	Independence	of	Liberia	(1847).	34	See	Constitution	of	the	Republic	of	Liberia	(1847).	See	also	Charles	Henry	Huberich,	The	Political	
and	Legislative	History	of	Liberia,	vol	1	and	2	(New	York:	Central	Book	Company,	1947).	
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At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 Liberians—west	 Africans	 whose	ancestors	knew	the	lands	of	Liberia	long	before	the	republic	was	an	idea,	and	who	were	largely	excluded	from	its	realisation	as	a	nation-state—were	not	included	as	signatories	 of	 either	 the	 Declaration	 of	 Independence	 or	 the	 Constitution	 of	 the	Republic.	Rather	they	were	systematically	excluded,	by	design	and/or	effect,	from	being	 full	 legal	 subjects	 of	 Liberia.	 Instead,	 for	 most	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 and	twentieth	centuries,	Liberia’s	national	law	was	used	to	secure	order	and	stability,	ensuring	 the	 republic’s	 ruling	minority	 could	 extend	 and	maintain	 their	 control	over	the	country	and	its	diverse	peoples	and	lands.	Thus	 grounded	 as	 a	 normative	 matter	 in	 less	 than	 five	 percent	 of	 the	subjects	 over	 whom	 it	 claimed	 and	 exercised	 jurisdiction,	 the	 Americo-Liberian	republic	 failed	 to	 maintain	 within	 itself	 the	 basis	 of	 its	 ongoing	 existence	 as	 a	modern	 institution,	 leaving	 its	 foundations	effectively	groundless.	The	result	was	revolution	and	the	eventual	overthrow	of	the	Republic	in	1980,	with	a	coup	d’état	led	 by	 the	 young	 ‘indigenous’	 man,	 Master	 Sergeant	 Samuel	 Doe.	 The	 coup	precipitated	the	devastating	civil	wars	of	 the	1990s	and	early	2000s	that	killed	a	quarter	 of	 a	 million	 people,	 displaced	 millions	 more,35	 and	 destroyed	 the	institutions	and	infrastructure	of	the	State	of	Liberia.		The	first	civil	war	broke	out	at	the	end	of	1989,	when	the	National	Patriotic	Front	 of	 Liberia	 (NPFL),	 under	 the	 command	 of	 Charles	 Taylor,36	 led	 an	 attack	against	 the	Doe	Government.	 The	 toppling	 of	Doe’s	 regime	 did	 not	 end	 the	war,	however,	with	Taylor	having	to	fight	for	control	of	Monrovia	against	rival	factions.	In	 1993,	 the	 United	 Nations	 deployed	 the	 UN	 Observer	 Mission	 in	 Liberia,37	 to	oversee	attempts	to	resolve	the	conflict.	However,	the	‘turning	of	the	tide’	did	not	come	until	1996,	with	‘the	restoration	of	a	climate	of	security’	and	the	‘successful	organization	 and	 conduct	 of	 the	 elections’	 that	 resulted	 in	 Taylor	 becoming	President	 of	 the	 Republic.38	 With	 the	 democratic	 election	 of	 Taylor	 to	 the	
																																																						35	Forced	Migration	Online	notes:	‘The	extent	of	indiscriminate	violence	and	civil	unrest	during	the	civil	war	was	such	that	virtually	all	of	the	country’s	approximately	3	million	people	had	to	flee	their	homes	at	one	time	or	another,	sometimes	for	a	few	weeks	and	in	many	cases	for	several	years.	However,	official	figures	estimate	that	1.2	million	were	internally	displaced	and	700,000	were	refugees	at	the	war’s	end.’	Shelly	Dick,	FMO	Country	Guide:	Liberia:	http://www.forcedmigration.org/research-resources/expert-guides/liberia/fmo013.pdf,	11.			36	See,	eg,	Colin	M	Waugh,	Charles	Taylor	and	Liberia:	Ambition	and	Atrocity	in	Africa's	Lone	State	
State	(London:	Zed	Books,	2011).	37	UN	Doc	S/Res/866	(22	September	1993).	
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21presidency	 in	 1997,	 the	 UN	 Observer	 Mission	 was	 replaced	 by	 the	 UN	 Peace-building	Support	Office	in	Liberia.39		The	state	of	peace	under	Taylor’s	presidency	was	short-lived,	with	Liberia	again	breaking	out	in	civil	war	in	1999.	The	war	lasted,	with	intermittent	fighting,	until	 Taylor’s	 forced	 resignation	 in	 August	 2003	 and	 the	 signing	 of	 a	Comprehensive	Peace	Agreement.40	As	part	of	the	peace	agreement,	a	Multilateral	Force	 authorised	 by	 the	 UN	 Security	 Council,41	 and	 led	 by	 Nigeria	 through	 the	Economic	 Community	 of	West	 African	 States,	 oversaw	 the	 transition.42	Within	 a	few	 months,	 this	 Force	 was	 replaced	 by	 the	 UN	 Mission	 in	 Liberia	 (UNMIL),	mandated	to	oversee	and	facilitate	the	transition	to	democracy.43		In	2005,	Liberia	held	successful	elections,	with	Ellen	Johnson	Sirleaf	taking	office	as	President	of	the	Republic	in	2006.	Sirleaf	was	re-elected	in	2011.	With	the	transition	 to	democracy,	UNMIL’s	peace	operation	also	 shifted	 from	a	 traditional	peace-keeping	to	a	more	multi-dimensional	peace-building	operation.		The	year	2013—the	year	I	carried	out	fieldwork	in	the	country—marked	a	decade	of	post-war	government	in	Liberia	committed	to	instituting	the	rule	of	law	as	 a	 core	 pillar	 of	 its	 state-building	 and	 development	 agenda.	 It	 also	 marked	 a	decade	 of	 a	 UN	 peace	 operation	 in	 the	 country	 with	 a	 mandate	 to	 support	 ‘the	establishment	of	a	state	based	on	the	rule	of	law’.44	If	this	marks	a	critical	break	in	the	history	of	the	republic,	then	the	extent	to	which	the	old	contradiction	remains	
																																																																																																																																																														38	UN	Doc	S/1997/712	(12	September	1997),	Final	Report	of	the	Secretary	General	on	the	United	
Nations	Observer	Mission	in	Liberia,	paras	24-25	and	28-30.	That	the	elections	were	seen	as	a	core	benchmark	of	success	of	the	UN	Observer	Mission	is	made	clear	in	UN	Doc	S/1997/643	(13	August	1997),	24th	Progress	Report	of	the	Secretary	General	on	the	United	Nations	Observer	Mission	in	
Liberia,	para	45	(‘With	the	establishment	of	a	democratically	elected	government	in	Liberia,	the	principal	objective	of	UNOMIL	has	now	been	achieved’).	39	See	UN	Doc	S/1997/817	(22	October	1997).	40	For	the	text	see	UN	Doc	S/2003/850	(29	August	2003),	Annex.		41	UN	Doc	S/Res/1497	(1	August	2003).	42	On	the	transition,	see	Jeremy	Matam	Farrall,	‘The	Liberian	Transitional	Peace	Process,	2003-2006’,	in	Building	Democracy	and	Justice	after	Conflict:	Working	Paper	#6	(Canberra:	RegNet,	2010).	43	UNMIL’s	initial	mandate	is	set	out	in	UN	Doc	S/Res/1509	(19	September	2003).	For	discussion	and	evaluation	of	the	activities	and	performance	of	UNMIL	during	the	transitional	period,	see	Jeremy	Matam	Farrall,	‘Recurring	Dilemmas	in	a	Recurring	Conflict:	Evaluating	the	UN	Mission	in	Liberia	(2003–2006)’,	Journal	of	International	Peacekeeping,	vol	16	(2012).	For	analysis	of	the	period	between	2003	and	2013,	see	Shane	Chalmers	and	Jeremy	Matam	Farrall,	‘Securing	the	Rule	of	Law	through	United	Nations	Peace	Operations	in	Liberia’,	Max	Planck	Yearbook	of	United	Nations	
Law,	vol	18	(2014).	44	UN	Doc	S/Res/1509	(19	September	2003),	preambular	para	7.			
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makes	the	question	of	what	is	taking	place	in	the	rule	of	law	especially	important	for	Liberians.		For	one,	beginning	again	after	a	revolution	and	wars	that	have	left	Liberia	in	a	fractious	state,	the	institution	of	the	rule	of	law	holds	out	the	possibility	of	being	together	as	Liberians	not	just	as	a	matter	of	fact	but	also	as	a	matter	of	right.	At	its	core,	 this	 is	a	 thesis	on	pluralism;	 its	driving	concern	 is	what	 it	means	 for	 law	to	rule	 given	 law’s	essential	 pluralism.45	 The	 tension	 this	 creates	 is	well-known:	 on	one	 hand,	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 is	 set	 against	 the	 arbitrary	 exercise	 of	 power,	 with	everyone	equally	before	the	law;	on	the	other	hand,	there	is	need	for	discretion	in	law,	to	ensure	it	remains	responsive	to	the	plurality	of	difference	that	enlivens	it.	This	is	a	common	problem	with	the	rule	of	law,	but	the	problem	is	especially	acute	for	 Liberia,	which	 remains	 to	 a	 great	 extent	 a	 state	without	 a	 nation.	Whilst	 the	peoples	who	constitute	‘Liberia’	generally	identify	as	citizens	of	the	republic,46	the	identity	hardly	reaches	deep	 into	 the	social.	 In	 this	context,	 the	 institution	of	 the	rule	of	law	might	provide	a	common	bond	that	could	help	in	the	short	term	to	hold	the	 nation	 together,	 whilst	 over	 time	 enable	 the	 deepening	 of	 its	 social	connections.	To	do	 this,	 however,	 the	 rule	of	 law	must	 remain	 responsive	 to	 the	normative	 differences	 that	 animate	 Liberia,	 if	 its	 institution	 is	 not	 to	 become	 a	medium	of	violence,	or	simply	irrelevant.		A	second	reason	why	the	question	of	what	is	taking	place	in	the	rule	of	law	in	Liberia	 is	 important	 is	 that,	as	a	 fractious	post-war	state,	 in	which	 ‘the	rule	of	law’	is	being	promoted	by	both	domestic	and	foreign	actors	as	central	to	its	peace	and	 development,	 Liberia	 is	 a	 site	 that	 is	 especially	 open	 to	 colonisation	 by	transnational	 regimes	 that	 function	 para-sitically.	 Capitalism	 exemplifies	 the	model	 of	 a	 parasitic	 regime	 that	 requires	 other	 bodies	 for	 its	 own	 sustenance	without	 needing	 to	 care	 for	 the	 other	 in	 itself,	 in	 its	 treatment	 of	 everything	 as	exchangeable	 and	 therefore	 nothing	 as	 valuable	 in	 itself.	 As	 a	 logic,	 capitalism	operates	 in	 the	 chasm	 that	 separates	 subject	 and	 object.	 By	 reifying	 this	distinction,	which	 becomes	 structural,	 it	 enables	 the	 exploitation	 of	 an	 object	 as	mere	 object	 whilst	 passing	 the	 swindle	 off	 as	 ‘the	 reality’.	 Thus	 the	 woman	
																																																						45	I	discuss	this	in	Part	2	below,	as	well	as	in	Part	2	of	Chapter	3.	46	The	fact	that	there	are	31	languages	spoken	in	Liberia,	27	of	which	are	‘indigenous’,	in	a	country	with	a	population	of	approximately	4	million,	gives	a	sense	of	Liberia’s	social	diversity.	See	the	entry	for	‘Liberia’,	Ethnologue:	Languages	of	the	World:	http://www.ethnologue.com/country/LR.	
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23becomes	a	human	resource;	 the	 forest	becomes	a	natural	 resource;	and	 in	either	case	the	subject	is	reduced	to	an	object	of	exchange	as	a	matter	of	common	sense.		The	chasmic	structure	of	the	rule	of	law	enables	it	to	be	regulated	by	such	a	regime,	 the	 logic	 of	 which	 becomes	 its	 logic	 as	 a	 social	 institution.	 As	 I	 showed	above	in	the	case	of	Liberia’s	Central	Prison,	responses	to	the	contradiction	in	the	rule	of	law	inform	how	the	rule	of	law	manifests	as	a	reality.	By	informing	how	the	contradictoriness	in	the	rule	of	 law	is	dealt	with,	for	instance	by	emphasising	the	separation	 of	 subject	 and	 object	 and	 denying	 their	 inseparability,	 a	 regime	 can	inform	 how	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 takes	 place.	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 a	 regime	 such	 as	capitalism	 informs	 the	 course	 of	 events,	 such	 as	 a	 post-war	 state-building	 and	development	 strategy,	 the	 logic	 that	 informs	 the	 regime	 might	 inform	 the	institutions	 created	 to	 realise	 the	 strategy.47	 The	 problem,	 however,	 is	 not	 only	that	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 is	 open	 to	 mediation	 by	 the	 regimes	 that	 circumscribe	 its	institution,	informing	how	it	manifests;	the	problem	is	also	that	this	makes	the	rule	of	 law	 a	 medium	 of	 these	 regimes,	 enabling	 their	 operation.	 Thus	 the	 same	dissonance	 that	 enables	 an	 institution	 to	 be	 built	 on	 the	 backs	 of	 subjects	 as	 a	factual	matter	without	becoming	identical	with	them	as	a	normative	matter,	and	to	sustain	itself	parasitically	in	this	way,	can	be	exploited	by	a	regime	to	its	own	ends.		The	circumstances	that	surround	the	attempt	to	establish	a	state	based	on	the	rule	of	law	in	Liberia	include	not	only	the	spread	of	a	transnational	economic	regime	that	desires	the	country’s	natural	and	human	resources	but	could	not	care	less	about	its	subjects.	It	also	includes	the	intervention	of	a	liberal-internationalist	regime	that	tends	to	treat	every	recognised	subject	as	equivalent,	thereby	reducing	them	 to	 an	 empirical	 individuality	 that	denies	 their	 subjective	differences.	As	 an	‘empirical	 individual’,	 the	 subject	 becomes	 the	 object	 of	 a	 universal	 subjectivity	that	 makes	 it	 not	 only	 legitimate	 but	 a	 categorical	 humanitarian	 imperative	 to	assist	 in	developing	it	 to	 its	 full	potential	as	such.48	Capitalism	and	liberalism	are	not	the	only	regimes	circumscribing	what	is	taking	place	in	Liberia	post-war,	nor	is	the	 rule	 of	 law	 only	 informed	 by	 powerful	 transnational	 regimes.	 In	 a	 country	where	the	institutions	of	the	nation-state	are	weak	or	non-existent,	and	therefore	relatively	 ineffective	 mediums,	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 remains	 especially	 open	 to	 take	
																																																						47	On	the	regulatory	influence	of	capitalism,	see	also	John	Braithwaite,	Regulatory	Capitalism:	How	it	
Works,	Ideas	for	Making	it	Work	Better	(Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgar,	2008).	48	See	also	Gerry	Simpson,	‘Humanity,	Law,	Force’,	in	Strengthening	the	Rule	of	Law	through	the	UN	
Security	Council,	ed	Jeremy	Matam	Farrall	and	Hilary	Charlesworth	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2016).	
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place	in	ways	that	defy	the	logics	of	these	regimes.	The	result	is	a	site	in	which	the	problem	of	what	takes	place	in	the	rule	of	law	is	both	extremely	lively	and	at	the	frontline	 of	 the	 contemporary	 global	 growth	 of	 para-sitic	 regimes	 that	 operate	through	domestic	institutions.49		
2	 Approaching	the	rule	of	law	and	Liberia		A	philosophical	problem	underlies	 this	 thesis:	how	 to	 respond	 to	 the	dialectic	of	subject	 and	 object,	 that	 is,	 their	 simultaneous	 separation	 and	 inseparability.	 In	short,	the	problem	arises	out	of	the	confusion	of	‘being’	(subjectively)	and	‘existing’	(objectively),	where	the	two	are	never	completely	separate	(a	subject	being	always	informed	 by	 an	 objective	 existence),	 but	 also	 never	 in	 perfect	 harmony	 or	 unity	(objective	existence	always	being	made	sense	of	subjectively).50			This	 dialectic,	 whereby	 subject	 and	 object	 inform	 each	 other	 without	becoming	identical,	is	not	problematic	in	itself.51	The	problem	arises	when	there	is	an	 insistence	on	 identity.	This	can	happen	in	two	ways:	(1)	by	separating	subject	and	 object	 and	 making	 them	 identical	 with	 themselves;	 and	 (2)	 by	 collapsing	subject	 and	 object	 and	 making	 them	 identical	 with	 each	 other.	 At	 its	 extreme,	postmodernism	slips	 into	the	first	conceit,	 in	 its	radical	critique	of	objectivity.	By	emphasising	 the	 indeterminacy	 of	 every	 posited	 identity,	 subject	 and	 object	 are	held	 in	 total	 non-identity,	 which	 loses	 sight	 of	 the	 inseparability	 of	 the	 two.	 In	effect	 this	 total	 non-identity,	 which	 turns	 the	 chasm	 into	 a	 black	 hole,	 becomes	another	 form	 of	 identification,	 the	 two	 that	 are	 never	 one	 (as	 subject-object)	becoming	two	ones	(as	subject	/	object).	At	another	extreme,	analytical-positivism	slips	into	the	second	conceit,	in	its	pursuit	of	objectivity.52	In	the	desire	to	be	at	one	
																																																						49	I	do	not	mean	domestic	as	opposed	to	international	or	transnational.	I	mean	domestic	as	the	locale	of	the	institution,	which	might	be	international	or	transnational	at	the	same	time.	In	this	sense,	a	‘domestic	institution’	operates	as	a	site	or	medium	of	inter-normativity,	that	is,	as	a	site	where	what	is	international	or	transnational	becomes	also	domestic.	For	discussion	of	‘sites	of	inter-normativity’,	see	Jutras,	‘Legal	Dimensions	of	Everyday	Life’.	50	On	this	problem,	see	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	in	general,	and	in	particular	Part	I,	Section	II:	Being	and	Existence	at	104-136.	See	also	Theodor	W	Adorno,	‘The	Actuality	of	Philosophy’,	Telos,	vol	31	(1977).	I	also	discuss	the	subject-object	dialectic	in	Part	2	of	Chapter	1.	51	On	the	concepts	of	subject/ivity	and	object/ivity,	and	their	negative-dialectical	relation,	see,	eg,	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	18-19,	21-22,	144-146,	176-177.	See	also	Theodor	W	Adorno,	Hegel:	
Three	Studies,	trans	Shierry	Weber	Nicholsen	(Cambridge:	MIT	Press,	1963),	4,	63.	52	By	‘analytical-positivism’	I	mean	broadly	the	tendency	to	equate	what	is	with	what	is	posited	as	‘is’	through	the	act	of	analysis.	For	instance,	legal	positivism	is	marked	by	the	tendency	to	equate	
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25with	 existence,	 positivism	 loses	 sight	 of	 the	 separation	 of	 subject	 and	 object,	collapsing	the	two,	being	and	existence,	which	are	irreducible	to	the	one.	Neither	position	holds	on	its	own,	because	each	fails	to	maintain	the	truth	of	the	 other	 within	 it.	 This	 is	 where	 poststructuralism	 offered	 a	 way	 forward,	 by	maintaining	both	positions	in	an	irresolute	dialectic	that	provides	a	response	to	the	‘double	 demand	 of	 modernity’	 (as	 Peter	 Fitzpatrick	 puts	 it):	 ‘the	 demand	 for	assured	position	integrated	with	a	responsiveness	to	all	that	is	beyond	position,	a	demand	 to	 be	met	 now	without	 resort	 to	 erstwhile	 solutions	 of	 a	 transcendent	kind.’53	Manderson	has	summarised	the	poststructuralist	response	to	this	demand	as	‘[t]he	search	for	mobile	signifieds	beneath	constant	and	iterable	signifiers’.54	In	other	 words,	 a	 poststructuralist	 (re)search	 agenda	 is	 critically	 attentive	 to	 the	subjects	 that	 enliven	 the	 structures	 that	 take	 their	 name	whilst	 remaining	 non-identical	to	them.	Thus	what	 is	signified	remains	mobile	 in	that	 it	 is	always	more	and	 always	other	 than	 its	 identifying	marks,	which	 remain	 constant	 and	 iterable	because	they	are	not	empirically	fixed	to	what	they	signify.		This	returns	to	the	problem	of	institutionalisation.	Never	identical	with	its	subjects,	an	institution	can	persist	in	the	absence	of	the	empirical	individuals	who	come	and	go	from	time	to	time.	 Indeed,	 its	 integrity	as	an	 institution	depends	on	this	separation.	Thus	as	a	social	structure	an	institution	might	remain	constant	and	iterable	whilst	the	empirical	individuals	that	enliven	it	remain	mobile;	and	yet	an	institution	is	never	absolutely	separate	from	these	individuals,	who,	as	subjects	and	not	 as	mere	 bodies,	 constitute	 its	 grounds	 as	 an	 entity.	 Thus	 the	 integrity	 of	 an	institution	 also	 depends	 on	 it	 maintaining	 within	 it	 the	 subjectivity	 of	 the	individuals	who	are	of	its	essence,	without	becoming	identical	with	them.55		
																																																																																																																																																														what	is	law	with	what	is	posited	as	‘the	law’.	Similarly,	scientific	methodologies	are	marked	by	the	equation	of	what	is	with	what	is	apparent	to	observation.	53	Fitzpatrick,	Modernism	and	the	Grounds	of	Law,	2.	54	Manderson	contrasts	this	with	structuralism,	which	he	characterises	as	‘[t]he	search	for	constant	signifieds	beneath	mobile	signifiers’.	Desmond	Manderson,	‘The	Metastases	of	Myth:	Legal	Images	as	Transitional	Phenomena’,	Law	Critique,	vol	26	(2015):	208-209.	55	To	reiterate	another	image	to	signify	this	point,	an	image	evoked	by	‘Proust’s	narrator’	and	reiterated	by	Spivak	in	her	‘Translator’s	Preface’	to	Derrida’s	Of	Grammatology:	‘I	was	not	one	man	only	[…]	but	the	steady	advance	hour	after	hour	of	an	army	in	close	formation,	in	which	there	appeared,	according	to	the	moment,	impassioned	men,	indifferent	men,	jealous	men…	In	a	composite	mass,	these	elements	may,	one	by	one,	without	our	noticing	it,	be	replaced	by	others,	which	others	again	eliminate	or	reinforce,	until	in	the	end	a	change	has	been	brought	about	which	it	would	be	impossible	to	conceive	if	we	were	a	single	person’.	‘What,	then’,	Spivak	asks,	‘is	the	[…]	identity?’	Gayatri	Chakravorty	Spivak,	‘Translator’s	Preface’,	in	Jacques	Derrida,	Of	Grammatology	(Baltimore:	The	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1997),	xi.	
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The	 subject-object	dialectic	 is	 the	 constitutive	 logic	of	 the	 institution.	 It	 is	also	the	constitutive	logic	of	 law,	and	its	rule,	as	I	turn	to	discuss	in	a	moment.	A	thesis	 that	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 must	 therefore	consider	 how	 it	 approaches	 this	 philosophical	 problem,	 and	 how	 its	 approach	addresses	both	of	the	‘double	demands	of	modernity’	at	the	same	time.56		A	 Theoretical	approach		The	 philosophy	 set	 out	 by	 Theodor	 Adorno	 in	 his	 work	 Negative	 Dialectics	 is	directed	at	this	very	problem.57	At	its	crux,	negative	dialectics	is	nothing	more	than	‘the	 consistent	 consciousness	 of	 non-identity’.58	 This	 is	 ‘dialectical’	 in	 the	 sense	that	 it	 places	 every	 thesis,	 or	 identity,	 in	 relation	 with	 its	 antithesis,	 or	 non-identity.	However,	this	is	a	negative	dialectic,	rather	than	a	positive	one,	in	that	the	equation	of	 thesis	 and	antithesis,	 identity	 and	non-identity,	 is	not	 seen	 to	end	 in	synthesis.	 The	 equation,	 which	 would	make	 a	 thesis	 identical	 with	 its	 object,	 is	always	seen	to	be	inadequate.	Every	synthetic	end	is	seen	as	another	identification,	another	act	of	 articulation,	 the	 truth	of	which	 remains	 in	 relation	 to	 the	ways	 in	which	it	is	more	and	other	than	articulated.	This	results	in	a	restless	negativity,59	a	constant	overturning	of	one-sided	positions.60	This	 is	 set	 against	 the	 academic	 tendency	 to	 separate,	 analytically,	subjective	 and	 objective	 dimensions,	 with	 the	 social	 sciences	 doing	 objective	research,	 and	 the	 humanities	 doing	 subjective	 research.	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 this	crude	 division	 is	 accurate,	 it	 is	 problematic.	 It	 is	 problematic	 because	 the	 social	
																																																						56	See	note	53	above.	57	The	central	text	I	engage	with	is	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics.	Others	include	Adorno,	Hegel:	Three	
Studies;	Adorno,	‘The	Actuality	of	Philosophy’;	Theodor	W	Adorno,	Metaphysics:	Concept	and	
Problems	(Lectures,	1965),	trans	Edmund	Jephcott	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2000);	Theodor	W	Adorno,	Aesthetic	Theory,	trans	Robert	Hullot-Kentor	(New	York:	Continuum,	2004);	Theodor	W	Adorno,	Minima	Moralia:	Reflections	from	Damaged	Life,	trans	E	F	N	Jephcott	(London:	Verso,	2005);	Theodor	W	Adorno,	History	and	Freedom:	Lectures	1964-1965,	trans	Rodney	Livingstone	(Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	2006);	Theodor	W	Adorno,	Lectures	on	Negative	Dialectics:	
Fragments	of	a	Lecture	Course	1965-1966	(Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	2008).	58	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	16-18.	59	In	this	Adorno’s	Negative	Dialectics	sits	alongside	Jean-Luc	Nancy,	Hegel:	The	Restlessness	of	the	
Negative,	trans	Jason	Smith	and	Steven	Miller	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2002).	60	To	a	significant	extent	this	approach	informed	the	work	of	the	first	generation	of	scholars	affiliated	with	the	Frankfurt	Institute	for	Social	Research	Commonly	known	as	the	‘Frankfurt	School’.	This	includes,	relevantly	to	this	thesis,	Walter	Benjamin,	Max	Horkheimer,	and	Herbert	Marcuse.	See,	eg,	Susan	Buck-Morss,	The	Origin	of	Negative	Dialectics:	Theodor	W	Adorno,	Walter	
Benjamin,	and	the	Frankfurt	Institute	(New	York:	The	Free	Press,	1977).	
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27sciences	have	a	disciplinary	advantage	when	it	comes	to	empirical	research,	just	as	the	 humanities	 have	 an	 advantage	 in	 their	 attention	 to	what	 remains	more	 and	other	than	observed	and	described	as	empirical.		The	 problem	 can	 be	 seen	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 study	 of	 law,	 where	 the	separation	between	‘law	as	object’	and	‘law	as	subject’	is	as	real	as	it	is	artificial.61	On	 one	 side,	 approaching	 law	 as	 an	 object	 of	 study	 risks	 losing	 sight	 of	 its	subjective	 qualities:	 it	 risks	 treating	 law	 and	 its	 rule	 in	 a	 way	 that	 reifies	 its	institutional	separation	from	the	experience	of	the	subjects	who	enliven	it.	On	the	other	side,	approaching	law	subjectively	risks	losing	sight	of	its	objective	qualities:	it	risks	treating	law	and	its	rule	in	a	naïvely	relativistic	way	that	fails	to	maintain	how	the	institution	has	a	structure	that	makes	it	more	than	its	subjects.		Because	law	is	both	subjective	and	objective,	and	neither	of	these	alone,	the	problem	is	how	to	bring	the	two	together	in	the	study	of	law	without	losing	sight	of	the	 differences.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 problem	 is	 not	 how	 to	 overcome	 the	differences	 between	 the	 humanities	 and	 social	 sciences,	 by	merging	 subject	 and	object	 into	 some	 third	 basis	 for	 thinking	 about	 law	 (producing	 a	 kind	 of	 Gonzo	methodology).62	 The	 problem	 is	 how	 to	 avoid	 separating	 the	 two	 entirely	 and	privileging	 one	 over	 the	 other,	 without	 collapsing	 the	 two	 in	 disregard	 of	 their	differences—how	 to	maintain	 their	 differences	whilst	 bringing	 them	 together	 in	their	critical	relation	to	each	other.		Negative	 dialectics	 is	 directed	 at	 exactly	 that.63	 The	 critical	 strength	 of	Adorno’s	 philosophy	 is	 its	 capacity	 to	 maintain	 the	 separation	 of	 what	 is	‘subjective’	 and	 what	 is	 ‘objective’	 as	 well	 as	 their	 inseparability,	 that	 is,	 the	negative-dialectical	 relation	 of	 subject	 and	 object.64	 In	 this,	 Adorno’s	 negative-
																																																						61	For	a	discussion	of	the	different	approaches	to	law	in	the	fields	of	‘socio-legal	studies’	and	‘law	and	the	humanities’,	with	a	tendency	in	the	former	to	approach	law	as	an	object	of	study,	and	in	the	latter	as	a	subject	of	study,	see	Desmond	Manderson,	‘AD	2014:	A	Review	essay	of	Eve	Darian-Smith,	Laws	and	Societies	in	Global	Contexts—Contemporary	Approaches	’,	Law	and	Humanities,	vol	8,	no	1	(2014).	See	also	Austin	Sarat,	‘Vitality	Amidst	Fragmentation:	On	the	Emergence	of	Postrealist	Law	and	Society	Scholarship’,	in	The	Blackwell	Companion	to	Law	and	Society,	ed	Austin	Sarat	(Online:	Blackwell,	2004);	Austin	Sarat,	Matthew	Anderson,	and	Cathrine	O	Frank,	‘Introduction:	On	the	Origins	and	Prospects	of	the	Humanistic	Study	of	Law’,	in	Law	and	the	
Humanities:	An	Introduction,	ed	Austin	Sarat,	Matthew	Anderson,	and	Cathrine	O	Frank	(Online:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2016).	62	The	Gonzo	reference	is	of	course	to	Hunter	S	Thompson,	whose	style	of	journalism	was	famous	for	bringing	together	the	most	precise	factual	investigation	with	his	freakish	experience	of	the	facts.	63	Poststructuralism	has	this	potential	in	it	as	well,	and	yet	it	has	struggled	to	advance	its	research	agenda	within	the	social	sciences.	I	consider	this	further	in	Part	2	of	Chapter	1,	where	I	address	the	similarities	and	differences	between	Adorno’s	negative	dialectics	and	Derrida’s	deconstruction.	64	I	examine	the	‘subject-object	dialectic’	in	Part	2	of	Chapter	1.	
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dialectical	 philosophy	 is	 able	 to	 bring	 together	 the	 disparate	 disciplines	 of	 the	social	 sciences	 and	 the	 humanities	 without	 amalgamating	 them	 in	 disregard	 of	their	 differences.	 I	 address	 how	 it	 does	 this	 in	more	 detail	 in	 Chapter	 1.	 Rather	than	 go	 into	 the	 philosophical	 discussion	 here,	 however,	 it	 is	 more	 useful	 to	introduce	 how	 it	 does	 this	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 thesis,	 both	 conceptually,	 in	thinking	about	the	problem	of	 law	and	its	rule,	and	methodologically,	 in	carrying	out	a	research	project	on	the	rule	of	law	in	Liberia.			B	 Approaching	the	concept	of	law		Negative	dialectics	places	every	concept	into	dialogue	with	its	object—with	what	a	concept	 seeks	 to	 articulate—without	 seeking	 a	 final	 reconciliation,	 or	 becoming	nihilistic	because	of	 the	 impossibility	of	such	reconciliation.65	One	of	my	primary	concerns	in	this	thesis	is	to	examine	what	this	means	for	the	concept	of	law,	and	by	extension,	 law’s	 rule.	 This	 is	 also	 one	 of	 the	main	 contributions	 I	 seek	 to	make	through	 the	 thesis,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	 succeeds	 in	 driving	 Adorno’s	 negative-dialectical	philosophy	into	the	realities	of	law.66		I	begin	by	approaching	the	concept	of	law	as	the	articulation	of	normativity.	There	 are	 two	 ways	 to	 look	 at	 this.	 One	 is	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 law	 as	 the	expressive	 subject	 that	 articulates	 the	 sentence,	 ‘the	 law	 is	 this’.	 From	 this	perspective,	 law	 is	 not	 an	 object	 of	 study	 (‘the	 law’),	 but	 an	 expressive	 subject,	‘law’,	which	gives	form	to	existence,	as	its	object,	always	as	a	normative	matter.	By	
law:	 ‘the	 law	 is	 this’.	 And	 yet	 the	 view	 from	 this	 perspective	 is	 unsettled:	 the	subject	can	see	how	every	act	of	articulation,	of	expressing	what	‘is’	(‘the	law’),	is	a	leap	 of	 faith,	 over	 what	 remains	 in	 between	 what	 is	 (in	 actuality)	 and	 what	 is	predicated	as	‘is’—how	‘this’	is	and	is	not	what	it	is	expressed	to	be	by	law.	This	is	about	 seeing	 the	 contradiction	 in	 law	 from	 the	 non-naïve	 perspective	 of	 law-as-subject,	 a	 contradiction	 that	 animates	 every	 expression	 of	 ‘the	 law’.	 The	 second	perspective	 then	 switches	 standpoints,	 to	 take	 the	 view	 of	 the	 subject	 within	jurisdiction,	whose	experience	of	law	is	neither	wholly	circumscribed	by	‘the	law’	
																																																						65	See	also	Erik	Doxtader,	‘Reconciliation	-	A	Rhetorical	Concept/ion’,	Quarterly	Journal	of	Speech,	vol	89,	no	4	(2003).	66	Introducing	Negative	Dialectics,	Adorno	stated	the	aim	of	his	book:	‘to	drive	it	[negative	dialectics],	according	to	its	own	concept,	into	the	realm	of	reality’:	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	Prologue.	
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29as	expressed,	nor	wholly	outside	‘the	law’.	Rather	than	seeing	‘law’,	as	subject,	this	second	point	of	view	is	about	seeing	‘the	law’,	as	object,	from	the	perspective	of	the	subject	 whose	 experience	 is	 the	 very	 object	 of	 law.	 And	 the	 view	 from	 here	 is	equally	unsettled,	with	 the	 subject’s	 experience	of	 law	neither	 as	predicated	nor	simply	free	from	predication.		In	sum,	these	two	viewpoints	are	concerned	with	law	as	a	subjective	and	as	an	 objective	 phenomenon:	 from	 the	 first	 perspective,	 how	 law	gives	 form	 to	 the	world,	as	a	subjective	matter;	and	from	the	second	perspective,	how	the	law	takes	
form	in	the	world,	as	an	objective	matter.	The	point,	however,	is	that	neither	view	is	adequate	on	 its	own.	As	Adorno	writes,	 ‘dialectics	 [is]	not	a	standpoint’.67	As	a	dialectical	 phenomenon,	 law	 is	 both	 the	 positive	 expression	 and	 what	 remains	more	 and	 other	 than	 expressed.	 Just	 as	 negative	 dialectics	 is	 directed	 at	 the	consistent	consciousness	of	non-identity,	a	negative-dialectical	approach	to	law	is	directed	 at	 making	 law’s	 non-identical	 aspects	 critical	 to	 its	 concept.	 In	 more	concrete	terms,	it	is	about	making	the	prisoner’s	experience	central	to	the	concept	of	the	rule	of	 law,	rather	than	treating	him	as	excess	that	must	be	remanded	in	a	corrections	facility	in	order	to	uphold	the	absoluteness	of	the	rule-of-law	concept.	Approaching	 law	 in	 this	 way	 is	 not	 just	 an	 academic	 exercise.	 As	 an	academic	 exercise,	 its	 importance	 is	 that	 it	 makes	 law	 essentially	 plural,	 by	bringing—and	more	 importantly,	 by	 keeping—law	 in	 dialogue	with	 the	 subjects	who	enliven	its	forms	as	a	normative	matter.	The	result	 is	a	 ‘legal	pluralism’	that	locates	 the	 pluralism	 in	 law,	 rather	 than	 being	 a	 description	 of	 the	 relation	between	different	legal	orders,	as	it	is	most	often	thought	about.68	By	approaching	law	as	only	really	meaningful,	or	‘whole’,	when	seen	in	relation	to	the	subjects	who	are	 within	 jurisdiction	 whilst	 remaining	 excluded	 from	 its	 expressions	 as	 a	normative	 matter,	 pluralism	 becomes	 law’s	 essential	 condition.	 But	 it	 must	 be	
																																																						67	Ibid,	16-18.	68	For	a	review	of	this	literature,	see	Miranda	Forsyth,	A	Bird	that	Flies	with	Two	Wings:	The	Kastom	
and	State	Justice	Systems	in	Vanuatu	(Canberra:	ANU	E	Press,	2009),	Chapter	2.	See	also	Sally	Engle	Merry,	‘Legal	Pluralism’,	Law	and	Society	Review,	vol	22,	no	5	(1988).	I	find	the	most	compelling	approach	to	legal	pluralism	in	Macdonald’s	work	on	a	‘critical	legal	pluralism’.	For	an	introduction,	see	Martha-Marie	Kleinhans	and	Roderick	A	Macdonald,	‘What	is	a	Critical	Legal	Pluralism?’,	
Canadian	Journal	of	Law	and	Society,	vol	12	(1997).	Macdonald	develops	this	further	in	Roderick	A	Macdonald,	‘Custom	Made	-	For	a	Non-chirographic	Critical	Legal	Pluralism’,	Canadian	Journal	of	
Law	and	Society,	vol	26,	no	2	(2011).	See	also	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns,	‘Responding	to	the	Demands	of	Difference:	An	Introduction’,	in	Cultural	Pluralism,	Identity	Politics,	and	the	Law,	ed	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns	(Ann	Arbor:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	2001).	I	address	the	question	of	law’s	pluralism	in	Part	2	of	Chapter	3.	
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emphasised:	this	is	a	dialectical,	and	not	an	analytical,	approach.	The	result	is	not	an	array	of	individuated	laws,	separated	into	an	indissoluble	pluralism.	As	much	as	law	is	seen	to	be	essentially	plural,	 law	is	also	seen	to	be	essentially	singular.	On	this	approach,	law	is	as	much	in-common	as	it	is	experienced	in	different	ways.		A	negative-dialectical	approach	thus	enables	one	to	appreciate	the	chasmic	structure	of	law,	whereby	law	is	simultaneously	singular,	incorporating	all	subjects	within	jurisdiction,	and	plural,	taking	place	in	non-identical	ways,	enlivened	by	the	subjects	over	whom	law	rules.	This	is	important	for	understanding	law	and	its	rule	as	 a	 common	 experience,	 but	 it	 is	 especially	 important	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	question	 of	what	 is	 taking	 place	 in	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 Liberia.	 That	 is	 because	 it	provides	 a	 way	 of	 approaching	 a	 problem	 that	 has	 confronted	 scholars	 and	practitioners	 working	 in	 the	 field	 of	 ‘law	 and	 development’	 or	 ‘rule-of-law	promotion’	since	the	earliest	colonial	interventions.69		The	‘problem’	is	how	to	institute	a	singular	rule	of	law	in	a	situation	of	legal	pluralism.70	 On	 one	 side,	 the	 answer	 to	 this	 problem	 is	 to	 attempt	 to	 erase	 all	traces	 of	 pluralism.	 This	 is	 the	 attitude	 of	 many	 of	 the	 members	 of	 Liberia’s	national	 legal	profession,	who	see	other	expressions	of	 law,	whether	 ‘customary’	or	 ‘traditional’,	 as	 eventually	withering	 away	with	modernisation.71	 It	 is	 also	 the	attitude	 of	 many	Western	 government	 officials,	 who	 do	 not	 even	 recognise	 the	existence	of	different	expressions	of	law	within	the	nation-state.72	On	another	side,	
																																																						69	For	a	history	of	this	field,	see	David	M	Trubeck,	‘The	“Rule	of	Law”	in	Development	Assistance:	Past,	Present,	and	Future’,		(unpublished	paper,	2003):	https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_8/mg3md/ruleoflaw.pdf.	See	also	David	M	Trubeck,	‘Law	and	Development	in	the	Twenty-first	Century’,	University	of	Wisconsin	Law	School	Legal	Studies	
Research	Paper	Series	Paper	No.	1178	(2011);	Michael	Zürn,	André	Nollkaemper,	and	Randy	Peerenboom,	eds,	Rule	of	Law	Dynamics:	In	an	Era	of	International	and	Transnational	Governance	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2012);	John	Hatchard	and	Amanda	Perry-Kessaris,	eds,	
Law	and	Development	in	the	21st	Century:	Facing	complexity	in	the	21st	Century	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2003).	70	For	two	recent	studies	of	this	problem,	see	Forsyth,	A	Bird	that	Flies	with	Two	Wings:	The	Kastom	
and	State	Justice	Systems	in	Vanuatu;	Laura	Grenfell,	Promoting	the	Rule	of	Law	in	Post-conflict	
States	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2013).	For	another	approach	to	this	problem,	see	Brian	Z	Tamanaha,	‘The	Rule	of	Law	and	Legal	Pluralism	in	Development’,	Hague	Journal	on	the	Rule	
of	Law,	vol	3,	no	1	(2011).	71	I	discuss	this	in	Part	2	of	Chapter	7.	Grenfell	makes	a	similar	observation	with	respect	to	the	attitude	in	many	international	organisations:	see	Laura	Grenfell,	‘The	UN	and	"Rule-of-Law	Constitutions"’,	in	Strengthening	the	Rule	of	Law	through	the	United	Nations	Security	Council,	ed	Jeremy	Matam	Farrall	and	Hilary	Charlesworth	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2016),	128.	72	For	instance,	in	2007,	in	explaining	why	Australia	voted	against	the	United	Nations	Declaration	of	
Indigenous	Peoples	Rights,	Australia’s	Ambassador	to	the	UN,	Robert	Hill,	argued	that	‘[c]ustomary	law	is	not	“law”	in	the	sense	that	modern	democracies	use	the	term;	it	is	based	on	culture	and	tradition’,	effectively	limiting	‘law’	properly	so-called	to	‘State	law’,	and	by	startling	implication,	leaving	Liberia,	amongst	many	other	parts	of	the	world	where	the	law	of	the	state	is	dysfunctional	
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31where	differences	 in	 law	are	recognised,	 the	answer	 is	 to	establish	a	hierarchical	Constitution	 that	 places	 ‘other	 law’	 in	 a	 position	 of	 subordination	 to	 a	 higher	(national)	law,	with	any	contradiction	in	law	resolved	in	favour	of	the	higher	law.	Yet	another	approach	might	advocate	a	radical	separation	of	law,	seeking	to	avoid	contradictions	in	law	by	decentralising	legal	authority.73		However,	 none	of	 these	 responses	 takes	 seriously	 the	 challenge	posed	by	law’s	 pluralism.	 This	 is	 the	 same	 challenge	 noted	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	Introduction:	to	take	seriously	the	implications	of	the	contradiction	in	law,	which	manifests	 in	 its	 simultaneous	 singularity	 and	 plurality.	 This	 problem	 cannot	 be	wished	away,	nor	can	it	be	overcome	through	the	establishment	of	a	hierarchical	constitutional	 system	 or	 the	 decentralisation	 of	 legal	 authority.	 The	 problem	remains	in	any	case	because	it	is	the	condition	of	law	in	its	every	expression.	A	negative-dialectical	approach	enables	one	to	appreciate	this—the	chasmic	structure	 of	 law,	 and	 its	 rule—and	 therefore	 to	 appreciate	 the	 nature	 of	 the	problem	 of	 trying	 to	 institute	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 Liberia	 (or	 elsewhere).	 More	critically,	this	approach	then	enables	one	to	analyse	the	different	responses	to	the	contradiction—to	 see	 how	 these	 responses	 inform	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 as	 a	material	phenomenon,	and	how	the	rule	of	law	provides	a	medium	for	them	to	take	place.		C	 A	methodology	of	the	imagination		Carrying	out	this	research	gives	rise	to	a	further	problem	of	methodology:	how	to	examine	 ‘the	 empirical’.	 From	 a	 negative-dialectical	 perspective,	 the	 act	 of	identifying	an	object	of	 study	 is	 seen	 to	 cut	 that	object	 short,	 leaving	an	 identity	that	 has	 its	 truth	 in	 relation	 with	 what	 remains	 non-identical	 to	 its	conceptualisation.	 This	 leaves	 the	 empiricist	 in	 the	 most	 wonderful	 paradox,	suspended	 in	 an	 imaginarium	 between	 subjectivity	 and	 objectivity:	 thinking	 an	object	as	it	is,	in	fact	the	empiricist	thinks	the	object	otherwise;	grasping	the	object	as	a	matter	of	fact,	the	empiricist	grasps	the	fact	as	a	matter	of	theory.		The	approach	I	 take	to	this	problem	is	not	 to	seek	to	resolve	the	paradox,	but	to	make	 it	critical	 to	research.	To	use	Adorno’s	term,	the	task	 is	 to	develop	a	
																																																																																																																																																														and/or	irrelevant	in	everyday	life,	almost	entirely	lawless.	See	UN	Doc	A/61/PV.107	(13	September	2007),	11.	See	also	Grenfell,	Promoting	the	Rule	of	Law	in	Post-conflict	States,	54.	73	See	also	Sarat	and	Kearns,	‘Responding	to	the	Demands	of	Difference:	An	Introduction’.	
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more	 exact	 imagination:	 ‘an	 imagination	 that	 remains	 strictly	 confined	 to	 the	material	offered	 it	by	 scholarship	and	science	and	goes	beyond	 them	only	 in	 the	smallest	 features	of	 its	arrangement,	 features	which	of	course	 it	must	produce	of	itself.’74	 If	 the	 critical	 function	 of	 the	 scholar’s	 imagination	 is	 its	 productive	arrangement	of	research	material,	this	is	both	negative	and	positive:	negating	the	given	 objectivity	 of	 things,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 giving	 form	 to	 everything	 as	 the	material	of	reason.	As	 intellectual	 labour,	 this	work	 is	what	gives	the	material	 its	scientific	value.	Without	critically	engaging	the	 imagination,	 things	would	remain	in	 the	 realm	 of	myth:	 treating	material	 as	 purely	 objective	 in	 itself,	 the	 rational	empiricist	remains	blind	to	its	subjective	conditioning,75	just	as	the	relativist	who	treats	material	as	purely	subjective	remains	blind	to	its	objective	conditioning.		Following	Adorno,	I	approach	‘the	empirical’	as	the	phenomenon	that	plays	out	 in	ways	which	always	defy	 its	 rational	conception.	What	 is	empirical	 is	what	the	 researcher	 imagines	 it	 to	 be	 as	 a	 conceptual	 matter	 and	 thereby	 renders	imaginary,	leaving	a	concept	of	the	empirical	that	interpolates	the	empirical.	This	is	an	act	of	interpellation	in	that	the	researcher	calls	what	is	empirical	to	attention	by	 identifying	 it	according	 to	 its	concept.	 In	 this	 the	rational	empiricist	displaces	the	object	of	study	twice	over,	the	first	time	in	thinking	the	concept	into	existence	out	of	the	object,	and	the	second	time	in	affirming	the	existence	of	this	concept	in	place	of	 its	object.	To	avoid	displacing	its	object	for	the	second	time	and	to	move	beyond	the	pure	fiction	of	rationality,	a	conceptual	schema—whether	of	law	or	of	a	project	such	as	this	one—must	engage	the	empirical	through	the	imaginary.76		The	lesson	for	the	social	scientist	is	this:	rather	than	approach	the	object	of	study	directly	and	try	to	lay	hold	of	it	with	the	most	adequate	conceptual	schema	possible,	approach	 it	 indirectly,	 through	an	arrangement	 that	encircles	 the	object	from	 its	points	of	difference.	 ‘Solely	constellations	represent,	 from	without,	what	the	concept	has	cut	away	from	within,	the	“more”,	which	the	former	wishes	to	be,	so	very	much	as	 it	 cannot	be	 the	 latter.’	Adorno	continues:	 ‘By	gathering	around	
																																																						74	Adorno,	‘The	Actuality	of	Philosophy’,	131.	The	translation	here	is	from	Shierry	Weber	Nicholsen,	
Exact	Imagination,	Late	Work:	On	Adorno's	Aesthetics	(Cambridge:	MIT	Press,	1997),	4.	75	See	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	23-24.	76	For	further	discussion,	see	Shane	Chalmers,	‘Law's	Imaginary	Life	on	the	Ground:	Scenes	of	the	Rule	of	Law	in	Liberia’,	Law	and	Literature,	vol	27,	no	2	(2015):	181.	
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33the	 thing	 to	 be	 cognized,	 the	 concepts	 potentially	 determine	 its	 innermost	 core,	thinking	to	attain	what	thinking	necessarily	stamped	out	of	itself.’77		In	 my	 appropriation	 of	 this	 constellational	 approach,	 the	 concepts	 that	gather	around	the	object	 to	be	cognised	and	 ‘potentially	determine	 its	 innermost	core’	are	the	object’s	negative	identities,	that	is,	the	ways	in	which	it	is	other	than	expressed	by	its	concept.	This	is	not	a	purely	negative	result.	Again,	the	point	is	to	bring	‘positive’	and	‘negative’	together	in	an	unholy	alliance.	To	put	it	one	way,	the	result	 is	 a	 negative	 position	 (or	 to	 put	 it	 another	 way,	 a	 posited	 negation).	 For	instance,	 the	 object	 of	 Chapter	 6	 is	 ‘the	 national	 law	of	 Liberia’,	which	 I	 present	through	a	constellation	of	scenes	configured	to	show	how	the	national	law	is	taking	non-identical	 form	on	the	ground.	Subverted;	perverted;	 ignored;	 inverted:	viewed	from	these	negative	vantage	points,	 from	these	points	of	 fundamental	difference,	the	image	of	the	‘the	national	law’	is	seen	configured	in	ways	that	reveal	something	more	 of	 its	 true	 identity.	 Critically,	 this	 ‘true	 identity’,	 or	 ‘innermost	 core’	 of	 the	object,	 is	 only	 ever	 grasped	negatively	 and	partially:	 as	 a	 non-truth—identifying	the	 phenomenon	 in	 the	 ways	 it	 is	 other	 than	 conceived;	 and	 as	 a	 non-whole—without	identifying	once	and	for	all	how	it	is	otherwise.		Thus	it	is	in	the	refuse	of	scattered	off-cuts	that	the	crystal	of	the	totality	is	to	be	discovered;	not	 the	totality	 itself,	but	 in	 the	assemblage	of	 the	smallest	and	least	 remarkable	 data,	 a	 composite	 that	 refracts	 a	 dialectical	 image	 of	 it.78	 And	whilst	 it	 is	 a	 ‘dialectical	 image’	 that	 is	 illuminated	 through	 this	 discursive	configuration,	 and	 not	 some	 absolute	 reality,	 this	 is	 nonetheless	 real;	 indeed,	 by	representing	 the	 object	 configuratively,	 through	 the	 imaginative	 work	 of	 the	scholar,	one	might	obtain	an	 image	of	 it	 that	 is	more	real	 than	 the	 law	of	 reason	would	admit	on	its	own.		This	is	the	approach	I	take	to	the	concept	of	the	rule	of	law;	and	this	is	the	kind	of	portrait	 that	 I	have	attempted	 to	create	as	a	 result,	portraying	 through	a	constellation	of	scenes	the	life	of	law’s	rule	in	Liberia.		
	
	
																																																						77	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	164-166.	78	See	Benjamin,	The	Arcades	Project,	461,	462.	On	the	metaphor	of	‘refraction’,	see	Manderson,	‘AD	2014’,	79.	
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3	 Research	design		Beyond	the	borders	of	Western	nation-states	and	a	few	others,	the	world	appears	to	be	a	dark	place	when	it	comes	to	the	rule	of	law.	Literally	dark:	on	the	influential	World	 Justice	 Project	 map	 depicting	 ‘rule	 of	 law	 around	 the	 world’,	 most	 non-Western	states	are	several	shades	darker	than	the	enlightened	Western	ones,	and	Africa	remains	largely	a	blank	space:		
	
Figure	3.	‘Rule	of	Law	Around	the	World’79		This	 would	 seem	 to	make	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 west	 African	 republic	 of	 Liberia	 an	unpropitious	site	to	study	the	life	of	the	rule	of	law.	But	then,	the	claim	that	there	is	‘no	rule	of	law’	almost	anywhere	outside	of	Western	states	is	suspicious.	For	one,	it	brings	 to	mind	 the	 colonial	 argument	 that	 there	was	 ‘no	 law’	outside	of	 civilised	nations.	 Whilst	 that	 argument	 has	 been	 thoroughly	 discredited,	 even	 if	 the	occasional	 influential	 representative	 still	 repeats	 it,80	 it	 is	 remarkable	 that	 just	when	the	majority	of	the	world’s	peoples	have	finally	won	recognition	of	their	laws	as	 ‘law’,	 these	 laws	are	deemed	 inadequate	 to	 the	 task	of	governing.	At	 the	same	time,	it	recalls	the	racist	trope	that	equates	the	civilised	West	as	being	governed	by	
																																																						79	[image	omitted	from	digital	version]	80	See	note	72	above.	
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35reason	(through	the	orderly	rule	of	law)	and	the	savage	others	as	being	governed	by	passion	(through	the	arbitrary	rule	of	humans).81		In	 deciding	 to	 study	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 Liberia,	 I	 designed	my	 research	 to	challenge	both	of	 these	distinctions:	between	 the	 ‘existence’	or	 ‘non-existence’	of	the	rule	of	law,	and	between	‘the	rule	of	law’	or	‘the	rule	of	humans’.	This	is	not	to	homogenise	the	rule	of	law,	to	the	point	that	it	is	simply	everywhere.	My	argument	is	 that	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 never	 ‘exists’	 in	 any	 case,	 but	 rather	 describes	 a	 restless	struggle	to	make	law	predominant	over	its	subjects	at	the	same	time	as	it	is	given	form,	and	takes	form,	in	and	through	those	subjects’	lives	and	interactions.	Whilst	this	 is	 a	 common	 experience,	 and	 in	 that	 sense	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 might	 be	everywhere,	it	takes	place	in	singular	ways,	and	in	that	sense	it	would	be	different	everywhere.	 Nonetheless,	 on	 this	 argument,	 a	 research	 design	 that	 aims	 to	examine	 the	 life	 of	 law’s	 rule	 would	 open	 up	 most	 places	 in	 the	 world,	 if	 not	everywhere.	Why,	then,	a	single	case	study	rather	than	a	multiple	or	comparative	case	design?	And	why	Liberia	as	that	single	case?		A	 Case	study		In	asking	‘what	is	taking	place	in	Liberia’,	I	am	approaching	the	experience	of	the	rule	of	 law	there	as	a	particular	 instance	of	my	general	concern	with	 ‘what	takes	place’,	and	not	as	an	example.	The	difference	is	slight	but	critical	to	understanding	why	I	chose	a	single	case	rather	than	multiple	cases.		Whereas	an	example	 is	entirely	 in	 the	service	of	 something	else,	 its	every	aspect	pointing	to	what	it	is	supposed	to	exemplify,	an	instance	is	both	generic	and	singular,	pointing	to	a	general	claim	(as	‘an	instance	of’)	whilst	maintaining	its	own	
																																																						81	The	impression	of	a	disturbing	continuity	between	the	colonial	claims	of	‘no	law’	and	the	contemporary	claim	of	‘okay	law,	but	no	rule	of	law’,	as	well	as	the	distinction	between	the	rational	West	and	the	impassioned	Others,	is	reinforced	by	the	emergence	of	the	rule	of	law	as	a	concern	of	the	UN	Security	Council.	In	1961	the	Council	made	its	first	reference	to	the	rule	of	law	in	a	resolution	‘[n]oting	with	deep	regret	and	concern	[…]	the	general	absence	of	the	rule	of	law	in	the	Congo’—the	very	heart	of	darkness.	See	UN	Doc	S/Res/161	(21	February	1961),	Part	B,	preambular	para	2.	For	an	economic	analysis	of	the	narrative	of	lack	in	rule-of-law	assistance,	see	also	Taylor’s	argument	that	creating	an	impression	of	a	lack	of	rule	of	law	functions	to	establish	market-demand	for	rule-of-law	products:	Veronica	Taylor,	‘Big	Rule	of	Law©®℠™(pat.pending):	Branding	and	Certifying	the	Business	of	the	Rule	of	Law’,	in	Strengthening	the	Rule	of	Law	through	the	United	
Nations	Security	Council,	ed	Jeremy	Matam	Farrall,	and	Hilary	Charlesworth	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2016).	See	also	Ugo	Mattei	and	Laura	Nader,	Plunder:	When	the	Rule	of	Law	is	Illegal	(New	York:	Wiley-Blackwell,	2008).	
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singular	 presence	 in	 time	 and	 space	 (as	 ‘being	 present’	 in	 ‘this	 instant’).82	 As	 a	result,	whereas	an	example	seeks	to	establish	a	positively	servile	relationship	with	its	 master	 claim,	 instances	 remain	 ambivalent,	 both	 serving	 to	 support	 and	 to	contradict	the	claim	upon	it.83	This	is	critical	from	a	scholarly	standpoint	because	it	does	not	require	the	data	to	fit	a	theoretical	claim	in	any	absolute	way,	and	instead	treats	the	contradictions	between	data	and	theory	as	integral	to	the	study;	and	it	is	critical	 from	an	ethical	 standpoint	because	 it	 lessens	 the	violence	 that	 is	done	 to	data	when	 exploited	 in	 a	 theoretical	work	 such	 as	 this	 one,	 by	 treating	 the	 case	with	 singular	 care	 and	 not	 totally	 obliterating	 its	 divergent	 particularities.	 By	implication,	a	thesis	must	be	concerned	with	its	case	as	unique	and	incomparable	as	much	as	it	is	seen	to	be	generic.		That	is	how	I	approach	the	experience	of	the	rule	of	law	in	Liberia:	as	both	singular	and	generic,	with	the	singularities	of	what	takes	place	in	the	rule	of	law	in	this	case	differing	from	other	cases,	but	with	the	general	dynamics	of	how	the	rule	of	law	takes	place	remaining	common.84	If	 that	 is	 the	 rationale	 for	choosing	a	 single	case,	what	 is	 the	 rationale	 for	choosing	Liberia	as	that	case?	There	are	both	impartial	and	partial	reasons,	based	on	a	methodology	that	has	no	direct	interest	in	Liberia	apart	from	the	criteria	used	to	select	the	case,	and	yet	requires	a	singular	interest	in	the	case.	On	the	impartial	side,	I	used	three	criteria	to	select	the	case:	(1)	a	state	recently	emerged	from	war,	(2)	host	to	an	active	international	peace	operation	with	a	strong	emphasis	on	rule-of-law	 reform,	 (3)	 with	 English	 as	 a	 vernacular	 language.	 I	 imposed	 the	 third	criterion	 to	 make	 the	 task	 of	 research	 easier	 for	 a	 monoglot	 Anglo-Australian	researcher.	I	imposed	the	first	two	criteria	on	the	basis	that	I	thought	it	would	be	easier	 to	observe	 the	 conflicted	 life	of	 law’s	 rule	 in	a	 state	 still	 ruptured	by	war,	where	 the	 state’s	 institutions	 are	 dysfunctional	 or	 non-existent	 and	 (to	 turn	Tamanaha	around)	 there	 is	 a	high	degree	of	 ‘sharp	disagreement	over	 the	 social	good’,	where	‘law	is	perceived	as	a	powerful	instrument’,	where	people	‘endeavor	
																																																						82	See	‘instance,	n.’,	OED	Online,	December	2015.	83	Compare	John	Rawl’s	method	of	‘reflective	equilibrium’;	see,	eg,	Norman	Daniels,	‘Reflective	Equilibrium’,	in	Edward	N	Zalta,	ed,	The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy	(Winter	2013	Edition):	http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/reflective-equilibrium/.	84	Whilst	this	is	incompatible	with	a	research	design	that	amasses	multiple	exemplary	cases	in	service	of	the	thesis,	it	does	not	rule	out	a	study	of	multiple	instances,	nor	does	it	make	comparison	impossible.	However,	a	study	of	multiple	instances	would	be	difficult	to	do	within	the	scope	of	this	thesis,	given	the	necessary	depth	and	care	with	which	each	case	would	have	to	be	treated.	
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37to	 seize	 or	 co-opt	 the	 law	 in	 every	way	 possible’,	 where	 they	 attempt	 ‘to	 fill	 in,	interpret,	manipulate,	and	utilize	 the	 law	to	serve	 their	own	ends’,	 indeed	where	law	cannot	be	extricated	from	‘social,	political,	religious,	and	economic	disputes’.85	If	all	of	that	animates	the	rule	of	law,	as	I	argue,	rather	than	being	set	in	definitive	opposition	 to	 it,	 then	 my	 hypothesis	 in	 designing	 the	 project	 was	 that	 ‘what	 is	taking	 place	 in	 the	 rule	 of	 law’	 in	 a	 post-war	 state	 would	 be	 highly	 animated,	making	data	collection	and	analysis	easier	than	in	a	site	such	as	Australia,	where	the	conflicts	are	less	easy	to	observe	as	a	result	of	strong	state	institutionalisation.		That	 is	 why	 I	 selected	 a	 site	 recently	 emerged	 from	war.	 The	 reason	 for	selecting	a	site	that	is	host	to	an	active	international	peace	operation	with	a	strong	emphasis	on	rule-of-law	reform	is	two-fold.	(1)	It	adds	an	international	dimension	to	a	domestic	struggle	over	the	rule	of	law,	in	the	form	of	an	intervention	led	by	the	UN	that	has	an	active,	long-running,	and	well-funded	rule-of-law	reform	mandate.	(2)	 This	 makes	 the	 question	 of	 what	 is	 taking	 place	 also	 a	 question	 of	 what	 is	taking	place	in	an	international	intervention	in	the	rule	of	law,	exposing	to	critique	a	transnational	industry	that	holds	itself	out	as	assisting	in	the	establishment	of	the	rule	 of	 law.	A	 thesis	 that	 examines	what	 is	 taking	place	 in	 the	 rule	 of	 law	might	therefore	 offer	 a	 critical	 view	 of	 what	 is	 taking	 place	 in	 this	 intervention,	 with	implications	for	the	practice	of	rule-of-law	assistance	around	the	world.		B	 Research	methods		The	 core	 of	 the	 research	 for	 the	 case	 study	 involved	 six-months	 fieldwork	 in	Liberia	 in	 2013.	 During	 this	 time	 I	 gathered	material	 using	 qualitative	 research	methods	combining	getting	a	feel	for	the	place,	hearing	from	people	on	the	ground,	observing	what	is	going	on,	as	well	as	reading	documentary	material.				
																																																						85	Tamanaha	cautions	that	the	institution	of	the	rule	of	law	must	be	sequestered	from	everyday	political	conflict	to	protect	it	from	becoming	a	means	through	which	actors	struggle	for	power:	‘The	root	danger	can	be	stated	summarily.	In	situations	of	sharp	disagreement	over	the	social	good,	when	law	is	perceived	as	a	powerful	instrument,	individuals	and	groups	within	society	will	endeavor	to	seize	or	co-opt	the	law	in	every	way	possible;	to	fill	in,	interpret,	manipulate,	and	utilize	the	law	to	serve	their	own	ends.	This	will	spawn	a	Hobbesian	conflict	of	all	against	all	carried	on	within	and	through	the	legal	order.	[…]	Spiraling	conflicts	will	ensue	with	no	evident	halting	point	or	termination	short	of	exhaustion	of	resources	or	total	conquest	by	one	side.’	Tamanaha,	
Law	as	a	Means	to	an	End,	1-2.	I	discuss	this	further	in	Part	2	of	Chapter	3.	
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Figure	4.	Field	sites	in	Liberia86		For	four	of	the	months	I	was	in	Monrovia,	Liberia’s	capital	city	(with	a	population	of	approximately	1.5	million,	out	of	a	total	population	of	4	million).	In	Monrovia	I	examined	 the	 work	 being	 done	 to	 establish	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 by	 government	 and	international	 actors,	 foremost	 the	 UN	 Mission	 in	 Liberia,	 but	 also	 bilateral	development	agencies,	and	 international	and	national	NGOs.	For	this	 I	conducted	interviews,87	gathered	official	documents,	newspaper	articles,	and	radio	programs.				
																																																						86	Thanks	to	Karina	Pelling	at	CartoGIS,	ANU	College	of	Asia	and	the	Pacific,	for	producing	this	map.	87	This	includes	78	official	interviews.	For	the	list	of	interviews,	see	the	Appendix.	In	addition,	I	had	many	conversations	that	were	not	officially	interviews	but	were	no	less	informative.	
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Figure	5.	Benson	Street,	central	Monrovia,	where	I	would	buy	my	daily	groceries	from	the	market		women	(beneath	the	umbrellas)	whilst	pondering	the	meaning	of	the	life	of	the	rule	of	law88		For	 the	 other	 two	 months,	 I	 conducted	 fieldwork	 outside	 Monrovia	 in	 Edina	(Grand	 Bassa	 County),	 Gbarnga	 (Bong	 County),	 Harper	 (Maryland	 County),	Robertsport	(Grand	Cape	Mount	County),	Sanniquellie	(Nimba	County),	Voinjama	(Lofa	County),	Zorzor	(Lofa	County),	and	Zwedru	(Grand	Gedeh	County).		The	 purpose	 of	 visiting	 the	 rural	 sites	was	 to	 follow-up	 on	what	 I	 learnt	about	 the	 rule-of-law	 reform	 process,	 to	 see	 how	 it	was	 taking	 place	 across	 the	country.	 I	 did	 this	 through	 a	 combination	 of	 observation	 and	 interviews	 with	actors	 engaged	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 rule-of-law	 reform	programs,	 including	government	officials	(magistrates,	police,	and	administrative	officials),	UN	officials,	international	 and	 national	 NGOs,	 civil-society	 actors,	 journalists,	 and	 through	conversations	with	people	I	encountered	in	the	communities.								
																																																						88	[image	omitted	from	digital	version]	
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Figure	6.	Voinjama,	capital	of	Lofa	County	and	one	of	biggest	towns	in	Liberia89		During	 the	 fieldwork,	 I	 also	visited	New	York	 to	conduct	 interviews	with	staff	 in	the	 UN	 Headquarters	 working	 on	 global	 issues	 of	 rule-of-law	 assistance,	 and	visited	 the	 Liberian	 archives	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Indiana	 to	 gather	 historical	material	on	Liberia.		The	fieldwork	is	complemented	by	deskwork,	including	document	analysis	and	a	review	of	scholarly	and	practice-based	literature.	It	is	also	complemented	at	points	by	the	analysis	of	artworks,	including	photography,	painting,	and	literature.		
4	 Chapter	outline		There	are	 two	parts	 to	 the	 thesis.	The	 first	 concerns	 the	rule	of	 law	as	a	general	proposition,	 in	answer	to	the	question	of	what	takes	place	in	the	rule	of	 law.	The	second	 concerns	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 Liberia,	 in	 answer	 to	 the	 question	 of	what	 is	taking	place	in	the	rule	of	law	there.	
																																																						89	Photograph	by	Shane	Chalmers.	The	population	of	Voinjama	is	approximately	30,000.	
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41Part	I	begins	with	a	reading	of	Adorno’s	negative-dialectical	philosophy	that	draws	out	the	main	points	relevant	to	the	thesis	(Chapter	1).	I	then	begin	driving	these	 points	 into	 the	 reality	 of	 law’s	 rule,	 first	 by	 examining	 the	 origins	 of	 the	contradiction	 in	 law	 (Chapter	 2),	 and	 then	 by	 examining	 how	 this	 contradiction	structures	the	rule	of	law,	opening	it	to	different	logics,	which	inform	how	the	rule	of	law	takes	place	whilst	taking	place	through	it	(Chapter	3).		Part	 I	ends	with	an	outline	of	 the	 two	theoretical	 frameworks	 that	 inform	the	 study	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 Liberia.	 These	 frameworks	 are	 based	 on	 the	arguments	developed	in	Chapters	2	and	3.	The	first	framework	is	concerned	with	the	 contradiction	 in	 law	 and	 the	 consequences	 for	 law’s	 rule;	 the	 second	 is	concerned	 with	 the	 forms	 of	 violence	 this	 enables	 as	 well	 as	 the	 ethical	possibilities	 it	holds	out.	These	two	concerns	frame	each	chapter	 in	Part	II	of	the	thesis.	The	study	of	the	rule	of	law	in	Liberia	begins	in	Chapter	4.	The	first	concern	here	is	how	the	idea	of	‘Liberia’	was	given	form	through	law	from	its	conception	as	an	idea	of	liberty	at	the	beginning	of	the	nineteenth	century	to	its	consolidation	as	a	 nation-state	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century.	 The	 second	 concern	 is	 how	 a	 particular	logic	 informed	 the	 making	 of	 Liberia	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 and	 twentieth	 centuries	through	 the	 super-imposition	of	 a	 representational	 framework	over	peoples	 and	lands	 in	west	 Africa	 that	 culminated	 in	 a	 state	 of	 civil	 death	 for	 the	majority	 of	Liberians.	The	logic,	I	argue,	is	the	logic	of	capital.		At	the	end	of	Chapter	4,	 I	consider	the	Liberian	Government’s	twenty-first	century	 vision	 for	 re-making	 the	 republic	 post-war—a	 vision	 that	 suggests	 a	continuation,	 if	 not	 an	 intensification,	 of	 the	 institutionalisation	 of	 the	 logic	 of	capital.	This	raises	a	question,	which	I	address	in	the	subsequent	chapters.	How	is	the	 Government	working	 to	 realise	 its	 vision	 of	 peace,	 given	 the	 violence	 of	 the	logic	that	informs	it?	Chapter	5	addresses	this	question	by	examining	what	is	taking	place	in	the	attempt	to	secure	peace	in	Liberia	with	the	assistance	of	a	UN	peace	operation.	On	one	hand,	my	concern	here	is	how	Liberia	is	being	given	form	by	law	in	the	twenty-first	 century	 in	 the	attempt	 to	 establish	a	 state	based	on	 the	 rule	of	 law.	To	 this	end,	I	examine	the	work	that	is	being	done	by	both	the	Government	and	the	UN	to	realise	the	Government’s	vision	of	Liberia.	On	the	other	hand,	my	concern	is	with	how	a	logic	of	security	is	informing	this	work.		
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The	 analysis	 in	 Chapter	 5	 shows	 an	 attempt	 to	 secure	 peace	 through	 the	establishment	of	a	state	based	on	a	forceful	rule	of	law.	Not	only	is	this	turning	the	rule	of	law	into	a	medium	of	the	state’s	security	sector,	but	it	is	also	enabling	the	logic	of	 security	 to	 take	place	 through	 the	 institution	of	 the	 rule	of	 law.	Bringing	‘justice’	 within	 this	 security	 complex	 is	 supposed	 to	 make	 the	 arrangement	bearable.	 However,	 this	 raises	 a	 question:	 how	 just	 is	 the	 justice	 of	 this	arrangement?		Chapter	6	addresses	this	question	in	examining	how	law	is	taking	form	on	the	ground	post-war.	Again	there	are	two	concerns	here.	One,	I	am	concerned	with	how	 the	 contradiction	 in	 law	 opens	 law	 up	 to	 take	 form	 in	 contradictory	ways,	enlivened	by	 its	subjects.	The	result	 is	an	 inordinate	rule	of	 law,	with	 law	taking	form	 on	 the	 ground	 in	 ways	 that	 make	 it	 simultaneously	 not	 law.	 Two,	 I	 am	concerned	with	how	this	is	a	matter	of	justice—with	how	this	contradiction	in	law	opens	the	national	law	up	to	take	form	in	ways	that	might	make	it	just.		This	raises	a	critical	problem.	The	implication	of	the	analysis	in	Chapter	6	is	that	the	arrangement	of	‘peace	through	justice’	requires	an	inordinate	rule	of	law—a	 rule	 of	 law	 that	 remains	 responsive	 to	 the	 contradictory	 demands	 of	 justice	 it	confronts	on	the	ground.	The	problem	is	that	such	a	state	of	peace	would	be	based	upon	a	contradictory	logic.	Indeed,	it	would	require	facing	the	contradiction	in	law	and	its	rule	rather	than	attempting	to	resolve	or	dismiss	it.	Whether,	and	how,	such	a	critical	approach	to	law’s	rule	might	be	instituted	is	the	question	to	which	I	turn	in	the	final	chapter	(Chapter	7).	The	first	concern	in	Chapter	7	is	the	‘process	of	law’—how	law	takes	place	in-between	the	expression	of	law	as	‘the	law’	and	the	experience	of	law	as	always	otherwise	than	 ‘the	law’	as	expressed.	Arguing	that	the	critical	 function	of	a	 legal	system	 is	 to	 mediate	 this	 contradiction	 in	 law,	 I	 examine	 the	 work	 of	 the	Government	of	Liberia	and	 its	 international	partners	 to	reform	the	national	 legal	system.	I	also	compare	this	reform	with	unofficial	efforts	being	taken	to	deal	with	the	 contradiction	 in	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 I	 am	 concerned	with	 the	
quality	of	these	systems	of	law.	By	quality	I	mean	how	a	legal	system	deals	with	the	contradiction	in	law.	Thus	a	legal	system	might	‘over-mediate’	law,	articulating	the	law	from	a	standpoint	that	is	set	against	its	subjects.	It	might	also	‘under-mediate’	law,	with	law	being	all-but	indistinguishable	from	what	its	subjects	express	it	to	be.	
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43The	ethical	potential	of	a	 legal	 system	 is	 its	capacity	 to	remain	responsive	 in	 the	process	of	articulating	the	law.		In	 the	 case	 of	 Liberia,	 the	 analysis	 in	 Chapter	 7	 shows	 a	 national	 legal	system	that	is	being	reformed	in	a	way	that	risks	over-mediating	law,	making	it	a	medium	 for	 a	 modern-liberalist	 agenda	 for	 transformation	 as	 well	 as	 an	instrument	of	 domination	used	 to	 secure	 ‘peace	 and	 stability’	without	 justice.	At	the	same	time,	the	national	legal	system	remains	extremely	dysfunctional,	marked	by	corruption	of	the	police	and	courts	as	well	as	incidences	of	mob	violence.	Both	the	acts	of	official	corruption	and	‘mob	justice’,	I	argue,	are	expressions	of	under-mediated	 law.	 Alongside	 this,	 however,	 outside	 the	 national	 legal	 system,	communities	are	mediating	expressions	of	the	law	in	ways	that	make	the	process	genuinely	 responsive.	What	 is	 critical	 about	 these	 community	 ‘peace-builders’	 is	not	 the	 law	 that	 takes	 form	through	 their	mediation,	but	how	 the	process	makes	conflict	the	basis	of	a	legal	resolution.		The	thesis	concludes	by	considering	the	implications	of	the	analysis	of	the	rule	of	law	in	Liberia,	drawing	out	the	twin-strands	that	frame	each	chapter	of	the	case	study,	before	returning	to	the	question	of	what	this	means	for	the	rule	of	law	both	in	theory	and	in	the	practice	of	trying	to	institute	it	around	the	world.		
		
		 	
	 		
	 	
45						
PART	I		 	
46	
	
		 	
		
					
Chapter	1	negative	dialectics			 	
48	 	 	 	 Chapter	1		
	
1	 Inspiration	
	This	thesis	is	inspired	by	Theodor	Adorno’s	Negative	Dialectics.1	I	say	‘inspired	by’	because	 Adorno’s	 book	 remains	 for	 me	 incomprehensible	 in	 the	 whole,	 as	 a	dialogue	with	a	philosophical	tradition	and	its	corpus	that	I	have	yet	to	master,	and	yet	 comprehensible	 in	 part,	 as	 an	 excursus	 on	 a	 critical	 mode	 of	 thinking	 that	accords	 with	 my	 own	 negative	 tendency	 and	 strikes	 against	 my	 more	 positive	compulsion.2	It	is	this	part	of	the	book	(its	dialectical	‘logic’),	rather	than	the	whole	(its	 wide-ranging	 critique	 of	 European	 philosophy),	 that	 informs	 my	 thinking	throughout	the	thesis.	Of	course	this	begs	the	question	of	whether	it	is	possible	to	extract	 ‘negative	 dialectics’	 in	 this	way	 from	Negative	 Dialectics,	 as	 if	 it	were	 an	essence	 to	 be	 extracted	 from	 the	 bodily	 excess	 of	 a	 timeless	 and	 placeless	specimen;	 and	 moreover	 whether	 this	 essence	 might	 then	 be	 injected	 into	 this	specific	study	of	the	rule	of	law	and	Liberia.	The	question	is	critical,	and	part	of	my	aim	in	this	chapter	is	to	answer	that	question,	to	set	out	why	the	approach	I	take	here	is	not	only	justified	but	required.		I	 also	 say	 this	 thesis	 is	 inspired	 by	 Adorno’s	Negative	 Dialectics	 because	inspiration—as	a	‘breathing	in’—is	perhaps	the	most	apt	form	of	engagement	with	this	particular	work.	If	to	breathe	in	is	to	inhale	a	vital	substance,	it	is	only	ever	a	partial	 act;	 to	 take	 just	 one	 breath	would	 be	 to	 stop	 breathing—.	And	 if	 Adorno	sought	to	do	anything	in	setting	out	his	dialectical	philosophy	in	Negative	Dialectics	it	 was	 to	 break	 thought	 from	 its	 self-contentment	 and	 turn	 it	 without	 relent	towards	what	it	can	only	ever	fail	to	grasp	in	one	breath.	The	worst	possible	way	to	read	Negative	Dialectics—a	way	of	reading	that	Adorno’s	style	of	writing	ruthlessly	works	 against—would	 be	 to	 attempt	 to	 consume	 it,	 to	 look	 in	 it	 for	 some	conceptual	whole,	some	self-sufficient	thought-product	that	might	be	resold	on	the	market	under	a	new	name.	Certainly	it	does	not	provide	a	framework	that	might	be	re-assembled	here	or	elsewhere,	upon	which	to	hang	one’s	research	material.		But	inspiration	is	even	more	negative	than	that.	If	to	breathe	in	is	to	inhale	a	vital	substance,	the	act	of	inhalation	is	not	only	always	partial	but	also	renders	the	
																																																						1	There	are	two	English	translations	of	Negative	Dialectics.	I	rely	primarily	on	the	translation	by	Dennis	Redmond	published	online:	http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ndtrans.html.	All	references	in	the	thesis	are	to	this	version.	At	times	I	have	also	cross-checked	this	translation	against	the	original	German	Negative	Dialektik	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	1966).	2	Throughout	the	thesis	I	use	‘negative’	and	‘positive’	in	the	sense	of	‘negate’	and	‘posit’,	rather	than	in	a	normative	sense.	
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49desired	substance	stagnant,	stripping	it	of	its	oxygen.	In	this	act—which	is	also	the	act	of	thinking—what	is	so	essential	to	it	is	now,	on	passing	into	it,	the	opposite	of	what	was	sought	and	what	must	be	sought	again	and	again.	This	is	what	negative	dialectics	 provides	 as	 an	 approach	 to	 thinking:	 a	 self-consciousness	 of	 the	continuous	breathing-in	 that	 is	always	partial	and	always	destructive	of	 the	very	material	that	is	necessary	to	it.	Always	partial	and	always	destructive—but	in	this,	always	inspired,	always	alive.		This,	 then,	 by	 way	 of	 introduction,	 is	 the	 philosophical	 approach	 that	inspires	 the	 thesis:	 an	 approach	 that	 defies	 not	 only	 the	 very	 book	 that	 would	deliver	it	wholesale	to	the	market	but	also	any	attempt	to	pin	‘it’	down.	To	clarify	what	 I	 mean	 by	 this,	 I	 begin	 again	 in	 Part	 2	 of	 the	 chapter	 by	 setting	 out	 my	understanding	of	‘negative	dialectics’.	This	involves	drawing	out	five	aspects	from	Adorno’s	philosophy	 that	are	central	 to	 this	 thesis:	 (1)	 the	subject	of	experience,	through	a	discussion	of	the	subject-object	dialectic;	(2)	how	understanding	this	is	a	matter	 of	 justice;	 (3)	 the	 problem	 of	 conceptualisation;	 (4)	 the	 logical	 law	 of	contradiction;	and	(5)	the	dialectical	dimensions	of	determination	and	infinitude.	I	conclude	in	Part	3	by	returning	to	what	this	means	for	the	thesis.	
	
2	 Negative	dialectics		A	 The	subject	of	experience		Writing	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 two	world-wars,	 having	 lived	 through	 the	 eclipse	 of	German	 National	 Socialism	 and	 European	 Fascism,	 living	 through	 the	 one-dimensional	 flattening	 of	 the	 world	 and	 its	 qualitative	 reduction	 to	 exchange-value,3	and	in	reflection	on	the	failed	realisation	of	the	Marxist	concept	of	history,4	
																																																						3	To	use	the	phrase	made	famous	by	Adorno’s	intellectual	companion,	Herbert	Marcuse,	One-
Dimensional	Man:	Studies	in	the	Ideology	of	Advanced	Industrial	Society	(Boston:	Beacon	Press,	1966).		See	also	Theodor	W	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	trans	Dennis	Redmond	(2001),	53-54,	63-65.	For	a	discussion	of	the	reduction	of	the	world	to	the	logic	of	exchange,	see	ibid,	149-151,	190-193.	4	Adorno	famously	begins	Negative	Dialectics	with	the	line:	‘Philosophy,	which	once	seemed	outmoded,	remains	alive	because	the	moment	of	its	realization	was	missed.	The	summary	judgment	that	it	had	merely	interpreted	the	world	is	itself	crippled	by	resignation	before	reality,	and	becomes	a	defeatism	of	reason	after	the	transformation	of	the	world	failed.’	Adorno,	Negative	
Dialectics,	15-16.	In	this	Adorno	is	reflecting	on	the	failed	communist	transformation	and	the	Marxist	position	that	philosophy	‘merely	interpreted’	the	world—that	it	pointed	through	Marx	to	
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Adorno’s	Negative	Dialectics	is	nothing	if	not	a	total	assault	on	totalitarianism.	And	for	Adorno	there	is	nothing	more	totalitarian	in	thought	than	the	reduction	of	the	experience	 of	 the	 world	 to	 a	 synthetic	 identity	 with	 its	 conceptualisation.	 The	annihilation	of	that	which	fails	to	live	up	to	its	concept,	and	which	always	fails	to	live	up	 to	 its	 concept,	 can	only	ever	result	 from	such	 identity	 thinking—whether	the	concept	is	the	Volk,5	an	object’s	exchange-value,	or	indeed	an	expression	of	law.		To	understand	this	concern	it	is	necessary	to	understand	what	is	meant	by	‘experience’.	 For	 Adorno,	 this	 concept	 describes	 the	 experience	 of	 contradiction	that	arises	out	of	the	confusion	of	‘being’	(subjectively)	and	‘existing’	(objectively),	where	the	two	are	never	completely	separate	(a	subject	being	always	informed	by	an	 objective	 existence),	 but	 also	 never	 in	 perfect	 harmony	 or	 unity	 (objective	existence	always	being	made	sense	of	subjectively).6	This	is	the	experience	of	the	subject-object	 dialectic,	 whereby	 subject	 and	 object	 inform	 each	 other	 without	becoming	identical.		As	 such,	 the	 concept	 of	 experience	 is	 not	 directed	 at	 a	 pure	 or	 original	knowledge	of	existence,	nor	a	perfect	state	of	being,	but	rather	a	condition	of	not	knowing,	and	not	being,	in	any	absolute	way.7	As	Adorno	writes,	‘what	experience	is	concerned	with	at	any	particular	moment	is	the	animating	contradiction	of	such	absolute	truth.’8	This	means	that	a	subject	is	never	at	one	with	its	object.	But	it	also	means	 a	 subject	 is	 never	 at	 one	 with	 itself.	 This	 is	 not	 the	 kind	 of	 monadic	experience	 of	 the	 autonomous	 and	 self-determining	 neoliberal	 subject.9	 For	Adorno,	 as	 for	 Hegel,	 the	 subjectivity	 of	 the	 individual	 is	 also	 contingent	 and	
																																																																																																																																																														the	logical	overthrow	of	capitalism	in	the	ultimate	act	of	historical	negation—a	position	that	was	‘crippled’	by	the	historical	experience	of	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century.	5	‘The	people’,	or	Volksgemeinschaft,	of	German	National	Socialism.	6	On	this	problem,	see	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	in	general,	and	in	particular	Part	I,	Section	II:	Being	and	Existence	at	104-136.	See	also	Theodor	W	Adorno,	‘The	Actuality	of	Philosophy’,	Telos,	vol	31	(1977).	7	As	Adorno	writes	in	the	introduction	to	his	study	of	‘the	experiential	content	of	Hegel’s	philosophy’,	the	concept	of	experience	as	used	here	‘is	not	intended	to	capture	phenomenological	“ur-experience”;	nor,	like	the	interpretation	of	Hegel	in	Heidegger’s	Holzwege,	is	it	intended	to	get	at	something	ontological,	the	“Wort	des	Seins”	[word	of	Being]	or	the	“Sein	des	Seinden”	[Being	of	beings].’	Theodor	W	Adorno,	Hegel:	Three	Studies,	trans	Shierry	Weber	Nicholsen	(Cambridge:	MIT	Press,	1963),	53.	8	Ibid.	See	also	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	21-22.	9	See	also	Nancy’s	caution	against	mistaking	the	Hegelian	concept	of	subject	for	an	‘ideological	notion	[…]	that	is	nonphilosophical,	individualist,	egoist,	and	“liberal”	[…]’—a	caution	that	applies	equally	to	Adorno’s	concept	of	subject.	Jean-Luc	Nancy,	Hegel:	The	Restlessness	of	the	Negative,	trans	Jason	Smith	and	Steven	Miller	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2002),	4-5.	
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51objectively	 determined,10	 ‘the	 subject’	 always	 an	 objective	 form,	 constituted	historically	and	in	relation	to	nature,11	and	therefore	never	absolutely	individual.12	At	the	same	time,	the	subject	comprises	self-conscious	individuals	who	recognise	themselves	 and	 demand	 to	 be	 recognised	 as	 singular	 manifestations	 of	subjectivity.	Thus	the	subject	is	both	objective	and	subjective,	generic	and	singular,	and	 none	 of	 these	 in	 itself.	 It	 cannot	 be	 untangled	 or	 resolved	 and	 remains	suspended	in	an	experience	that	is	of	the	animating	contradiction	of	absolute	truth.	In	 sum,	 this	 is	 the	 concept	 of	 experience	 that	 informs	 Adorno’s	 negative-dialectical	 philosophy:	 the	 experience	 of	 a	 subject	 that	 is	 both	 common	 and	individual,	 determined	 and	 self-determining,	 an	 objective	 part	 of	 a	 whole—and	therefore	 knowable	 only	 through	 empirical	 study	 of	 the	 whole—and	 yet	irreconcilably	apart	from	this	totality—and	therefore	knowable	only	in	its	singular	situation.13	 And	 this	 contradictory	 experience	 animates	 every	 claim	 to	 truth—to	knowing	the	world	objectively,	to	being	at	one	with	it	subjectively.14		B	 A	matter	of	justice		In	approaching	the	experience	of	the	subject	in	this	way,	negative	dialectics	shares	common	 ground	with	 poststructuralism.15	 This	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 their	 view	 of	 the	
																																																						10	See,	eg,	Adorno,	Hegel:	Three	Studies,	63.	Nancy’s	articulation	of	the	Hegelian	concept	of	‘subject’	also	fits	Adorno’s	and	is	helpful	here:	‘The	Hegelian	subject	is	not	to	be	confused	with	subjectivity	as	a	separate	and	one-sided	agency	for	synthesizing	representation,	nor	with	subjectivity	as	the	exclusive	interiority	of	a	personality.	Each	one	of	these	can	be	moments	among	others	of	the	subject,	but	the	subject	itself	is	nothing	of	the	sort.	In	a	word:	the	Hegelian	subject	is	in	no	way	the	self	all	to	
itself.’	Nancy,	Restlessness	of	the	Negative,	4-5.	11	The	concepts	of	‘nature’	and	‘history’	are	central	to	much	of	Adorno’s	work.	For	an	overview	of	these	concepts,	see	Susan	Buck-Morss,	The	Origin	of	Negative	Dialectics:	Theodor	W	Adorno,	Walter	
Benjamin,	and	the	Frankfurt	Institute	(New	York:	The	Free	Press,	1977),	Chapter	3.		12	As	Adorno	writes:	‘everything	through	which	he	[the	empirical	individual]	is	specifically	constituted	as	a	cognitive	subject,	hence,	that	is,	the	logical	universality	that	governs	his	thinking,	is,	as	the	school	of	Durkheim	in	particular	has	shown,	always	also	social	in	nature.’	Adorno,	Hegel:	
Three	Studies,	63.	See	also	Marcuse’s	discussion	of	‘subject’	in	Hegel’s	philosophy:	Herbert	Marcuse,	
Reason	and	Revolution:	Hegel	and	the	Rise	of	Social	Theory	(New	York:	Humanity	Books,	1999).	13	See	also	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	21-22.	14	Compare	Peter	Fitzpatrick,	Modernism	and	the	Grounds	of	Law	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2001),	54.	‘The	persistent	failure	to	account	for	the	social	in	terms	of	the	totality	or	in	terms	of	a	distinct	particularity	was	a	productive	failure	in	that	it	showed	there	was	something	of	the	totality	and	of	the	particularity	“in”	society.	The	totality	was	transposed	in	terms	of	infinite	possibility	and	the	particularity	in	terms	of	determinate	being-in-common.	Yet,	as	we	saw,	these	dimensions	of	the	social	can	neither	“be”	in	or	of	themselves	nor	causally	combine	in	some	relational	way.’	15	Perhaps	the	most	important	common	influence	in	this	respect	was	Nietzsche,	to	the	extent	that	Nietzsche	was	responsible	for	diagnosing	the	condition	of	the	modern	subject	as	one	of	maddening	
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modern	 experience	 as	 one	 of	 irreconcilable	 contradiction,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 their	approach	to	this	condition.16	For	one,	each	takes	social	structures	seriously,	 from	the	more	 exploitative	 forms	 to	 the	more	 critical,	 and	more	 social	ways	 of	 being	together,	without	need	 for	 transcendental	 affirmation.17	Moreover,	 in	 contrast	 to	the	postmodernists	who	became	enchanted	by	the	thought	of	 indeterminacy,	and	the	 trenchant	 positivists	 who	 cannot	 let	 go	 of	 their	 desire	 for	 certainty	 and	stability,	Adorno’s	 critical	 concern,	 as	 that	 of	 poststructuralism,	 is	 not	 to	 resolve	the	subject’s	contradictory	experience	but	to	make	it	critical	to	every	resolution.18	In	this,	the	concern	of	Adorno’s	negative-dialectical	philosophy,	as	that	of	Derrida’s	philosophy	of	deconstruction,	is	to	work	against	the	domination	that	results	from	any	 attempt	 at	 resolving	 the	 contradictory	 experience	 that	 leaves	 subject	 and	object	as	separate	as	they	are	inseparable.	And	for	both,	this	is	a	matter	of	justice.	For	Adorno,	 any	attempt	 to	 resolve	or	dismiss	 the	 subject-object	dialectic	would	either	 separate	 the	 two	entirely,	 in	an	analytical	 fashion	 that	 conceives	of	
																																																																																																																																																														contradiction:	of	being,	on	irreparably	shattered	ground	of	knowing—ground	solid	enough	to	walk	upon,	but	if	one	pauses	for	closer	inspection,	entirely	fractured,	held	together	superficially	by	the	mass	of	soles	that	continue	to	walk	together.	See	Friedrich	Nietzsche,	The	Gay	Science,	trans	Walter	Kaufmann	(New	York:	Random	House,	1974).	In	particular,	see	the	story	of	‘the	madman’	in	section	125,	along	with	sections	108	and	343.	See	also	Friedrich	Nietzsche,	Thus	Spoke	Zarathustra:	A	Book	
for	All	and	None,	trans	Walter	Kaufmann	(New	York:	Viking	Press,	1966),	Prologue	and	section	XXV.	For	an	overview	of	Nietzsche’s	influence	on	Adorno,	see	Gillian	Rose,	The	Melancholy	Science:	An	
Introduction	to	the	Thought	of	Theodor	W	Adorno	(London:	Macmillan,	1978),	11,	18-26.	16	Derrida,	who	perhaps	above	all	was	responsible	for	poststructuralist	scholarship,	came	to	acknowledge	the	relation	between	his	work	and	Adorno’s	in	a	speech	he	delivered	in	acceptance	of	the	Theodor-Adorno	Prize	in	2001,	published	as	Jacques	Derrida,	Fichus	(Paris:	Galilee,	2002).	In	that	speech,	Derrida	acknowledges	Adorno	as	an	‘adopted	father’,	as	well	as	the	commonality	between	Adorno’s	dialectical	philosophy	and	his	own	philosophy	of	deconstruction.	Writing	on	this	speech,	Deranty	notes:	‘In	this	text,	Derrida	clearly	presents	deconstruction	as	sharing	the	spirit	of	Adorno’s	negative	dialectic,	and	Benjamin’s	mystical	enlightenment.	He	seems	to	imply	that	his	own	way	of	doing	philosophy	is	a	viable	Adornian	alternative	to	the	other	Adornian	heritage,	the	rationalistic,	academic	style	of	Critical	Theory	as	it	is	now	conducted	in	Frankfurt	[under	Jürgen	Habermas].	Indeed,	paradoxically,	and	Derrida’s	speech	in	Frankfurt	made	this	particularly	evident,	Adorno’s	inspiration	survives	intact	rather	in	the	remnants	of	French	post-structuralism	(e.g.	in	the	writings	of	Giorgio	Agamben)	than	in	contemporary	Critical	Theory	with	its	harsh	criticism	of	the	previous	generation.’	Jean-Philippe	Deranty,	‘Adorno's	Other	Son:	Derrida	and	the	Future	of	Critical	Theory’,	Social	Semiotics,	vol	16,	no	3	(2006):	432.	On	the	relation	between	Adorno’s	philosophy	and	poststructuralism	generally,	see	Peter	Dews,	‘Adorno,	Post-Structuralism	and	the	Critique	of	Identity’,	New	Left	Review,	vol	157	(May-June	1986).	17	See,	eg,	Giorgio	Agamben,	The	Coming	Community,	trans	Michael	Hardt	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2009);	Jean-Luc	Nancy,	‘Of	Being-in-Common’,	in	Community	at	Loose	Ends,	ed	Miami	Theory	Collective	(Minneapolis:	Minnesota	University	Press,	1991).	See	also	Fitzpatrick’s	work	on	law	and	sociality,	eg,	Fitzpatrick,	Modernism	and	the	Grounds	of	Law;	Peter	Fitzpatrick,	‘Leveraging	Leviathan’,	in	After	Sovereignty:	On	the	Question	of	Political	Beginnings,	ed	Charles	Barbour	and	George		Pavlich	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2009).	18	For	instance,	the	polarisation	between	structure	and	agency	is	not	to	be	resolved	by	collapsing	the	two	into	a	concept	of	‘structuration’	any	more	than	they	are	to	be	held	apart	in	an	either/or	debate.	For	a	critique	of	Anthony	Gidden’s	concept	of	‘structuration’,	see	Fitzpatrick,	Modernism	and	
the	Grounds	of	Law,	51.	
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53the	subject	as	wholly	subject	and	the	object	as	wholly	object;	or	else	it	would	elide	the	one	in	pronouncing	a	unity	of	the	two,	in	a	totalitarian	fashion	that	conceives	of	an	 equivalence	 of	 subject	 and	 object.19	 An	 example	 of	 the	 former	 analytical	separation	 is	 the	 subject	 of	Enlightenment	who	 sees	 the	world	 as	his	 object	 and	whose	rights	as	an	individual	are	inviolable—in	both	cases	failing	to	recognise	the	extent	 to	 which	 his	 subjective	 existence	 is	 constituted	 in	 the	 very	 objective	spheres,	 natural	 and	 historical,	 from	 which	 he	 thinks	 himself	 free	 as	 a	 rightful	individual.	An	example	of	the	latter	totalitarian	elision	would	be	the	state	in	which	the	individual	subject	is	no	longer	recognised	apart	from	the	whole,	which	is	held	up	as	the	objective	form	of	the	absolute	subject—failing	to	recognise	the	extent	to	which	 ‘the	 whole	 realizes	 itself	 only	 in	 and	 through	 the	 parts,	 only	 through	discontinuity,	alienation,	and	reflection’.20	This	is	a	matter	of	justice	in	that	to	speak	of	‘the	subject’	in	absolute	terms	is	to	ignore	the	ways	in	which	individual	manifestations	of	subjectivity	diverge	from	it,	 becoming	 objects	 of	 indifference,	 and	 as	 such,	 being,	 exposed	 to	 violence.21	Likewise,	 to	 speak	 of	 ‘objectivity’	 in	 absolute	 terms	 is	 to	 overlook	 the	 ways	 in	which	 objects	 are	 constituted	 subjectively,	 thus	 concealing	 their	 historical	concretion,	 and	 as	 such,	 exposing	 the	 subject	 to	 violence	 through	 its	 historical	exclusion	 from	 what	 is	 objective	 whilst	 allowing	 for	 the	 perpetuation	 of	domination	within	the	production	of	the	object/ivity.22		Derrida’s	philosophy	of	deconstruction	works	in	a	similar	way	to	expose	the	untruth	 of	 binary	 oppositions	 and	 the	 exploitation	 that	 congeals	 in	 the	 space	between	 them.23	 However,	 in	 revealing	 the	 untruth	 of	 binary	 thinking,	 Derrida	
																																																						19	As	Adorno	writes:	‘The	subject	is	in	truth	never	wholly	the	subject,	the	object	never	wholly	the	object;	nevertheless	both	are	not	to	be	pieced	together	out	of	a	third,	which	would	transcend	them.’	He	continues:	‘The	duality	of	subject	and	object	is	to	be	critically	maintained	against	the	totality	claim	which	inheres	to	thought.’	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	176-177.	20	This	quote	is	Adorno	on	Hegel’s	concept	of	‘totality’:	Adorno,	Hegel:	Three	Studies,	4.	See	also	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	18-19	and	21-22.	21	An	example	I	consider	in	this	thesis	is	liberalism,	which,	as	noted	in	the	Introduction	of	the	thesis,	tends	to	treat	every	recognised	subject	as	equivalent,	thereby	reducing	it	to	an	empirical	individuality	that	denies	its	subjective	differences.	As	an	‘empirical	individual’,	the	subject	becomes	the	object	of	a	universal	subjectivity	that	makes	it	not	only	legitimate,	but	a	humanitarian	imperative,	to	assist	in	developing	it	to	its	full	potential.			22	For	example,	see	Marx’s	critique	of	capital:	Karl	Marx,	Capital:	A	Critique	of	Political	Economy:	
Volume	1	(London:	The	Electric	Book	Company,	1998	[1887]).	23	The	logic	of	negative	dialectics	is	also	one	of	‘disassembly’—Adorno	uses	the	word	Zerfalls:	decay,	decomposition,	disintegration.	Like	Derrida,	Adorno	is	careful	to	emphasise	that	this	‘is	neither	solely	a	method	nor	something	real	in	the	naïve	understanding	of	the	term’.	‘Not	a	method’	because	the	dialectical	form	of	things	is	objective,	‘the	unreconciled	thing,	which	lacks	precisely	
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neither	 collapses	 the	 two	 into	 the	 one,	 nor	 dismisses	 their	 relation	 outright.	Deconstruction	does	not	aim	to	do	away	with	difference	any	more	 than	negative	dialectics;	the	opposite,	it	is	motivated	by	an	ethical	concern	for	the	singularity	of	the	other	in	its	utter	difference—hence	the	two	are	never	reduced	to	the	one.	And	yet	the	justice	of	deconstruction	is	not	to	be	found	in	suspending	the	subject	in	an	infinite	 plurality	 of	 difference—hence	 the	 two	 are	 never	 cleaved	 from	 one	another.24	Rather,	the	justice	of	deconstruction,	like	that	of	negative	dialectics,	is	in	the	experience	of	contradiction:	in	recognising	difference,	always	different	from	its	recognition.25		There	are	 two	 sides	 to	 this,	 neither	 tenable	on	 its	own.	 (1)	 In	recognising	difference,	difference	is	affirmed	(cognised)—thus	what	is	different	is	cut	short	by	the	identification	of	what	is	different.26	This	is	difference	as	‘distinction,	inequality,	or	 discernibility’.27	 (2)	 Recognising	what	 is	 different	 as	unrecognisably	 different,	difference	 is	 not	 affirmed	 (not	 cognised)—thus	 what	 is	 different	 is	 left	 open	 to	what	 is	 different.	 This	 is	 difference	 as	 ‘deference’,	 deferring	what	 is	 different	 to	what	 is	 different	 to	 its	 cognition	 here	 and	 now,	 expressing	 ‘the	 interposition	 of	delay,	the	interval	of	a	spacing	and	temporalizing	that	puts	off	until	“later”	what	is	presently	 denied,	 the	 possible	 that	 is	 presently	 impossible.’28	 Critically,	 neither	position	 holds	 on	 its	 own.	 What	 is	 different	 must	 be	 articulated	 for	 it	 to	 be	meaningfully	spoken	of,	but	this	reduces	difference	to	a	self-referential	identity—to	 absolute	 sameness,	 ‘the	 order	 of	 the	 same’;29	 and	 so	 the	 meaning	 must	 be	deferred,	but	this	suspends	what	is	different	in	indeterminate	space—as	absolute	difference,	 ‘nonidentity’;30	 and	 so	 what	 is	 different	 must	 be	 articulated…	 and	
																																																																																																																																																														that	identity	which	the	thought	surrogates,	is	contradictory	and	blocks	every	attempt	at	unanimous	interpretation’.	And	yet	not	‘simply	real:	for	contradictoriness	is	a	reflection-category,	the	thinking	confrontation	of	concept	and	thing.’	See	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	148-149.	24	My	understanding	of	deconstruction,	and	its	relation	to	justice,	is	based	on	a	reading	of	Jacques	Derrida,	‘Force	of	Law:	The	"Mystical	Foundation	of	Authority"’,	Cardozo	Law	Review,	vol	11	(1989-1990).	For	his	critique	of	structuralism,	see	also	‘Structure,	Sign	and	Play	in	the	Discourse	of	the	Human	Sciences’	in	Jacques	Derrida,	Writing	and	Difference,	trans	Alan	Bass	(London:	Routledge	Classics,	2001).	25	On	deconstruction	as	justice	see	Derrida,	‘Force	of	Law’.	26	To	‘cognise’	is	to	‘become	conscious	of;	to	make	(anything)	an	object	of	cognition’:	see	‘cognise,	
v.’,	OED	Online,	December	2015.		27	Jacques	Derrida,	‘Differance’,	in	Literary	Theory:	An	Anthology,	ed	Julie	Rivkin,	and	Michael	Ryan	(Malden:	Blackwell,	2004),	279.	28	Ibid.	29	Ibid.	30	Ibid.	
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55around	 it	 goes.	 To	 cut	 things	 short,	 there	 can	 be	 no	 justice	 in	 either	 affirming	difference	absolutely	or	in	absolutely	deferring	difference.		Doing	 justice	 to	 the	 subject,	 whether	 approached	 by	 way	 of	 negative	dialectics	 or	 deconstruction,	 requires	 respecting	 this	 contradictory	 experience,	which	 requires	a	 restless	process	of	 recognising	how	 the	 subject	 is	 always	other	than	its	identified	forms.	This	does	not	mean	refraining	from	the	act	of	identifying,	which	 for	 Adorno	would	mean	 to	 stop	 thinking	 altogether,31	which	would	mean	‘not	 even	 the	 simplest	 operation	 could	 be	 thought	 through,	 there	 would	 be	 no	truth,	 everything	would	be	 emphatically	nothing’;32	 and	 for	Derrida	would	mean	suspending	the	possibility	of	justice	indefinitely,	which	would	be	unjust,	‘for	only	a	decision	 is	 just’.33	This	 is	 the	paradox	 for	both	Adorno	 and	Derrida:	 the	decisive	cognition	 is	 as	 necessary	 as	 it	 is	 violent,	 moving	 towards	 truth	 as	 much	 as	 it	 is	untrue	in	itself,	as	just	as	it	is	never	‘presently	just,	fully	just’.34	As	Derrida	writes,	in	summarising	 the	 problem:	 ‘the	 ordeal	 of	 the	 undecidable	 […]	 must	 be	 gone	through	 by	 any	 decision	 worthy	 of	 the	 name’,	 an	 ordeal	 that	 ‘is	 never	 past	 or	passed’,	 never	 ‘surmounted	 or	 sublated’	 in	 the	 decision,	 but	 ‘remains	 caught,	lodged,	 at	 least	 as	 a	 ghost—but	 an	 essential	 ghost—in	 every	 decision,	 in	 every	event	 of	 decision.’35	 Truth	 and	 justice	 are	 in	 this	 experience	 of	 contradiction,	 an	experience	that	animates	every	act,	every	judgment,	every	thesis.		C	 Concepts	and	the	non-conceptual		As	a	philosopher	and	as	a	social	scientist,	Adorno’s	concern	was	the	violence	that	is	done	 to	 life	 the	 moment	 un-dialectical	 ‘identity	 thinking’	 is	 reified	 in	 society.	Adorno	 saw	 this	 in	Nazi	Germany,	where	 such	 thinking	 facilitated	 the	Holocaust	through	 the	 ideological	 equation	 of	 the	 proper	 subject	 of	 human	 life	 with	 the	concept	of	Volksgemeinschaft,36	reducing	any	non-identical	forms	of	subjectivity	to	
																																																						31	As	he	writes,	‘to	think	means	to	identify’:	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	16-18.	32	Ibid,	18-19.	See	also	at	114-116:	‘The	thought,	which	wishes	to	think	the	inexpressible	through	the	sacrifice	of	thought,	falsifies	it	into	that	which	it	would	like	least	to	be,	the	gratuitous	absurdity	[Unding]	of	an	utterly	abstract	object.’	33	See	Derrida,	‘Force	of	Law’,	963.	34	Ibid.	35	Ibid,	965.	36	The	concept	of	a	‘people’s	community’	that	became	central	to	the	ideology	of	German	National	Socialism.	
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eliminable	objects.	He	saw	it	in	the	capitalist-economic	reduction	of	everything	to	equally	exchangeable	units.	He	saw	 it	 in	a	 scientific	mode	of	 research	 that	 treats	the	isolated	object	as	matter	of	fact.	Above	all,	he	saw	it	in	the	modern	bureaucratic	state,	in	its	drawing	together	of	all	of	these	conceits	in	the	administration	of	life—identifying	 subjectivity	 according	 to	 circumscribed	 categories,	 rationalising	everything	 instrumentally	 according	 to	 a	 concept	 of	 exchangeability,	 based	 on	 a	model	of	truth	that	resembles	an	‘ideology	of	the	positive’	that	equates	what	is	real	with	what	 is	 identified.37	Adorno’s	concern,	both	 in	Negative	Dialectics	and	 in	his	critical	 sociology,38	 is	 to	 work	 against	 this	 potential	 violence	 by	 insisting	 on	opening	thought	up	to	that	which	remains	otherwise	than	thought,	rendered	non-conceptual	under	the	order	of	the	concept.39		Having	 set	 out	 what	 is	 at	 stake	 in	 this,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 subject’s	contradictory	experience,	and	how	facing	the	contradiction	is	a	matter	of	justice,	I	now	turn	to	the	underlying	problem,	or	mechanism,	that	is,	conceptualisation.	This	is	 also	 where	 a	 negative-dialectical	 approach	 diverges	 from	 deconstruction.	 In	sum,	 where	 Derrida’s	 philosophy	 remains	 focused	 on	 subjective	 constructions,	Adorno’s	 negative	 dialectics	 is	 directed	 at	 seeing	 through	 these	 constructions	 to	the	 reality	 they	 articulate.	 In	 this,	 Adorno	 is	 primarily	 concerned	 with	 what	conceptualisation	does	to	its	object,	and	ensuring	that	the	object	is	not	lost	sight	of.		The	German	word	begreifen	 is	 a	keyword	 for	Adorno,	 as	 it	was	 in	Hegel’s	philosophy,	 and	 plays	 on	 the	 dual	 meaning	 of	 ‘grasp’,	 as	 both	 a	 physical	 and	 a	mental	 enclosure.40	 This	 is	 ‘understanding’	 as	 an	 act	 of	 turning	 objective	 sense	over	to	conscious	thought,	in	order	to	make	sense	of	the	subject’s	experience	of	life.	This	 is	 never	 an	 entirely	 abstract	 act:	 thinking	 always	 involving	 taking	 hold	 of	objects,	physically,	sensationally,	 in	the	attempt	to	comprehend	the	experience	of	them,	consciously,	rationally.	For	Adorno,	there	is	no	thought	without	an	objective	basis,41	 just	 as	 ‘thinking	 without	 the	 concept	 is	 nothing	 of	 the	 sort’.42	 That	 is,	
																																																						37	See	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	61-63.	These	examples	are	‘un-dialectical’	in	the	sense	that	each	reifies	the	positive	identity	as	the	truth	of	the	matter,	rather	than	maintaining	the	truth	of	the	identity	in	its	relation	with	its	non-identity.		38	See	also	Matthias	Benzer,	The	Sociology	of	Theodor	Adorno	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2011).	39	As	Adorno	writes	in	the	Prologue	to	Negative	Dialectics:	‘With	logically	consistent	means,	[negative	dialectics]	attempts	to	put,	in	place	of	the	principle	of	unity	and	of	the	hegemony	of	the	supra-ordinated	concept,	that	which	would	be	outside	of	the	bane	of	such	unity.’	40	See,	eg,	Nancy,	Restlessness	of	the	Negative,	5.	41	See	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics.	See	also	Adorno,	‘The	Actuality	of	Philosophy’.	
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57concepts	 are	 never	 purely	 subjective	 but	 always	 in	 relation	 to	 an	 object,	 always	with	 an	 object	 in	 mind,	 as	 little	 as	 it	 might	 be	 recognised;	 and	 yet	 the	 relation	between	 thought	 and	 object	 is	 never	 immediate	 but	 mediated	 conceptually,	 the	material	of	thought	being	an	irresolvable	confusion	of	conceptualised	things.		Thus	for	Adorno	the	problem	of	conceptual	violence	is	terrifyingly	real,	not	merely	the	conceit	of	the	intellectual	but	of	the	conscious	subject	who	acts	in	the	world.43	 Concepts,	 as	 technological	 innovation,	 as	 much	 as	 a	 way	 to	 appreciate	things,	provide	the	cognitive	tools	that	facilitate	the	subject’s	conceited	mastery	of	the	world,	 that	 is,	 domination.	Adorno’s	 critique	of	 conceptual	 violence	does	not	aim	to	do	away	with	theorisation,	seeing	such	an	end	as	no	less	conceited	than	the	fetishisation	of	thought,	and	no	less	violent,	leaving	the	subject	blind	to	how	things	continue	to	be	mediated	subjectively,	and	therefore	prone	to	domination	without	second	 thought.	But	 the	driving	 concern	of	negative	dialectics	 is	 to	work	against	the	 privileged	 thought	 of	 the	 subject,	which	 always	 comes	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	object.	With	a	deep	love	of	language	and	thinking,	Adorno	was	motivated	by	a	care	for	the	object,	critically	aware	of	the	violence	done	to	it	in	the	act	of	articulation,	as	a	 conscious	 act	 of	 the	 subject.	 For	 Adorno,	 the	 contradiction	 is	 irresolvable:	 the	solution,	 neither	 to	 stop	 thinking	 out	 of	 respect	 for	 the	 object,	 nor	 to	 think	 that	thought	can	be	perfected	so	as	to	be	at	one	with	the	object;	no	solution,	but	to	seek	to	open	concepts	up	to	their	object	without	making	them	the	same	as	thought.	This	is	about	maintaining	an	uncompromising	respect	for	the	primacy	of	the	object,	not	by	withdrawing	from	the	act	that	would	violate	it,	articulation,	but	by	making	the	negative-dialectical	 relation	 of	 subject	 and	 object	 critical	 to	 every	 act	 of	articulation.	 That	 is	 what	 it	 means	 for	 negative	 dialectics	 to	 be	 directed	 at	 ‘the	consistent	consciousness	of	non-identity’.44		 Key	to	making	sense	of	this	is	the	concept	of	the	non-conceptual.	This	is	the	‘more’	in	the	formulation,	‘what	is,	is	more,	than	it	is.’45	What	is,	encompassed,	‘is’,	
																																																																																																																																																														42	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	104-107.	See	also	ibid,	16-18,	19-21,	114-116.	43	Compare	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns,	‘Introduction’,	in	Law's	Violence,	ed	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns	(Ann	Arbor:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	1995).	44	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	16-18.	In	this,	negative	dialectics	is	just	another	name	for	critical	thinking—indeed	for	Critical	Theory—demanding	attention	to	what	is	excluded	from	and	oppressed	by	every	attempt	at	identification.	On	the	relation	between	negative	dialectics	and	the	Critical	Theory	of	the	Frankfurt	School,	see	Buck-Morss,	Origin	of	Negative	Dialectics.	On	Critical	Theory,	see	also	Max	Horkheimer,	‘Traditional	and	Critical	Theory’,	in	Critical	Theory:	Selected	
Essays	(New	York:	Continuum,	2002).	45	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	163-164.	
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and	what	is	more,	remains	non-conceptual;	being,	as	thought,	reduced	to	a	lifeless	form	in	the	hands	of	the	subject.	To	grasp	this,	precisely	what	cannot	be	grasped,	it	is	worth	a	brief	excursion	through	a	passage	from	Sartre’s	novel,	Nausea:	For	the	moment	it’s	the	jazz	that’s	playing;	there’s	no	melody,	only	notes,	a	host	 of	 little	 jolts.	 They	 know	no	 rest,	 an	unchanging	 order	 gives	 birth	 to	them	and	destroys	them,	without	ever	giving	them	time	to	recover,	to	exist	for	 themselves.	They	run,	 they	hurry,	 they	strike	me	with	a	sharp	blow	 in	passing	 and	 are	 obliterated.	 I	 should	 quite	 like	 to	 hold	 them	 back,	 but	 I	know	 that	 if	 I	 managed	 to	 stop	 one,	 nothing	 would	 remain	 between	 my	fingers	but	a	vulgar,	doleful	sound.46	
This	is	what	negative	dialectics	seeks	to	open	up	to	thinking	without	making	it	the	same	 as	 thought:	 a	 world	 that	 exists	 otherwise	 from	 birth	 to	 death,	 in	 restless	opposition	to	what	would	pin	 it	down	definitively,	 its	objects	striking	the	subject	sharply,	whose	every	attempt	to	grasp	them	renders	them	lifeless.	At	a	standstill,	held	 firmly	between	the	subject’s	 fingers,	 its	objects	become	doleful	 (suffering	 in	abject	discontent)	as	opposed	to	playing	out	in	a	moment	of	jazz	the	notes	of	which	know	no	melody	or	 rest.	And	 it	 is	 this	critical	 recognition	 in	 the	moment	of	 self-reflection	(‘I	should	quite	 like	to	hold	them	back,	but	I	know	that	 if	 I	managed	to	stop	one,	nothing	would	remain	between	my	fingers	but	a	vulgar,	doleful	sound’)	that	negative	dialectics	insists	upon	in	thinking.	For	Adorno,	this	is	where	philosophy	(by	which	he	has	in	mind	a	European	tradition	 of	 philosophy	 ‘since	 Plato’,	 and	 German	 idealism	 in	 particular)	 has	persistently	 failed,	 either	 dismissing	 from	 the	 outset	 the	 non-conceptual	 as	‘transient	 and	 inconsequential’	 and	 of	 no	 interest,	 or	 else,	when	 it	 has	 taken	 an	interest	it	has	done	so	 ‘in	vain’,	merely	ending	up	with	new	conceptualisations	of	the	 non-conceptual.47	 Adorno	 criticises	 Hegel’s	 dialectic,	 like	 every	 version	 of	
																																																						46	Jean-Paul	Sartre,	Nausea,	trans	Robert	Baldick	(Harmondsworth:	Penguin	Books,	1965),	36-37.		47	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	19-21.	Sartre’s	existentialism	came	close	to	what	negative	dialectics	hopes	to	achieve	in	its	attempt	to	‘break	out	of	conceptual	fetishism’,	in	its	attention	to	the	moment	of	experience,	and	Adorno	praises	Sartre’s	early	works	of	fiction	in	particular	in	this	respect.	However,	even	existentialism	does	not	escape	critique,	as	ultimately	affirming	an	absolute	subjectivity	‘indifferent	towards	every	objectivity’:	see	ibid,	58-61.	In	this,	Sartre	pushed	the	subject’s	individual	freedom	too	far,	idealising	the	decisive	act	of	the	subject,	the	decision,	resulting	in	a	false	liberation,	the	subject	thought	separate	from	its	objective	conditions.	Meanwhile,	the	object	continues	to	strike	the	subject	unsettlingly,	like	Derrida’s	‘ordeal	of	the	undecidable’,	neither	‘surmounted	or	sublated’	in	the	subject	that	decides.	Thus	despite	a	critical	concern	for	existence	beyond	the	structural	order	of	things,	for	what	is	non-conceptually	apart	from	the	given	modes	of	being,	Sartre’s	philosophy	swung	to	the	opposite	extreme;	reifying	the	non-conceptual,	existentialism	lost	sight	of	the	subject	of	experience	the	moment	it	lost	sight	of	its	objectivity.	For	Adorno’s	critique	of	existentialism,	see	ibid.	For	a	response	to	Adorno’s	critique,	see	David	Sherman,	Sartre	and	Adorno:	The	Dialectics	of	Subjectivity	(Albany:	SUNY	Press,	2007),	75-78.	
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59dialectics	before	and	since,	 for	 this	reason.	Adorno’s	critique	 is	 that	 the	Hegelian	system	 lost	 sight	 of	 its	 object	 the	moment	 it	was	 held	 out	 as	wholly	 identifiable	with	 the	 subject.48	 This	 is	 critically	 problematic	 in	 that	 the	 dialectic	 fails	 to	maintain	its	negative	thrust	and	ultimately	affirms	the	possibility	of	a	synthesis	of	subject	 and	 object,	 of	 reason	 and	 reality.	 Hegel’s	 dialectic	 thus	 results	 in	 the	domination	 of	 the	 object	 by	 the	 ‘primacy	 of	 the	 subject’,49	 the	 experience	 of	contradiction	 ultimately	 resolved	 by	 sublating	 the	 object	 as	 an	 aspect	 of	 the	absolute	subject.	In	this,	Adorno	writes,	‘Hegel	is,	like	Kant	and	the	entire	tradition,	including	Plato,	a	partisan	of	the	One.’50	Any	approach	to	thinking	that	strives	for	such	 unity—for	 a	 resolution	 between	 thought	 and	 what	 thinking	 seeks	 to	comprehend—is	to	be	criticised,	and	is	criticised	ruthlessly	in	Negative	Dialectics,	just	as	much	as	an	approach	that	would	separate	out	the	two	definitively.	Having	 said	 that,	 Hegel’s	 dialectic	 remains	 critical.	 Adorno’s	 aim	 in	critiquing	it	is	not	to	trash	it	but	to	release	it,	in	both	meanings	of	the	word:	to	free	it	from	its	confinement,	and	to	work	upon	it	as	one’s	own.	Adorno’s	critique	aims	to	 retrieve	 the	 negativity	 in	 Hegel’s	 philosophy	 that	 was	 so	 essential	 in	 his	
Phenomenology,51	 and	 push	 it	 to	 its	 logical	 end-point,	 which	 is	 without	 end,	 a	restless	 overturning	 of	 every	 point.52	 Just	 as	 Adorno’s	 negative	 dialectic	 aims	 to	open	 up	 thinking	 to	 the	 non-conceptual	 through	 concepts,	 as	 instruments	 of	analysis,	 to	 release	 what	 is	 dynamic	 in	 them,	 the	 energy	 contained	 in	 concepts	breaking	 the	word	of	 their	 current	 lease—the	 same	 is	 true	of	Adorno’s	Negative	
Dialectics	with	 respect	 to	Hegel’s	 philosophy.	 It	 is	 in	 releasing	Hegel’s	 dialectical	system	 through	 its	 critical	 treatment	 in	Negative	 Dialectics	 that	 Adorno	 aims	 to	open	up	the	conceptual	to	the	non-conceptual	without	making	them	the	same.			
																																																						48	As	Adorno	writes:	‘Hegel’s	substantive	philosophizing	had	as	its	fundament	and	result	the	primacy	of	the	subject	or,	in	the	famous	formulation	from	the	introduction	to	Logic,	the	identity	of	identity	and	non-identity.’	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	18-19.		49	Ibid.	See	also	48-50.	50	See	ibid,	158-161.	51	As	Adorno	writes:	‘As	early	as	the	introduction	to	the	Phenomenology	he	[Hegel]	gets	to	the	very	border	of	the	consciousness	of	the	negative	essence	of	the	dialectical	logic	he	is	expounding.	Its	command—to	gaze	purely	at	each	and	every	concept	until	it	moves	itself,	becomes	non-identical	with	itself,	by	virtue	of	its	own	meaning,	hence	of	its	identity—is	one	of	analysis,	not	synthesis.	What	is	static	in	the	concepts	is	supposed,	so	as	to	satisfy	these	latter,	to	release	what	is	dynamic	out	of	itself,	comparable	to	the	commotion	of	the	drop	of	water	under	a	microscope.	[…]	Dialectics	means,	objectively,	the	breaking	of	the	identity-compulsion	through	the	stored-up	energies	which	are	bound	up	in	its	concretizations’:	ibid.	52	In	this	Adorno’s	Negative	Dialectics	sits	alongside	Nancy’s	Hegel:	The	Restlessness	of	the	Negative.	
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D	 The	law	of	contradiction		The	 contradiction	 is	 central	 to	 this	 mode	 of	 thinking,	 as	 the	 ‘index	 of	 non-identity’.53	It	is	therefore	important	to	introduce	it	here	in	greater	depth.	In	this	it	is	 useful	 to	 consider	 Adorno’s	 formulation:	 ‘Since	 however	 this	 totality	 [of	 the	concept]	 is	 formed	 according	 to	 logic,	 whose	 core	 is	 constructed	 from	 the	proposition	 of	 the	 excluded	 third,	 everything	 which	 does	 not	 conform	 to	 such,	everything	qualitatively	divergent	assumes	the	signature	of	the	contradiction.’54		In	 logic,	 at	 least	 in	 the	 European	 tradition	 since	 Aristotle,	 the	 ‘law	 of	 the	excluded	 third’	 purports	 to	 establish	 a	 clear	 line	 of	 separation	 between	 two	contradictory	propositions:	‘X’	is	either	true	(it	is	‘X’)	or	it	is	not	true	(it	is	‘not	X’).	Whatever	fails	to	live	up	to	the	categorical	demands	of	this	distinction	is	relegated	to	the	condition	of	the	contradiction,	which	is	the	excluded	third	proposition:	‘X’	is	true	and	it	is	not	true	(it	is	‘X’	and	it	is	‘not	X’);	and	conversely,	what	is	expressed	as	‘X’	is	neither	‘X’	nor	‘not	X’	(the	expression	neither	true	nor	not	true).	Both	of	these	perspectives	on	the	contradiction	are	instructive	and	need	to	be	kept	in	mind.55	To	understand	how	this	contradiction	informs	the	concept	it	might	help	to	think	 about	 how,	 as	 a	 form	 of	 expression,	 a	 concept	 represents	 what	 has	 been	squeezed	 out	 of	 its	 object.	 What	 has	 been	 squeezed	 out	 (‘ex-pressed’)	 in	 the	process	 of	 conceptualisation,	 and	 re-presented	 as	 the	 concept,	 is	 ‘X’;	 everything	else	is	‘not	X’.	But	of	course,	what	also	remains—neither	wholly	‘X’	nor	wholly	‘not	X’—is	the	remnant	waste	from	which	‘X’	has	been	squeezed.	In	the	logical	move	to	distinguish	 ‘X’	 from	‘not	X’	this	 leftover	becomes	non-conceptually	other.	It	 is	not	identical	 with	 ‘X’	 because	 the	 expression	 merely	 re-presents	 what	 has	 been	squeezed	 out	 of	 its	 object;	 thus	 in	 their	 relation	 they	 are	 not	 the	 same.	 But	 this	leftover	is	also	not	entirely	in	the	category	of	‘not	X’.	It	is	after	all	the	very	object	of	expression:	it	is	the	non-identity	of	identity,	expelled	as	the	non-conceptual	in	the	act	 of	 giving	 expression	 to	 the	 concept;	 thus	 in	 their	 difference	 they	 are	 not	unrelated.	 Suspended	 in	 a	 state	 of	 abjection,	 what	 is	 expressed	 as	 ‘X’	 remains	
																																																						53	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	16-18.	54	Ibid.	55	On	the	need	to	take	both	perspectives	on	the	contradiction,	from	the	point	of	view	of	subject	and	object,	see	Adorno’s	essay	on	‘The	Experiential	Content	of	Hegel’s	Philosophy’	in	Adorno,	Hegel:	
Three	Studies,	78.		
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61neither	‘X’	nor	‘not	X’.	From	the	standpoint	of	what	is	expressed	as	‘X’,	it	is	neither	identical	to	its	concept	nor	entirely	separate	from	it.	That	is	from	the	non-conceptual	point	of	view	of	the	object	of	articulation.	However,	 as	 noted,	 there	 is	 a	 second	 perspective	 on	 the	 contradiction,	 from	 the	point	of	view	of	the	expressive	subject.	From	this	standpoint,	‘X’	is	‘X’,	precisely	as	it	says	 it	 is.	To	dispute	the	 logic	of	 that,	 from	a	conceptual	perspective,	would	be	self-contradictory,	 which	 is	 absurdity.56	 And	 yet:	 ‘The	 non-naïve	 thought	 knows	how	little	 it	encompasses	what	 is	thought,	and	yet	must	always	hold	forth	as	 if	 it	had	such	completely	in	hand’.57	Whilst	‘X’	is	‘X’,	as	it	says	it	is	(holding	forth	‘as	if	it	had	 such	 completely	 in	 hand’),	 even	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 the	 concept	 it	 is	patently	obvious	 that	 it	 is	 also	not	what	 it	 seeks	 to	express,	despite	what	 it	 says	(‘the	 non-naïve	 thought	 knows	 how	 little	 it	 encompasses	 what	 is	 thought’).	 To	understand	 conceptually	 what	 it	 means	 for	 ‘X’	 to	 be	 ‘X’	 therefore	 requires	understanding	the	absurdity	in	which	the	concept	is	at	the	same	time	not	what	it	expresses	 itself	 to	 be.	 Thus	 it	 is	 ‘X’	 and	 it	 is	 ‘not	 X’.	 To	 fail	 to	maintain	 this	 self-contradictory	 understanding	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	 concept	 would	 be	 to	 raise	 the	concept	to	the	level	of	the	object	at	the	expense	of	the	object.	To	insist,	for	example,	that	what	is	expressed	as	‘X’	is	 ‘X’.,	would	be	to	ignore	the	experience	of	what	can	only	ever	be	other	than	its	expression.	In	this	the	concept	would	displace	its	object	twice	over,	the	first	time	in	thinking	the	concept	into	existence	out	of	its	object,	and	the	second	 time	 in	 reaffirming	 the	existence	of	 the	concept	 in	place	of	 its	object.	This	 is	 the	kind	of	 totalitarian	 thinking	 that	negative	dialectics	works	against,	by	insisting	upon	the	absurdity	of	contradiction	over	the	violence	of	affirmation.	By	insisting	on	critical	thinking,	the	intent	of	negative	dialectics	therefore	is	not	to	break	the	law	of	the	excluded	third	or	have	it	struck	off	the	books;	it	is	much	more	 radical	 than	 that.58	 Adorno	 accepts	 that	 the	 contradiction	 describes	 the	logical	 form	 of	 conceptual	 thought.	 ‘Identity	 thinking’	 is	 an	 insatiable	 conceit,	incapable	 of	 satisfaction	 with	 its	 object,	 but	 it	 is	 nonetheless	 a	 condition	 of	
																																																						56	On	the	definition	of	absurdity	as	self-contradiction,	see	Thomas	Hobbes,	Leviathan	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2008	[1651]),	88.	57	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	24-27.	58	Etymologically	the	word	‘radical’	relates	to	the	form	of	the	root,	as	in:	‘Of,	belonging	to,	or	from	a	root	or	roots;	fundamental	to	or	inherent	in	the	natural	processes	of	life,	vital;	spec.	designating	the	humour	or	moisture	once	thought	to	be	present	in	all	living	organisms	as	a	necessary	condition	of	their	vitality.’	See	‘radical,	adj.	and	n.’,	OED	Online,	December	2015.	Negative	dialectics	is	radical	in	this	sense,	in	that	it	is	directed	at	showing	how	the	contradiction	is	at	the	root	of	thinking.	
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thinking.	Adorno	could	not	be	clearer	about	this:	‘To	think	means	to	identify.’59	To	think	‘X’	means	to	have	in	mind	a	concept	of	what	is	‘X’,	and	therefore	what	is	‘not	X’.	Whilst	negative	dialectics	does	not	seek	to	overthrow	this	 law,	 it	does	seek	to	reintroduce	 the	 ‘excluded	 third’	 back	 into	 the	 equation,	 as	 the	 condition	 of	thinking.		Thus	the	contradiction	is	not	a	problem	to	be	ashamed	of	and	hidden	from	sight	or	 cleaned	up	with	obsessive	 scrubbing;	 either	way	 it	will	 remain,	perhaps	better	 hidden	 or	 else	 as	 the	 stain	 one	 tries	 to	 ignore.	 Negative	 dialectics	 has	 no	interest	in	cleaning	the	surface	of	thought	through	better	and	stronger	analysis.	To	seek	such	clarity—to	determine	analytically	whether	something	is	‘X’	or	‘not	X’—is	simply	 to	 reaffirm	 the	 hegemony	 of	 the	 subject	 over	 its	 object,	 and	 negative	dialectics	has	no	interest	in	facilitating	the	subject’s	desire	to	control	existence.	Of	course	 dialectics	 cannot	 do	without	 such	 distinctions:	 the	 concept	 is	 no	 less	 the	material	of	dialectical	analysis	than	is	the	object	that	contradicts	it.	But	rather	than	fetishise	 the	 concept,	 a	 negative-dialectical	 approach	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	confusion	that	results	when	concepts	clearly	face	their	contradiction—to	the	ways	in	 which	what	 is	 expressed	 as	 ‘X’	 is	 neither	 ‘X’	 nor	 ‘not	 X’,	 and	 how	 ‘X’	 itself	 is	always	also	 ‘not	X’.	 In	short,	 the	 intent	of	negative	dialectics	 is	not	 to	resolve	the	contradiction	but	to	draw	attention	to	it	as	the	untruth	of	the	matter.		E	 Determination	and	infinitude	
	At	 its	most	 basic	 ‘negative	 dialectics’	 is	 therefore	 just	 another	 name	 for	 ‘critical	thinking’,	striking	at	the	limits	of	thought,	demanding	attention	to	what	is	excluded	from	 and	 oppressed	 by	 every	 attempt	 at	 identification.60	 As	 a	 critical	 mode	 of	thinking	it	is	a	constant	reminder	that	concepts	are	wholly	inadequate	to	their	task	of	 determining	 the	 truth	 of	 things,	 that	 the	 truth	 of	 a	 concept	 lies	 and	 lies	 in	 its	relation	with	 its	contradiction.61	This	 is	what	Adorno	means	when	he	writes:	 ‘Its	name	says	 to	begin	with	nothing	more	 than	 that	objects	do	not	vanish	 into	 their	
																																																						59	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	16-18.	60	On	the	relation	between	negative	dialectics	and	the	theoretical	approach	of	the	first	generation	of	‘Frankfurt	School’	scholars,	which	Adorno’s	colleague	Max	Horkheimer	termed	Critical	Theory,	see	Buck-Morss,	Origin	of	Negative	Dialectics.	On	Critical	Theory,	see	also	Horkheimer,	‘Traditional	and	Critical	Theory’.	61	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	16-18.	
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63concept,	 that	 these	 end	 up	 in	 contradiction	 with	 the	 received	 norm	 of	 the	
adaequatio.’62	What	 is,	 grasped	by	 thought,	 always	ends	up	 in	 contradiction	with	what	thinking	mistakes	for	its	truth	according	to	the	maxim	veritas	est	adaequatio	
rei	et	intellectus	(‘truth	is	the	equation	of	thing	and	intellect’).63		This	 is	 where	 negative	 dialectics	 ‘transgresses’64	 against	 the	 dominant	European	 tradition	 of	 dialectical	 philosophy:	 in	maintaining	 that	 the	 truth	never	emerges	 in	 any	 affirmative	 way.	 Unlike	 the	 positivist	 version	 of	 dialectics	 that	Adorno	critiques,	exemplified	by	the	formulation	of	the	 ‘negation	of	the	negation’	as	a	method	of	determining	the	truth	of	 the	matter,65	negative	dialectics	seeks	to	reveal	how	little	of	the	object	is	present	in	the	material,	that	is,	the	untruth	of	the	matter.	 ‘Dialectics	[is]	not	a	standpoint’,	Adorno	emphasises:66	dialectics	does	not	culminate	 in	 a	 truthful	 exposition	 any	 more	 than	 it	 might	 be	 used	 to	 defend	 a	proposition.	There	is	no	such	position,	no	point	at	which	one	might	stand	and	look	back	having	finally	reached	‘the	truth’;	there	is	only	the	constant	overturning	of	the	ground	on	which	one	stands,	as	the	overturning	of	the	truth	in	light	of	its	untruth.	To	take	dialectics	as	a	standpoint	for	determining	what	is	true	would	be	to	grind	to	a	halt	in	a	cloud	of	dust	while	the	world	carries	on.	The	constant	movement	of	negative	dialectics	and	its	attention	to	untruth	is	not,	 however,	 a	 hopeless	 descent	 into	 relativism	 or	 nihilism.	 Whilst	 negative	dialectics	 rejects	 every	 affirmation	 of	 truth,	 it	 equally	 rejects	 relativism’s	 false	individualism,	 in	which	the	autonomous	and	self-determining	subject	 is	the	 locus	of	 truth	 by	 virtue	 of	 its	 absolute	 separation	 from	 anything	 objective	 apart	 from	itself.	 For	 Adorno,	 there	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 there	 is	 an	 actuality	 beyond	 the	 self-conscious	 subject,	 that	 informs	 the	 subject,	 whilst	 being	 transformed	 by	 it.	 The	point	 is	 not	 that	 there	 is	 no	 objective	 truth:	 the	point	 is	 that	what	 is	 objectively	true	is	never	grasped,	comprehensively;	existence	reducible	to	a	concept	of	being	
																																																						62	Ibid.	63	I	am	assuming	‘the	received	norm	of	the	adequatio’	refers	to	this	maxim,	as	formulated	by	Thomas	Aquinas.	This	is	in	keeping	with	the	point	being	made	by	Adorno,	but	he	does	not	make	his	reference	explicit.	However,	whether	or	not	Adorno	is	referring	to	Aquinas	specifically	is	not	relevant.	The	point	is	the	reification	of	this	maxim—how,	as	Goris	and	Aertsen	note,	‘the	definition	of	truth	as	the	“conformity	of	the	thing	with	the	intellect”	(adaequatio	rei	et	intellectus)	rose	to	hegemony’:	Wouter	Goris	and	Jan	Aertsen,	‘Medieval	Theories	of	Transcendentals’	in	ed	Edward	N	Zalta,	The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy	(Summer	2013):	plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/transcendentals-medieval/.	64	See	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	Prologue.	65	See	ibid.	66	Ibid,	16-18.	
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no	more	 than	 knowledge	 is	 reducible	 to	 a	 determinate	 system	 of	 thought.67	 But	this	also	does	not	end	in	a	nihilistic	position	of	 indeterminacy.	Rather,	as	Adorno	states	 in	 the	 opening	 paragraph	 of	 the	 Prologue	 to	 Negative	 Dialectics,	 this	approach	 seeks	 to	 emancipate	 dialectics	 from	 any	 form	 of	 affirmation	 ‘without	relinquishing	anything	in	terms	of	determinacy.’68		What	Adorno	means	by	 ‘determinacy’,	 and	how	negative	dialectics	moves	thought	 towards	 the	 determinate	 without	 succumbing	 to	 affirmation,	 is	 what	makes	this	mode	of	thinking	so	critical	and	so	necessary	to	intellectual	work.	One	way	to	think	about	this	is	the	relation	just	touched	upon,	between	what	is	‘real’,	as	a	claim	to	the	truth,	and	what	is	‘actual’,	in	truth.	Thus	on	one	side:	what	is	actual,	rendered	 as	what	 is	 real,	 reality	 represents	 existence	 in	 stucco	 finish,	 plastered	over	with	a	calcareous	substance	that	imitates	stone.69	On	the	other	side:	truth	in	actuality,	always	more	than	realised,	always	penetrates	through;	the	cement	wears	away	with	time,	dissolves	under	changing	conditions,	an	interior	becomes	exposed	to	an	exterior,	revealing	the	gaps,	requiring	a	fresh	rendering,	a	fresh	reality.		There	 are	 two	dimensions	 at	 play	 here:	what	 is	 actual,	which	 is	 infinitely	realisable,	always	more	in	truth	than	what	‘is’	the	truth;	and	what	is	real,	which	is	by	definition	how	things	are,	precisely	what	‘is’	without	more.	In	poststructuralist	terms,	these	two	dimensions	correspond	to	determinacy	and	indeterminacy,	as	the	relation	between	what	is	fixed	in	itself	and	what	is	always	beyond	itself,	outside	of	itself,	exterior	to	itself.70	For	Adorno,	as	in	poststructuralism,	both	dimensions	are	always	 in	 play.	Reality:	 never	 an	 ambivalent	 statement,	 always	 an	 expression	 of	what	 ‘is’	 actual;	 whilst	 what	 is	 actual:	 never	 restricted	 by	 its	 definition	 as	 ‘is’,	always	overflowing	the	order	of	things,	always	taking	form	in	other	ways.		This	 is	 not	 a	 binary	 code,	 switching	 from	 one	 to	 the	 other.	 The	 point	 is	dialectical,	posing	truth	in-between	the	proposition	and	the	exposition,	in-between	
																																																						67	See	Adorno’s	critique	of	ontology,	in	particular	Heidegger’s:	ibid,	Part	I.	68	Ibid,	Prologue.	69	See	‘stucco,	n.’,	OED	Online,	December	2015.		70	With	thanks	to	Peter	Fitzpatrick	for	drawing	my	attention	to	the	notion	of	‘exteriority’	as	a	parallel	way	of	thinking	about	Adorno’s	notion	of	‘more’.	My	understanding	of	exteriority	is	primarily	informed	by	Fitzpatrick’s	discussion	of	it	in	relation	to	law:	see,	eg,	Ben	Golder	and	Peter	Fitzpatrick,	Foucault's	Law	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2009),	71.	See	also	Fitzpatrick,	Modernism	and	the	
Grounds	of	Law,	5,	62.	On	the	concept	of	the	‘exterior’	or	‘outside’,	see	also	Maurice	Blanchot,	The	
Step	Not	Beyond,	trans	L	Davis	(Albany:	SUNY	Press,	1992);	Michel	Foucault,	‘Maurice	Blanchot:	The	Thought	from	Outside’,	in	Foucault/Blanchot	(New	York:	Zone	Books,	1987);	Maurice	Blanchot,	The	
Infinite	Conversation,	trans	Susan		Hanson	(London:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	1993).	
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65real	definition	and	actual	infinitude,	in-between	finite	reality	and	infinite	actuality.	This	 is	 the	movement	 towards	truth.	Exposing	the	 truth	to	 its	untruth,	as	what	 is	beyond	 its	 determinate	 position,	 the	 truth,	 made	 to	 tremble,	 must	 move	 out	 of	itself,	 beyond	 itself,	 towards	 an	 other	 position,	 if	 it	 is	 to	 survive	 and	not	 turn	 to	dust.	And	yet	there	is	no	movement	without	position;	infinitude	without	definition,	even	 less	 substantive	 than	 dust.71	 The	 truth	must	 stake	 its	 claim	 in	 real	 ground,	take	 up	 position,	 against	 the	 thought	 of	 infinity,	 so	 that	 it	 might	 tremble	 in-between,	 never	 resting	 on	 one	 or	 the	 other,	 becoming,	 in	 truth,	 neither	 wholly	determinate	nor	wholly	indeterminate.72	Bringing	 this	 back	 to	 Adorno’s	 concern	 with	 identity	 thinking,	 it	 is	 by	focusing	attention	on	the	non-identical—on	difference	as	the	untruth	of	identity—that	 negative	 dialectics	moves	 thinking	 closer	 to	 truth.	 This	 is	 the	 ‘determinacy’	that	Adorno	sought	 to	pry	 from	the	grip	of	affirmation.	Determination	here	does	not	mean	bringing	the	facts	 into	perfect	 focus	 in	an	attempt	to	see	their	absolute	objectivity,	as	 if	objects	could	be	dragged	before	a	microscope	as	brute	 facts	and	known	 as	 such	 without	 a	 mediating	 thought.73	 And	 whilst	 thought	 always	 falls	short	 in	 its	 mediate	 attempt	 to	 identify	 what	 is	 under	 the	 microscope,	 the	microscope	is	not	to	be	trashed	in	a	fit	of	subjectivity.	The	opposite:	in	light	of	the	immanent	potential	of	reason	to	become	irrational	the	moment	it	loses	sight	of	its	object,	which	is	every	moment,74	and	the	blind	terror	of	a	rational	thought	that	has	no	particular	concern	for	 its	object,	negative	dialectics	 is	driven	by	a	care	for	the	most	 marginal	 datum,75	 as	 that	 which	 is	 either	 overlooked	 or	 else	 registered	indifferently	on	a	graph.	 ‘Dialectics	develops	the	difference	of	the	particular	from	
																																																						71	As	Adorno	writes:	‘By	virtue	of	its	differentiation	from	nothingness,	even	the	most	indeterminate	something	would	be,	contrary	to	Hegel,	not	something	purely	and	simply	indeterminate.’	Adorno,	
Negative	Dialectics,	174-175.	He	goes	on	to	write:	‘This	refutes	the	idealistic	doctrine	of	the	subjectivity	of	all	determinations.’	72	See	Nancy,	Restlessness	of	the	Negative.	In	particular	see	his	discussion	of	‘restlessness’	(3-7),	‘becoming’	(8-13),	and	‘trembling’	(40-45).	On	‘truth’,	see	also	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	21-22,	43-45,	50-53,	57-58,	61-63,	107-111,	114-116,	132-134.	On	‘infinity’,	see	also	ibid,	24-27.	73	As	Adorno	puts	it:	‘Philosophy,	Hegel’s	included,	invites	the	general	objection	that	insofar	as	it	would	have	compulsory	concepts	as	its	material,	it	already	characterizes	itself	in	advance	as	idealistic.	As	a	matter	of	fact	none	of	them,	not	even	extreme	empiricism,	can	haul	off	the	facta	
bruta	and	present	them	like	anatomical	cases	or	physics	experiments;	none,	as	so	many	paintings	tempt	one	to	believe,	glue	specific	things	onto	the	text.’	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	23-24.	74	See	Max	Horkheimer	and	Theodor	W	Adorno,	Dialectic	of	Enlightenment,	trans	John	Cumming	(New	York:	Continuum,	1998).	75	‘It	compels	thinking	to	linger	before	the	smallest	of	all	things.’	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	43-45.	
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the	 generality,	which	 is	 dictated	 by	 the	 generality’,	 Adorno	writes;76	which	 is	 to	say:	where	reason	dictates	what	 is	real	 through	 its	conceptualisation	of	reality—which	 is	 always	 a	 generalisation	 to	 an	 extent,	 and	 its	 immanently	 irrational	aspect—negative	dialectics	responds	by	holding	up	 in	reflection	the	difference	of	the	 particular,	 which	 is	 nothing	 other	 than	 the	 non-conceptual	 untruth	 of	 the	identified	reality.		And	yet	the	particular	needs	the	general,	is	always	an	aspect	of	the	general,	without	 which	 the	 particular	 would	 become	 meaningless	 in	 its	 absolute	singularity,	 disconnected	 from	 everything,	mere	 nothingness.	 And	 yet	 again,	 the	caution:	‘So	little	as	the	particular	would	be	determinable	without	the	general,	by	which	 it	 is	 identified	 according	 to	 current	 logic,	 so	 little	 is	 it	 identical	with	 it.’77	Because	 the	 difference	 of	 the	 particular	 is	 what	 is	 different	 from	 its	conceptualisation	 (‘dictated	 by	 the	 generality’),	 what	 is	 different	 ‘assumes	 the	signature	of	 the	contradiction’.78	As	contradiction,	difference	 is	 ‘the	non-identical	under	 the	 aspect	 of	 identity’.79	 This	must	 be	 kept	 in	mind	 above	 all	 because,	 to	repeat,	 dialectics	 is	 not	 a	 standpoint:	 it	 is	 not	 about	 discovering	 and	 celebrating	‘the	 truth’	 of	 reality,	 even	of	 the	most	particular	 kind.	The	particular	 is	 no	more	true	 than	 the	 general.	 The	 moment	 difference	 is	 heralded	 as	 anything	 more	positive	 than	 a	 sign	 of	 non-identity,	 it	 takes	 on	 an	 affirmative	 appearance—an	identity—which	 would	 be	 as	 untrue	 as	 the	 identity	 from	 which	 it	 has	 been	excluded.	 What	 is	 otherwise,	 reified	 to	 an	 identity	 of	 the	 Other,	 becomes	 an	oppressive	 conceit.80	 Just	 as	deferring	difference	 indefinitely	would	 result	 in	 ‘the	gratuitous	absurdity	[Unding]	of	an	utterly	abstract	object’,81	affirming	difference	would	 cut	 short	 the	 very	 object	 of	 concern.	 Again,	 the	 point	 is	 in	 the	 relation	between	 the	 two,	 never	 withdrawing	 into	 particularity,	 out	 of	 respect	 for	difference,	 in	 condemnation	 of	 generalisation	 as	 ‘bad	 equality’,	 but	 also	 never	
																																																						76	Ibid,	18-19.	77	Ibid,	174-175.	78	Ibid,	16-18.	79	Ibid.	80	As	Adorno	writes:	‘The	critique	of	ontology	does	not	aim	at	any	other	ontology,	nor	even	at	one	which	is	non-ontological.	Otherwise	it	would	merely	posit	an	Other	as	what	is	simply	and	purely	first;	this	time	not	the	absolute	identity,	being,	the	concept,	but	the	non-identical,	the	existent,	facticity.	Therein	it	would	hypostasize	the	concept	of	the	non-conceptual	and	treat	it	counter	to	what	it	means’.	Ibid,	139-140.	81	Ibid,	114-116.	See	also	118-121.	
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67sublating	the	particular	 in	awe	of	 the	general,	 reducing	difference	to	sameness—both	paths	to	ignorance.	And	so	whilst	it	might	be	said,	as	I	just	have,	that	negative	dialectics	moves	thinking	 closer	 to	 truth,	 this	 is	 not	 about	 determining	 the	 truth	 of	what	 is	 non-conceptually	other	any	more	than	it	 is	about	affirming	a	truthful	identity.	Moving	thinking	 closer	 to	 truth	 is	 nothing	 more	 than	 the	 restless	 overturning	 of	 the	untruth	 that	 accumulates	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	 such	 an	 elusive	 truth.	 That	 is	 why	negative	dialectics	is,	at	its	crux,	‘the	consistent	consciousness	of	non-identity’.82			
3	 The	possibility	of	philosophy		Introducing	 Negative	 Dialectics,	 Adorno	 stated	 the	 aim	 of	 his	 book:	 ‘to	 drive	 it	[negative	dialectics],	according	to	its	own	concept,	into	the	realm	of	reality’.83	The	purpose	of	this	chapter	has	been	to	draw	out	five	aspects	from	Adorno’s	negative-dialectical	philosophy	that	are	central	to	this	thesis,	both	in	terms	of	the	arguments	I	make	about	the	rule	of	law	in	general	and	in	Liberia,	as	well	as	the	methodology	for	 making	 these	 arguments.	 Beginning	 in	 the	 next	 chapter,	 my	 aim	 is	 to	 drive	these	aspects	of	Adorno’s	philosophy	into	the	realities	of	law,	and	its	rule.	On	one	hand,	 this	 means	 seeing	 how	 the	 subject-object	 dialectic	 structures	 law’s	 rule,	opening	 it	 up	 to	 contradiction;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 means	 seeing	 how	 the	contradiction	 makes	 law’s	 rule	 a	 medium	 of	 violence,	 but	 also	 potentially	 a	medium	of	justice.		To	 a	 significant	 extent,	 this	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 logic.	 The	 logical	 law	 of	contradiction,	as	well	as	the	polarised	dimensions	of	determination	and	infinitude,	are	abstractions	that	describe	a	problem	of	thoughtful	engagement	with	the	world.	They	 are	 problems	 that	 flow	 from	 a	 rational	 attempt	 at	 making	 sense	 of	experience.	 However,	 what	 makes	 Adorno’s	 negative-dialectical	 philosophy	 so	critical	 to	 social	 research	 is	 that	 it	 shows	 how	 this	 is	 also	 a	matter	of	 logic.	 For	Adorno,	 the	problem	of	conceptualisation	 is	 the	problem	of	what	 it	does	to	 life.84	Negative	 dialectics	 is	 directed	 at	 examining	 reality	 without	 slipping	 into	 the	conceit	of	a	realism	that	seeks	to	unify	the	real	with	the	rational,	as	much	as	it	 is	
																																																						82	Ibid,	16-18.	83	Ibid,	Prologue.	84	See	notes	23	and	43	above.	
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directed	at	examining	the	rational	without	slipping	into	an	idealism	that	loses	total	grip	on	the	real.		This	 is	 the	 possibility	 of	 Adorno’s	 negative-dialectical	 philosophy—the	possibility	 of	 examining	 the	 relation	 between	 logic	 and	 matter,	 between	 the	rational	and	 the	real,	between	concepts	and	what	 is	 rendered	non-conceptual,	 to	make	each	critical	to	the	other.	This	is	about	opening	up	the	conceptual	to	the	non-conceptual,	without	holding	one’s	breath.85	It	is	also	about	opening	up	the	thesis	to	its	possibility.						
																																																						85	Or	as	Adorno	puts	it,	‘the	utopia	of	cognition	would	be	to	open	up	the	non-conceptual	with	concepts,	without	making	it	the	same	as	them.’	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	19-21.	
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1	 Law	as	is		Law’s	rule	is	animated	by	an	irresolvable	contradiction.	The	aim	of	this	chapter	is	to	examine	the	origins	of	that	contradiction,	by	driving	negative	dialectics	into	the	reality	of	law.		The	examination	begins	with	a	simple	structure,	the	predicate	sentence,	of	the	form	subject–copula–predicate:	 ‘it	is	this’.	My	argument	is	that	this	is	also	the	structure	of	law,	or	more	specifically,	that	law	is	the	copula	writ	large:	a	dialectical	medium	connecting	subject	and	object,	making	an	existential	judgment	as	to	how	things	‘are’	into	a	corporeal	sentence	on	and	of	what	is,	at	the	same	time	making	a	grammatical	 sentence	 on	 and	 of	 how	 things	 ‘are’	 into	 an	 actual	 judgment	 as	 to	what	is.	I	 develop	 this	 argument	 in	Part	 2	 of	 the	 chapter	by	 examining	 law	as	 the	articulation	of	normativity.	This	 involves	seeing	 law	 from	three	perspectives:	 (1)	from	the	standpoint	of	law	as	the	expressive	subject	that	articulates	the	sentence	‘the	 law	is	 this’;	 (2)	 from	the	standpoint	of	 the	subject	within	 jurisdiction,	whose	experience	 is	 articulated	 by	 the	 sentence	 ‘the	 law	 is	 this’;	 and	 (3)	 from	 the	perspective	of	the	process	of	law,	playing	out	between	the	expression	of	law	as	‘the	law’	and	the	experience	of	law	as	always	otherwise	than	‘the	law’	as	expressed.		By	 examining	 the	 concept	of	 law	as	 the	 articulation	of	normativity	 in	 this	way,	following	the	logic	of	the	subject-object	dialectic,	my	aim	is	to	draw	out	law’s	chasmic	structure.	My	argument	 is	that	the	contradiction	in	 law,	which	makes	 its	institution	 both	 separate	 and	 inseparable	 from	 its	 subjects,	 also	 structures	 the	contradiction	in	the	rule	of	law,	which	remains	separate	and	inseparable	from	the	rule	of	humans.	As	such,	this	chapter	enables	me	to	peer	through	the	crack	in	law’s	rule	in	the	chapters	that	follow.			A	 The	predicate	sentence		But	first,	the	predicate	sentence,	and	never	far	from	the	scene,	Adorno:	The	cult	of	being	lives	by	the	ancient	ideology	of	the	idola	fori	[idols	of	the	market	place]:	that	which	thrives	in	the	darkness	of	the	word	being	and	the	
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71forms	 derived	 from	 it.1	 ‘Is’	 establishes	 the	 context	 of	 the	 existential	judgment	between	the	grammatical	subject	and	the	predicate	and	thereby	suggests	 something	 ontic.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 taken	 purely	 by	 itself,	 as	 the	copula,	 it	 means	 the	 general	 categorical	 matter-at-hand	 of	 a	 synthesis,	without	 representing	 something	 ontic.	 Heidegger	 draws	 the	 ontological	purity	 from	 the	 logicity	 of	 the	 copula,	 thus	 suiting	 his	 allergy	 against	 the	factical;	 from	 the	 existential	 judgment	 however	 the	memory	 of	 the	 ontic,	which	 then	 permits	 it	 to	 hypostasize	 the	 categorical	 achievement	 of	 the	synthesis	as	a	given	fact.	To	the	‘is’	there	does	indeed	correspond	a	‘matter-at-hand’:	in	every	predicative	judgment	the	‘is’	has	its	meaning	just	as	much	as	 the	 subject	 and	 the	 predicate.	 The	 ‘matter-at-hand’	 is	 however	intentional,	not	ontic.	The	copula	fulfils	itself	according	to	its	own	meaning	solely	 in	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 subject	 and	 the	 predicate.	 It	 is	 not	independent.2	In	 this	 passage	 Adorno	 identifies	 two	 aspects	 of	 the	 copula:	 (1)	 In-between	 the	grammatical	 subject	 and	 predicate,	 it	 establishes	 ‘the	 context	 of	 the	 existential	judgment’.	It	holds	up	the	sentence	as	a	sentence	on	and	of	life,	convicting	‘it’,	what	
is	 in	 actuality	 always	 more	 than	 predicated,	 of	 being,	 identifiable,	 accountable,	expressible:	 ‘it	 is	 this’.	 At	 least	 that	 is	what	 it	 holds	 up—life	 behind	 bars.	 (2)	By	
itself,	however,	as	a	grammatical	operative,	the	copula	merely	performs	a	synthetic	function,	combining	‘it’	and	‘this’,	subject	and	predicate,	in	a	single	sentence	on	and	of	words,	convicting	it	of	this,	identifying	one	with	the	other,	sententiously.		Thus	by	 itself	 the	copula	re-presents	nothing	actual,	or	nothing	more	 than	what	‘is’,	in	its	purest	form,	discourse—the	stuff	of	ideology	as	much	as	idols.	And	yet	this	word-play	is	almost	never	for	itself.	Used	seriously,	its	intention	is	to	make	sense	of	existence;	like	the	idol,	it	is	intended	to	signify	nothing	in	itself	and	always	something	more.	Thus	the	two	aspects	of	the	copula	are	not	simply	separate;	they	
																																																						1	Francis	Bacon	considered	‘four	classes	of	idols	which	beset	men’s	minds’:	those	of	the	tribe,	corresponding	to	the	common	mind	of	the	generic	human	subject;	those	of	the	cave,	corresponding	to	the	individual	mind	of	the	human	subject;	those	of	the	market	place,	corresponding	to	an	inter-subjective	social	mind;	and	those	of	the	theatre,	corresponding	to	a	traditional	mind.	See	Francis	Bacon,	The	New	Organon,	or	True	Directions	concerning	the	interpretation	of	Nature,	trans	James	Spedding,	Robert	Leslie	Ellis,	and	Douglas	Denon	Heath	(Adelaide:	ebooks@Adelaide,	2014	[1620]),	Aphorisms,	XXXVIII-XLIV.	Relevant	to	this	discussion	is	the	third	class,	the	idols	of	the	market	place:	‘There	are	also	Idols	formed	by	the	intercourse	and	association	of	men	with	each	other,	which	I	call	Idols	of	the	Market	Place,	on	account	of	the	commerce	and	consort	of	men	there.	For	it	is	by	discourse	that	men	associate,	and	words	are	imposed	according	to	the	apprehension	of	the	vulgar.	And	therefore	the	ill	and	unfit	choice	of	words	wonderfully	obstructs	the	understanding.	Nor	do	the	definitions	or	explanations	wherewith	in	some	things	learned	men	are	wont	to	guard	and	defend	themselves,	by	any	means	set	the	matter	right.	But	words	plainly	force	and	overrule	the	understanding,	and	throw	all	into	confusion,	and	lead	men	away	into	numberless	empty	controversies	and	idle	fancies’:	ibid,	Aphorisms,	XLIII.		2	Theodor	W	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	trans	Dennis	Redmond	(2001),	107-111.	
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are	also	inseparable.	Crossing	one	way:	the	intention	of	the	linguistic	synthesis,	to	perform	 a	 real	 function,	 to	 determine	 the	matter-at-hand:	 ‘it	 is	 this?’—a	 serious	question.	Crossing	 the	other	way:	 from	the	existential	 judgment,	a	memory	of	 the	ontic	 pervades	 what	 remains	 purely	 synthetic,	 the	 grammatical	 construct	becoming	real:	‘it	is	this!’—a	serious	answer.	Now	both	are	real:	the	actual	problem	that	 needs	 to	 be	 judged,	 a	 sentence	handed	down,	 as	much	 as	 the	 sentence	 that	allows	for	the	matter	to	be	spoken	of,	and	therefore	taken	in	hand,	and	dealt	with.		 Thus	the	copula,	most	meaningful	by	itself,	‘is	not	independent’,	its	meaning	always	 in-between	what	 is,	 in	actuality,	and	how	it	 ‘is’,	expressed,	enlivening	both	through	 the	 contra-diction.	 What	 is,	 in	 actuality,	 contradicting	 how	 it	 ‘is’,	expressed;	what	‘is’,	expressed,	contradicting	how	it	is,	in	actuality.	The	‘matter-at-hand’:	 always	 this	 contradictory	 configuration	 of	 what	 is	 objective	 and	 what	 is	subjective.	Holding	this	material,	as	an	idol,	the	subject	does	not	have	in	hand	what	it	intends	to	grasp,	as	is.	To	think	the	matter-at-hand,	as	is,	the	subject	makes	the	fatal	mistake,	making	the	sentence	on	and	of	words	into	a	sentence	on	and	of	life.	That	is	why	it	must	not	be	forgotten	that	the	matter-at-hand	is	intentional	and	not	ontic,	intending	to	hold	up	what	‘is’	as	how	things	are,	without	actually	upholding	how	things	are	as	what	 ‘is’.	To	forget	this	 is	to	forget	that	 ‘the	Idols	of	the	Market	
Place	are	 the	 most	 troublesome	 of	 all—idols	 which	 have	 crept	 into	 the	understanding	through	the	alliances	of	words	and	names’,	words	and	names	that	beget	other	words	and	names,	defining	each	other	and	not	the	objects	with	which	they	deal.3	And	yet,	 the	configuration	is	no	idle	form.	What	 is:	brought	 into	being	through	an	act	of	copulation.	Mediating	between	what	is	and	how	it	‘is’	expressed,	copulation	gives	existence	a	name,	being,	even	more	apparent,	more	alive	even,	at	the	same	time	condemning	it	to	idol	form,	at	risk	of	existence,	being,	no	more	than	a	fetish.	And	so,	the	copula,	is,	a	dialectical	medium,	making	an	existential	judgment	as	 to	 how	 things	 ‘are’	 into	 a	 corporeal	 sentence	 on	 and	 of	 what	 is—out	 of	 the	subjective	verdict,	an	objective	sentence;	at	 the	same	time	making	a	grammatical	sentence	on	and	of	how	things	‘are’	into	an	actual	judgment	as	to	what	is—out	of	the	 subjective	 sentence,	 an	 objective	 verdict.	 ‘Is’:	 connecting	 subject	 and	 object	through	the	lines	of	the	conscious	mind.		
																																																						3	Bacon,	The	New	Organon,	Aphorisms,	LIX.	See	also	note	1	above.	
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73B	 The	predicate	sentence	of	law			If	that	is	the	copula,	a	dialectical	medium,	synthesising	sentences	on	and	of	words,	that	 are	 sentences	 on	 and	 of	 the	 world,	 reflecting	 the	 subject’s	 experience	 of	separation	 and	 yet	 inseparability,	 then	what	 does	 it	mean	 to	 say	 that	 law	 is	 the	
copula	writ	large?		It	means	the	same,	with	one	forceful	difference:	the	law	is	this—a	sentence	over	 life,	 like	every	other,	and	yet	 like	no	other.	 ‘The	 law	 is	 this’:	 a	 sentence	 like	every	other,	it	remains	intentional	and	not	ontic,	normative	and	not	definitive;	like	no	 other,	 its	 hypostasisation	 is	 rock-solid.	 ‘The	 law	 is	 this’,	 the	 legal	 authority	states,	 to	 which	 the	 response	 can	 be	 heard,	 ‘this	 is	 not	 law’,	 to	 which	 the	 legal	authority	 re-states,	 ‘the	 law	 is	 the	 law’.	 ‘This’,	 what	 even	 the	 greatest	 scientific	mind	 non-naïvely	 refrains	 from	 claiming	 to	 know	 absolutely,	 holding	 up	 only	 a	fractured	probability	of	what	this	 ‘is’,	 the	legal	authority	renders	stone-cold	fact.4	
And	yet,	 rendered	 in	 stucco	 finish,	 the	 sentence	plastered	over	with	a	 calcareous	substance	that	imitates	stone,	the	basis	always	penetrates	through.	The	voices	talk	back,	‘this	is	not	law’:	a	sentence	on	and	of	law,	convicting	it	of	inadequacy,	as	‘is’,	requiring	a	response	that	is	more	than	an	affirmation	of	what	is	‘the	law’.	My	aim	in	the	rest	of	the	chapter	is	to	examine	the	implications	of	this—of	seeing	 law	 as	 the	 copula	writ	 large.	 I	 do	 this	 in	 the	 next	 part	 of	 the	 chapter	 by	considering	law	as	the	articulation	of	normativity	from	three	perspectives.		(1)	 The	 first	 perspective	 is	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 law	 as	 the	 expressive	subject	that	articulates	the	sentence,	‘the	law	is	this’.	This	means	looking	at	things	
through	law—seeing	law	not	as	an	object	of	study	(‘the	law’),	but	as	an	expressive	subject,	 ‘law’,	 that	 gives	 form	 to	 existence,	 as	 its	 object,	 always	 as	 a	 normative	matter.	This	is	the	‘outside’	perspective,	in	poststructuralist	terminology,	the	view	from	the	exterior:	law,	as	subject,	looking	in	at	its	legal	creation	non-naïvely.	This	is	 also	what	 I	 refer	 to	 as	 the	 conceptual	 perspective.	 And	 the	 view	 from	here	 is	unsettled:	the	subject	can	see	how	every	act	of	articulation,	of	expressing	what	‘is’	(‘the	law’),	 is	an	idolistic	 leap	of	faith,	over	what	remains	in	between	what	 is	and	what	is	predicated	as	‘is’—how	‘this’	is	and	is	not	what	it	is	expressed	to	be	by	law.	In	 short,	 this	 is	 about	 seeing	 the	 contradiction	 in	 law	 from	 the	 non-naïve	
																																																						4	See	Bruno	Latour,	The	Making	of	Law:	An	Ethnography	of	the	Conseil	d'Etat,	trans	Marina	Brilman	and	Alain	Pottage	(Cambridge:	Polity,	2010).		
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perspective	 of	 law-as-subject,	 a	 contradiction	 that	 animates	 every	 expression	 of	‘the	law’.		(2)	 The	 second	 perspective	 is	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 the	 subject	 within	jurisdiction,	whose	experience	of	law	is	neither	wholly	circumscribed	by	‘the	law’	as	expressed,	nor	wholly	outside	‘the	law’.	Rather	than	seeing	‘law’,	as	subject,	this	second	point	of	view	is	about	seeing	‘the	law’,	as	object,	from	the	perspective	of	the	subject	whose	experience	is	the	very	object	of	law.	This	is	the	inside	perspective	of	the	grammatical	subject	of	 the	predicate	sentence,	 that	experiences	 the	reality	of	the	 sentence,	 ‘the	 law	 is	 this’.	 This	 is	 also	what	 I	 refer	 to	 as	 the	 non-conceptual	perspective,	 the	 abject	 perspective,	 of	 the	 subject	 whose	 experience	 of	 law	 is	neither	as	predicated	nor	simply	free	from	predication.	These	first	two	viewpoints	are	concerned	with	law	as	a	 ‘subjective’	and	as	an	 ‘objective’	phenomenon:	 from	the	 first	perspective,	how	 law	gives	 form	 to	 the	world,	as	a	subjective	matter;	and	from	the	second	perspective,	how	the	law	takes	
form	in	the	world,	as	an	objective	matter.	And	yet:	‘dialectics	[is]	not	a	standpoint’.5	Having	considered	law	from	these	two	separate	standpoints,	in	positive-analytical	fashion,	 the	next	 task	 is	 to	confuse	things,	 in	negative-dialectical	 fashion.6	Thus	a	third	perspective	is	needed.	(3)	If	the	first	perspective	provides	a	view	of	the	pendulum	in	motion	from	an	external	standpoint,	observing	how	 it	 swings	back	and	 forth	between	poles—how	what	 ‘is’	 is	 also	 not	 as	 is;	 and	 if	 the	 second	 perspective	 provides	 a	 view	 of	things	 riding	 the	pendulum,	 attempting	 to	 stay	un-nauseated,	made	dizzy	by	 the	experience	of	an	existence	neither	as	‘is’	nor	not	as	‘is’;	then	this	third	perspective	provides	a	view	on	the	process	itself.	This	is	about	seeing	how	‘law’	becomes	 ‘the	law’	and	how	‘the	law’	becomes	‘law’,	and	how	this	process	of	becoming	takes	place	in	the	interplay	between	the	two	poles	of	law	as	expressive	subject	and	the	law	as	object	 of	 expression,	 which	 is	 no	 place	 at	 all	 but	 a	 constant	 movement.	 This	interplay	animates	law,	making	it	both	dominating	and	emancipating,	violent	and	non-violent;	and	it	is	this,	as	I	examine	in	Chapter	3,	that	animates	law’s	rule.				
	 	
																																																						5	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	16-18.	6	Dialectical	analysis	is	‘confusing’	in	the	sense	that	it	does	not	just	separate	out	everything	into	discrete	things,	as	in	positivist	analysis,	but	also	focuses	on	how	these	analytically	separated	things	are	fused	together	(con-fused).	
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2	 Articulation	of	normativity		A	 Acts	of	articulation		Law	 is	articulate.	As	an	expressive	subject,	 law	articulates	how	things	are,	giving	form	to	reality	through	its	expression	as	‘the	law’.	By	law:	this	is	the	law.	This	is	law	as	 ‘articulation’	 in	 the	most	 basic	 sense	 of	 the	 term:	 ‘to	 give	 expression’.	 This	 is	‘law’,	without	definite	article,	without	determinate	form	in	itself—an	act	of	giving	
form,	of	making	express,	what	remains	otherwise	unexpressed.		Law	 is	 also	 imaginative,	 its	 expressive	 scope	 as	 limited	 as	 the	 human	imagination.	Thus	law	might	articulate	things	linguistically,	through	acts	of	writing,	speaking,	and	singing,	as	well	as	 through	other	expressive	modes,	such	as	dance,	sculpture,	 painting,	 weaving—indeed	 through	 any	 cultural	 artefact,	 through	 any	spatial	arrangement,	through	any	act	by	which	the	subject	gives	form	to	things.7		Infinitely	 imaginative,	 law	 nonetheless	 has	 a	 definite	 object	 in	 mind:	 to	articulate	normativity.	By	 ‘normativity’	 I	mean	the	quality	of	being	normative:	as	
prescription,	it	is	the	subjective	sentence	on	life,	which	subscribers	render	real	by	acting	upon	with	conviction,	making	what	 is	 intentional	 into	something	ontic.	To	the	serious	question,	 ‘it	 is	this?’,	the	serious	answer,	 ‘it	 is	this’.	What	 ‘is’:	always	a	normative	 statement,	 rendered	 real	 by	 its	 affirmation,	 as	 is.	 The	 child	 asks:	 ‘the	tree	is	the	soil?’	The	parent	answers	negatively,	cutting	the	tree	from	the	ground	it	inhabits,	 from	the	air	 it	breathes,	 from	the	birds	 it	nests,	and	affirms,	 ‘the	 tree	 is	
this’.	Expressing	what	‘is’:	always	an	act	of	articulating	normativity.	Likewise	‘law’:	giving	 form	to	how	things	are	to	be	by	expressing	how	things	ought	to	be,	giving	form	 to	 how	 things	 ought	 to	 be	 by	 expressing	 how	 things	 are	 to	 be.	 Thus	 the	
																																																						7	See	Roderick	A	Macdonald,	‘Custom	Made	-	For	a	Non-chirographic	Critical	Legal	Pluralism’,	
Canadian	Journal	of	Law	and	Society,	vol	26,	no	2	(2011).	See	also	Austin	Sarat,	‘What	Popular	Culture	Does	For,	and	To,	Law’,	in	Imagining	Legality:	Where	Law	Meets	Popular	Culture,	ed	Austin	Sarat	(Tuscaloosa:	University	of	Alabama	Press,	2011);	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns,	‘The	Cultural	Lives	of	Law’,	in	Law	in	the	Domains	of	Culture,	ed	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns	(Ann	Arbor:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	1998);	Jessica	Silbey,	‘Images	in/of	Law’,	New	York	Law	School	
Law	Review,	vol	57	(2012-2013).	
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expression	of	law	‘gives	legal	form	to	life	and	life	to	law’	as	matter	of	jurisdiction.8	Juris-diction—the	expressive	act	of	law—‘gives	us	the	structure	of	our	existence.’9		If	‘law’,	without	definite	article,	is	a	subjective-expressive	act	of	giving	form	to	what	 is	 real	 and	what	 is	 ideal,	 jurisdictionally,	 in	 a	way	 that	 the	 two—reality,	and	 how	 it	 is	 imagined	 ideally	 according	 to	 law—cannot	 be	 separated	 or	 finally	resolved,	 then	 ‘the	 law’,	with	definite	article,	 is	 the	expression	 that	 takes	 form	 in	this	act.	As	an	expression	of	law,	‘the	law’	takes	form	as	a	dialectical	image	of	how	things	are	to	be	and	how	things	ought	to	be,	brought	together	in	a	flash,	creating	a	distinct	sense	of	how	things	are	to	be	because	that	is	how	they	ought	to	be	and	of	how	 things	 ought	 to	 be	because	 that	 is	 how	 they	 are	 to	 be.10	 Expressed	 together	authoritatively	 in	 an	 imaginative	 act	 of	 law,	what	 remains	 normative	 becomes	 a	matter	of	 common	sense:	 ‘this	 is	 the	 law’;	whilst,	 as	 an	 image,	 the	matter	of	 ‘the	law’	is	also	actually	real,	giving	form	to	existence	regularly.11		
(i)	 acts	of	domination		This	is	the	fantastic	reality	of	law,	as	an	imaginative	act	of	articulating	normativity.	But	like	the	most	powerful	fairy	tales,	there	is	a	violent	side	to	this.	To	the	extent	that	 law	 is	 imaginatively	 articulate,	 law	 articulates,	 which	 is	 not	 only	 ‘to	 give	expression’,	but	at	the	same	time	and	in	the	process,	 ‘to	bend	at	the	joint’.12	Thus	what	is	expressed	as	‘the	law’	is	bent	in	the	act	of	articulation.	The	expression	that	
																																																						8	As	Dorsett	and	McVeigh	show	in	their	study	of	jurisdictional	thinking:	Shaunnagh	Dorsett	and	Shaun	McVeigh,	Jurisdiction	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2012),	1.	9	Ibid.	See	also	Peter	Rush,	‘An	Altered	Jurisdiction:	Corporeal	Traces	of	Law’,	Griffith	Law	Review,	vol	6	(1997);	Marianne	Constable,	Our	Word	is	Our	Bond:	How	Legal	Speech	Acts	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2014);	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns,	‘Editorial	Introduction’,	in	Rhetoric	of	
Law,	ed	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns	(Ann	Arbor:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	1996).	10	On	‘dialectical	images’,	see	Walter	Benjamin,	The	Arcades	Project,	trans	Howard	Eiland	&	Kevin	McLaughlin	(Cambridge:	Belknap	Press,	1999),	461-463.	11	This	account	of	law	appears	to	resemble	the	one	developed	by	Fitzpatrick	in	his	work	on	law.	Fitzpatrick	famously	articulates	a	view	of	law	in	terms	of	a	polarity	between	an	indeterminate	law,	an	illimitable	law,	which	is	not	circumscribed	by	grounds	of	its	own,	on	one	side,	and	the	determinate	laws	that	lay	down	the	law	in	the	most	definite	terms,	on	the	other	side.	See,	eg,	Peter	Fitzpatrick,	Modernism	and	the	Grounds	of	Law	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2001).	At	least	to	begin	with,	the	similarities	between	Fitzpatrick’s	view	and	the	one	I	present	here	are	due	to	the	affinities	between	a	negative-dialectical	approach	and	a	poststructuralist	one.	However—and	as	Fitzpatrick	might	point	out—because	one	is	always	‘beginning	again’	(see	note	23	below),	the	affinity	has	been	refined	and	strengthened	by	my	reading	of	Fitzpatrick’s	work.	I	return	to	discuss	Fitzpatrick’s	influence	below,	in	thinking	about	‘the	process	of	law’,	which	is	concerned	with	the	problem	of	dealing	with	the	contradictory	nature	of	law.	This	is	where	Fitzpatrick’s	work	on	responsiveness	is	especially	important	to	the	approach	to	law	I	articulate	here.	12	See	‘articulate,	v.’,	OED	Online,	December	2015.	
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77takes	form	as	‘the	law’	is	an	image	of	things	articulated:	giving	form	to	things,	law,	the	expressive	subject,	does	not	simply	express	how	things	are	because	that	is	how	things	are,	purely	objectively,	but	represents	how	things	are	because	that	 is	how	they	ought	to	be.13		This	 is	 the	 origin	 of	 the	 ‘originary	 violence’	 of	 law	 discussed	 by	 Walter	Benjamin,	 Jacques	 Derrida,	 and	 Peter	 Fitzpatrick.	 Before	 getting	 to	 Benjamin,	Derrida,	 and	 Fitzpatrick,	 however,	 first	 Adorno,	 who	 also	 points	 at	 this,	 the	originary	violence	of	 law,	 in	Negative	Dialectics,	when	he	addresses	 ‘the	 juridical	sphere’	in	reflection	on	Hegel’s	Philosophy	of	Right:		Law	[Recht]	is	the	Ur-phenomenon	of	irrational	rationality.	In	it	the	formal	principle	of	equivalence	becomes	the	norm,	everyone	is	measured	by	[the]	same	 standard.	 Such	 equality,	 in	 which	 differences	 perish,	 gives	 a	 secret	impetus	to	inequality;	persisting	mythos	in	the	midst	of	an	only	apparently	demythologized	humanity.	The	norms	of	law	[Rechtsnormen]	cut	short	what	is	not	covered,	every	experience	of	the	specific	which	is	not	preformed,	for	the	 sake	 of	 the	 seamless	 systematic,	 and	 then	 raises	 instrumental	rationality	 to	a	second	reality	sui	generis.	 […]	The	entire	 juridical	 realm	 is	one	of	definitions.	Its	systematic	commands,	that	nothing	shall	pass	into	it,	which	could	escape	from	its	closed	circle,	quod	non	est	in	actis	[which	is	not	in	 the	 act/deed].	 This	 enclosure,	 ideological	 in	 itself,	 exerts	 real	 violence	through	the	sanctions	of	law	[Sanktion	des	Rechts]	as	the	socially	controlling	authority,	particularly	in	the	administered	world.14	In	its	‘very	form’,	Adorno	writes,	law	‘expresses	domination,	the	yawning	difference	of	individual	interests	from	the	whole’.15	As	an	expressive	form—as	an	instrument	of	rationality—‘the	norms	of	law	cut	short	what	is	not	covered,	every	experience	of	the	specific	which	is	not	preformed’—precisely	what	is	non-identical	to	‘the	law’—and	 raises	 this	 rationalised	 reality,	 this	 legal	 identity,	 to	 the	 level	 of	 a	 second	nature.16	Whatever	 fails	 to	 live	 up	 to	 this	 reality,	 this	 second	nature,	 given	 form	
																																																						13	See	also	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns,	‘Introduction’,	in	Law's	Violence,	ed	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns	(Ann	Arbor:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	1995).	14	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	303-305.	15	Ibid,	305-306	(my	italics).	16	Adorno	uses	the	concept	of	‘second	nature’	to	refer	to	rationalised	reality,	that	is,	a	reality	that	is	
thought	real,	in	two	senses:	mediated	by	thought,	and	mistaken	for	being	natural.	Buck-Morss	summarises	the	concept	of	second	nature	as	‘a	negating,	critical	concept	which	referred	to	the	false,	mythical	appearance	of	given	reality	as	ahistorical	and	absolute.’	‘As	Adorno	employed	the	term	in	his	own	writings,	“second	nature”	was	one	of	a	constellation	of	critical	concepts	together	with	“fetish”,	“reification”,	“enchantment”,	“fate”,	“myth”,	and	“phantasmagoria”,	which	were	used	to	see	through	the	mysterious	“natural”	appearance	of	objects	in	their	“given”	form	to	the	historical	dimension	of	their	production.	The	purpose	of	such	analysis	was	to	destroy	the	mythical	aura	of	
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through	 its	 expression	 as	 ‘the	 law’,	 experiences	 law	 antagonistically.	 Thus	 law	‘expresses	 domination’:	 the	 law,	 always	 an	 inadequate	 expression	 of	 what	 is,	nonetheless	imposed	on	things,	demands	categorical	conformity,	under	real	threat	of	penalty.	And	this	results	from	the	chasmic	structure	of	law—from	the	yawning	
difference	that	separates	the	empirical	individual	from	the	institution	of	law.17	In	 outlining	 this	 view	 of	 law,	 Adorno	 cites	 Hegel,	 specifically	 Hegel’s	observation	 that	 ‘law’	 [Recht]	 and	 ‘the	 real	 world	 of	 law’	 [Rechts]	 are	 ‘grasped	through	thought,’	that	 through	 thought	 the	 form	 of	 rationality,	 namely	 universality	 and	determinacy,	 is	 given,	 this,	 the	 law	 [Gesetz],	 is	 what	 that	 feeling	 which	reserves	 itself	 at	 will,	 that	 conscience	 which	 places	 law	 [Recht]	 in	 the	subjective	conviction,	looks	at	with	grounds	as	what	is	most	hostile	to	itself.	It	perceives	the	form	of	legality	[Form	des	Rechten],	as	one	of	duty	and	one	of	 the	 law	 [Gesetzes],	 as	 a	dead,	 cold	 letter	 and	as	 a	 fetter;	 for	 it	does	not	cognize	 itself	 in	 it,	 hence	 is	 not	 free	 in	 it,	 because	 the	 law	 [Gezetz]	 is	 the	rationality	of	the	thing,	and	this	latter	does	not	permit	the	feelings	to	warm	to	its	own	particularity.18	In	other	words:	 the	 individual	subject,	who	experiences	 law/Recht	 in	the	 form	of	what	‘is’,	expressed	as	‘the	law’/Gesetz,	experiences	it	‘as	a	dead,	cold	letter	and	as	a	 fetter’.	 The	 distinction	 here	 between	 ‘Recht’	 and	 ‘Gesetz’	 is	 critical,	 as	 the	distinction	between	‘law’	and	‘the	law’.	Recht,	as	law—expressing	right—gives	form	as	a	conceptual	matter	to	things,	as	‘this,	the	law	[Gesetz]’;	thus	the	law,	as	Gesetz—
an	expression	of	right—takes	form	as	‘the	rationality	of	the	thing’,	as	matter	of	law.	And	as	 the	rationality	of	 the	 thing—as	a	conceptualisation	of	how	 ‘things	are’	by	right—the	 law	 is	 experienced	 hostilely	 by	 a	 life	 that	 overflows	 rationality,	 that	refutes	 its	sentence	and	continues	to	play	out	beyond	the	grasp	of	every	rational	order.	 Everything	 remains	 non-identical	 to	 law’s	 imagination	 of	 things,	 and	 so	nothing	 is	recognisable	 in	the	 law	apart	 from	its	 image,	which	 is	never	adequate.	Law,	addressed	to	its	images	of	things,	dominates	everything.	Adorno	thus	points	to	both	meanings	of	articulation:	to	give	expression,	and	to	bend	at	 a	 joint.	Adorno’s	 apparently	pessimistic	verdict	 is	 concerned	with	 the	
																																																																																																																																																														their	legitimacy.’	Susan	Buck-Morss,	The	Origin	of	Negative	Dialectics:	Theodor	W	Adorno,	Walter	
Benjamin,	and	the	Frankfurt	Institute	(New	York:	The	Free	Press,	1977),	55.	17	This	returns	to	the	meaning	of	‘chaos’	discussed	in	the	Introduction,	as	a	‘yawning	gulf,	chasm,	or	abyss’;	see	also	‘chaos,	n.’,	OED	Online,	December	2015.	18	Cited	in	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	303-305.	
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79real	 consequences	 of	 articulation,	 in	 this	 case,	 the	 consequences	 of	 law	 as	 the	articulation	of	normativity.	Everything,	cut	short	by	the	norms	of	law:	every	thing,	raised	to	a	second	reality	sui	generis,	as	the	material	of	law.	In	giving	expression	to	reality	 in	 terms	of	 ‘the	 law’,	 acts	 of	 law,	 as	 acts	 of	 articulation,	 are	 seen	 to	 bend	reality,	giving	form	to	it	as	what,	 from	the	conceptual	perspective,	 is,	 imagined	to	be	 its	proper,	natural	 form.	Thus	 in	 the	act	of	articulation,	what	 ‘is’	 is	raised	to	a	second	nature,	that	of	the	law;	and	in	the	process,	what	is,	now	identified	with	the	rational	reality	of	a	 law	that	 is	expressed	sui	generis,	 is	cut	short,	becoming	non-identical	with	what	is	‘the	law’.	What	is	‘more’:	becoming	the	stain	of	an	irrational	rationality	that	will	not	entirely	vanish.		Thus	 the	violence	of	 law	has	 its	 ‘origin’	 in	 the	contradictory	experience	of	being,	 inseparably	 apart.	 Copulation,	 which	 holds	 out	 the	 hope	 of	 an	 existential	synthesis,	 producing	 the	 one	 out	 of	 the	 two,	 produces	 difference	 as	 much	 as	sameness,	a	third	that	is	neither	the	one	nor	the	other,	nor	simply	whole	in	itself,	but	what	is,	inseparably	apart.	The	law	that	takes	form	through	the	Act	is	this:	no	synthesis	in	fact,	but	a	configuration	that	nonetheless	establishes	the	context	of	the	existential	 judgment.	 ‘The	 law	is	 the	 law’,	as	 the	sentence	holds	out,	but	what	 ‘is’	the	law	is	also	always	otherwise,	as	experienced	by	the	subjects	within	jurisdiction.	The	violence	of	law	originates	in	this	contradiction,	in-between	the	synthesising	act	and	the	demand	that	what	has	been	disseminated	must	conform	to	 the	synthetic	prescription	in	the	way	it	lives.	That	is,	the	violence	is	in	the	statement,	‘the	law	is	
this’,	intensified	and	made	terrifyingly	real	in	the	re-statement,	‘the	law	is	the	law’,	silencing	the	voices	that	say	‘this	is	not	law’.19	
	
(ii)	 acts	of	emancipation		The	violence	of	 law	has	 its	origin	 in	 the	contradiction,	but	 the	contradiction	also	originates	the	law.	Put	simply,	there	would	be	no	law	to	speak	of	without	it	being	
																																																						19	Macdonald	has	articulated	the	concrete	experience	of	this	in	his	work	on	legal	pluralism.	For	an	introductory	paper	on	this,	see	Martha-Marie	Kleinhans	and	Roderick	A	Macdonald,	‘What	is	a	
Critical	Legal	Pluralism?’,	Canadian	Journal	of	Law	and	Society,	vol	12	(1997).	Macdonald	develops	this	further	in	Macdonald,	‘Custom	Made’.	The	point	relevant	to	this	discussion	is	summarised	in	the	following	passage:	‘As	agents,	legal	subjects	understand	the	normativity	of	law	as	originating	in	their	own	actions	and	interactions;	that	is,	they	learn	about	law,	first	and	foremost,	from	themselves.	This	is	not	to	say	that	that	they	reject	the	word.	What	they	reject	is	the	notion	that	the	pre-existing	word	and	accompanying	institutional	rituals,	sacraments,	and	dogma	are	the	source	and	force	of	law.	[…]	The	meaning	of	the	word	is	to	be	understood	in	actions	and	interactions’.	Ibid,	311	(italics	in	original).	I	discuss	this	further	in	Part	2	of	Chapter	3.	
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spoken	 of.	 Inarticulate,	 law	 remains	 implicit	 at	 best:	 sensed	 but	 its	 sense	 never	made	explicit.	The	act	of	articulation	is	required	for	law	to	be	the	law.	As	such,	the	violence	that	flows	from	law’s	contradictory	nature	is	not	simply	a	matter	of	law-as-subject	dominating	 its	object.	This	violence	 is	also	hopeful,	also	emancipatory.	At	least	these	are	the	claims	I	now	turn	to	examine.	Adorno	 does	 not	 examine	 this	 directly,	 in	 terms	 of	 law,	 but	 this	 is	 the	implication	of	 his	 treatment	of	 conceptualisation	 as	 a	means	of	 both	domination	and	emancipation	discussed	in	Chapter	1.	Recall:	as	an	act	of	domination,	a	concept	cuts	short	what	it	intends	to	express,	as	its	object;	and	yet,	without	giving	form	to	the	 object	 conceptually,	 the	 object	 would	 remain	 unrecognised,	 sensed	 but	 not	
made	 sense	 of.	 Rather	 than	 existence	 cleaved	 into	 what	 is	 conceptual	 and	 what	remains	non-conceptual,	existence	would	remain	meaningless,	never	being,	made	sense	of	(being	as	nothing).	Or	rather,	because	humans,	as	conscious	subjects,	are	thinking	 subjects,	 always	 making	 sense	 of	 existence,	 the	 result	 of	 not	 actively	thinking	would	 be	 to	 abandon	 the	 object	 to	 how	 it	 is	 nonetheless	 recognised	by	other	 articulate	 subjects	 (being	 as	 given).	 Conceptualisation,	 as	 re-
conceptualisation,	is	therefore	emancipatory	to	the	extent	that	it	works	to	overturn	the	 untruth	 of	 what	 has	 been	 given,	 moving	 the	 concept	 towards	 its	 non-conceptual	aspect.	Bringing	 this	 to	bear	on	 the	concept	of	 law,	 to	begin	with,	merely	sensing	what	is	law	as	a	normative	matter	might	be	sufficient	most	of	the	time,	but	when	my	sense	of	what	is	law	and	your	sense	of	what	is	law	come	into	conflict,	a	decision	has	 to	be	made	as	 to	what	 is	 the	 law.	Whilst	 this	decision	necessarily	 cuts	 short	both	senses	of	law,	yours	and	mine,	to	a	greater	or	lesser	extent,	 in	articulating	a	common	sense	of	law	(‘the	law	is	this’),	the	decision	is	nonetheless	necessary	if	the	conflict	 is	 to	 be	 resolved	 by	 law.	 The	 legal	 decision	 might	 substitute	 a	 harshly	singular	 untruth—‘the	 law	 is	 this’—for	 the	 amorphous	 truth	 that	 is	most	 just	 in	respect	of	an	infinite	plurality	of	difference,	but	the	definite	injustice	of	a	decisive	law	 is	nonetheless	more	 just	 than	 the	 indefinite	 justice	of	 an	 indecisive	 law.	The	decisive	cognition	is	as	necessary	as	it	is	violent,	as	just	as	it	is	never	fully	just.20	As	 Fitzpatrick	 writes,	 ‘the	 “original”	 violence	 pertaining	 to	 law’	 is	 the	‘incessant	 violence	 which	 inevitably	 follows	 from	 there	 not	 being	 an	 origin	 and	
																																																						20	See	Jacques	Derrida,	‘Force	of	Law:	The	"Mystical	Foundation	of	Authority"’,	Cardozo	Law	Review,	vol	11	(1989-1990).	See	also	the	discussion	of	this	in	Part	2	of	Chapter	1.	
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81from	law	having	to	originate	in	each	act	of	legal	decision.’21	Thus	every	act	of	legal	decision-making—stating	 ‘the	 law	 is	 this’—gives	 form	 to	 law	 as	 a	 ‘fresh	judgement’.22	 And	 yet,	 what	 is	 ‘the	 law’	 remains	 intentional	 and	 not	 ontic.	 The	result	is	that	what	‘is’	the	law	remains	in	need	of	a	fresh	judgment,	either	to	affirm	that	 ‘the	 law’	 is,	 in	 fact,	 ‘the	 law’,	 or	 else	 to	 amend	 the	 initial	 act,	 to	 answer	 the	question,	‘the	law	is	this?’,	with	a	new	statement,	‘the	law	is	this’.	Articulating	 what	 is	 the	 law	 becomes	 even	 more	 imperative	 when	 the	situation	is	not	simply	one	where	you	and	I,	amongst	others,	have	a	sense	of	law	as	a	normative	matter	and	every	now	and	again	need	to	articulate	what	is	the	law	to	avoid	or	resolve	conflict,	but	when	what	is	the	law	has	already	been	articulated.	In	this	situation,	the	question	of	justice	is	not	simply	to	decide	what	is	the	law	for	the	first	time—to	make	common	sense	of	what	is	law	in	relation	to	your	sense	and	my	sense—but	 to	 do	 this	 also	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 previous	 expression	 of	 law.	 The	 legal	decision	is	emancipatory	in	this	situation	in	that	it	is	an	act	of	‘beginning	again’,23	holding	 out	 the	 potential	 of	 deciding	 again	 what	 is	 ‘the	 law’	 in	 response	 to	 the	experience	of	legal	subjects.	This	is	about	overturning	the	untruth	of	the	law,	as	the	injustice	of	the	law,	by	moving	it	towards	what	is	more,	true	and	just.	I	continue	to	examine	the	implications	of	the	emancipatory	aspect	of	acts	of	articulation	 in	 the	 section	 below	 on	 ‘the	 process	 of	 law’,	 when	 I	 discuss	Fitzpatrick’s	work	on	responsiveness.	Before	I	get	to	that,	however,	 I	need	to	say	something	 more	 about	 the	 experience	 of	 law	 as	 the	 articulation	 of	 normativity	from	the	second	perspective,	that	of	the	subject	within	jurisdiction.	
		 	
																																																						21	Fitzpatrick,	Modernism	and	the	Grounds	of	Law,	80-81.	As	Fitzpatrick	makes	clear,	whilst	an	indecisive	law	is	no	such	thing,	the	law	is	decisive.	Thus	like	the	copula,	law	establishes	‘the	context	of	the	existential	judgment’,	and	in	this,	it	establishes	the	grounds	of	violence.	Benjamin	also	pointed	to	this	originary	violence	of	law	in	his	‘critique	of	violence’:	see	Walter	Benjamin,	‘Critique	of	Violence’,	in	Walter	Benjamin:	Selected	Writings,	Volume	1,	1913-1926,	ed	Marcus	Bullock	and	Michael	W	Jennings	(Cambridge:	Belknap	Press,	2002).	See	also	the	discussion	of	this	in	Derrida,	‘Force	of	Law’.	22	See	Fitzpatrick,	Modernism	and	the	Grounds	of	Law,	80-81.	23	I	use	‘beginning	again’	in	the	sense	discussed	in	Ben	Golder	and	Peter	Fitzpatrick,	Foucault's	Law	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2009),	123.	According	to	Golder	and	Fitzpatrick,	the	notion	of	‘beginning	again’	is	central	to	Foucault’s	understanding	of	the	ethical	possibility	of	law.	For	Foucault,	‘society	can	exist	only	by	means	of	the	work	it	does	on	itself	and	on	its	institutions’,	and	thus	‘we	are	always	in	the	position	of	beginning	again’.	
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B	 Being	abject	before	the	law	
	In	the	previous	section	I	took	the	standpoint	of	law	as	the	expressive	subject	to	see	how	law	acts	to	give	form	to	existence,	bending	it	in	the	act	of	calling	it	into	being.	From	 this	 perspective,	 ‘the	 law’	 is	 law,	 but	 it	 is	 also	not	 identical	with	what	 law	seeks	 to	 express	 through	 its	 conceptual	 schemas.	 This	 makes	 law’s	 acts	 of	articulation	 both	 dominating,	 with	 ‘the	 law’	 cutting	 short	 its	 object,	 and	emancipating,	as	an	act	that	might	re-form	‘the	law’	to	move	it	closer	to	its	object,	by	remaining	consistently	conscious	of	non-identity.		So	 much	 can	 be	 seen	 by	 taking	 the	 standpoint	 of	 law	 as	 the	 expressive	subject	looking	upon	its	legal	creation	non-naïvely.	However,	there	is	another	side	to	this,	which	is	the	experience	of	the	subject	within	jurisdiction.	The	question	here	is:	what	does	the	contradiction	that	animates	law,	making	it	both	dominating	and	emancipating,	 look	 like	 from	 an	 ‘objective’	 standpoint?	 This	 question	 switches	perspectives	to	make	law	in	its	given	form	the	object	to	be	comprehended	from	the	standpoint	of	the	subject	that	finds	itself	before	the	law.24	As	I	now	turn	to	discuss,	this	 perspective	 focuses	 on	 how	 ‘the	 law’,	 never	 simply	 as	 is,	 is	 never	 simply	experienced	 as	 given.	 Again,	 there	 are	 two	 dimensions	 to	 this.	 For	 one,	 how	 a	subject	of	 law	experiences	what	 is	 law	 is	never	 identical	 to	what	 is	expressed	as	‘the	 law’;25	and	yet	a	subject’s	experience	of	what	 is	 law	is	never	entirely	outside	the	law	either,	insofar	as	law	speaks	to	subjects’	experience	jurisdictionally.26		For	the	subject	who	experiences	law	in	this	way,	as	always	other	than	given,	and	 yet	 must	 answer	 to	 the	 law,	 as	 given,	 by	 force	 of	 law,	 this	 is	 an	 abject	experience	of	being,	‘cast	off	or	away,	esp.	as	being	vile	or	unworthy;	refuse,	scum,	dregs.	 Chiefly	fig.	of	 persons.’27	 This	 experience	 of	 abjection	 is	 the	 ‘objective’	experience.	 In	 the	 inspired	 act	 of	 giving	 form	 to	 the	 law,	 the	 object	 of	 law—the	very	 experience	 of	 its	 subjects—is	 both	 law’s	 vital	 material	 and	 its	 toxic	 waste	
																																																						24	The	difference	between	these	two	points	of	view	is	the	difference	between	the	conceptual	and	non-conceptual	perspectives	on	the	contradiction	discussed	in	Chapter	1.	From	the	conceptual	perspective	(the	articulate	perspective,	examined	in	the	previous	section)	‘the	law’	as	expressed	is	law,	but	also	not	law;	whilst	from	the	non-conceptual	perspective	(the	abject	perspective,	examined	here)	what	is,	expressed	as	‘the	law’,	is	neither	‘the	law’	nor	not	‘the	law’,	but	always	more.	25	As	discussed	in	Chapter	1,	what	is	expressed	as	‘X’	is	never	entirely	‘X’.	26	Again,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	1,	what	is	expressed	as	‘X’	is	never	entirely	‘not	X’.	27	‘Abjection,	n.’,	OED	Online,	December	2015.	
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83(‘refuse,	 scum,	 dregs’),	 expelled	 with	 every	 breath.28	 Thus	 the	 subject,	 who	experiences	law	objectively,	experiences	it	abjectly.	Adorno,	commenting	on	Hegel’s	Philosophy	of	Right,	sums	up	the	absurdity,	and	the	violence,	of	this	experience:	That	 the	 individual	 feels	 so	 easily	 wronged,	 when	 the	 antagonism	 of	interest	 drives	 it	 into	 the	 juridical	 sphere,	 is	 not,	 as	 Hegel	 would	 like	 to	argue,	its	own	fault,	such	that	it	would	be	too	deluded	to	recognise	its	own	interest	in	the	objective	legal	norm	and	its	guarantee;	rather	it	is	that	of	the	constituents	of	the	legal	sphere	itself.29		The	 abjection	 felt	 by	 the	 subject	 that	 fails	 to	 recognise	 its	 experience	 in	 the	objective	legal	norm	is	not	delusional	but	entirely	rational;	it	is	not	a	symptom	of	the	irrationality	of	the	subject	but	of	the	law	itself.	Thus	it	 is	 in	the	experience	of	the	 subject	 that	 the	 rationality	 of	 the	 objective	 norms	 of	 law	 is	 shown	 to	 be	irrational;	 that	what	 is	 rational	 to	 the	 law	 is	 irrational	 to	what	 is	 before	 it.	 And	this—being,	 non-identical	 before	 the	 law,	 as	 a	 normative	matter—is	 the	 original	and	unshakeable	legal	experience.	As	Adorno	writes:	law	is	the	Ur-phenomenon	of	
irrational	rationality.30		And	so	the	subject	within	jurisdiction	always	finds	itself	in	a	state	of	being	abject	 before	 the	 law,	 as	 a	 physical	 matter—as	 the	 subject	 who	 stands	 before	 a	magistrate;	 but	 also	 as	 a	 temporal	 matter—as	 the	 subject	 whose	 sense	 of	normativity	 is	 felt	before	 it	 is	articulated	 in	 terms	of	 the	 law;	and	as	a	sequential	matter—as	 the	 subject	 whose	 sense	 of	 normativity	 is	 given	 form	 by	 law	 and	superseded	in	the	process.31	Coming	before	the	law	in	every	sense,	as	‘worthy’	of	a	law	that	takes	its	name,	and	yet—being,	‘vile	or	unworthy;	refuse,	scum,	dregs’32—never	able	to	finally	enter	into	it,	physically,	temporally,	sequentially,	the	subject	of	law	remains	suspended	on	the	threshold.		
																																																						28	On	‘inspiration’,	see	Part	1	of	Chapter	1.	29	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	303-305.	30	Ibid.	See	also	note	14	above	and	accompanying	text.	31	But	it	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	the	three	meanings	of	‘supersede’,	as	a	sequential	movement	that	marks	the	end	of	what	is	being	superseded,	but	also	as	a	deferral.	The	third	meaning	is	especially	important	to	keep	in	mind,	because	it	redirects	the	flow	of	events,	backwards.	An	act	of	supersedence	is	never	simply	a	uni-linear	development,	but	also	a	deferral	of	what	remains	in	parallel	existence,	delayed,	and	therefore	still	potentially	to	come.	This	is	important	because	it	points	to	how	what	is	superseded	is	never	totally	obliterated	but	rather	remains	latent.	For	these	three	meanings	of	‘supersede’,	as	a	sequential	movement,	as	marking	an	end,	and	as	a	deferral,	see	the	entry	for	‘supersede,	v.’,	OED	Online,	December	2015.	32	See	note	27	above.	
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Perhaps	this	is	also	the	experience	of	Kafka’s	countryman	‘before	the	law’,	who	 never	 passes	 into	 the	 law,	 nor	walks	 away	 from	 its	 gate.33	 If	 Adorno	 could	have	spoken	with	Kafka’s	countryman	he	might	have	said	up	front:	‘Its	systematic	commands,	 that	 nothing	 shall	 pass	 into	 it,	 which	 could	 escape	 from	 its	 closed	circle’;34	which	would	be	to	say:	under	the	order	of	law,	only	nothing	shall	pass	into	the	law	ultimately,	whilst	being,	suspended	otherwise	on	the	threshold.35	The	gate,	as	the	concept,	opens	to	its	object	at	the	same	time	as	it	refuses	entry	to	that	which	remains	abject	before	it.	And	so	this	law,	which	takes	your	name	and	talks	to	you,	is	neither	for	you	nor	not	for	you.	
		 	
																																																						33	See	Franz	Kafka,	Before	the	Law,	trans	Ian	Johnston	(Online:	http://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/kafka/beforethelaw.htm,	2015	[1915]).		Before	the	law	sits	a	gatekeeper.	To	this	gatekeeper	comes	a	man	from	the	country	who	asks	to	gain	entry	into	the	law.	But	the	gatekeeper	says	that	he	cannot	grant	him	entry	at	the	moment.	The	man	thinks	about	it	and	then	asks	if	he	will	be	allowed	to	come	in	sometime	later	on.	‘It	is	possible’,	says	the	gatekeeper,	‘but	not	now’.	The	gate	to	the	law	stands	open,	as	always,	and	the	gatekeeper	walks	to	the	side,	so	the	man	bends	over	in	order	to	see	through	the	gate	into	the	inside.	When	the	gatekeeper	notices	that,	he	laughs	and	says:	‘If	it	tempts	you	so	much,	try	going	inside	in	spite	of	my	prohibition.	But	take	note.	I	am	powerful.	And	I	am	only	the	lowliest	gatekeeper.	But	from	room	to	room	stand	gatekeepers,	each	more	powerful	than	the	last.	I	cannot	endure	even	one	glimpse	of	the	third.’	The	man	from	the	country	has	not	expected	such	difficulties:	the	law	should	always	be	accessible	for	everyone,	he	thinks,	but	as	he	now	looks	more	closely	at	the	gatekeeper	in	his	fur	coat,	at	his	large	pointed	nose	and	his	long,	thin,	black	Tartar’s	beard,	he	decides	that	it	would	be	better	to	wait	until	he	gets	permission	to	go	inside.	The	gatekeeper	gives	him	a	stool	and	allows	him	to	sit	down	at	the	side	in	front	of	the	gate.	There	he	sits	for	days	and	years.	[…]	Finally	his	eyesight	grows	weak,	and	he	does	not	know	whether	things	are	really	darker	around	him	or	whether	his	eyes	are	merely	deceiving	him.	But	he	recognizes	now	in	the	darkness	an	illumination	which	breaks	inextinguishably	out	of	the	gateway	to	the	law.	Now	he	no	longer	has	much	time	to	live.	Before	his	death	he	gathers	up	in	his	head	all	his	experiences	of	the	entire	time	into	one	question	which	he	has	not	yet	put	to	the	gatekeeper.	He	waves	to	him,	since	he	can	no	longer	lift	up	his	stiffening	body.	The	gatekeeper	has	to	bend	way	down	to	him,	for	the	difference	between	them	has	changed	considerably	to	the	disadvantage	of	the	man.	‘What	do	you	want	to	know	now?’	asks	the	gatekeeper.	‘You	are	insatiable.’	‘Everyone	strives	after	the	law’,	says	the	man,	‘so	how	is	it	that	in	these	many	years	no	one	except	me	has	requested	entry?’	The	gatekeeper	sees	that	the	man	is	already	dying	and,	in	order	to	reach	his	diminishing	sense	of	hearing,	he	shouts	at	him,	‘Here	no	one	else	can	gain	entry,	since	this	entrance	was	assigned	only	to	you.	I’m	going	now	to	close	it.’	34	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	303-305.	35	For	a	similar	reading	of	Kafka’s	parable,	see	Peter	Fitzpatrick,	‘Necessary	Deceptions:	Kafka	and	the	Mystery	of	Law’,		(forthcoming).	See	also	Fitzpatrick,	Modernism	and	the	Grounds	of	Law,	80-81.	‘[…]	So,	tying	law	to	the	violence	of	the	origin	entails	not	an	origin	whose	violence	has	a	fixed	and	forceful	palpability,	but	an	origin	pervaded	by	what	is	non-existent,	an	origin	whose	violence	is	constantly	impelled	by	that	very	nothingness.	Not	only	do	we	see	law	here	imbued	with	originating	violence,	but	we	also	find	it	fully	occupying	the	place	of	the	origin.	There	can	be	nothing	before	this	
law.	Or,	putting	that	at	a	tangent,	what	is	before	this	law	can	only	be	nothing.	Or,	putting	it	at	another	tangent,	law	ultimately	comes	from	nowhere	and	is	not	beholden	to	anything	before	it.	[…]’	
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85C	 The	process	of	law	
	‘Dialectics	 [is]	 not	 a	 standpoint’;	 and	 yet	 so	 far	 this	 examination	 of	 law	 as	 the	articulation	 of	 normativity	 has	 approached	 law	 from	 two	 standpoints.	 This	 is	necessary	to	see	law	as	the	copula	writ	large,	but	wholly	inadequate.	The	problem	with	 points	 of	 view,	 even	when	 precariously	 grounded	 in	 contradiction,	 is	 their	fixation:	they	still	seek	to	put	things	in	their	place.	‘Law’	and	‘not	law’,	‘identity’	and	‘non-identity’,	‘subject’	and	‘object’,	and	every	perplexing	combination	of	these:	the	result	 remains	a	punctuated	arrangement.	Recall	 the	general	question	 this	 thesis	seeks	 to	 answer:	what	 takes	 place	 in	 the	 rule	 of	 law?	What	 is	missing	 from	 this	chapter	 so	 far	 is	 an	 examination	 of	 the	 very	 process	 of	 ‘what	 takes	 place’,	 the	passage	in-between	law’s	states	of	fixation.		The	question	here	 is	no	 longer	what	 takes	place:	 the	 fact	 that	 ‘law’	 is	 ‘the	law’	and	not	 ‘the	 law’;	 the	 fact	that	what	 is	expressed	as	 ‘the	 law’	 is	neither	 ‘law’	nor	not	 ‘law’.	The	question	here	 is	 the	 taking	place	 of	 ‘what’:	how	 ‘law’	becomes	‘the	 law’,	 and	 how	 ‘the	 law’	 becomes	 ‘law’,	 without	 the	 two	 ever	 becoming	equivalent.	It	 is	this	(im)possibility	of	 ‘law’s	becoming’—of	law	becoming	the	law	and	the	law	becoming	law—that	I	take	up	in	this	final	section.		In	part	this	is	about	the	emancipatory	violence	discussed	at	the	end	of	the	first	section	of	this	part,	on	‘acts	of	articulation’,	which	makes	every	act	of	law	an	act	of	‘beginning	again’,36	holding	out	the	possibility	of	deciding	again	what	is	‘the	law’	in	response	to	the	abject	experience	of	the	subject.	As	discussed,	this	is	about	overturning	the	untruth	of	the	law,	as	the	injustice	of	the	law,	by	moving	it	towards	what	is	more,	true	and	just.	However,	it	also	has	to	do	with	what	Fitzpatrick	points	to	as	the	non-violence	of	law.37		If	 the	 violence	 of	 law	 is	 its	 rational	 aspect	 as	 the	 articulation	 of	normativity—law’s	every	act	cutting	short	its	object—then	the	non-violence	of	law	is	its	non-rational	aspect,	its	openness	to	what	remains	its	object,	non-conceptually	other.38	As	I	showed	in	the	discussion	of	the	‘predicate	sentence	of	law’,	whilst	law,	as	 the	 copula,	 is	most	meaningful	by	 itself,	 its	 expressions	 are	 nonetheless	mere	
																																																						36	See	note	23	above.	37	See	Peter	Fitzpatrick,	‘Why	the	Law	is	also	Non-Violent’,	in	Law,	Violence	and	the	Possibility	of	
Justice,	ed	Austin	Sarat	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2001).	38	See	also	Fitzpatrick,	Modernism	and	the	Grounds	of	Law,	78.	
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word-play	if	it	does	not	also	establish	‘the	context	of	the	existential	judgment’.	For	law,	 as	 the	 copula,	 to	 be	 really	 meaningful,	 its	 sentences	 on	 and	 of	 words	must	become	 sentences	 on	 and	 of	 life.	 But	 this	means	 law	must	 be	open	 to	 life,	 as	 its	object,	 as	much	as	 its	acts	 cut	 short	existence	by	 rendering	 its	own	sentences	as	what	is	real.	 In	short,	 for	 law	to	become	the	law	in	fact	and	not	 just	 in	word,	 law	must	 remain	open	 to	becoming	 the	 law	always	 in	 respect	of	 the	 fact	of	 its	being	otherwise.	Following	Adorno,	 this	means	ensuring	 law	remains	open,	as	a	conceptual	matter,	to	what	is	not	the	law,	as	a	non-conceptual	matter,	without	making	the	two	the	same—ensuring	acts	of	 law	remain	 ‘consistently	conscious	of	non-identity’	 in	the	 process	 of	 articulating	 identity	 lawfully.	 This	 is	 also	 to	 follow	 Fitzpatrick	 in	thinking	 about	 the	 responsiveness	 of	 law.	 Before	 I	 get	 to	 Fitzpatrick	 and	 the	possibility	 of	 responsiveness	 in	 law,	 however,	 I	 need	 to	 continue	 with	 Kafka,	because	 perhaps	 what	 is	 most	 interesting	 about	 his	 parable	 here	 is	 what	 it	suggests	 about	 law’s	 non-violent	 aspect,	 as	 much	 as	 its	 violent	 aspect,	 and	therefore	its	ethical	possibility.		In	his	parable	‘Before	the	Law’,39	Kafka’s	gatekeeper	tells	the	countryman	at	the	outset	 that	 he	 cannot	be	 admitted	 to	 the	 law	 ‘at	 the	moment’,	 although	 ‘it	 is	possible’	 he	 will	 be	 allowed	 entry	 later.	 From	 the	 abject	 perspective,	 this	possibility	seems	like	an	insidious	conceit.	For	the	countryman	before	the	law,	it	is	this	possibility	 that	makes	 law	seem	omnipotent,	 giving	 its	gatekeeper—which	 is	only	its	first	gatekeeper—an	overbearing	power	to	refuse	entry.	This	appears	to	be	an	 insidious	 conceit	 because,	 if	 the	 possibility	 of	 entering	 was	 not	 held	 out,	 it	would	 not	 be	 possible	 for	 the	 gatekeeper	 to	 withhold	 entry.	 It	 is	 the	 very	possibility	of	admission	that	gives	law	its	power	to	exclude;	and	so	the	countryman	sits	and	waits	in	abjection,	refused	entry	for	the	moment,	but	in	anticipation	of	the	possibility	of	being	admitted	later,	through	a	gate	that	was	after	all	made	for	him.	From	this	perspective,	it	is	the	possibility	of	law	giving	form	to	how	things	ought	to	be,	 determinately,	 as	 an	 objective	matter,	 that	 enables	 ‘the	 law’	 to	 take	 form,	 to	transform	everything	 into	 ‘the	norms	of	 the	 law’,	whilst	also	 leaving	 its	object	at	the	 gate,	 as	 ‘unworthy’	 of	 finally	 entering	 into	 the	 law.	 And	 perhaps	 that	 is	 the	contradictory	 possibility	 of	 law,	 seen	 non-conceptually:	 a	 violently	 insidious	
																																																						39	Reproduced	in	note	33	above.	
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87conceit,	a	trick	that	allows	law	to	constitute	itself	as	the	law	out	of	its	object	at	the	expense	of	its	object.		And	 yet,	 shifting	 standpoints	 to	 take	 the	 conceptual	 point	 of	 view,	 the	opposite	is	also	apparent.	From	this	perspective,	the	possibility	of	law	being	open	to	 its	 object	 is	 not	 its	 power	 to	 exclude	 its	 subjects	 from	 the	 law,	 but	 rather	 a	reflection	of	its	need	to	be	attuned	to	what	it	is	powerless	to	include:	the	experience	of	 the	subject.	From	this	perspective,	 the	subject’s	experience	cannot	 finally	pass	into	 law	 and	 become	 its	 objective	 experience	 of	 ‘the	 law’,	 not	 because	 law	 is	omnipotent,	 but	 because	 law	 is	 impotent.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 even	 if	 Kafka’s	gatekeeper	wanted	to	admit	the	countryman	he	would	have	been	powerless	to	do	so—law,	the	expressive	subject,	always	ultimately	failing	in	its	effort	to	articulate	things	‘objectively’.		Thus	what	appears	to	be	an	insidious	conceit,	is,	from	one	perspective,	and	from	another,	is	merely	a	reflection	of	law’s	insatiable	need	to	reach	out	to	what	it	is	 powerless	 to	 grasp.	 ‘You	 are	 insatiable,’	 Kafka’s	 doorkeeper	 says	 to	 the	countryman	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 parable…	 The	 sentence	 hangs	 between	 the	doorkeeper	and	the	countryman,	implicating	them	both.	The	subject	before	the	law	is	insatiable,	spending	his	life	seeking	entry	into	a	law	that	never	admits	him	entry	nor	refuses	him	absolutely	(the	possibility	is	there;	the	gate	is	made	for	him	after	all).	 But	 so	 too	 is	 law	 as	 the	 expressive	 subject	 insatiable,	 unable	 to	 grant	admission	to	what	by	its	own	designs	it	is	intended	to	admit.	And	yet,	without	the	possibility	 of	 satiation	 hanging	 between	 them,	 bringing	 them	 together	 in	 this	maddening	way,	the	countryman	would	go	elsewhere,	seeking	law	in	other	ways,	and	 the	 law	 would	 become	 uninspired,	 taking	 one	 last	 breath	 before	 becoming	entirely	instrumental	rationality	without	any	redeeming	quality.		It	 is	 in	 light	 of	 this	 absurd	 portrayal	 of	 law	 that	 Fitzpatrick’s	 work	 on	responsiveness	 becomes	 urgent;	 because	 responsiveness	 is	 nothing	 other	 than	how	 to	 deal	 with	 law’s	 contradictoriness	 in	 a	 way	 that	 makes	 its	 possibility	 its	
ethical	possibility.	As	mentioned	above,	Fitzpatrick	articulates	a	theory	of	law	that	is	very	similar	 to	 the	one	I	have	outlined	here,	 in	 terms	of	a	polarity	between	an	indeterminate	 law,	 an	 illimitable	 law	 that	 is	 not	 circumscribed	by	 grounds	of	 its	own,	 on	 one	 side,	 and	 the	 determinate	 laws	 that	 lay	 down	 the	 law	 in	 the	most	definite	 terms,	 on	 the	 other	 side.	 In	 Fitzpatrick’s	 work,	 these	 two	 polarised	dimensions	are	as	integral	to	each	other	as	they	are	disparate.	Law	would	remain	
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impotent	 if	 it	were	entirely	beyond	delimitation,	 just	 as	 the	 laws	would	begin	 to	crumble	if	they	were	absolutely	fixed.	Law	must	be	grounded,	just	as	the	grounded	laws	must	remain	responsive	to	what	remains	otherwise	indeterminate.	Returning	to	 the	 terms	 I	have	been	using:	 ‘law’	 (without	definite	article)	must	 take	 form	as	‘the	law’	(with	definite	article),	and	yet	to	be	law,	it	must	always	also	be	more	than	‘the	law’	as	expressed.	This	is	about	law	becoming	the	law	in	ways	that	respect	its	being	unconditionally	otherwise.	As	Fitzpatrick	puts	it:		‘The	law’	thence	would	be	an	unconditional	law	of	utter	responsiveness	to	the	other,	a	responsability,	to	revive	an	old	usage.	This	could	only	be	a	law	incapable	of	 containment.	Yet,	without	more,	 such	a	 law	would	be	a	mere	dissipation.	So,	that	law	would	depend	for	its	realization	on	the	conditional	and	conditioned	 ‘laws’	 to	give	 it	determinate	effect.	The	determinate	 laws,	in	turn,	depend	on	the	unconditional	law,	the	responsive	law,	for	their	own	continuing	existence.40	This	 law,	 ‘incapable	of	containment’,	 is	 law	in	 its	non-conceptual	aspect.	And	yet,	‘without	more,	 such	 a	 law	would	 be	 a	mere	 dissipation’:	 what	 is	more,	must	 be	breathed	 in	 and	 given	 expression	 to	 as	 ‘the	 law’,	 if	 it	 is	 to	 be	 more	 than	indeterminate	vapor.	But—and	this	is	the	critical	move—‘the	determinate	laws,	in	turn,	 depend	 on	 the	 unconditional	 law,	 the	 responsive	 law,	 for	 their	 continuing	existence’:	expressed	as	 ‘the	 law’,	 law	 is	stripped	of	 its	vital	substance,	becoming	toxic	waste,	and	again	‘such	a	law	would	be	a	mere	dissipation’.	That	is	why	law	in	its	conceptual	aspect,	as	 the	articulation	of	normativity,	must	remain	responsive,	to	 ensure	 it	 does	 not	 cease	 to	 be	 law.	 Just	 as	 the	 non-conceptual	more	 requires	concepts	 of	what	 ‘is’,	 concepts	 of	what	 ‘is’	must	 remain	 open	 to	what	 is	 beyond	their	order.	In	this	sense	‘responsive	law’	is	inspired	law,	a	law	that	remains	open	to	 its	 non-conceptual	 aspect	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 it	 gives	 expression	 to	 the	 law	determinately.	Being	responsive—being	responsable,	‘to	revive	an	old	usage’41—is	to	continue	breathing,	to	revive	an	even	older	usage.	Thus	the	‘problem’	of	law	for	Fitzpatrick,	which	is	also	law’s	‘possibility’,	is	found	in	the	tension	between	its	infinitude	and	its	determinacy,	in	the	process	that	plays	 out	 in-between	 ‘law’	 and	 ‘the	 law’.42	 This	 process	 makes	 law	 an	 abject	experience	 for	 subjects	 before	 the	 law,	 but	 it	 also	 holds	 open	 the	 law	 to	 being	
																																																						40	Peter	Fitzpatrick,	‘The	Revolutionary	Past:	Decolonizing	Law	and	Human	Rights’,	Metodo:	
International	Studies	in	Phenomenology	and	Philosophy,	vol	2,	no	1	(2014):	128.	41	See	note	40	above.	42	See	discussion	of	‘determination	and	infinitude’	in	Chapter	1.	
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89otherwise.	 Thus	 on	 one	 side,	 the	 process	 of	 becoming	makes	 the	 law	 a	 terribly	fallible	conceit,	and	a	potentially	violent	instrument	of	domination.	As	Fitzpatrick	emphasises	in	his	reading	of	Kafka’s	The	Trial:	‘There	is	no	trial.	Or	the	title	could	be	translated	as	“the	process”.	There	is	no	process.’43	Fitzpatrick’s	point	is	that	The	
Trial,	or	Der	Prozess,	has	this	closed	dimension	to	it,	describing	a	legal	process	that	cuts	 short	 its	 object,	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 protagonist	 K.,	 refusing	 entry	 to	 a	subject	who	 remains	abject	before	 it.	The	process	of	 law,	by	which	 law	becomes	not	 law	 the	 moment	 it	 opens	 its	 mouth	 to	 articulate	 the	 law,	 is,	 from	 this	perspective,	not	a	genuine	process	at	all.	In	this	limited	form,	‘the	trial,	the	process,	is	in-terminable’,	never	admitting	its	object,	it	remains	a	closed	circle.44		But	 there	 is	 of	 course	more	 to	 the	 process—just	 as	 there	 is	more	 to	The	
Trial.	 The	 process	 of	 law’s	 ‘becoming’	 is	 also	 its	 ethical	 possibility.	 Fitzpatrick	draws	this	out	in	his	reading	of	Kafka,	showing	how	in	Kafka’s	writing:	‘With	law,	there	 is	 always	 an	 “opening”	 as	 well	 as	 a	 “closing”,	 a	 possibility	 somehow	embedded	there’.45	This	is	the	possibility	of	becoming	law	through	a	process	that	is	always	 interminable,	 but	 in	 its	 infinite—or	 ‘illimitable’—attunement	 to	 what	 is	more	 than	 it	 is,	 also	 always	 open	 to	 its	 object.	 In	 short,	 law	 is	 always	beginning	
again,	opening	it	up	to	being,	otherwise.46	This	‘position	of	beginning	again’	is	not	a	proposition	(a	 ‘beginning-position’)	 for	 finally	reaching	the	truth	of	 the	matter	of	law.	Being,	‘always	in	the	position	of	beginning	again’,	is	no	such	position	at	all:	it	is	not	a	standpoint,	but	an	insistence	on	the	constant	overturning	of	the	grounds	of	the	law	in	respect	of	the	ever-new	ways	of	‘relating	to	others	and	being-together’.47		This	 is	 the	 critical	 aspect	 of	 the	 process	 of	 ‘law’s	 becoming’:	 remaining	consistently	conscious	of	how	law,	as	the	articulation	of	normativity,	is	an	opening	and	a	closure,	both	at	the	same	time,	making	one	critical	to	the	other.	Law,	as	the	articulation	of	normativity,	is	never	wholly	open,	because	then	the	process	would	be	 as	 good	as	 closed,	 interminable	 in	 the	 sense	of	 always	being	without	 closure,	
																																																						43	Fitzpatrick,	‘Necessary	Deceptions’.	44	Ibid.	45	Ibid.	46	As	discussed	above,	in	note	23,	Golder	and	Fitzpatrick	point	to	how	‘beginning	again’	is	central	to	an	understanding	of	the	ethical	possibility	of	law.	Citing	Foucault	they	note	how	‘society	can	exist	only	by	means	of	the	work	it	does	on	itself	and	on	its	institutions’,	and	thus	‘we	are	always	in	the	position	of	beginning	again’.	They	continue:	‘It	is	this	constituent	attunement	to	alterity,	to	new	ways	of	relating	to	others	and	of	being-together,	that	constitutes	the	sociality	of	Foucault’s	ethical	project.’	Golder	and	Fitzpatrick,	Foucault's	Law	123.	47	Ibid.	
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difference	deferred	indefinitely,	being	as	nothingness.	But	law,	as	the	articulation	of	 normativity,	 is	 also	 never	 wholly	 closed,	 because	 then	 the	 process	 would	become	wholly	irrelevant,	never	open	to	its	object,	objectless	absurdity,	and	total	violence.	Never	one	or	the	other	by	itself,	but	also	never	absolutely	fused	together,	the	 two	 becoming	 one	 only	 to	 blind	 the	 subject	 as	 to	 how	 the	 unity	 is	 like	 the	promise	of	false	idols.	Or	as	Fitzpatrick	writes,	reflecting	on	The	Trial:	‘The	opening	and	the	closing	fuse	in	our	being	drawn	into	the	emanant	radiance	of	the	law—“a	radiance	 that	 streams	 forth	 inextinguishably	 from	 the	 door	 of	 the	 Law”.’48	 The	radiance	 of	 the	 law	 that	 appears	 to	 transcend	 its	 contradictory	 condition	 is	blinding,	leaving	the	subject	no	less	abject	but	much	less	capable	of	mediating	the	contradiction.49	
	
3	 Opening	up	to	the	rule	of	law		The	question	 that	 runs	 through	 this	 thesis	 in	many	different	ways	 is	what	 takes	place	 in	 the	 act	 of	 articulation.	 This	 question	 is	 the	 critical	 concern	 of	 negative	dialectics,	 as	 I	 showed	 in	 my	 reading	 of	 Adorno’s	 philosophy	 in	 Chapter	 1.	 To	understand	 the	 implications	 of	 this	 question	 for	 law,	 I	 began	 this	 chapter	 by	considering	a	simple	structure,	the	predicate	sentence,	of	the	form	subject–copula–predicate:	 ‘it	 is	 this’.	 In	 examining	 this	 structure,	 I	 showed	 how	 the	 copula	 is	 a	dialectical	 medium,	 connecting	 subject	 and	 object	 without	 overcoming	 their	separation.	I	then	argued	that	this	 is	also	the	form	of	 law—that	law	is	the	copula	writ	large—an	argument	I	developed	in	Part	2	by	examining	law	as	the	articulation	of	normativity.		The	 point	 I	 pursued	 is	 that,	 if	 giving	 express	 form	 to	 things	 contradicts	
everything,	which	remains	the	ways	in	which	things	are	not	as	expressed,	then	in	the	act	of	articulating	what	‘is’	by	law,	‘the	law’	as	expressed	remains	non-identical	with	what	it	seeks	to	express.	As	I	showed,	this	can	be	terribly	violent,	with	law’s	acts	of	articulation	dominating	its	object	by	cutting	it	short	through	the	norms	of	law.	But	it	can	also	be	emancipatory,	with	every	new	act	of	articulation	re-forming	what	has	been	expressed	as	the	law,	potentially	bringing	law	closer	to	its	subjects.	
																																																						48	Fitzpatrick,	‘Necessary	Deceptions’.	49	See	also	Panu	Minkkinen,	‘The	Radiance	of	Justice:	On	the	Minor	Jurisprudence	of	Franz	Kafka’,	
Social	and	Legal	Studies,	vol	3,	no	3	(1994).	
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91At	the	same	time,	law’s	non-violent	aspect—its	‘illimitable	openness’—means	that	law	must	remain	open	to	life,	as	its	object,	as	much	as	its	acts	cut	short	existence	by	rendering	its	own	sentences	as	what	is	real.	Thus	for	law	to	become	the	law	in	fact	and	not	just	in	word,	law	must	remain	open	to	becoming	the	law	in	respect	of	its	being	 otherwise.	 This	 is	 what	 makes	 the	 process	 of	 law	 both	 responsive	 and	‘responsable’.50	The	remaining	chapters	of	the	thesis	are	concerned	with	what	this	concept	of	law	means	for	law’s	rule.	If	the	institution	of	law	is	animated	by	a	contradiction	that	makes	 its	expressions	both	 law	and	not	 law,	 then	where	does	this	 leave	 ‘the	rule	of	law’	as	a	theoretical	proposition	and	as	an	empirical	reality?				
																																																						50	See	note	40	above.		
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1	 A	proposition		The	 chasmic	 structure	 of	 law	 examined	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 gives	 rise	 to	 a	critical	question	in	both	theory	and	practice:	where	does	it	leave	‘the	rule	of	law’	as	a	proposition?		The	 argument	 I	 make	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 that	 it	 leaves	 it	 in	 a	 very	 fertile	position.	 Animated	 by	 a	 contradiction	 between	 the	 intention	 of	 instituting	 an	objective	order	that	separates	law	from	its	subjective	basis—so	that	it	is	law,	and	not	 humans,	 that	 rules—and	 yet	 the	 impossibility	 of	 achieving	 that	 separation,	law’s	rule	cannot	be	closed	off	to	its	subjects.	As	an	institution,	the	rule	of	law	must	remain	 open	 to	what	 its	 conceptual	 schema	does	 not	wholly	 admit:	 the	 subjects	who	 enliven	 it	 whilst	 remaining	 abject	 before	 it.	 This	 is	 not	 a	 resolute	 position,	because	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 like	 every	 modern	 institution,	 always	 cuts	 short	 as	 a	normative	matter	the	subjects	upon	whose	backs	it	is	to	be	found.	But	this	is	also	not	a	hopeless	position,	because	it	exposes	both	the	possibility	and	the	necessity	of	its	responsiveness	as	an	institution	to	the	subjects	who	enliven	it.	Thus	law’s	rule	is	enlivened	by	a	dialectic	that	makes	‘the	rule	of	law’	not	only	a	violent	conceit	but	also	a	critical	institution	of	social	life.		I	 make	 this	 argument	 in	 two	 steps.	 In	 the	 first	 (Part	 2),	 I	 examine	 ‘the	definitive	theory	of	the	rule	of	 law’	to	show	how	‘the	rule	of	 law’	and	 ‘the	rule	of	humans’	 are	 separate,	 and	 opposed,	 but	 also	 inseparable,	 and	 constitutive,	 and	how	 this	 places	 the	 institution	 on	 fluid	 grounds,	 neither	 entirely	 negating	 its	possibility	nor	giving	it	a	determinate	position.	To	do	this,	 I	begin	by	considering	how	legal	pluralism,	understood	as	a	diagnostic	of	the	normative	differences	that	animate	law’s	life	on	the	ground,	reflects	the	contradiction	in	the	proposition	of	the	rule	of	law.	That	is,	as	a	reminder	of	the	subjectivity	of	law,	legal	pluralism	reflects	the	 problem	 that	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 cannot	 be	 closed	 to	 its	 subjective	 situation	through	the	institution	of	legal	order.	With	this	in	mind,	I	then	turn	to	the	theory	of	the	rule	of	law	to	show	how,	as	a	proposition,	it	is	set	against	the	very	arbitrariness	that	 results	 from	 law’s	 pluralism.	 Thus	 the	 need	 for	 discretionary	 treatment	 by	law,	 to	 ensure	 the	 law	 remains	 responsive	 to	 the	 plurality	 of	 difference	 that	confronts	it,	comes	up	against	the	need	for	standard	measures	of	law,	to	ensure	the	law	is	not	exercised	arbitrarily	but	applies	equally	to	everyone.	
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94	 In	the	second	step	(Part	3),	I	turn	to	the	problem	of	 ‘instituting	the	rule	of	law’	 in	 practice.	Having	 established	 the	 chasmic	 structure	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 the	question	 remains:	where	does	 this	 leave	 its	 institution	 as	 an	 empirical	matter?	 I	address	this	question	by	considering	how	the	chasmic	structure	of	the	rule	of	law	opens	it	to	animation	by	different	‘logics’,	which	inform	how	it	takes	place.	In	doing	this	I	show	how	a	theo-logic	once	sought	to	resolve	the	contradiction	in	the	rule	of	law	by	invoking	God	as	the	ultimate	authority.	In	this	way,	the	sovereign	position	of	 the	 law-maker	 could	 be	 upheld	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 the	 sovereign	 was	 held	subject	to	the	law,	through	the	logic	of	a	natural	law	that	ultimately	made	law,	and	not	humans,	supreme.	Likewise,	I	show	how	a	mytho-logic	now	operates	to	resolve	the	 contradiction	 by	 naturalising	 the	 institution	 of	 the	 courts	 as	 the	 objective	arbiter	of	the	rule	of	law,	ensuring	law-maker	is	subject	to	law	at	the	same	time	as	law	is	subject	to	law-maker,	as	a	matter	of	law.	Thus,	just	as	the	objective	authority	of	God	once	ensured	it	is	law,	in	the	end,	and	not	humans,	that	rules,	now	it	is	the	objective	authority	of	the	courts	that	ensures	it	is	law,	in	the	end,	and	not	humans,	that	 rules.	 However,	 neither	 the	 theological	 natural	 law	 nor	 the	 mythological	judicial	objectivity	ultimately	resolves	the	contradiction,	leaving	law’s	rule	open	to	other	logics,	and	in	particular	other	ideologies	such	as	capitalism,	to	inform	how	it	takes	place.	This,	I	argue,	is	what	enables	para-sitic	regimes	to	colonise	a	place	and	people	through	the	institution	of	the	rule	of	law.		
2	 The	definitive	theory	of	the	rule	of	law		The	 subjective	 nature	 of	 law,	which	makes	 ‘the	 law’	more	 than	 the	 output	 of	 an	institutionalised	 production	 process,1	 poses	 a	 problem	 for	 a	 definitive	 theory	 of	the	rule	of	law.	The	problem	is	that	by	definition	‘the	rule	of	law’	is	opposed	to	‘the	rule	of	humans’,2	 and	yet	 law	remains	an	 inter-subjective	phenomenon;	 thus	 the	rule	of	law,	set	against	the	rule	of	humans,	cannot	be	instituted	in	a	way	that	finally	separates	 law	 from	 its	 subjects.	 In	 examining	 this	 problem	 here,	 I	 begin	 by	
																																																						1	See	Chapter	2,	where	I	discussed	how	law	does	not	merely	have	an	objective	form,	as	something	that	might	be	‘made’	and	‘received’	as	a	pre-fabricated	order	and	erected	over	the	heads	of	humans,	but	is	also	always	enlivened	in	and	through	the	subjects	of	law.	2	This	has	been	the	case	since	Aristotle:	see	Part	16,	Book	3	of	his	Politics.	For	an	historical	overview,	see	Brian	Z	Tamanaha,	On	the	Rule	of	Law:	History,	Politics,	Theory	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2004).	See	also	Brian	Z	Tamanaha,	‘The	Rule	of	Law	for	Everyone?’,	
Current	Legal	Problems,	vol	55,	no	1	(2002).	
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95considering	the	phenomenon	of	‘legal	pluralism’.	This	extends	the	discussion	of	the	concept	of	law	in	the	previous	chapter	to	show	how	law	is	animated	by	a	plurality	of	difference,	which,	as	I	go	on	to	discuss,	is	the	very	‘problem’	of	the	rule	of	law.			A	 Law’s	pluralism		
(i)	 a	relational	legal	pluralism		‘Legal	 pluralism’	 is	 now	 a	 core	 theme	 of	 socio-legal	 scholarship.3	 A	 dominant	tendency	 within	 this	 field	 is	 to	 approach	 legal	 pluralism	 as	 a	 question	 of	 the	relation	 between	 different	 forms	 of	 law,	 or	 ‘legal	 orders’.4	 For	 social	 scientists	observing	the	law	‘objectively’,	in	the	forms	it	takes	on	the	ground,	the	problem	is	how	apparently	distinct	 legal	orders—such	as	 the	national	 legal	order	of	a	 state,	the	 customary	 legal	 order	 of	 a	 people	within	 a	 state,	 and	 the	 international	 legal	order	 between	 states—intersect	 and	 interact	 with	 each	 other,	 informing	 each	other	 whilst	 remaining	 apart	 from	 one	 another	 as	 forms	 of	 law.	 To	 quote	 the	definition	 given	 by	 Brian	 Tamanaha,	 which	 is	 representative	 of	 this	 approach,	‘legal	 pluralism	 refers	 to	 a	 context	 in	 which	 multiple	 legal	 forms	 coexist’.5	 The	problem,	in	other	words,	is	that	law,	in	‘a	context	of	legal	pluralism’,	takes	form	in	different,	multiple	and	often	contradictory,	ways.	For	 instance,	 take	 the	 following	 two	 forms	 of	 law:	 the	 ‘national	 law	 of	Liberia’	and	the	‘traditional	law’	of	one	of	Liberia’s	communities.	As	forms	of	law,	they	 appear	 to	 be	 very	 different,	 with	 one	 representing	 the	 Anglo-American	
																																																						3	For	a	review	of	this	literature,	see	Miranda	Forsyth,	A	Bird	that	Flies	with	Two	Wings:	The	Kastom	
and	State	Justice	Systems	in	Vanuatu	(Canberra:	ANU	E	Press,	2009),	Chapter	2.	See	also	Sally	Engle	Merry,	‘Legal	Pluralism’,	Law	and	Society	Review,	vol	22,	no	5	(1988).	I	find	the	most	compelling	approach	to	legal	pluralism	in	Macdonald’s	work	on	a	‘critical	legal	pluralism’.	For	an	introduction,	see	Martha-Marie	Kleinhans	and	Roderick	A	Macdonald,	‘What	is	a	Critical	Legal	Pluralism?’,	
Canadian	Journal	of	Law	and	Society,	vol	12	(1997).	Macdonald	develops	this	further	in	Roderick	A	Macdonald,	‘Custom	Made	-	For	a	Non-chirographic	Critical	Legal	Pluralism’,	Canadian	Journal	of	
Law	and	Society,	vol	26,	no	2	(2011).	I	discuss	this	approach	further	below.	See	also	Peter	Fitzpatrick,	‘Law	and	Societies’,	Osgoode	Hall	Law	Journal,	vol	22,	no	1	(1984);	Emmanuel	Melissaris,	Ubiquitous	Law:	Legal	Theory	and	the	Space	for	Legal	Pluralism	(Farnham:	Ashgate,	2009).	4	See,	eg,	Sally	Falk	Moore’s	conceptualisation	of		legal	pluralism	in	terms	of	‘semi-autonomous	social	fields’:	Sally	Falk	Moore,	Law	as	Process:	An	Anthropological	Approach	(London:	Routledge,	1978).	5	Brian	Z	Tamanaha,	‘The	Rule	of	Law	and	Legal	Pluralism	in	Development’,	Hague	Journal	on	the	
Rule	of	Law,	vol	3,	no	1	(2011).	See	also	Brian	Z	Tamanaha,	‘The	Folly	of	the	'Social	Scientific'	Concept	of	Legal	Pluralism’,	Journal	of	Law	and	Society,	vol	20,	no	2	(1993);	Brian	Z	Tamanaha,	‘Understanding	Legal	Pluralism:	Past	to	Present,	Local	to	Global’,	Sydney	Law	Review,	vol	30	(2008).	
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96	Common	 Law	 tradition,	 and	 the	 other	 representing	 the	 law	 of	 a	 west	 African	community’s	 own	 sacred	 institutions.	 And	 yet,	 when	 attempting	 to	 pinpoint	 the	line	 of	 division	 between	 them,	 empirically—the	 points	 in	 fact	 at	 which	 the	 two	forms	are	as	separate	as	their	description	implies—the	analyst	becomes	confused.	The	analyst	becomes	confused	because	the	description	is	not	wrong:	‘the	national	law	 of	 Liberia’	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 the	 ‘traditional	 law’	 of	 the	 community;	 the	difference	could	not	be	blanker.	And	yet,	there	is,	in	fact,	no	discernible	line.	On	the	ground,	what	 the	 analyst	 discovers	 is	 that	 at	 the	 very	point	where	 a	 line	 should	demarcate	the	difference,	the	line	recedes,	or	multiplies,	or	disappears	altogether.	The	more	the	analyst	examines	where	the	line	finally	cuts,	in	fact,	between	the	two	forms,	the	more	confusing	the	task	becomes.	The	analyst	is	thus	confronted	with	a	perplexing	 situation:	 two	different	 forms	of	 law	 that	 are	no	different	 at	 the	very	points	of	their	difference.6	To	 move	 forward	 with	 the	 analysis,	 the	 analyst	 might	 turn	 back	 to	 the	conceptualised	 forms	 themselves	 to	 demonstrate	 their	 discrete	 singularity.	 Thus	the	 ‘traditional	 law’	 of	 the	 community,	 and	 the	 ‘national	 law’	 of	 Liberia,	 are	different—that	much	is	clear.	The	question	then	becomes	how	these	two	different	forms	relate	to	each	other,	to	account	for	the	empirical	fact	of	their	non-difference.	Taking	this	approach	to	the	problem,	the	line	can	be	drawn	at	any	reasonable	point	between	 the	 forms,	 and	 the	 resulting	 empirical	 confusion	 becomes	 a	 relational	problem.	The	fact	of	their	‘relationship’	covers	for	the	empirical	inadequacy	of	the	linear	 distinction	 between	 the	 forms,	 allowing	 for	 the	 line	 to	 be	 drawn	 with	renewed	conviction.7	Relational	analysis	in	this	way	allows	the	analyst	to	bracket	the	empirical	confusion	within	an	excessive	 concept,	 ‘the	relationship’.8	Whatever	
																																																						6	Chapter	6	examines	particular	instances	of	this	problem	in	the	case	of	Liberia.	To	give	one	example	here:	In	many	parts	of	Liberia,	the	authority	of	the	national	law	is	subject	to	the	authority	of	local	law,	with	authorities	of	the	national	legal	system	also	subjects	of	local	law.	Thus	a	Liberian	National	Police	officer	(an	authority	of	‘the	national	law’),	who	is	also	a	subject	of	a	‘local	legal	order’,	can	be	seen	to	enforce	the	national	law	in	a	way	that	is	informed	by	the	local	law.	In	such	a	situation,	in	which	both	‘national	law’	and	‘local	law’	are	embodied	in	the	same	authority/subject,	and	‘takes	place’	through	their	legal	act	(in	this	case	law	enforcement),	what	takes	form	as	‘the	law’	becomes	a	confusion	of	both.	As	I	examine	in	Chapter	6,	in	Liberia	this	can	be	seen	not	only	in	the	case	of	Police,	but	also	Magistrates,	whose	legal	acts	embody	both	national	and	local	laws,	as	well	as	in	the	behavior	of	individual	citizens	and	whole	communities.		7	Such	relational	concepts	include	‘intersection’,	‘interaction’,	‘intertwining’,	‘overlapping’.		8	See	also	Nancy’s	observation:	 ‘(I	could	speak	of	 it	 in	terms	of	“relation”,	except	that	“relation”	 is	still	too	exterior	for	something	which	does	not	allow	separation	of	interiors	from	exteriors.)’	Jean-Luc	 Nancy,	 ‘Of	 Being-in-Common’,	 in	 Community	 at	 Loose	 Ends,	 ed	 Miami	 Theory	 Collective	(Minneapolis:	Minnesota	University	Press,	1991),	4.	See	also	at	page	7.	
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97remains	 in	 fact	outside	the	conceptualised	form	is	excess	that	 is	accounted	for	 in	the	relationship.	The	benefit	of	this	approach	is	a	matter	of	control.	Whereas	on	the	ground,	the	‘local	law’	is	indistinguishable	at	its	most	critical	points	from	the	‘national	law’,	back	 in	 the	 Academy	 the	 two	 forms	 may	 be	 cleaved	 apart	 and	 a	 relationship	established	to	deal	with	the	confusion.	(The	added	benefit	is	that	one	form	of	law	might	then	be	made	predominant	over	all	others—but	more	on	this	in	a	moment.)	There	is	a	high	cost	to	overcoming	the	confusion	in	this	way,	however.	No	longer	confusing	the	 forms	of	 law,	 the	 fact	of	 their	non-difference	becomes	sameness,	as	forms	 of	 law,	 and	 their	 difference	 becomes	 a	matter	 of	 comparison	 rather	 than	singular	 appreciation.	 Equivalence,	 and	 not	 omnivalence,	 becomes	 the	 order	 of	things.	The	contradiction	that	gave	rise	to	the	confusion	between	the	forms	of	law,	and	 that	 enlivens	 law	 on	 the	 ground,	 is	 no	 longer	 in	 plain	 sight.	 Instead	 it	 is	contained	 within	 a	 relationship	 that	 serves	 to	 protect	 the	 autonomy	 of	 the	identified	 forms	 of	 law	 by	 ensuring	 that	 any	 transgression	 beyond	 the	 accepted	ways	 in	 which	 law	 might	 take	 form	 can	 be	 dealt	 with	 as	 a	 violation	 of	 the	relationship.		This	 problem	 of	 ‘legal	 pluralism’	 is	 only	 disturbing,	 or	 even	 surprising,	however,	if	one	thinks	that	the	normal	situation	is	one	where	law	takes	coherent,	orderly	 form,	 free	 from	 internal	 difference.	 Thus	 the	 law	 of	 the	 state,	 properly	speaking,	 is	 a	 coherent	 legal	 order;	 and	 any	 manifestations	 of	 difference	 are	treated	as	not-law—a	resolution	that	affirms	the	coherence	of	what	is	the	law	and	renders	 contrary	 expressions	 of	 law	 as	 nothing	 of	 the	 sort.	 On	 this	 positive-analytical	approach,	coherent	legal	order	is	the	primary	unit	of	understanding,	to	the	 point	 that	 it	 is	 naturalised	 as	 the	 equivalent	 of	 ‘law’.	 ‘Legal	 pluralism’	 then	represents	 a	 distortion	 of	 law,	 as	 a	 distortion	 of	 legal	 order;	 it	 becomes	 a	secondary	condition	that	is	used	to	explain	a	troubling	exception	to	the	perceived	norm	 of	 law.	 On	 this	 approach,	 legal	 pluralism	 is	 ‘produced’	 when	 the	 natural	order	 of	 things	 is	 thrown	 into	 disarray.	 As	 Tamanaha	writes:	 ‘Colonization	 thus	produced	 legal	 pluralism,	 grafting	 or	 erecting	 a	 variegated	mix	 of	 legal	 systems:	transplanted	state	legal	systems	focused	on	matters	of	government	and	commerce,	alongside	modified	indigenous	laws	and	institutions,	with	mutual	interpenetration	
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98	and	hybrid	combinations	of	both.’9	Seen	in	this	way,	 ‘legal	pluralism’	is	similar	to	the	notion	of	‘hybridity’,	which	is	likewise	premised	on	there	being	pure	or	typical	forms	of	 law	which	 then	become	mixed	 to	 form	atypical,	hybridised	 forms.	Thus	‘[t]he	potential	 combinations	 that	can	arise	 in	 legal	pluralism	are	 limitless’,10	but	only	because	legal	pluralism	is	approached	as	a	combination	of	legal	orders.			
(ii)		 a	critical	legal	pluralism		In	 contrast	 to	 this	 positive-analytical	 approach,	 if	 law	 is	 seen	 to	 be	 animated	 by	difference	at	 its	very	origin,	as	 I	 argued	 in	Chapter	2,	with	 ‘the	 law’	enlivened	 in	and	through	its	subjects,	making	law	as	multiple	and	conflicted	as	any	social	body,	then	‘legal	pluralism’	is	just	another	way	of	describing	the	differences	in	law	in	its	
every	form.	On	this	approach,	legal	pluralism	does	not	describe	a	divergence	from	the	norm	of	law,	caused	by	colonialism	or	globalisation,11	but	rather	the	normative	nature	of	law	itself,	as	a	subjective	phenomenon.	In	other	words,	legal	pluralism	is	the	 natural	 state	 of	 law,	 as	 much	 as	 is	 legal	 order.	 Whilst	 colonialism	 and	globalisation	no	doubt	intensify	the	differences	in	law,	they	do	not	‘produce’	legal	pluralism.	 Production	 implies	 the	 creation	 of	 something	 secondary	 out	 of	something	 primary.	 For	 legal	 pluralism	 to	 be	 a	 product,	 a	 secondary	 condition,	then	there	has	to	be	a	primary	state	of	law	in	which	differences	are	absent	from	its	expression	in	a	legal	order.	By	implication,	once	upon	a	time	there	must	have	been	a	primal	state	where	 law	took	 form	homogenously,	and	a	possible	end	of	history	where	 law	 becomes	 ‘unified’	 and	 once	 again	 takes	 form	 homogenously.	 As	Fitzpatrick	has	shown,	the	notion	of	a	legal	order	free	of	difference,	particularly	as	a	description	of	a	primal	legal	order,	 is	the	stuff	of	myth,	and	more	critically,	 it	 is	the	stuff	of	the	very	mythology	of	a	modern	law	that	finds	‘legal	pluralism’	to	be	a	disturbing	perversion	of	law’s	natural	state.12		
																																																						9	Tamanaha,	‘Rule	of	Law	and	Legal	Pluralism’,	6.	Tamanaha	goes	on	to	note:	‘Colonization	brought	on	the	first	wave	of	legal	pluralism,	as	described	above.	A	second	wave	is	occurring	today,	consisting	of	two	distinct	strains.	Legal	norms	and	institutions	attached	to	global	capitalism	(the	first	strain)	and	to	liberal	democratic	democratic	norms	(the	second	strain)’:	ibid,	9.	10	Ibid.	11	Ibid.	12	Peter	Fitzpatrick,	The	Mythology	of	Modern	Law	(Oxon:	Routledge,	1992);	Peter	Fitzpatrick,	
Modernism	and	the	Grounds	of	Law	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2001).	
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99In	 contrast	 to	 the	 positive-analytical	 treatment	 of	 legal	 pluralism	 as	 a	perversion	of	 the	norm	of	 law,	 I	approach	 legal	pluralism	here	as	a	diagnostic	of	the	normative	differences	that	animate	 law’s	 life	on	the	ground	 in	 its	every	 form.	This	 view	 is	 informed	 in	 particular	 by	 Roderick	Macdonald’s	work	 on	 a	 ‘critical	legal	 pluralism’.13	 Macdonald’s	 approach	 to	 legal	 pluralism	 has	 a	 negative-dialectical	drive	to	it,	in	its	restless	determination	to	overturn	one-sided	analyses,	in	 this	 case	 by	 showing	 how	 law	 gives	 form	 to	 the	 normativity	 of	 its	 subjects,	structurally,	 as	much	 as	 the	 law	 takes	 form	 normatively	 through	 its	 subjects,	 as	legal	agents,	 and	how	this	dialectic	of	 law	and	normativity	 takes	place	by	modes	limited	only	by	the	social	imagination	and	circumstance.		Macdonald’s	 concept	 of	 ‘custom	 made’	 law	 captures	 this	 view	 of	 legal	pluralism	 especially	 well,	 as	 a	 term	 that	 brings	 together	 two	 apparently	contradictory	 concepts,	 holding	 them	 together	 in	 a	 way	 that	 the	 two	 become	confused	 without	 entirely	 merging,	 becoming	 one	 whilst	 remaining	 polarised.14	
Thus	on	one	side:	‘custom’,	what	is	by	nature	unthinking	practice;	an	implicit	way	of	doing	 things,	 as	 what	 is	 habitual,	 what	 is	 customary	 goes	 without	 saying	 and	without	reason.	Or	as	Macdonald	sums	up	this	usual	appreciation	of	custom:	‘it	is	common	 to	 explain	 customary	 rules	 as	 nothing	 more	 than	 conventions	 of	 long	usage	 that	 emerge	 from	 repetition	 (usually	 an	 unthinking	 or	 unconscious	repetition),	and	therefore	the	product	of	arbitrary,	non-rational	action.’15	And	so	on	
the	other	side:	what	 is	 ‘made’—real	 law;	which	 is	 to	say,	real	 law	is	made.	This	 is	the	 thought	 that	 law’s	 normative	 status	 as	 ‘the	 law’	 has	 its	 source	 in	 the	 act	 of	articulation,	as	a	process	that	takes	what	is	otherwise	raw	and	gives	it	form	as	‘the	law’,	as	matter	of	law.16		For	 Macdonald,	 the	 problem	 is	 not	 that	 these	 two	 positions—what	 is	‘custom’	and	what	is	‘made’—are	simply	untrue;	the	problem	lies	in	affirming	their	untruth,	 by	 failing	 to	 grasp	 how	 each	 is	 untrue	 in	 itself.	 This	 is	 about	 ‘the	independence’	of	what	 is	 ‘customary	law’	and	what	 is	 ‘statutory	 law’	but	also	the	
																																																						13	See	Kleinhans	and	Macdonald,	‘Critical	Legal	Pluralism’;	Macdonald,	‘Custom	Made’.	14	Macdonald,	‘Custom	Made’.	15	Ibid,	317.	As	an	example	of	this	appreciation	of	custom,	Macdonald	refers	to	Austin’s	explanation	of	customary	rules	‘as	merely	proto-law’	in	John	Austin,	Lectures	on	Jurisprudence,	or	the	Philosophy	
of	Positive	Law,	4	ed,	vol	1	(London:	John	Murray,	1879),	100f.	16	See	Macdonald,	‘Custom	Made’,	316-317.	
	 	 	 		 Chapter	3		
	
100	‘interdependence	 of	 these	 two	 forms’.17	 Thus	 crossing	 one	 way:	 the	 act	 of	articulating	normativity	gives	form	to	law,	making	what	is	‘customary’	into	what	is	‘statutory’;	‘the	law’	is	therefore	custom	made	in	the	sense	that	it	is	the	outcome	of	a	 process	 of	 rendering	 (in	 stucco	 finish).	 But	 crossing	 the	 other	 way:	 the	 term	‘custom	made’	 also	points	 to	 the	 restless	 ‘customizing	 of	 our	 explicit	 and	 formal	normative	 creations’,	 which	 makes	 ‘the	 law’	 real	 through	 the	 everyday	 acts	 of	subjects.18	This	is	the	critical	aspect	of	Macdonald’s	critical	legal	pluralism:	seeing	law	as	a	subjective	act	of	articulating	normativity,	without	becoming	blind	to	how	the	subjects	of	law,	being	‘made	over’	by	the	law,	are	also	always	making	over	the	law,	as	their	own.	As	such,	law	is	‘autobiographical’	and	not	simply	dictation,	with	the	act	of	subscription	by	so-called	law-receiving	subjects	being	no	less	formative	of	 law	 than	 the	 act	 of	 prescription	 by	 the	 so-called	 law-giving	 or	 law-making	subject.19	Recall	 the	 logic	 of	 the	 subject-object	 dialectic:	 the	 subject,	 always	 generic	and	 singular,	 determined	 and	 self-determining,	 an	 objective	 part	 of	 the	whole—and	 therefore	 knowable	 only	 through	 empirical	 study	 of	 the	 whole—and	 yet	irreconcilably	apart	from	this	totality—and	therefore	knowable	only	in	its	singular	situation.20	Likewise	law:	generic	to	the	extent	that	it	expresses	a	common	sense	of	how	things	are	and	how	things	ought	to	be,	and	yet	singular	to	the	extent	that	it	is	always	performed	in	and	through	individual	subjects,	acting	in	concert.	Thus	what	is	 ‘the	 law’	 is	 determined	 by	 ‘law-receiving’	 subjects	 (for	 example	 citizens),	 as	much	 as	 ‘the	 law’	 is	 the	 product	 of	 a	 self-determining	 ‘law-making’	 subject	 (for	example	 parliament).	 Law	 is	 therefore	 an	 objective	 part	 of	 a	 social	 whole,	structuring	how	a	people	is	together	as	how	it	ought	to	be	together;	and	yet	law	is	also	irreconcilably	apart	from	this	totality,	with	its	life	in	the	experiences	of	every	single	subject.		
																																																						17	Ibid,	317.	18	Ibid,	326.	On	the	concept	of	‘everyday	life’	and	its	relation	to	law,	see	also	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns,	eds,	Law	in	Everyday	Life	(Ann	Arbor:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	1993);	Daniel	Jutras,	‘Legal	Dimensions	of	Everyday	Life’,	Canadian	Journal	of	Law	and	Society,	vol	16	(2001).	For	a	seminal	sociological	study	of	‘law’s	life	on	the	ground’,	see	Eugen	Ehrlich,	Fundamental	Principles	
of	the	Sociology	of	Law,	trans	W	L	Moll	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	1936).	19	See	Kleinhans	and	Macdonald,	‘Critical	Legal	Pluralism’,	46.	For	a	contemporary	example	of	this,	see	Imelda	Deinla	and	Veronica	Taylor,	‘Towards	Peace:	Rethinking	Justice	and	Legal	Pluralism	in	the	Bangsamoro’,	RegNet	Research	Paper	2015/63	(2015);	Imelda	Deinla	and	Veronica	Taylor,	‘An	Annotated	Bibliography	on	Justice	and	Legal	Pluralism	in	Mindanao:	Ways	for	Women	to	Participate	in	Peacebuilding	(Philippines)’,	RegNet	Research	Paper	2015/64	(2015).	20	See	Part	2	of	Chapter	1.	
instituting	law’s	rule	 	
	
101The	 crucial	 point	 here	 is	what	 this	 reveals	 about	 the	 intrinsic	 plurality	 of	law	and	the	 ‘law-maker’.	As	Kleinhans	and	Macdonald	write	in	their	introductory	paper	on	‘what	is	a	critical	legal	pluralism’:		By	 highlighting	 the	 dynamics	 of	 reciprocal	 construction,	 a	 critical	 legal	pluralism	 legitimates	 interpretations	of	 law	apart	 from	those	endorsed	by	officials—whether	 these	 be	 institutional	 office-holders	 such	 as	 judges	within	 a	 political	 State,	 or	 whether	 they	 be	 empirically	 identified	community	spokespersons,	or	whether	they	be	the	scholastic	investigators	themselves.	The	 law	 is	within	all	members	of	any	society	 that	purports	 to	recognize	 them	 as	 legal	 subjects.	 This	 constructivist	 aspect	 of	 legal	pluralism	is	what	gives	this	law	its	true	authority.21	Literary	 scholars	 have	 long-understood	 this—how	 texts	 are	 ‘authored’	 in	 the	relation	between	writer	and	reader,	who	are	themselves	never	writing	and	reading	as	isolated	individuals.22	Thus	the	‘authority’	of	the	text,	never	resting	on	itself,	 is	always	 authorised	 in	 a	 contra-dictory	 interplay	 of	 subject	 and	 object,	 mediated	historically,	 socially.	 Likewise	 the	 legal	 Act,	 like	 any	 literary	 text,	 is	 a	 dialogical	work,	drafted	not	in	isolation	but	in	an	historical	context,	penetrated	through-and-through	by	what	is	not	apparently	in	it,	by	what	has	been	and	what	is	otherwise;23	authored—‘truly	authorised’24—not	merely	by	an	institution-as-author	but	also	by	subjects-as-readers.	As	examined	 in	 the	previous	chapter,	 law	 is	never	simply	an	act	that	gives	form	to	‘the	law’	objectively,	as	‘is’	on	the	books,	but	is	also	always	an	active	 performance,	 with	 the	 law	 taking	 form	 subjectively.	 And	 yet	 law	 is	 also	never	 simply	 what	 goes	 without	 saying—is	 never	 simply	 otherwise	 than	 ‘the	law’—any	 more	 than	 law	 is	 simply	 what	 is	 said	 to	 be	 ‘the	 law’.	 What	 is	 law	 is	always	both	‘the	law’	and	not	 ‘the	law’,	and	is	always	experienced	this	way	by	its	subjects,	whose	experience,	as	 the	object	of	 law,	 is	neither	of	 ‘the	 law’	nor	not	of	‘the	law’.	As	a	result,	on	this	approach,	the	problem	of	 ‘legal	pluralism’	becomes	the	problem	 of	 how	 the	 difference	 that	 animates	 law	 on	 the	 ground,	 resulting	 in	apparently	different	and	contradictory	forms	of	law,	is	a	matter	of	expression.	For	
																																																						21	Kleinhans	and	Macdonald,	‘Critical	Legal	Pluralism’,	46	(italics	in	original).	22	See	Desmond	Manderson,	Kangaroo	Courts	and	the	Rule	of	Law	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2012),	Chapter	6.	23	See	also	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns,	‘Writing	History	and	Registering	Memory	in	Legal	Decisions	and	Legal	Practices:	An	Introduction’,	in	History,	Memory,	and	the	Law,	ed	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns	(Ann	Arbor:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	2009).	24	Kleinhans	and	Macdonald,	‘Critical	Legal	Pluralism’,	46	(see	quote	above).	
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102	instance,	 if	 the	 problem	 is	 to	 understand	 the	 relationship	 between	 ‘statutory’,	‘customary’,	and	 ‘international’	 law	in	a	given	situation,	rather	than	approach	the	problem	at	the	point	of	the	conceptualised	forms	of	 law,	and	proceed	to	examine	how	these	forms	intersect	and	interact,	thereby	treating	subjects	of	law	merely	as	units	 of	 analysis	 within	 this	 social	 complex,	 the	 task	 is	 to	 enquire	 into	 how	 the	subjects	 of	 law	 are	 also	 giving	 expression	 to	 ‘the	 law’.25	 On	 this	 approach,	 ‘law’	(without	 definite	 article)	 is	 a	 singular	 phenomenon	 with	 an	 infinite	 plurality	 of	difference	 within	 its	 expressive	 range,	 giving	 form	 to	 ‘the	 law’	 (with	 definite	article)	 in	multiple	 and	 contradictory	 ways.	 ‘Legal	 pluralism’	 thus	 describes	 the	difference	within	 law,	 as	 itself	 always	 multiple	 and	 contradictory,	 and	 it	 is	 this	difference—this	 pluralism—that	 manifests	 on	 the	 ground	 in	 the	 multiple	 and	contradictory	observable	forms	of	law.		As	 I	 discuss	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 when	 this	 critical	 approach	 to	 legal	pluralism	is	brought	to	bear	on	‘the	rule	of	law’,	the	question	is	no	longer	how	best	to	‘deal	with’	the	fact	that	law	manifests	in	multiple	forms	within	a	social	body,	for	instance,	 by	 trying	 to	 regulate	 them	 by	 establishing	 a	 hierarchical	 relationship	between	 ‘statutory’,	 ‘customary’,	 and	 ‘international’	 laws	 under	 a	 national	constitution.	 Rather,	 the	 question	 is	 how	 to	 deal	with	 the	 plurality	 of	 difference	within	 law	 itself,	whether	 this	 difference	manifests	within	what	 appears	 to	 be	 a	
single	legal	order,	such	as	the	national	law	of	a	state,	or	in	multiple	orders.26	In	 summary,	 if	 law	 is	 approached	 in	 a	 positive-analytical	mode,	 as	 taking	form	in	coherent	orders,	then	it	will	be	disturbing	to	discover	that	the	boundaries	of	 these	 legal	 orders	 do	 not	 exist	 on	 the	 ground;	 that,	 in	 fact,	 law	 takes	 form	 in	multiple	and	contradictory	ways	that	endlessly	subvert	its	proper	ordering.	On	this	approach,	 ‘legal	pluralism’	 is	a	diagnostic	of	disease	 in	 the	proper	 legal	ordering.	For	those	who	hold	onto	a	concept	of	the	rule	of	law	that	is	stable	and	orderly,	in	which	a	plurality	of	laws	are	tolerated	as	long	as	they	are	subordinate	to	a	higher	law	 that	 regulates	 the	 different	 forms,	 ‘legal	 pluralism’	 presents	 a	 relational	problem	that	might	be	brought	under	control	without	compromising	the	singular	rule	 of	 law.	 However,	 such	 an	 approach,	 which	 treats	 difference	 in	 law	 as	 a	(dangerous)	 deviation	 from	 the	 norm	 of	 legal	 order,	 misses	 the	 critical	
																																																						25	See	ibid.;	Macdonald,	‘Custom	Made’.	26	See	also	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns,	‘Responding	to	the	Demands	of	Difference:	An	Introduction’,	in	Cultural	Pluralism,	Identity	Politics,	and	the	Law,	ed	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns	(Ann	Arbor:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	2001).	
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103implications	 of	 law’s	 pluralism,	 and	 therefore	 can	 only	 fail	 in	 its	 intentions	 to	regulate	 the	phenomenon,	 becoming	potentially	 violent,	 and	ultimately	 unstable.	The	 fundamental	 play	of	 difference	 that	 animates	 law	 requires	 an	 approach	 that	treats	 law	 as	 both	 singular	 and	 plural,	 and	 therefore	 law’s	 rule	 as	 essentially	contradictory.	 If	 ‘law’,	 and	 ‘legal	 order’,	 is	 approached	 as	 being	 enlivened	 by	 a	plurality	of	difference,	 then	 ‘legal	pluralism’	becomes	the	problem	of	 law	itself.	 It	also,	as	I	now	turn	to	discuss,	becomes	the	problem	of	the	rule	of	law,	which	is	set	against,	and	therefore	enlivened	by,	the	very	plurality	of	difference	that	makes	law	arbitrary	in	its	expression.		
	B	 Rule	and	discretion		Legal	 pluralism	 presents	 a	 critical	 challenge	 to	 law’s	 rule	 because	 it	 reflects	 the	contradiction	that	is	at	its	heart	as	a	proposition.	On	one	hand,	the	implication	of	law’s	pluralism	is	that	the	institution	of	the	rule	of	law	is	necessary	for	social	order,	requiring	a	common	bond	of	law	to	connect	subjects	in	some	union.	On	the	other	hand,	 the	 implication	 of	 law’s	 pluralism	 is	 that	 the	 institution	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	cannot	be	equated	in	any	resolute	way	with	‘stable	order’.	In	short,	legal	pluralism,	as	 a	 reminder	of	 the	 subjectivity	of	 law,	 reflects	 the	disturbing	problem	 that	 the	rule	of	 law	cannot	be	 closed	 to	 its	 subjective	 situation	 through	 the	 institution	of	legal	order.	This	 problem	 can	 be	 seen	 for	 instance	 in	 the	 work	 of	 Albert	 Dicey,	 the	English	jurist	famous	for	popularising	the	term	‘the	rule	of	 law’	in	the	nineteenth	century.27	 Like	 theorists	 before	 and	 after	 him,	 Dicey	 set	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	opposition	 to	 a	 regime	 in	 which	 law	 is	 exercised	 arbitrarily	 by	 those	 in	government.28	As	Dicey	writes:	‘It	means,	in	the	first	place,	the	absolute	supremacy	
																																																						27	Albert	V	Dicey,	Introduction	to	the	Study	of	the	Law	of	the	Constitution	(London:	Macmillan,	1948),	Chapter	IV.	28	Ibid.	One	of	the	most	compelling	contemporary	arguments	linking	the	rule	of	law	to	the	ideal	of	non-arbitrariness	is	made	by	Martin	Krygier:	see,	eg,	Martin	Krygier,	‘The	Rule	of	Law	and	'The	Three	Integrations'’,	Hague	Journal	on	the	Rule	of	Law,	vol	1,	no	1	(2009);	Martin	Krygier,	‘The	Rule	of	Law:	Legality,	Teleology,	Sociology’,	in	Relocating	the	Rule	of	Law,	ed	Gianluigi	Palombella	and	Neil	Walker	(Oxford:	Hart	Publishing,	2009);	Martin	Krygier,	‘The	Rule	of	Law’,	in	Oxford	Handbook	
of	Comparative	Constitutional	Law,	ed	Michel	Rosenfeld	and	András	Sajó	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2012);	Martin	Krygier	and	Adam	Czarnota,	eds,	The	Rule	of	Law	after	Communism:	Problems	
and	Prospects	in	East-Central	Europe	(Dartmouth:	Ashgate,	1999);	Martin	Krygier,	Adam	Czarnota,	and	Wojciech	Sadurski,	eds,	Rethinking	the	Rule	of	Law	after	Communism	(Budapest:	Central	European	University	Press,	2005).	For	one	of	the	earliest	extant	arguments	setting	the	rule	of	law	in	
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104	or	 predominance	 of	 regular	 law	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 influence	 of	 arbitrary	 power,	and	 excludes	 the	 existence	 of	 arbitrariness,	 of	 prerogative,	 or	 even	 of	 wide	discretionary	 authority	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 government.’29	 As	 can	 be	 read	 in	 this	quote,	 Dicey	 is	 especially	 concerned	 with	 the	 arbitrariness	 of	 discretionary	treatment	by	law.	Whilst	Dicey	does	not	conflate	‘arbitrariness’	and	‘discretion’,	he	brings	the	two	together	in	opposition	to	the	rule	of	law.	Thus	he	writes,	‘the	rule	of	law	 is	 contrasted	 with	 every	 system	 of	 government	 based	 on	 the	 exercise	 by	persons	 in	 authority	 of	 wide,	 arbitrary,	 or	 discretionary	 powers	 of	 constraint’,	before	observing:	a	 study	 of	 European	politics	 now	 and	 again	 reminds	 English	 readers	 that	
wherever	 there	 is	 discretion	 there	 is	 room	 for	 arbitrariness,	 and	 that	 in	 a	republic	no	less	than	under	a	monarchy	discretionary	authority	on	the	part	of	the	government	must	mean	insecurity	for	legal	freedom	on	the	part	of	its	subjects.30	In	formulating	his	concept	of	the	rule	of	law,	Dicey	was	looking	across	the	English	Channel	 at	 continental	 European	 systems	 of	 government,	 where	 he	 saw	 a	 wide	exercise	 of	 discretion	 by	 law.31	 He	 contrasted	 this	 with	 what	 he	 saw	 as	 a	fundamental	 principle	 of	 the	 British	 constitution:	 that	what	 is	 expressed	 by	 law	should	be	applied	equally	to	everyone,	regardless	of	their	position.	Thus	for	Dicey	the	 rule	 of	 law	 is	 about	 ‘equality	 before	 the	 law,	 or	 the	 equal	 subjection	 of	 all	classes	to	the	ordinary	law	of	the	land	administered	by	the	ordinary	law	courts’.32	Elsewhere	 Dicey	 sharpens	 his	 definition	 of	 ‘equality	 before	 the	 law’,	 making	 its	point	 ‘the	 universal	 subjection	 of	 all	 classes	 to	 one	 law	 administered	 by	 the	
																																																																																																																																																														opposition	to	a	regime	in	which	law	is	exercised	arbitrarily	by	those	in	government,	see	Aristotle,	
Politics,	Book	3,	Part	16.	More	generally,	see	Tamanaha,	On	the	Rule	of	Law.		29	Dicey,	Introduction	to	the	Study	of	the	Law	of	the	Constitution,	202.	30	Ibid,	188	(my	italics).		31	As	Dicey	observes:	‘Modern	Englishmen	may	at	first	feel	some	surprise	that	the	“rule	of	law”	(in	the	sense	in	which	we	are	now	using	the	term)	should	be	considered	as	in	any	way	a	peculiarity	of	English	institutions	[…]	Yet,	even	if	we	confine	our	observation	to	the	existing	condition	of	Europe,	we	shall	soon	be	convinced	that	the	“rule	of	law”	even	in	this	narrow	sense	is	peculiar	to	England	[…]	In	almost	every	continental	community	the	executive	exercises	far	wider	discretionary	authority	in	the	matter	of	arrest,	of	temporary	imprisonment,	of	expulsion	from	its	territory,	and	the	like,	than	is	either	legally	claimed	or	in	fact	exerted	by	the	government	in	England’.	Ibid,	188.	Dicey	then	considers	the	situation	of	Europe	in	the	eighteenth	century:	‘During	the	eighteenth	century	many	of	the	continental	governments	were	far	from	oppressive,	but	there	was	no	continental	country	where	men	were	secure	from	arbitrary	power.	The	singularity	of	England	[as	the	only	exception	to	this	situation]	was	not	so	much	the	goodness	or	the	leniency	as	the	legality	of	the	English	system	of	government’.	Ibid,	189.	32	Ibid,	202-203.	
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105ordinary	courts’.33	This	principle	of	equality	before	 the	 law	remains	 fundamental	to	a	liberal	concept	of	the	rule	of	law.	And	 yet,	 like	 the	 Legal	 Realists	 and	 Critical	 Legal	 Studies	 scholars	 who	would	 critique	 the	 rule-fundamentalism	 of	 legal	 formalists	 in	 the	 twentieth	century,	 Dicey	 also	 recognised	 the	 essentiality	 of	 discretion	 in	 law,	 to	 ensure	 it	remains	 responsive	 to	 the	 differences	 that	 animate	 everyday	 life.	 As	 an	 English	Common	Law	jurist,	Dicey	was	especially	aware	of	the	importance	of	discretion	in	judicial	 decision-making.	 However,	 like	 many	 Anglo-American	 legal	 scholars	 to	follow,	Dicey	approached	the	tension	between	the	need	for	standard	measures	of	law	 (rules)	 to	 ensure	 equality	 before	 the	 law,	 and	 the	 need	 for	 differential	treatment	by	law	(discretion)	to	ensure	the	law	remains	responsive	to	those	who	are	 abject	 before	 it,	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 a	 philosophical	 tradition	 that	 sees	differential	 treatment	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 social	 cohesion.	 From	 this	 liberalist	perspective,	 political	 society	 is	 formed	 by	 autonomous	 individuals	 contracting	together	 on	 an	 equal	 basis.	 On	 this	 basis,	 differential	 treatment	 by	 the	 political	organs	of	the	social	body	is	seen	as	a	threat	to	cohesion,	driving	a	wedge	between	individuals	 who	 are	 thought	 to	 be	 separate	 to	 begin	 with.	 With	 the	 ‘state’	conceived	as	a	formation	of	individuals,	who	are	individuals	first	and	only	then	in	
society,	 the	 fear	 is	 that	 these	 separate	 individuals	 will	 fall	 apart	 if	 there	 is	differential	 treatment.	 Difference	 is	 thus	 a	 primary	 vulnerability	 of	 the	 nation-state,	as	conceived	in	these	liberalist	terms,	and	the	standard	measure—the	rule—is	a	primary	value	of	law	that	works	to	ensure	it	does	not	fall	apart.		Thus	 mindful	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 standard	 measure	 of	 law	 to	 the	liberal	rule-of-law	principle	of	equality	before	the	law,	and	fearful	of	the	challenge	that	discretion	in	law	poses	to	this	principle,	Dicey	set	the	rule	of	law	against	the	exercise	of	legal	discretion;	and	yet	at	the	same	time,	he	did	not	naïvely	advocate	a	legal	 system	without	 any	 exercise	 of	 discretion.	 And	 it	 is	here—in	his	 non-naïve	view	of	how	law	takes	place—that	the	crack	in	the	proposition	of	‘the	rule	of	law’	can	 be	 seen.	 As	 the	 passages	 quoted	 above	 show,	 for	 Dicey,	 the	 rule	 of	 law	‘excludes	the	existence	of	arbitrariness’,	and	therefore	must	exclude	the	exercise	of	discretion,	 for	 the	 reason	 that	 ‘wherever	 there	 is	 discretion	 there	 is	 room	 for	arbitrariness’;	but	with	an	eye	to	how	law	takes	place,	Dicey	stopped	short	of	an	absolute	 exclusion	 of	 discretion,	 excluding	 only	 ‘wide	 discretionary	 authority	 on	
																																																						33	Ibid,	193.	
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106	the	 part	 of	 the	 government’.	 In	 this,	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 set	 in	 opposition	 to	arbitrariness,	could	not	be	entirely	closed	to	the	exercise	of	discretion,	and	is	thus	left	open	to	arbitrariness.		Dicey’s	ambivalence—setting	the	rule	of	law	against	arbitrariness,	and	yet,	unable	 to	 close	 it	 entirely,	 leaving	 it	 open	 to	 arbitrariness—does	 not	 reflect	 his	shortcomings	as	a	legal	theorist.	Rather,	his	ambivalent	theorisation	of	the	rule	of	law	reflects	a	contradiction	that	is	at	its	core	as	a	proposition,	making	the	rule	of	law	 both	 necessary	 and	 impossible.	 There	 is	 a	 passage	 in	 Thomas	 Hobbes’	
Leviathan	that	provides	a	striking	image	of	this	‘problem’.	Peter	Fitzpatrick	draws	attention	to	this	 image	 in	his	reading	of	Hobbes,	where	he	addresses	how	(citing	Hobbes):	the	very	laws	made	by	Leviathan,	the	civil	laws,	are	found	in	a	sense	to	bind	Leviathan,	for,	just	as	‘men’	have	been	able	to	create	a	sovereign	Leviathan,	‘so	 also	 have	 they	made	 Artificiall	 Chains,	 called	 Civill	 Lawes,	 which	 they	themselves,	 by	mutual	 covenants,	 have	 fastened	 at	 one	 end	 to	 the	 lips	 of	that	Man,	or	Assembly,	to	whom	they	have	given	the	Soveraigne	Power,	and	at	the	other	end	to	their	own	ears’.34		The	image	of	a	chain	connecting	subjects	and	sovereign	evokes	a	relationship	that	recognises	 the	 supreme	 authority	 of	 an	 institutional	 expression	 of	 law,	 whilst	binding	 the	 institutional	 organ	 of	 articulation—the	 lips	 of	 the	 sovereign—to	 the	bodies	of	 its	 subjects,	whose	every	movement	pulls	upon,	persuades,	 aggravates,	and	 no	 doubt	 slurs	 its	 expression	 of	 law.	 If	 this	 is	 the	 ‘objective’	 institutional	structure	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 whereby	 both	 ruler	 and	 ruled	 are	 regulated	 by	 a	common	bond	of	 law,	 then	 it	 is	 an	 institution	 that	 is	 not	 set	 over	 and	above	 the	heads	of	its	subjects	in	a	detached	way,	but	is	attached	directly	to	their	every	push	and	pull.	
	C	 The	irresolute	rule	of	law		This	contradiction,	whereby	the	rule	of	law	is	set	against	the	arbitrary	exercise	of	power	at	the	same	time	as	it	 is	essentially	arbitrary,	 is	 irresolvable.	Indeed	it	has	frustrated	 legal	 scholars	 both	 before	 and	 after	 Dicey,	 in	 one	way	 or	 another.	 As	
																																																						34	Peter	Fitzpatrick,	‘Legal	Theology:	Law,	Modernity	and	the	Sacred’,	Seattle	University	Law	Review,	vol	32	(2009):	332.	See	also	Peter	Fitzpatrick,	‘Leveraging	Leviathan’,	in	After	Sovereignty:	On	the	
Question	of	Political	Beginnings,	ed	Charles	Barbour	and	George		Pavlich	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2009).	
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107Tamanaha	remarks:	 ‘The	 idea	of	 “the	rule	of	 law,	not	man”,	powerful	as	 it	 is,	has	been	forever	dogged	by	the	fact	that	laws	are	not	self-interpreting	or	applying.	The	operation	of	 law	cannot	be	 sequestered	 from	human	participation.’35	Nonetheless,	the	 modern	 compulsion	 is	 to	 seek	 to	 resolve	 the	 contradiction.	 Thus,	 despite	Tamanaha’s	 observation	 that	 law	 cannot	 be	 sequestered	 from	 human	participation,	the	implication	of	this	appears	to	be	so	disturbing	that	he	goes	on	to	argue	that	the	rule	of	law	must	be	sequestered	from	everyday	political	struggles	to	protect	 it	 from	becoming	a	means	 through	which	actors	struggle	 for	power.	 ‘The	root	danger	can	be	stated	summarily’,	Tamanaha	writes:		In	 situations	 of	 sharp	 disagreement	 over	 the	 social	 good,	 when	 law	 is	perceived	as	a	powerful	 instrument,	 individuals	and	groups	within	society	will	 endeavor	 to	 seize	 or	 co-opt	 the	 law	 in	 every	way	 possible;	 to	 fill	 in,	interpret,	manipulate,	and	utilize	the	law	to	serve	their	own	ends.	This	will	spawn	a	Hobbesean	conflict	of	all	against	all	carried	on	within	and	through	the	 legal	order.	Rather	 than	 function	 to	maintain	 social	 order	and	 resolve	disputes,	as	Hobbes	suggested	was	the	role	of	law,	combatants	will	fight	to	control	 and	use	 the	 implements	of	 the	 law	as	weapons	 in	 social,	 political,	religious,	and	economic	disputes.	Law	will	thus	generate	disputes	as	much	as	resolve	them.	[…]	Spiralling	conflicts	will	ensue	with	no	evident	halting	point	or	termination	short	of	exhaustion	of	resources	or	total	conquest	by	one	side.	Such	struggles	over	and	through	law	are	openly	visible	today,	and	worsening.36		This	 view	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law—and	 indeed	 this	 view	 of	 Hobbes’	 Leviathan—is	 in	stark	 contrast	 to	 the	 one	 presented	 by	 Hobbes,	 as	 combining	 institutional	structures	 with	 an	 inter-subjective	 agency	 in	 a	 way	 that	 the	 two	 are	 neither	harmoniously	 unified	 nor	 entirely	 separable.	 If	 the	 institutions	 of	 legal	 order	cannot	be	separated	 from	the	subjects	of	 law,	 then	 isolating	 the	rule	of	 law	from	the	 ‘social,	 political,	 religious,	 and	 economic	 disputes’	 and	 ‘sharp	 disagreements’	that	 animate	 a	 social	 body	 would	 itself	 threaten	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 To	 isolate	 the	institution	of	the	rule	of	law	from	everyday	life,	to	isolate	it	from	the	disorder	and	instability	that	animates	every	social	body,	would	be	to	cut	the	chain	that	binds	the	lips	of	the	sovereign	to	its	subjects	and	raise	the	institution	to	a	place	beyond	the	reach	of	the	many,	to	be	guarded	by	a	select	few.	Even	if	this	could	be	achieved,	it	
																																																						35	Tamanaha,	On	the	Rule	of	Law,	123-124	(my	italics).	See	also	generally	Manderson’s	work	on	the	rule	of	law,	in	which	he	responds	to	this	‘crisis’:	Manderson,	Kangaroo	Courts.	36	Brian	Z	Tamanaha,	Law	as	a	Means	to	an	End:	Threat	to	the	Rule	of	Law	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006),	1-2.	See	also	Manderson’s	response:	Manderson,	Kangaroo	Courts,	82-85.	
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108	would	 leave	 an	 authoritarian	 in	 the	 place	 of	 Hobbes’	 much	 more	 democratic	Leviathan,	 which	 Hobbes	 did	 not	 present	 as	 being	 in	 simple	 opposition	 to	 a	situation	of	 ‘conflict	of	 all	 against	all’	but	 rather	as	 the	 institutionalisation	 of	 this	conflict.	 Contrary	 to	 the	 popular	 narrative	 repeated	 by	 Tamanaha,	 that	 was	 the	point	of	Leviathan:	to	ensure	that	‘the	conflict	of	all	against	all’	would	be	‘carried	on	within	 and	 through	 the	 legal	 order’,	 rather	 than	 outside	 of	 it,	which	would	 be	 a	‘state	of	nature’.37		As	 Manderson	 shows	 in	 Kangaroo	 Courts	 and	 the	 Rule	 of	 Law,38	 and	 as	Fitzpatrick	 observes	with	 his	 ‘heretical’	 reading	 of	 Hobbes’	 Leviathan,39	 it	 is	 the	very	 ‘polarisation’	 within	 a	 social	 body—its	 conflicts,	 its	 sharp	 disagreements—that	enlivens	the	rule	of	law,	keeping	law	from	becoming	authoritarian	or	lifeless.40	Given	 this,	 the	 answer	 to	 the	 problem	 is	 not	 to	 make	 order	 and	 stability	 the	defining	quality	of	the	rule	of	law,	and	to	seek	to	achieve	this	by	placing	the	rule	of	law	beyond	the	everyday	political	processes	that	are	seen	to	afflict	social	life.	The	desire	to	sequester	law	from	the	struggles	that	constitute	every	socio-legal	order,	to	ensure	the	realm	of	 law’s	rule	remains	one	of	unity	and	stable	order,	can	only	have	the	opposite	effect,	imposing	on	the	rule	of	law	the	rule	of	particular	humans	who	want	to	control	it	by	conserving	it	under	the	order	of	their	particular	concept.	This	 is	 no	 less	 arbitrary,	 and	 potentially	 more	 dangerous,	 than	 the	 threat	Tamanaha	 identifies,	 because	 it	 subjects	 to	 domination	 what	 remains,	 as	 life,	beyond	the	confines	of	any	conceptual	order.		At	 the	 same	 time,	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 law’	 cannot	 be	 equivalent	 to	 ‘the	 rule	 of	humans’,	any	more	than	law’s	rule	can	be	sequestered	from	the	political	struggles	that	animate	the	social	body.	This	is	the	paradox.	On	one	hand,	Tamanaha	is	correct	
																																																						37	See	Fitzpatrick,	‘Leveraging	Leviathan’.	For	a	critique	of	Tamanaha’s	approach	to	the	rule	of	law,	see	also	Manderson,	Kangaroo	Courts,	82-85.	38	And	elsewhere;	see,	eg,	Desmond	Manderson,	‘The	Law	of	the	Image	and	the	Image	of	the	Law:	Colonial	Representations	of	the	Rule	of	Law’,	New	York	Law	School	Law	Review,	vol	57	(2012);	Desmond	Manderson,	‘Modernism,	Polarity,	and	the	Rule	of	Law’,	Yale	Journal	of	Law	and	
Humanities,	vol	24	(2012);	Desmond	Manderson,	‘Klimt's	Jurisprudence	-	Sovereign	Violence	and	the	Rule	of	Law’,	Oxford	Journal	of	Legal	Studies,	vol	35,	no	3	(2015).	39	And	elsewhere:	see,	eg,	Fitzpatrick,	The	Mythology	of	Modern	Law;	Fitzpatrick,	Modernism	and	the	
Grounds	of	Law.	This	is	how	Fitzpatrick	has	described	his	reading	of	Hobbes’s	Leviathan,	as	‘heretical’.	40	The	term	‘polarisation’	is	from	Manderson:	see	Manderson,	Kangaroo	Courts,	6.	(‘In	the	notion	of	polarity—of	the	continuance	rather	than	the	dissolution	or	resolution	of	contradiction—we	can	discern	traces	of	an	alternative	understanding,	a	very	modernist	understanding,	that	represent	the	multi-vocal	experience	and	unresolved	contradictions	of	human	discourse	not	just	as	the	fate	of	law	but	as	its	most	important	asset.’)	See	also	Manderson,	‘Modernism,	Polarity,	and	the	Rule	of	Law’.	
instituting	law’s	rule	 	
	
109to	 fear	 the	 implication	 of	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 law’	 becoming	 no	 different	 to	 ‘the	 rule	 of	humans’,	 as	 this	would	 totally	negate	 its	 integrity	 as	 an	 institution.	On	 the	other	hand,	as	Tamanaha	also	observes,	 ‘the	rule	of	 law’	cannot	be	separated	from	‘the	rule	 of	 humans’,	 without	 turning	 it	 into	 a	 lifeless	 institution,	 and	 potentially	 an	instrument	 of	 domination.	 Tamanaha	 attempts	 to	 resolve	 this	 contradiction	 by	identifying	the	kind	of	human	participation	that	should	be	kept	out	of	law,	and	the	kind	of	human	participation	that	should	be	allowed	to	animate	law;	but	again,	this	imposes	on	the	rule	of	law	the	rule	of	a	particular	person	or	groups	of	persons	who	hold	 themselves	 out	 as	 the	 arbiters	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 Rather	 than	 resolve	 the	original	 contradiction,	 the	 contradiction	 remains,	 with	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 no	 less	arbitrary,	and	potentially	more	oppressive.		The	 implication	 of	 this	 argument	 is	 that	 law’s	 rule	 has	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 an	irresolute	 process,	 its	 ‘end’	 being	 in	 the	 endless	 oscillation	 between	 ‘assured	stability’	and	‘infinite	variety’.	As	Fitzpatrick	writes:		The	modern	rule	of	law,	with	its	avowal	of	assured	stability	and	ultimacy	of	determination,	seems	closer	to	the	condition	of	the	primal	horde	[described	in	Freud’s	Totem	and	Taboo].	For	law	to	rule,	however,	it	must	also	embrace	the	opposite	attributes.	Law,	as	 the	 rule	of	 law,	has	 to	be	ever-responsive	and	 indeterminate,	 capable	 of	 extending	 to	 the	 infinite	 variety	 which	constantly	confronts	it.41		In	the	end	there	is	no	‘halting	point’	or	‘termination’	that	neatly	separates	a	state	of	conflict	 from	a	state	of	peace,	any	more	 than	 law	can	be	sequestered	 from	those	who	 ‘fill	 in,	 interpret,	manipulate,	and	utilize’	 it.42	These	 two	 ‘states’—one	where	law	rules	unanimously	in	an	orderly	and	stable	fashion,	the	other	where	the	rule	of	law	 is	 indistinguishable	 from	 the	 arbitrary	 rule	 of	 humans—are	 not	 simply	separate,	they	are	also	inseparable.	This	is	the	chasmic	structure	of	the	rule	of	law:	both	chaotic,	its	opening	denying	closure	and	therefore	a	stable	order,	and	chiastic,	the	 inseparability	 of	 the	 opposed	 sides	 forming	 a	 stable	 order.43	 This	 does	 not	make	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 simply	 chaotic,	without	 any	order	 or	 stability.	 The	point	 is	that	the	order	and	stability	of	the	rule	of	law	is	inseparable	from	the	play	of	social	life,	which	is	itself	animated	by	an	infinite	plurality	of	difference.	Thus	the	principle	
																																																						41	Fitzpatrick,	Modernism	and	the	Grounds	of	Law,	2.	See	also	generally	Manderson,	Kangaroo	
Courts.	42	See	Tamanaha’s	quote	cited	in	note	36	above.		43	On	the	chasm	as	both	‘chaotic’	and	‘chiastic’,	see	Part	1	of	the	Introduction.	
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110	of	 ‘equality	 before	 the	 law’,	 which	 in	 the	 liberalist	 tradition	 of	 Anglo-American	legal	 scholarship	 is	 supposed	 to	 justify	 the	 standard	 measure	 of	 law,	 comes	 up	against	 the	 abject	 experience	 of	 the	 subject	 before	 the	 law—an	 experience	 that	calls	for	differential	treatment	by	law.44		
3	 Instituting	the	rule	of	law			So	 far	 in	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 modern	 compulsion	 to	 pursue	 a	definitive	 separation	 between	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 law’	 and	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 humans’	 (despite	acknowledging	 their	 inseparability)	 does	 not	 resolve	 the	 contradiction,	 which	remains	the	index	of	the	life	of	law’s	rule—both	as	an	indication	of	what	threatens	it	and	makes	it	a	possibility.	However,	recognising	the	chasmic	structure	of	the	rule	of	law	does	not	resolve	the	problem.	The	question	remains:	how	to	respond	to	the	contradiction	between	the	intention	of	instituting	an	objective	order	that	separates	law	from	its	subjects	as	a	normative	matter	(to	ensure	it	 is	 law,	and	not	humans,	that	rules),	and	yet	the	impossibility	of	achieving	that	separation	(without	making	law	irrelevant,	or	worse,	a	mere	instrument	of	domination)?	In	short,	what	does	it	mean	 to	 institute	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 law’	 if	 its	 presence	 cannot	 be	 equated	 with	 the	absence	of	the	rule	of	humans?		The	 purpose	 of	 this	 part	 of	 the	 chapter	 is	 to	 examine	 how	 this	 ‘problem’	afflicts	 the	 practice	 of	 instituting	 law’s	 rule.	 To	 do	 this,	 I	 begin	 again	 with	 the	modern	problem	of	institutionalisation,	which	makes	an	institution	simultaneously	separate	and	inseparable	from	the	subjects	who	enliven	it.	I	then	turn	to	show	how	this	 contradiction	has	been	addressed	 through	 ‘resolutionary	 logics’	 that	 seek	 to	secure	the	foundations	of	the	institution	of	the	rule	of	law.		A	 The	act	of	institution		As	noted	in	the	Introduction	to	the	thesis,	the	problem	of	the	rule	of	law	is	also	the	problem	of	modern	institutionalisation,	when	an	institution	cannot	depend	on	God,	
																																																						44	Feminist	legal	scholars	have	been	at	the	forefront	of	demonstrating	why	legal	equality	requires	the	unequal	application,	or	rather,	the	equitable	application,	of	law.	See,	eg,	MacKinnon’s	concept	of	‘substantive	equality’:	Catharine	A	MacKinnon,	Toward	a	Feminist	Theory	of	the	State	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	1989).	See	also	Michael	Rosenfeld,	‘Substantive	Equality	and	Equal	Opportunity:	A	Jurisprudential	Appraisal’,	California	Law	Review,	vol	74	(1986);	Sarat	and	Kearns,	‘Responding	to	the	Demands	of	Difference:	An	Introduction’.	
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111tradition,	 or	 any	 other	 transcendental	 source	 to	 secure	 its	 foundations,	 which	ultimately	 come	 to	 rest	 upon—or	 rather	 in,	 and	 through—its	 subjects.	 The	problem	is	that	this	inserts	a	contradiction	into	the	basis	of	the	institution:	‘it’	can	never	be	absolutely	identical	with	its	subjects,	whose	difference	defies	such	unity	and	 closure;	 and	 yet	 it	 can	 never	 be	 absolutely	 separate	 from	 its	 subjects,	 who	constitute	its	grounds	as	an	entity.	Derrida	 considers	 this	 problem	 in	 his	 essay	 on	 ‘Declarations	 of	Independence’,	where	he	examines	the	act	of	articulation	that	 is	said	to	found	an	institution.45	 The	 problem	 for	 Derrida	 is	 the	 inability	 to	 decide	 whether	 the	instituting	 act	 is	 constative—a	mere	 statement	 of	 what	 is	 as	 matter	 of	 fact—or	
performative—bringing	about	the	fact	through	the	act	of	articulating	what	‘is’.	For	instance,	in	the	Declaration	of	Independence	of	the	United	States	of	America,	which	Derrida	 is	examining,	 ‘the	good	people’	declare	 their	 freedom	and	 independence.	On	one	hand,	this	suggests	a	statement	of	fact	(what	is),	which	the	Declaration	then	enshrines	in	law	(as	what	ought	to	be).	On	this	view,	the	instituting	act,	as	an	act	of	articulation,	appears	to	make	what	is	matter	of	fact	into	matter	of	right,	by	law.	On	the	 other	 hand,	 it	 also	 appears	 that	 the	 subject	 who	 signs	 the	 Declaration	 ‘by	right’—the	good	people—creates	its	subjectivity	in	fact,	as	a	free	and	independent	people,	 through	 the	 act	 of	 signature.	 That	 is	 because,	 while	 ‘[t]he	 “we”	 of	 the	Declaration	speaks	“in	the	name	of	the	people”	[…]	these	people	do	not	exist.	They	do	not	exist	 as	 an	 entity,	 the	 entity	 does	not	exist	before	 this	 declaration,	 not	as	
such.’46	The	signature,	as	matter	of	right,	therefore	appears	to	create	the	signer,	as	matter	 of	 fact,	 in	 a	 ‘fabulous	 retroactivity’	 that	 transforms	what	ought	 to	 be	 into	what	is,	the	very	condition	for	making	‘what	ought	to	be’	into	‘what	is’.47		This	 leaves	 two	 contradictory	 possibilities.	 As	Derrida	 asks:	 ‘Is	 it	 that	 the	good	people	have	already	freed	themselves	in	fact	and	are	only	stating	the	fact	of	this	emancipation	 in	 the	Declaration?	Or	 is	 it	 rather	 that	 they	 free	 themselves	at	
																																																						45	Jacques	Derrida,	‘Declarations	of	Independence’,	in	Negotiations:	Interventions	and	Interviews,	
1971-2001,	ed	Elizabeth	Rottenberg	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2002).	See	also	Seyla	Benhabib,	‘Democracy	and	Difference:	Reflections	on	the	Metapolitics	of	Lyotard	and	Derrida’,	
Journal	of	Political	Philosophy,	vol	2,	no	1	(1994);	Jacques	de	Ville,	‘Sovereignty	without	Sovereignty:	Derrida's	Declarations	of	Independence’,	Law	and	Critique,	vol	19	(2008);	Bonnie	Honig,	‘Declarations	of	Independence:	Arendt	and	Derrida	on	the	Problem	of	Founding	a	Republic’,	
American	Political	Science	Review,	vol	85,	no	1	(1991).	46	Derrida,	‘Declarations	of	Independence’,	49.	47	Ibid,	50.	
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112	the	 instant	 of	 and	 by	 the	 signature	 of	 this	 Declaration?’48	 The	 first	 (constative)	possibility	is	a	movement	from	fact	to	norm,	whereby	‘what	is	now’	is	recognized	and	 enacted	 by	 law	 to	 bring	 about	 ‘what	 ought	 to	 be	 now’.	 The	 second	(performative)	possibility	is	a	movement	from	norm	to	fact,	whereby	‘what	ought	to	 be	 now’	 is	 recognized	 and	 enacted	 by	 law	 to	 bring	 about	 ‘what	 is	 now’.	 The	problem,	 for	Derrida,	 is	 in	deciding	which	of	 these	movements	 is	 at	work	 in	 the	instituting	act;	and	the	resolution	to	the	problem,	Derrida	argues,	is	precisely	in	its	irresolution.	 The	 undecidability—the	 incoherent	 oscillation	 between	 the	 two	positions—is	‘required	to	produce	the	sought-after	effect’.49		Thus	to	begin	with,	 the	instituting	act	 is	clearly	performative:	 ‘Such	an	act	does	 not	 come	 back	 to	 a	 constative	 or	 descriptive	 discourse.	 It	 performs,	 it	accomplishes,	 it	 does	 what	 it	 says	 it	 does’.50	 And	 yet	 this	 performance	 remains	
intentional,	and	not	ontic;51	it	requires	an	ongoing	engagement	by	‘the	signers’,	an	ongoing	performance,	for	it	to	achieve	what	it	says	it	achieves.	Although	in	principle	an	institution—in	its	history	and	in	its	tradition,	in	its	offices	and	thus	in	its	very	institutionality—must	render	itself	independent	of	the	empirical	individuals	who	have	taken	part	in	its	production,	although	it	has	in	a	certain	way	to	mourn	them	or	resign	itself	to	their	loss,	even	and	especially	if	it	commemorates	them,	it	turns	out,	precisely	by	reason	of	the	structure	of	instituting	language,	that	the	founding	act	of	an	institution—the	act	as	archive	as	well	as	the	act	as	performance—must	maintain	within	itself	
the	signature.52	But	 this	 is	 problematic	 because	 it	 appears	 to	 leave	 an	 instituting	 act	 that	 ‘does	what	 it	 says	 it	 does’,	 that	 can	 never	 finally	 achieve	 its	 intention,	 that	 can	 never	quite	 do	 what	 it	 says	 it	 does—at	 least	 never	 yet.	 Without	 a	 solid,	 constative	beginning,	and	without	a	solid,	constative	end,	the	institution	becomes	suspended	in	an	ongoing	performance,	 an	endless	deferral.	Positioning	both	 ‘beginning’	 and	‘end’	in	the	instituting	act,	the	foundations	of	the	institution	remain	ever	in	need	of	founding.	 To	 have	 ‘the	 sought-after	 effect’—a	 constative	 state	 in	 which	 the	instituting	 act	 actually	 does	what	 it	 says	 it	 does—something	 has	 to	 ground	 this	
																																																						48	Ibid,	49.	49	Ibid.	50	Ibid,	47.	51	Ibid.		52	Ibid,	47-48	(italics	in	original).	On	the	significance	of	the	‘signature’,	see	also	Jacques	Derrida,	‘Signature	Event	Context’,	in	Limited	Inc,	ed	Gerald	Graff	(Evanston:	Northwestern	University	Press,	1988).	
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113performance.	 As	 Derrida	 writes:	 ‘for	 this	 Declaration	 to	 have	 meaning	 and	 an	effect,	 there	 must	 be	 a	 last	 instance’.53	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 US	 Declaration	 of	Independence,	 ‘God	 is	 the	 name—the	 best	 one—for	 this	 last	 instance	 and	 this	ultimate	signature’.54	By	appealing	to	God	as	the	last	instance,	as	what	conjoins	‘the	
to	 be	 and	 the	 ought	 to	 be,	 the	 constation	 and	 the	 prescription,	 the	 fact	 and	 the	right’,	the	performative	acquires	a	constative	quality.55	The	 problem	 of	 institutionalisation	 raises	 two	 issues	 relevant	 to	 this	chapter	 on	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 The	 first	 is	 the	 paradoxical	 nature	 of	 the	 institution,	which	makes	 it	 simultaneously	 performative	 and	 constative.	 This	 returns	 to	 the	discussion	in	Chapter	2	of	the	predicate	sentence.	On	one	hand,	the	instituting	act,	like	the	predicate	sentence,	is	a	play	on	and	of	words:	by	itself,	it	merely	performs	a	synthetic	function,	stating	‘what	ought	to	be	now’	as	‘what	is	now’.	Thus,	by	itself,	the	 instituting	act,	as	an	act	of	articulation,	 represents	nothing	actual,	or	nothing	more	than	what	‘is’,	in	its	purest	form,	discourse—the	stuff	of	ideology	as	much	as	idols.	 And	 yet:	 ‘It	 performs,	 it	 accomplishes,	 it	 does	 what	 it	 says	 it	 does’:	 the	sentence	on	and	of	words	becoming	a	sentence	on	and	of	life.	Thus	the	institution	remains	 intentional	 and	 not	 ontic,	 normative	 and	 not	 definitive;	 and	 yet	 it	 is	nonetheless	real,	nonetheless	empirical.	On	one	side,	there	is	an	objectivity	to	it;	it	has	 determinate	 ‘position’,	 so	 to	 speak.	 On	 the	 other	 side,	 its	 foundations	 are	subjective;	 and	 so	 to	 speak,	 it	 is	 positioned	 over	 an	 abyss.56	 As	 a	 result,	 ‘it’	 (the	institution	as	matter	of	fact)	is	enlivened	by	an	other,	or	rather	by	others,	who	give	it	life,	which	is	problematic	because	these	others	remain	simultaneously	separate	and	inseparable	from	the	institution,	undermining	its	integrity	as	an	autonomous	entity	at	the	same	time	that	they	constitute	it	as	an	autonomous	entity.	This	is	the	chasmic	 structure	 of	 the	 institution	 that	 I	 examined	 in	 the	 previous	 part	 of	 the	chapter	with	regard	to	the	definitive	theory	of	the	rule	of	law.		 This	chasmic	structure	of	the	institution	gives	rise	to	the	second	issue:	how	
to	respond	to	the	contradiction?	How	to	respond	to	a	situation	that	appears	to	defy	
																																																						53	Derrida,	‘Declarations	of	Independence’,	52.	54	Ibid.	As	the	US	Declaration	of	Independence	states:	‘We	therefore	the	Representatives	of	the	United	States	of	America,	in	General	Congress	assembled,	appealing	to	the	Supreme	Judge	of	the	world	for	the	rectitude	of	our	intentions,	do	in	the	Name	and	by	the	authority	of	the	good	People	of	these	Colonies	solemnly	publish	and	declare,	that	these	united	Colonies	are	and	of	right	ought	to	be	
free	and	independent	states.’	See	ibid,	51.	55	Ibid,	51-52.	56	As	the	‘abyss’	of	ancient	cosmology,	the	primordial	ocean	that	underlies	the	earth,	upon	which	the	ground	takes	its	place.	See	Part	1	of	the	Introduction.	
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114	logic,	 where	 the	 institution	 is	 simultaneously	 objective	 and	 subjective,	 with	 a	constative	quality	that	is	based	on	an	ongoing	performance?	Or	to	use	the	language	of	 the	previous	chapter:	how	to	respond	to	a	situation	where	 the	very	 thing	 that	establishes	 ‘the	 context	 of	 the	 existential	 judgment’	 (giving	 the	 institution	 its	objectivity	 as	 an	 entity)	 is	 a	 subjective	 act,	 an	 act	 of	 articulation?	 This	 is	 the	question	that	I	consider	in	the	remaining	section	of	the	chapter.		B	 Logics	of	resolution		The	question	haunts	theorists	of	the	rule	of	law.	How	can	law	rule	over	the	subject	
that	 is	 its	 source?	Or	 to	 put	 that	 another	way:	 how	 can	 law	 rule	 over	 its	maker,	whether	that	maker	is	a	monarch	or	‘the	people’?	Or	again,	to	put	it	in	the	terms	I	have	 been	 discussing	 here:	 how	 can	 what	 is	 established	 through	 an	 act	 of	articulation	be	the	author(ity)	of	the	act	of	articulation?	The	logical	answer	to	this	problem	 is	 that	 it	 is	 simply	 impossible.	 The	 law-maker,	 as	 sovereign,	 cannot	 be	subordinate	to	the	law	it	makes,	any	more	than	the	signature	can	create	the	signer	in	 a	 fabulous	 retroactivity	 that	 transforms	what	 ought	 to	 be	 into	what	 is:57	 that	would	 be	 self-contradictory—pure	 absurdity.	 It	 would	 be	 a	 situation	 where	 the	law-maker	and	the	made-law	are	both	sovereign	at	the	same	time.58	This	is	precisely	what	Dicey	appears	to	suggest	in	his	chapter	on	‘The	Rule	of	Law:	Its	Nature	and	General	Applications’,	which	begins	with	the	observation:		Two	features	have	at	all	times	since	the	Norman	Conquest	characterised	the	political	institutions	of	England.		
The	 first	 of	 these	 features	 is	 the	 omnipotence	 or	 undisputed	 supremacy	
throughout	 the	whole	 country	 of	 the	 central	 government.	 This	 authority	 of	the	 state	 or	 the	 nation	 was	 during	 the	 earlier	 periods	 of	 our	 history	represented	by	the	power	of	the	Crown.	The	King	was	the	source	of	law	and	the	maintainer	of	order.	The	maxim	of	the	courts,	tout	fuit	in	luy	et	vient	de	
lui	 al	 commencement	 [all	was	 his,	 and	 all	 proceeded	 originally	 from	him],	was	 originally	 the	 expression	 of	 an	 actual	 and	 undoubted	 fact.	 This	 royal	supremacy	has	now	passed	 into	 that	 sovereignty	of	Parliament	which	has	formed	the	main	subject	of	the	foregoing	chapters.		
The	second	of	 these	 features,	which	 is	closely	connected	with	 the	 first,	 is	 the	
rule	or	supremacy	of	law.	This	peculiarity	of	our	polity	is	well	expressed	in	
																																																						57	See	note	47	above.	58	For	a	discussion	of	this	problem,	see	Tamanaha,	‘The	Rule	of	Law	for	Everyone?’,	105-109.	
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115the	old	saw	of	the	courts,	‘La	ley	est	le	plus	haute	inheritance,	que	le	roy	ad;	
car	par	la	ley	il	meme	et	toutes	ses	sujets	sont	rules,	et	si	la	ley	ne	fuit,	nul	roi,	
et	nul	inheritance	sera’	[‘the	law	is	the	greatest	heritage	that	the	King	has	for	by	the	law	he	and	all	his	subjects	are	governed,	and	if	the	law	did	not	exist,	there	would	be	no	King	and	no	heritage’].59	On	the	face	of	it,	Dicey’s	observation	appears	contradictory.	How	can	both	law	and	law-maker	be	 supreme?	On	one	hand,	 the	 law-maker	 is	 said	 to	have	undisputed	supremacy;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 is	 said	 to	 be	 by	 law	 that	 the	 law-maker	 is	supreme.	Indeed,	it	is	said	that	by	law	the	law-maker	exists	as	an	entity;	and	yet	it	is	 this	very	 law-maker	that	 is	said	to	be	the	source	of	 law—the	source	of	 the	 law	that	brings	the	law-maker	into	existence.	Logically,	something	is	missing	from	this	analysis.	Something	else—something	from	outside	this	tautological	proposition—must	 intervene,	 to	ground	 the	 institution	of	 the	 rule	of	 law	and	make	 it	possible	(‘to	have	meaning	and	an	effect,	there	must	be	a	last	instance’).			 In	the	case	of	the	US	Declaration	of	Independence,	as	Derrida	shows,	God	is	what	intervenes	from	outside	and	above	to	provide	‘the	last	instance’.	By	invoking	God	as	the	ultimate	authority	for	the	act	of	articulation,	its	subjective	basis	comes	to	rest	not	on	an	abyssal	indeterminacy	but	on	an	unchanging	truth.	Likewise,	God	has	 from	time-to-time	provided	the	 last	 instance	for	grounding	the	rule	of	 law	in	Europe.	Thomas	Aquinas	addressed	the	problem	in	his	thirteenth	century	Treatise	
on	Law,	 in	considering	the	question	of	‘whether	all	are	subject	to	the	law?’60	First	he	 sets	 out	 the	 problem,	 or	 objection:	 ‘Obj.	 3.	 Further,	 the	 jurist	 says	 that	 the	
sovereign	is	exempt	from	the	laws.	But	he	that	is	exempt	from	the	law	is	not	bound	thereby.	 Therefore	 not	 all	 are	 subject	 to	 the	 law.’	 Aquinas	 then	 sets	 out	 his	argument	in	response:		
Reply	 Obj.	 3.	 The	 sovereign	 is	 said	 to	 be	 exempt	 from	 the	 law,	 as	 to	 its	coercive	power;	since,	properly	speaking,	no	man	is	coerced	by	himself,	and	law	has	no	coercive	power	save	 from	the	authority	of	 the	sovereign.	Thus	then	 is	 the	 sovereign	 said	 to	 be	 exempt	 from	 the	 law,	 because	 none	 is	competent	to	pass	sentence	on	him,	if	he	acts	against	the	law.	Wherefore	on	Ps.	L.	6:	To	Thee	only	have	I	sinned,	a	gloss	says	that	there	is	no	man	who	can	
judge	the	deeds	of	a	king.—But	as	to	the	directive	force	of	law,	the	sovereign	is	subject	to	the	law	by	his	own	will,	according	to	the	statement	(Extra,	De	
																																																						59	Dicey,	Introduction	to	the	Study	of	the	Law	of	the	Constitution,	183-184	(my	italics).	The	translation	of	the	‘old	saw	of	the	courts’	is	from	Chief	Justice	Robert	French,	‘Public	and	Private	Law:	the	Intersection’,	La	Trobe	Lecture,	30	October	2009.	60	Thomas	Aquinas,	Treatise	on	Law	(Summa	Theologica,	Questions	90-97)	(Chicago:	Henry	Regnery	Company,	1949),	Question	96,	Article	95.		
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Constit.	 cap.	 Cum	 omnes)	 that	whatever	 law	 a	 man	 makes	 for	 another,	 he	
should	 keep	 himself.	 And	 a	 wise	 authority	 says:	 ‘Obey	 the	 law	 that	 thou	
makest	 thyself.’	Moreover	 the	 Lord	 reproaches	 those	who	 say	 and	 do	 not;	and	who	 bind	 heavy	 burdens	 and	 lay	 them	 on	men’s	 shoulders,	 but	 with	 a	
finger	of	their	own	they	will	not	move	them	(Matth.	xxiii.	3,	4).	Hence,	in	the	judgement	 of	 God,	 the	 sovereign	 is	 not	 exempt	 from	 the	 law,	 as	 to	 its	directive	 force;	 but	 he	 should	 fulfil	 it	 of	 his	 own	 free-will	 and	 not	 of	constraint.—Again	 the	 sovereign	 is	 above	 the	 law,	 in	 so	 far	 as,	when	 it	 is	expedient,	he	can	change	the	law,	and	dispense	in	it	according	to	time	and	place.		In	 this	 passage,	 Aquinas	 begins	 by	 upholding	 the	 sovereign’s	 position	 above	 the	law,	on	 the	rational	basis	 that,	 ‘properly	speaking,	no	man	 is	 coerced	by	himself,	and	 law	 has	 no	 coercive	 power	 save	 from	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 sovereign’.	 But	having	done	 that,	 he	 then	also	upholds	 the	 rule	of	 law,	by	holding	 the	 sovereign	‘subject	to	the	law’.	The	result	would	appear	to	be	a	situation	where	both	law	and	law-maker	rule,	with	one	subject	to	the	other—and	thus	a	return	to	the	paradox.	Aquinas	gets	out	of	the	paradox,	however,	by	making	the	sovereign	subject	to	the	law,	 not	 by	 the	 coercive	 power	 of	 the	 law	 made	 by	 the	 sovereign,	 but	 by	 ‘the	judgement	of	God’.	By	invoking	God	as	the	ultimate	authority,	‘all	are	subject	to	the	law’,	 including	 the	 law-maker—a	 resolution	 that	 does	 not	 contradict	 the	supremacy	of	the	sovereign	but	also	does	not	exempt	the	sovereign	from	the	rule	of	law.	That	 resolution	might	 be	 acceptable	 in	 times	when	 the	 judgement	 of	 God	has	real	force	of	law,	but	as	a	modern,	post-Enlightenment	proposition,	‘the	rule	of	law’	 cannot	 depend	 on	 a	 God-given	 law	 to	 secure	 the	 grounds	 of	 its	 institution.	This	 leaves	a	problem:	because	 the	scientific-positivism	that	 informs	the	modern	Western	 view	of	 law	 cannot	 provide	 an	 external,	 or	 transcendental,	 authority	 to	break	 the	 tautology	 and	 secure	 the	 grounds	 of	 law’s	 rule	 over	 the	 subjects	who	enliven	 it,	 its	 institution	 is	 left	 in	 the	 impossible	 position.	 And	 so	 again	 the	question:	how	is	it	possible?	How	is	the	contradiction	dealt	with?	The	usual	answer	is	not	to	face	the	contradiction	at	all—to	deal	with	it	by	trying	 to	cover	 it	up.	This	 follows	 the	modern	 fear	 that	 this	precarious	situation,	whereby	 the	 objectivity	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 is	 subjective—acquiring	 its	 constative	quality	 through	 a	 social	 performance—is	 too	 fragile,	 and	 dangerous,	 to	
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117acknowledge.	 To	 foreground	 the	 contradiction	 as	 the	 animating	 condition	 of	 the	rule	of	law	would,	it	is	feared,	threaten	the	rule	of	law.61		To	protect	 the	 institution,	 the	subjective/performative	basis	of	 the	 rule	of	law	is	covered	over	as	much	as	possible	by	a	modern	mythology	that	functions	in	much	the	same	way	as	God	once	did,	providing	a	semblance	of	rationality	to	what	otherwise	defies	 logic.	The	focus	of	this	modern	mythology	is	on	the	 judiciary,	 to	ensure	 the	 last	 instance	 of	 law—its	 adjudication	 in	 the	 courts—is	 seen	 to	 be	 an	objective	 one,	 carried	 out	 by	 independent,	 impartial	 officers	 whose	professionalism	 ensures	 it	 is	 law,	 and	 not	 humans,	 that	 ultimately	 rules.62	 And	indeed,	 this	 is	what	appears	 to	 resolve	 the	contradiction	 in	 the	passage	by	Dicey	quoted	at	the	start	of	this	section,	where	he	sets	out	the	simultaneous	rule	of	law	and	law-maker.63	In	that	passage	Dicey	observes	that	‘[t]he	King	was	the	source	of	law’,	a	fact	he	establishes	by	repeating	‘[t]he	maxim	of	the	courts,	tout	fuit	in	luy	et	
vient	de	lui	al	commencement	[all	was	his,	and	all	proceeded	originally	from	him].’	So	here	is	the	familiar	paradox:	the	‘source	of	law’	is	the	King,	and	the	source	of	the	King’s	authority	is	law…	but	now	on	closer	inspection,	something	does	intervene	to	break	 the	 maddening	 tautology.	 In	 the	 end	 it	 is	 the	 courts	 that	 declare	 the	sovereignty	of	the	King.	Just	as	for	Aquinas	the	judgement	of	God	provides	the	last	instance	that	makes	the	law-maker	subject	to	the	law,	for	Dicey	it	is	the	judgement	of	the	courts	that	provides	the	last	instance.		This	 is	 the	modern	mythology	of	 the	rule	of	 law:	 faced	with	a	situation	 in	which	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 law’	 and	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 humans’	 cannot	 be	 finally	 separated—in	which	both	 law	and	humans	 rule—the	 institution	of	 the	 courts	provides	 the	 last	instance	to	secure	law’s	rule	over	humans	(whose	subjection	to	law	is	in	the	final	instance	 enforced	 by	 the	 courts)	 without	 compromising	 their	 position	 as	 the	source	of	law	(which	again	is	upheld	in	the	last	instance	by	the	courts).64		Of	course,	having	resolved	the	contradiction	in	the	proposition	of	the	rule	of	law,	whereby	both	law	and	law-maker	rule	simultaneously,	by	making	the	courts	the	ultimate	authority	of	the	institution	of	the	rule	of	law,	a	new	problem	appears:	
																																																						61	See	Tamanaha,	Law	as	a	Means	to	an	End.	62	As	Tamanaha	notes:	‘The	standard	twofold	construction	is,	first,	to	identify	the	judiciary	(comprised	of	legal	experts)	as	the	special	guardians	of	the	law,	and,	second,	to	deny	the	presence	of	the	individual	who	is	the	judge’:	Tamanaha,	On	the	Rule	of	Law,	123-124.	63	See	note	59	above.	64	See,	eg,	Cheryl	Saunders	and	Katherine	Le	Roy,	eds,	The	Rule	of	Law	(Sydney:	The	Federation	Press,	2003),	2.	
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118	how	 do	 the	 courts	 of	 law	 escape	 the	 paradox	 of	 the	 modern	 institution?	 If	 the	chasmic	 structure	 of	 the	 institution	 makes	 the	 foundations	 of	 the	 judiciary	subjective—if	the	courts	are	also,	so	to	speak,	positioned	over	an	abyss—then	does	this	 not	 undermine	 its	position	 as	 the	 last	 instance?	 If	 ‘it’—the	 institution	 of	 the	courts—is	enlivened	by	an	other,	or	rather	by	others,	who	give	it	life,	does	this	not	make	them	the	authority?	And	are	‘they’	none	other	than	the	subjects	of	law,	who	are	now	signing	the	instituting	act	under	the	disguise	of	a	wig?		In	sum,	if	the	problem	before	was	the	inability	to	decide	whether	it	is	law	or	humans	that	rules,	because	both	appear	to	rule	simultaneously,	then	the	courts	are	supposed	 to	 resolve	 this	 paradox	 by	 providing	 an	 objective	 standpoint,	 a	 last	instance	 that	makes	humans	subject	 to	 law	at	 the	same	 time	as	 law	 is	 subject	 to	them.	 The	 problem,	 however,	 is	 that	 this	 last	 instance,	 which	 is	 supposed	 to	intervene	 in	 the	 social	 performance	 and	make	 it	 constative/objective,	 is	 itself	 a	social	performance,	and	once	again	the	whole	edifice	comes	to	rest	over	the	abyss.	To	 ensure	 that	 does	 not	 happen,	 in	 fear	 of	 the	 consequences,	 the	 modern	imperative	 is	 to	ensure	 the	 courts	are	 seen	 to	be	wholly	objective.	Thus	 it	 is	 the	mythological	objectivity	of	the	courts	that	secures	the	grounds	of	‘the	rule	of	law’	as	 a	 proposition,	 by	 plastering	 over	 the	 crack	 that	 reveals	 its	 abyssal	 nature.65	Recognising	 the	 contradictory	 structure	 of	 the	 institution,	 as	 both	 performative	and	 constative,	 subjective	 and	 objective,	 the	 modern	 answer	 is	 to	 sublate	 the	performative/subjective	aspect	in	a	mythological	judicial	objectivity.66		In	 this	way,	 positive	 law	 is	 ‘mystified	 into	 a	 law	 of	 nature’,67	 becoming	 a	‘second-natural’	 law,68	 the	 logical	 structure	 of	 which	 would	 have	 surely	 struck	
																																																						65	Or	as	Meghan	Walsh	puts	it,	with	respect	to	the	mythological	objectivity	of	science:	‘In	this	world	of	double-blind	trials	and	peer-reviewed	articles,	objectivity	rules	all.	Otherwise	cracks	open	up	and	doubt	seeps	in,	rotting	the	very	foundation	science	is	built	upon.’	Meghan	Walsh,	‘It’s	the	end	of	the	world—How	do	you	feel?’,	Fast	Forward,	25	October	2015:	http://www.ozv.com/fast-forward.	66	‘Sublation’	here	refers	to	a	synthetic	resolution	to	the	contradiction,	whereby	the	contradictory	positions	are	brought	together	in	a	third	position	that	maintains	the	two	positions	whilst	overcoming	or	transcending	the	contradiction	between	them.	Of	course,	on	a	negative-dialectical	approach,	the	synthetic	resolution	is	seen	to	remain	contradictory—the	act	of	sublation	just	recreates	the	contradiction	anew	in	the	third	position.	Thus	the	contradiction	between	law-maker	and	made-law	is	resolved	by	resort	to	the	courts—but	rather	than	actually	resolving	the	contradiction,	it	becomes	the	condition	of	the	courts.	67	The	phrase	is	Karl	Marx’s:	‘The	law	of	capitalist	accumulation,	mystified	into	a	law	of	nature,	expresses	therefore	in	fact	only	that	its	nature	excludes	every	such	decrease	in	the	degree	of	exploitation	of	labor	or	every	such	increase	of	the	price	of	labor,	which	could	seriously	endanger	the	continual	reproduction	of	the	relationships	of	capital	and	its	reproduction	on	a	constantly	expanded	level.	It	cannot	be	otherwise	in	a	mode	of	production,	wherein	the	laborer	is	there	for	the	necessity	of	valorization	of	extant	values,	instead	conversely	of	the	objective	wealth	for	the	
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119Aquinas	 as	 a	 secular	 riff	 on	 his	 own	 natural	 law	 theory.	 As	 Adorno	writes,	 ‘the	constitutive	 forms	 of	 socialisation,	 of	 which	 that	 mystification	 is	 one,	 maintain	their	 unconditional	 supremacy	 over	 human	 beings,	 as	 if	 they	 were	 divine	providence.’69	By	‘that	mystification’,	Adorno	is	referring	specifically	to	‘the	law	of	capitalist	 accumulation’	 and	 how	 it	 has	 become	 such	 a	 structural	 part	 of	 society	that	it	appears	to	be	as	rock-solid	as	a	law	of	nature;	or,	as	Adorno	writes,	how	it	has	 become	 ‘nature-like	 due	 to	 the	 character	 of	 its	 inescapability	 under	 the	dominating	relationships	of	production’.70		What	I	have	sought	to	show	here	is	how	the	chasmic	structure	of	the	rule	of	law	 opens	 it	 up	 to	 such	 ‘constitutive	 forms	 of	 socialisation’.	 Whether	 the	constitutive	logic	follows	a	theology	of	natural	law	or	a	mythology	of	positive	law,	the	performative	act	of	institution	is	rendered	constative	by	invoking	an	authority	the	 objectivity	 of	 which	 is	 set	 beyond	 question.	 In	 each	 case,	 ‘[t]he	 natural	lawfulness	of	society	is	 ideology,	to	the	extent	it	 is	hypostasized	as	an	immutable	given	 fact	 of	 nature’.71	Where	once	 it	was	God,	 or	 tradition,	 now	 it	 is	 science,	 or	capitalism,	that	provide	these	‘constitutive	forms	of	socialisation’	that	plaster	over	the	abyss.	As	such,	these	naturalised	and	naturalising	logics	(of	which	God,	science,	and	capitalism	are	just	three)	enable	a	social	institution	such	as	the	rule	of	law	to	take	form,	by	providing	the	constative	basis	(the	last	instance)	for	the	performance	to	go	on,	whilst	providing	a	medium	for	 the	 logic	 to	reproduce	 itself	 through	the	institution.	Thus	Aquinas’	theory	of	the	rule	of	law	was	as	much	an	instantiation	of	the	King’s	sovereign	authority	as	it	was	an	instantiation	of	a	theological	rule	of	law.			
4	 Conclusion			A	 The	reality	of	law’s	rule		My	 aim	 in	 this	 chapter	 has	 been	 to	 take	 the	 approach	 to	 law	 developed	 in	 the	previous	chapter	and	drive	 it	 into	 the	reality	of	 law’s	rule.	To	do	this,	 I	began	by	
																																																																																																																																																														developmental	needs	of	the	laborer.’	Cited	in	Theodor	W	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	trans	Dennis	Redmond	(2001),	347-351.	68	On	the	concept	of	‘second	nature’,	see	note	16	in	Chapter	2.	69	Adorno,	Negative	Dialectics,	347-351.	70	Ibid.	71	Ibid.	
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120	returning	to	the	concept	of	law	as	the	articulation	of	normativity	to	show	how	‘the	law’	 is	 intrinsically	 plural.	 Law’s	 pluralism,	 I	 argued,	 is	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	differences	 that	 animate	 the	 law	as	a	 social	 form,	 and	not	 a	 secondary	 condition	produced	 out	 of	 the	 intersection	 or	 interaction	 of	 primary	 legal	 orders.	 By	implication,	legal	pluralism	is	a	condition	of	legal	order	itself,	and	not	a	problem	of	how	 to	 regulate	 the	 relationship	 between	 different	 forms	 of	 law.	 Or	 to	 put	 that	another	way:	the	problem	of	the	relationship	between	different	legal	orders	is	also	the	problem	of	legal	order	itself—and	both	are	the	‘problem’	of	the	rule	of	law.		I	 showed	 this	 in	 Part	 2	 of	 the	 chapter	 by	 examining	 the	 tension	 in	 the	proposition	of	‘the	rule	of	law’,	between	the	need	for	standard	measures	of	law,	to	ensure	the	law	does	not	become	an	arbitrary	expression	of	power,	and	the	need	for	discretionary	 treatment	 by	 law,	 to	 ensure	 the	 law	 remains	 responsive	 to	 the	differences	that	enliven	it.		 Having	 established	 the	 chasmic	 structure	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 through	 the	examination	 of	 its	 definitive	 theory,	 I	 then	 turned	 in	 Part	 3	 to	 the	 problem	 of	institutionalisation,	 and	how	 the	 simultaneous	 objectivity	 and	 subjectivity	 of	 the	institution	of	the	rule	of	 law	gives	rise	to	an	anxiety	that	scholars	have	sought	to	dispel	through	resolutionary	logics.	However,	far	from	dispelling	the	contradiction,	these	logics	are	enchanting,	functioning	as	‘constitutive	forms	of	socialisation’	that	plaster	over	the	cracks	 in	the	rule	of	 law	and	render	 its	 institutional	 foundations	solid.	Whether	the	ultimate	authority	is	the	judgment	of	God	or	the	judgement	of	the	 courts—or,	 as	 I	 examine	 in	 the	 next	 chapter,	 the	 logic	 of	 capital—the	performative/subjective	nature	of	the	instituting	act	becomes	hypostasized	into	a	constative/objective	 form	 that	 is	 as	 unquestionable	 as	 a	 law	 of	 nature.	 On	 one	hand,	 the	 logical	 resolution	 appears	 to	 secure	 the	 grounds	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	enabling	it	to	take	place;	on	the	other	hand,	it	makes	the	institution	a	medium	of	a	logic	 that	 remains	 as	 natural	 as	 it	 is	 artificial,	 a	 social-historical	 construct	 that,	through	 its	 institution,	 informs	 life.	This,	as	 I	now	turn	 to	examine	 in	 the	case	of	Liberia,	 is	 what	 enables	 a	 para-sitic	 regime	 to	 colonise	 a	 place	 and	 people,	 by	providing	the	constituting	logic	that	secures	the	institution	of	the	rule	of	 law,	but	without	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 its	 institutional	 logics	 becoming	 identical,	 leaving	 it	open	to	take	place	otherwise.				 	
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121B	 Framing	Liberia		In	addressing	the	question	of	what	takes	place	in	the	rule	of	law,	in	this	first	part	of	the	thesis	I	have	sought	to	provide	a	rational	way	of	understanding	a	contradictory	theory,	rather	than	a	rational	resolution	to	that	theory.	The	result	 is	a	concept	of	the	 rule	 of	 law	 animated	 by	 an	 irresolvable	 contradiction	 that	makes	 law’s	 rule	simultaneously	separate	and	inseparable	 from	the	subjects	that	enliven	 it.	Whilst	this	conceptualisation	 is	useful	 for	understanding	as	a	general	 theoretical	matter	‘what	takes	place	in	the	rule	of	law’	as	a	common	experience,	it	reveals	very	little	about	 the	 singular	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 actually	 takes	 place	 in	 any	particular	 instance.	 That	 is	why	 I	 ask	 the	 second,	 empirical	 question,	 of	what	 is	taking	 place	 in	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 Liberia.	 The	 next	 four	 chapters	 address	 this	empirical	question.		Two	theoretical	frameworks	inform	the	empirical	analysis	of	the	rule	of	law	in	Liberia.	The	first	is	concerned	with	the	chasmic	structure	of	law.	The	second	is	concerned	with	how	this	chasmic	structure	opens	the	rule	of	law	up	to	mediation	by	different	logics,	which	both	inform	how	the	rule	of	law	takes	place,	whilst	taking	place	 through	 law’s	 rule.	 To	 assist	 the	 reader	 in	 understanding	 the	 structure	 of	these	chapters,	the	following	is	an	outline	of	the	two	frameworks.		
(i)	 framework	1:	the	articulation	of	normativity			The	first	framework	is	based	on	the	conceptualisation	of	law	as	the	articulation	of	normativity	developed	in	Chapter	2.	Recall	that	this	provides	three	perspective	on	law.	 The	 first	 is	 the	 ‘articulate	 perspective’,	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 law	 as	 the	expressive	subject	that	articulates	the	sentence	‘the	law	is	this’.	The	second	is	the	‘abject	perspective’,	 from	the	standpoint	of	 the	subject	within	 jurisdiction,	whose	experience	is	articulated	by	the	sentence	‘the	law	is	this’.	The	third	perspective	is	on	the	process	of	law	that	plays	out	between	the	expression	of	law	as	‘the	law’	and	the	 experience	 of	 law	 as	 always	 otherwise	 than	 ‘the	 law’	 as	 expressed.	 The	 four	chapters	in	Part	II	follow	this	schema,	with	Chapters	4	and	5	taking	the	articulate	perspective,	 Chapter	 6	 taking	 the	 abject	 perspective,	 and	 Chapter	 7	 taking	 the	perspective	on	the	process	of	law.		
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122	 Chapter	4	focuses	on	how	‘Liberia’	was	given	form	by	law	in	the	making	of	the	 ‘First	 Republic’	 (1820s–1980),72	 whilst	 Chapter	 5	 focuses	 on	 the	 post-war	peace-building	 process,	 to	 see	 how	 Liberia	 is	 being	 given	 form	 by	 law	 in	 the	twenty-first	 century.	 Thus	 both	 chapters	 take	 the	 standpoint	 of	 law	 as	 the	expressive	subject.	However,	there	is	a	difference.	Whereas	Chapter	4	is	concerned	with	 an	 affirmation,	 ‘Liberia	 is	 this’	 (by	 law),	 Chapter	 5	 is	 concerned	with	 a	 re-affirmation,	‘Liberia	is	Liberia’	(by	law).		Chapter	6	then	switches	perspectives	to	take	the	standpoint	of	the	subject	within	 jurisdiction.	This	 is	 the	 abject	perspective.	 If	Chapter	4	 is	 concerned	with	the	 statement,	 ‘Liberia	 is	 this’	 (by	 law),	 focusing	 on	 the	making	 of	 Liberia	 in	 the	nineteenth	century;	and	if	Chapter	5	is	concerned	with	the	re-statement	‘Liberia	is	
Liberia’	(by	law),	focusing	on	the	consolidation	of	the	nation-state	post-war;	then	Chapter	6	 is	concerned	with	the	voices	that	 talk	back,	saying	 ‘this	 is	not	 law’	 in	a	way	 that	 requires	 a	 response	 that	 is	more	 than	yet	 another	 affirmation	 that	 ‘the	
law	is	the	law’.		 Finally,	Chapter	7	takes	the	third	perspective	of	the	process	of	law	playing	out	between	the	expression	of	law	as	‘the	law’	and	the	experience	of	law	as	always	otherwise	than	‘the	law’	as	expressed.	If	Chapters	4,	5,	and	6	each	show,	from	two	different	 perspectives,	 how	 law’s	 rule	 remains	 contradictory	 despite	 the	 best	efforts	at	resolving	its	contradictory	nature,	then	Chapter	7	addresses	the	question	of	how	to	deal	with	the	contradiction.		
	
(ii)	 framework	2:	the	informative	logics			The	first	theoretical	framework	is	concerned	with	the	chasmic	structure	in	law	and	the	 consequences	 for	 instituting	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 The	 second	 framework	 is	concerned	with	how	the	chasmic	structure	opens	up	the	rule	of	 law	to	mediation	by	different	logics,	which	both	inform	how	the	rule	of	law	takes	place,	whilst	taking	place	through	the	institution	of	law’s	rule.		
																																																						72	Historians	often	use	the	term	‘First	Republic’	to	refer	to	the	period	between	1847,	when	Liberia	declared	itself	a	Sovereign	and	Independent	State,	and	1980,	when	a	coup	d’état	led	by	the	young	‘indigenous’	man,	Master	Sergeant	Samuel	Doe,	overthrew	the	Amerio-Liberian	regime	that	had	governed	Liberia	since	1847.	Under	Doe’s	regime,	the	Constitution	of	1847	was	replaced	by	the	Constitution	of	1984.	The	1984	Constitution	is	still	in	effect	in	2015,	although	a	process	in	underway	to	substantially	amend	the	Constitution.		
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123Thus	 Chapter	 4	 is	 concerned	 with	 how	 a	 logic	 of	 capital	 informed	 the	articulation	 of	 ‘Liberia’	 in	 the	 making	 of	 the	 First	 Republic,	 whilst	 Chapter	 5	 is	concerned	with	how	a	 logic	of	security	 is	 informing	 the	consolidation	of	 ‘Liberia’	post-war.	In	both	instances,	these	logics	can	be	seen	to	operate	in	the	chasm	that	separates	 subject	 and	object.	 In	 the	 case	of	 the	 logic	 of	 capital,	 the	distinction	 is	reified,	thus	enabling	the	exploitation	of	an	object	as	mere	object	whilst	passing	the	swindle	 off	 as	 ‘the	 reality’.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 logic	 of	 security,	 the	 distinction	 is	plastered	over,	making	 the	security	of	 the	state	synonymous	with	 the	security	of	society	 and	 its	 members.	 As	 I	 show	 in	 both	 instances,	 not	 only	 do	 these	 logics	inform	how	 the	 rule	of	 law	 takes	place,	but	 the	 institution	of	 the	 rule	of	 law	can	also	be	seen	to	provide	a	medium	for	these	logics	to	take	place.73	Neither	 the	 logic	 of	 capital	 nor	 the	 logic	 of	 security	 resolves	 the	contradiction,	however,	with	subject	and	object	remaining	as	separate	as	they	are	inseparable.	With	 this	 in	mind,	Chapter	6	 is	 concerned	with	how	 the	 rule	of	 law	remains	 ‘illogical’,	 that	 is,	 how	 it	 remains	 fundamentally	 contradictory.	 Thus	Chapter	6	 examines	how	 the	national	 law	of	 Liberia	 is	 taking	place	 in	ways	 that	defy	logic.	Both	accepted	and	repudiated	at	the	same	time,	the	law	on	the	ground	is	seen	to	be	law	only	to	the	extent	that	it	is	also	not	law.		Finally,	 Chapter	 7	 turns	 to	 the	 question	 of	 how	 to	 deal	 with	 the	contradiction	 in	 law’s	 rule,	 given	 its	 irresolvability.	 In	addressing	 this	question,	 I	examine	how	a	logic	of	liberalism	is	informing	the	Government’s	efforts	to	reform	the	national	legal	system,	and	in	turn,	how	the	reform	of	the	national	legal	system	is	providing	a	medium	for	the	logic	of	liberalism	to	take	place	in	the	country.	At	the	same	 time,	 I	 examine	 how	 an	 ‘illogical’	 approach	 that	 makes	 the	 contradiction	critical	 to	 the	 legal	 system	 might	 ensure	 law’s	 rule	 remains	 responsive	 to	 the	subjects	who	enliven	it.	The	aim	of	these	two	frameworks	is	to	provide	a	conceptual	medium	with	which	to	drive	negative	dialectics	into	the	realities	of	the	rule	of	law	in	Liberia.	The	result	of	this	theoretical	work,	I	hope,	is	greater	respect	for	the	empirical	realities	of	Liberia	and	the	rule	of	law,	and	not	less.		
																																																						73	By	focusing	on	the	logic	of	capital	in	the	making	of	the	First	Republic,	and	the	logic	of	security	in	the	re-making	of	Liberia	in	the	twenty-first	century,	I	do	not	mean	to	imply	these	logics	are	time-bound	in	this	way.	If	anything—and	as	I	discuss	at	the	end	of	Chapter	4—the	logic	of	capital	continues	to	inform	the	re-making	of	Liberia	post-war,	just	as	the	logic	of	security	informed	the	articulation	of	Liberia	from	the	very	first	days	of	its	settlement	in	the	1820s.		
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1	 Overlooking	the	capital	
	Three	castles	stand	on	the	rise	of	Cape	Montserrado.	Looking	up	from	amongst	the	market	women	on	Benson	Street,1	they	can	be	seen	looming	over	Liberia’s	capital	city.	There	is	not	a	road	or	laneway	in	central	Monrovia	without	a	view	of	at	least	one	of	these	towering	structures,	and	if	there	is	such	a	street,	I	am	sure	it	does	not	escape	their	shadow.		When	I	say	three	castles,	I	mean	an	embassy,	a	temple,	and	a	hotel.	Looking	up	 Benson	 Street,	 one’s	 gaze	 is	 arrested	 first	 by	 the	 embassy.	 Operated	 by	 the	United	States	of	America,	 this	newly-completed	complex	shines	white	on	the	hill,	although	 there	 are	 rumours	 that	 it	 reaches	 even	deeper	beneath	 the	 surface.	On	the	other	side	of	the	street,	and	slightly	higher	up	the	rise,	stands	the	Grand	Lodge	of	Masons	of	the	Republic	of	Liberia.	The	Masonic	Temple’s	run-down	exterior,	still	visibly	 scarred	 by	munitions	 from	 the	 civil	 wars	 of	 the	 1990s	 and	 early	 2000s,	reflects	 the	 overthrow	 of	 the	 Americo-Liberian	 regime	 that	 once	 governed	 the	Republic	 from	within	 its	walls.	However,	 it	 is	 on	 the	 rise.	 Like	 the	embassy,	 it	 is	once	 again	 functioning	 as	 a	 stronghold,	 its	 membership	 representing	 power	 in	Liberia.2		Above	 both,	 standing	 on	 the	 very	 top	 of	 the	 hill,	 is	 Ducor	 Hotel,	 or	what	remains	of	the	five-star	resort.	Once	owned	by	Intercontinental,	it	is	now	a	hulking	eight-story	concrete	shell.	
	
																																																						1	For	a	photograph	of	Benson	Street,	see	Figure	5	in	the	Introduction.	2	During	my	daily	walk	up	Benson	Street	I	would	see	through	the	windows	in	its	grimy	battle-scarred	front	wall	the	silhouette	of	elegant	people	appearing	to	dance	in	a	brightly	lit	ballroom.	The	Roster	of	Grand	Masters	of	Liberia	provides	an	inventory	of	some	of	the	most	powerful	figures	in	Americo-Liberian	history,	from	the	first	President	of	the	Republic,	Joseph	J	Roberts,	to	the	last,	William	R	Tolbert,	Jr.	(See	Grand	Lodge	of	Masons,	AF	&	AM,	Republic	of	Liberia:	http://www.grandlodgeofliberia.org/.)	Whilst	the	Masons	lost	power	with	the	revolution	and	coup	that	overthrew	the	Americo-Liberian	oligarchy—the	two	being	practically	one—its	power	as	an	institution	in	Liberia	is	increasing	again.	As	a	Lebanese-Liberian	business-man	told	me,	if	one	wanted	to	succeed	in	Liberia	one	had	to	be	a	member	of	the	Masons.	
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Figure	7.	Overlooking	the	capital	from	inside	Ducor	Hotel,	September	20133		For	 several	 years	 after	 the	 cessation	 of	 armed	 conflict	 in	 2003,	 the	 hotel	 was	occupied	by	homeless	Liberians,	only	for	them	to	be	evicted	by	the	Government	in	anticipation	of	 its	renewal	as	a	glamorous	resort,	a	symbol	of	 ‘Liberia	Rising’.4	 In	the	years	before	the	overthrow	and	killing	of	Muammar	Gadhafi	in	2011,	Libya	and	Liberia	had	re-established	relations,	and	Libya	was	 in	 the	process	of	 investing	 in	Liberia.	One	investment	was	to	be	the	restoration	of	the	Ducor	Hotel.	This	would	have	 been	Colonel	Gadhafi’s	 castle	 on	 the	 hill,	 but	 for	 the	US-led	 intervention	 in	Libya.	 The	 significance	 of	 this	 would	 not	 have	 been	 lost	 on	 Liberians,	 whose	country	was	 throughout	 the	second	half	of	 the	 twentieth	century	both	a	base	 for	the	US	 to	 advance	 its	 cold-war	 interests	 in	 the	 region,5	 and	on	 the	 front	 lines	 of	Libyan-trained	revolutionary	movements	in	west	Africa.6	For	Liberians	looking	up	
																																																						3	[image	omitted	from	digital	version]	4	This	is	the	name	of	the	government’s	‘visioning	exercise’	of	‘Liberia’s	economic,	political,	social	and	human	development	over	an	18-year	timeframe	(2012–2030)’:	see	Republic	of	Liberia,	Agenda	
for	Transformation:	Steps	Toward	Liberia	RISING	2030.	Liberia’s	Medium	Term	Economic	and	
Development	Strategy	(2012–2017)	(Monrovia:	Republic	of	Liberia,	2012),	9.	See	also	Chapter	2	and	Chapter	5.2	of	the	Agenda	for	Transformation.	5	See	D	Elwood	Dunn,	Liberia	and	the	United	States	during	the	Cold	War:	Limits	of	Reciprocity	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2009).	6	See,	eg,	Colin	M	Waugh,	Charles	Taylor	and	Liberia:	Ambition	and	Atrocity	in	Africa's	Lone	State	
State	(London:	Zed	Books,	2011),	Chapters	5	and	9.	
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130	from	 the	 market	 on	 Benson	 Street,	 these	 three	 castles—representing	 the	 USA,	Colonel	 Gadhafi,	 and	 Liberia’s	 ruling	 class—would	 have	 reflected	 this	 familiar	history	of	the	three	powers	that	had	shaped	the	Republic	in	the	twentieth	century.	Instead,	three	months	after	the	killing	of	Gadhafi,	the	US	opened	its	new	embassy	complex	on	the	hill	overlooking	Monrovia,	 leaving	two	castles	and	the	crumbling	shell	of	a	hotel.		But	 this	 crumbling	 shell	 of	 a	 hotel	 must	 not	 be	 overlooked	 as	 a	 mere	structure.	It	is	precisely	as	a	hollowed-out	site,	a	remnant	of	something	more,	that	the	hotel	 is	 the	castle	of	 the	 three	 to	which	 the	most	 critical	 attention	should	be	paid.	 That	 is	 because	 of	 its	 radical	 difference	 from	 both	 the	 embassy	 and	 the	temple.	Unlike	 them,	 it	 is	a	res	 fungibilis—a	thing	entirely	 fungible—a	castle	 that	defies	its	very	castle-ness.			A	 The	logic	of	capital		In	 his	 Lectures	 on	 Jurisprudence,	 or	 the	 Philosophy	 of	 Positive	 Law,	 John	 Austin	defines	a	‘fungible	thing’	as	‘a	thing	whose	place,	lieu,	or	room,	may	be	supplied	by	a	thing	of	the	same	kind,	or	even	by	a	thing	not	of	the	same	kind,	as	money	in	the	form	of	damages’.7	How	he	 reaches	 this	definition	 is	 instructive,	because	what	 it	reveals	is	a	logic	that,	at	its	extreme,	makes	a	thing	(1)	indeterminate,	(2)	movable,	(3)	general.	(1)	 Austin	 begins	 his	 lecture	 ‘on	 certain	 distinctions	 among	 things’	 by	showing	how	in	Roman	law,	a	thing,	or	res,	in	‘the	most	extensive	sense’	‘embraces	every	object	 […]	which	may	be	the	subject	or	object	of	a	right	or	duty’,	 including	persons;	thus	‘a	slave	is	styled	a	thing’.8	He	contrasts	this	most	extensive	meaning	of	‘thing’	with	how	the	word	is	used	in	‘ordinary	discourse	or	parlance’:	‘When	we	speak	of	a	thing,	we	usually	mean	an	object	which	is	sensible	and	permanent,	and	which	is	not	a	person’.9	He	then	contrasts	the	extensive	Roman	law	meaning	and	the	 narrower	 ‘ordinary’	 meaning	 with	 the	 meaning	 in	 English	 law,	 which,	 he	concludes,	 oscillates	 between	 the	 two.	 The	 result,	 he	 writes,	 is	 that,	 ‘[i]n	 the	
																																																						7	John	Austin,	Lectures	on	Jurisprudence,	or	the	Philosophy	of	Positive	Law,	vol	2	(London:	John	Murray,	1873),	807.	8	Ibid,	802.	‘Acts	and	forbearances’	make	up	a	third	category	of	thing	embraced	by	this	‘most	extensive	sense’.	9	Ibid.	
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131language	 of	 English	 law,	 it	 would	 not	 appear	 that	 the	 term	 “thing”	 has	 any	determinate	 import’.10	 ‘In	 short,	 the	 extension	 of	 the	 term	 thing	 is	 so	 extremely	uncertain,	that	if	it	were	expelled	from	the	language	of	law,	much	confusion	would	be	avoided.’11		 (2)	 Rather	 than	 expel	 the	 term	 ‘thing’	 from	 the	 language	 of	 law,	 Austin	seeks	 to	 resolve	 the	 confusion	 by	 limiting	 his	 analysis	 of	 things	 to	 ‘permanent	sensible	objects	which	are	not	persons’.12	He	then	goes	on	to	describe	the	division	of	 such	 things	 into	 ‘things	 immovable’	 and	 ‘things	 movable’.	 On	 one	 side:	‘Physically,	 Immovable	 things	 are	 such	 as	 cannot	 be	 moved	 from	 their	 present	places;	or	cannot	be	moved	from	their	present	places	without	an	essential	change	in	their	actual	natures.’	On	the	other	side:	 ‘Physically,	Movable	things	are	such	as	can	be	moved	 from	the	places	which	 they	presently	occupy,	without	an	essential	change	 in	 their	 actual	natures.’	This	division	 is	qualified,	however,	by	a	 category	that	 cuts	 across	 both	 of	 these.	 This	 third	 category	 contains	 ‘things	 which	 are	physically	movable’	 but	which	 are	 ‘immovable	 by	 institution’.	 That	 is,	 ‘the	 thing,	though	physically	movable,	is	arbitrarily	annexed	to	an	immovable	thing,	so	as	to	be	 considered	 as	 a	 part	 of	 it,	 and	 to	 be	 comprised	 in	 its	 name’	 (such	 as	 an	heirloom).13	 So	 here	we	 learn	 that	 a	 thing	might	 have	 an	 ‘actual	 nature’	 and	 an	‘institutional	nature’—which	is	not	so	remarkable,	merely	pointing	to	a	thing	that	acquires	its	‘essential	nature’	through	an	actual	or	social	fixation.	But	we	also	learn	of	a	category	of	thing	that	is	thought	to	be	movable	without	an	essential	change	to	either	its	‘actual’	or	‘institutional’	nature.	This	is	a	remarkable	thought:	a	thing	that	remains	essentially	the	same	in	any	context;	a	thing	with	a	constancy	in	itself	that	makes	it	infinitely	iterable.		 (3)	 Austin	 then	 considers	 a	 further	 division	 of	 things	 into	 ‘specifically	determined’	 things	 (the	 house)	 and	 ‘generally	 determined’	 things	 (a	 house).14	What	 is	remarkable	here	 is	what	 is	meant	by	 ‘specific’.	What	we	 learn	 is	 that,	 ‘in	the	language	of	logicians’,	a	specifically	determined	thing	is	a	thing	determined	by	
																																																						10	Ibid,	803.	To	be	clear,	the	indeterminacy	here	is	the	inability	to	decide	whether	a	‘thing’	is	only	‘an	object	which	is	sensible	and	permanent’,	or	whether	it	also	embraces	humans	and	‘acts	or	forbearances’.	11	Ibid.	12	Ibid,	804-805.		13	Ibid,	805.		14	Ibid,	805-806.	
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132	its	 ‘species’,	 that	 is,	 by	 reference	 to	 a	 general	 class;	 whilst	 ‘in	 the	 language	 of	jurisprudence’,	it	is	a	thing	determined	in	its	particularity.15	The	suggestion	is	that,	in	the	language	of	jurisprudence,	‘species’	came	to	mean	the	opposite	of	its	logical	meaning,	 to	mean	 ‘particular’	 rather	 than	 ‘general’;	 although	 there	 is	 always	 the	other	 possibility,	 that	 ‘species’	 retained	 its	 meaning,	 pretending	 to	 mean	‘particular’	but	still	meaning	‘general’.	Which	is	it?		Austin	 begins	 by	 telling	 us	 that,	 ‘in	 the	 language	 of	 logicians’,	 ‘specific	performance	 would	 mean	 something	 totally	 different	 from	 what	 it	 actually	denotes’	in	the	language	of	jurisprudence:	‘It	would	not	mean	a	performance	of	an	obligation	 in	 the	 very	 terms	 of	 it;	 for	 instance,	 by	 conveying	 that	 specifically	determined	house;	but	would	be	equally	applicable	if	I	merely	conveyed	a	house,	or	something	in	lieu	of	one.’16	This	leads	Austin	to	conclude	that	‘specific’,	although	general	as	a	matter	of	logic,	is	particular	as	a	matter	of	law.	And	so	it	would	seem	‘species’	did	take	on	its	opposite	meaning	in	the	language	of	the	law.	And	yet	things	are	 not	 quite	 so	 clear.	 As	Austin	 goes	 on	 to	 explain,	 ‘almost	 the	 only	 ground	 for	enforcing	 specific	 performance	 is,	 that	 nothing	 else	 can	 completely	 supply	 the	place	of	 that	very	 thing	 for	which	 the	party	contracted’,	which,	he	emphasises,	 is	almost	never	the	case,	 for	the	reason	that	 ‘money	 in	the	 form	of	damages’	would	almost	 always	 suffice.	 In	 other	 words,	 whilst	 a	 ‘specific	 thing’	 means	 this	 thing	here,	 and	 not	 another	 like	 it,	 this	 thing	 here	 is	 almost	 never	 so	 singular	 that	 it	cannot	be	replaced	by	money,	that	is,	given	a	general	value.	And	so	it	would	seem	‘species’	 did	 retain	 its	 meaning	 after	 all,	 with	 what	 is	 specific	 remaining	generalisable	in	the	language	of	the	law.		But	yet	again,	there	remains	the	division	with	which	Austin	begins,	between	‘specifically	 determined’	 things	 (the	house)	 and	 ‘generally	 determined’	 things	 (a	house).	 If	 this	 division	 is	 to	 be	 meaningful,	 then	 the	 two	 (specific	 and	 general)	cannot	 simply	be	 the	 same.	And	 so,	 it	would	 seem,	 there	 is	 a	 third	possibility.	 If	‘specific’	is	not	a	wholly	particular	designation	in	the	language	of	law,	but	also	not	wholly	general,	then	it	must	be	a	designation	that	is	particular	and	general	at	the	same	 time.	 Passing	 into	 the	 language	 of	 jurisprudence,	 ‘species’	 appears	 to	 have	
																																																						15	Ibid,	806-807.	‘In	the	language	of	logicians,	a	genus	is	a	larger	class,	and	a	species	is	a	narrower	class	contained	by	the	genus’,	whereas	‘the	word	specific	[used	in	the	law	with	respect	to	a	thing]	corresponds	to	the	term	species	of	the	Roman	jurists,	with	whom	species	always	meant	an	individual’.	16	Ibid,	806.	
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133acquired	both	meanings;	 thus	as	an	object	of	 law,	a	 thing	remains	particular	and	general—its	singularity	always	determined	to	an	extent	by	a	general	value.	Taken	together,	this	lecture	by	Austin	reveals	a	logic	operating	through	the	‘philosophy	of	positive	law’	that,	at	its	extreme,	renders	an	object	entirely	fungible	
whilst	 maintaining	 the	 appearance	 of	 object-ness.	 Understood	 as	 a	 ‘movable	species’,	a	thing	is	simultaneously	the	opposite	of	a	thing,	understood	as	a	‘sensible	permanent	object’.	Austin	summarises	this	when	he	notes	with	approbation	how,	‘[i]n	 the	 language	of	 the	German	 jurists,	 fungible	 things	are	 styled	 “vertretbar”—representable.’17	 What	 is	 able	 to	 be	 represented,	 ad	 infinitum,	 without	 any	essential	change	to	its	nature,	is	the	thing	styled	vertretbar.	What	is	representable	is	not	an	object	in	its	singularity	but	a	thing	that	combines	a	particular	object	with	a	 general	 value,	 making	 the	 object	 generalisable	 through	 the	 representational	framework.	The	object	represented	is	not	actually	present	as	‘the	thing’,	and	is	only	presented	as	such,	synonymous	in	the	language	of	the	law.	As	Louis	Marin	writes,	‘[s]uch	would	be	the	first	effect	of	representation	in	general	[…]	not	presence	but	effect	of	presence.	It	is	surely	not	the	same,	but	it	is	as	if	it	were,	and	often	better	than,	 the	 same.’18	But	 this	 is	 not	 just	 a	matter	 of	 substitution	of	 the	 thing	 for	 its	object:	 to	 represent	 is	 also	 ‘to	 show,	 to	 intensify,	 to	 duplicate	 a	 presence’.19	 The	thing,	 presented	 as	 the	 same	as	 the	 object,	 authorises	 the	 actual	 presence	 of	 the	object.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 object	 acquires	 its	 legitimate	 presence,	 as	 a	 thing,	through	 the	 representational	 framework.	 As	 Marin	 writes,	 ‘[s]uch	 would	 be	 the	second	 effect	 of	 representation	 in	 general,	 to	 constitute	 a	 subject	 through	reflection	of	the	representational	framework’.20	Thus	the	thing	appears	to	be	more	real	than	the	object	it	represents,	through	the	reflection	of	the	framework	onto	the	object,	rendering	the	two	synonymous	(in	the	language	of	the	law).		 This	 suggests	 an	 elaboration	 to	 Austin’s	 division	 of	 things	 into	 ‘things	movable’	and	‘things	immovable’.	On	this	analysis,	a	fungible	thing	is	the	opposite	of	a	 thing	 ‘immovable	by	 institution’:	 it	 is	a	 thing	movable	by	 institution.	Recall,	a	thing	 immovable	 by	 institution	 is	 a	 physically	movable	 object	 that	 is	 ‘arbitrarily	annexed	 to	an	 immovable	 thing,	 so	as	 to	be	 considered	as	a	part	of	 it,	 and	 to	be	
																																																						17	Ibid,	807.	18	Louis	Marin,	Portrait	of	the	King	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	1988),	5.	19	Ibid.	20	Ibid,	5-6.	
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134	comprised	in	its	name’	(such	as	an	heirloom).	In	reversal	of	this,	a	thing	movable	by	institution	 is	 an	 object	 that	 cannot	 be	moved	 from	 its	 present	 place	without	 an	essential	change	in	its	actual	nature,	that	is	arbitrarily	annexed	to	a	movable	thing,	so	 as	 to	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 part	 of	 it,	 and	 to	 be	 comprised	 in	 its	 name.	 Thus	 an	object	is	made	fungible	by	making	it	synonymous	with	(comprised	in	the	name	of)	a	 movable	 thing	 with	 a	 general	 value—the	 two	 remaining	 separate,	 and	 yet	annexed	through	the	representational	framework	of	law.	As	a	movable	species,	the	actual	object	 takes	on	 the	appearance	or	outward	 form	of	a	 fungible	 thing,	much	like	the	sacrament	of	the	Eucharist,	which	makes	the	very	body	and	blood	of	Christ	representable	‘under	the	Species	of	bread	&	wine’.21		In	 summary,	 the	 representational	 framework	 examined	 by	 Austin	 in	 his	lecture	 ‘on	 certain	 distinctions	 among	 things’—specifically,	 the	 representational	framework	 of	 English	 law	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century—reveals	 a	 logic	 that	 can	transform	 singular	 objects	 into	 their	 opposite,	 movable	 species.	 If	 only	 the	alchemists	had	known,	as	they	sweated	over	a	fiery	kiln	trying	to	turn	base	metals	into	 the	 universal	 currency,	 the	 lawyers	 had	 the	 recipe!	 Functioning	 at	 levels	 of	generality,	this	logic	substitutes	for	the	object	a	thing	that	remains	essentially	the	same	in	any	context,	with	a	constancy	that	makes	it	infinitely	iterable,	and	presents	that	 thing	 as	 if	 it	were	 the	object.	By	 reflecting	 this	 logic	 onto	 the	object,	 as	 one	might	paint	a	structure	with	bright	light,	the	object	acquires	its	real	objectivity	as	a	thing	of	the	law.			 But	what	of	the	actual	object?	What	happens	when	the	light	goes	out?	What	is	left	of	the	object	when	the	thing	moves	on?	Marin	tells	us:	‘[t]he	first	effect	of	the	representational	 framework	 and	 the	 first	 power	 of	 representation	 are	 the	 effect	and	power	of	presence	instead	of	absence	and	death’.22	What	Marin	means	is	that	representation	 can	 present	 anew	what	 is	 absent	 or	 dead:	 ‘[s]omething	 that	was	present	and	is	no	longer	is	now	represented’.23	As	a	result,	when	the	thing	moves	on—when	the	representational	framework	ceases	to	be	reflected	onto	the	object—what	is	left	in	the	place	of	the	thing	is	absence,	death,	an	object	that	remains	to	be	
																																																						21	‘Species’	also	contains	these	meanings:	‘appearance;	outward	form’;	and	‘the	visible	form	of	each	of	the	elements	of	bread	and	wine	used	in	the	sacrament	of	the	Eucharist’,	for	instance,	‘they	denie	the	true	body	of	Christ	to	be	really	in	the	sacrament	of	the	Eucharist	under	the	Species	of	bread	&	wine’:	see	‘species,	n.’,	OED	Online,	September	2015.	22	Marin,	Portrait	of	the	King,	6.	23	Ibid,	5.	
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135seen,	as	the	hotel	on	the	hill,	as	a	hollowed-out	site.	At	least	that	is	the	case	for	an	object	such	as	the	Ducor	Hotel,	which	before	acquiring	its	presence	as	a	‘real	asset’,	was	absent	from	the	hill	overlooking	Monrovia.	But	what	of	an	object	that	was	not	dead	or	absent	before	becoming	animated	as	a	thing?	What	of	an	object	that	was	still	present	and	is	now	re-presented?	What	happens	to	that	object	when	the	thing	moves	on?			 One	 answer	 is	 suggested	 by	 what	 happens	 through	 the	 investment	 of	capital.	An	 ‘investment’	 is	 literally	an	outer	covering.	Three	dictionary	definitions	catch	the	eye:	(1)	‘Refractory	material	which	can	be	used	to	embed	or	surround	an	object	 and	 then	 is	 allowed	 to	 harden’;	 (2)	 ‘The	 surrounding	 or	 hemming	 in	 of	 a	town	or	fort	by	a	hostile	force	so	as	to	cut	off	all	communication	with	the	outside’;	(3)	 ‘The	investing	of	money	or	capital	[…]	the	conversion	of	money	or	circulating	capital	 into	some	species	of	property’.24	The	first	definition	points	to	the	effect	of	investment:	by	encasing	an	object	within	a	hard	layer	that	refracts	light,	it	creates	a	new	 reality	 by	 simultaneously	blocking	 the	 light,	 and	 therefore	one’s	 sight,	 from	penetrating	 to	 the	 actual	 object.	 When	 one	 looks	 at	 the	 thing	 invested	 (‘the	investment’),	 one	 sees	 a	 simulacra—a	 general	 value	 in	 the	 place	 of	 a	 singular	object.		The	 second	definition	 then	 points	 to	 the	 violence	 of	 this:	 assimilating	 the	object	 involves	 a	 use	 of	 force	 that	 is	 hostile	 to	 the	 object.	 There	 is	 perhaps	 no	better	portrayal	of	this	than	the	1982	movie	The	Thing	directed	by	John	Carpenter,	about	‘a	parasitic	extraterrestrial	life-form	that	assimilates	other	organisms	and	in	turn	 imitates	 them’.25	 This	 Thing	 is	 an	 alien	 species	 that	 is	 able	 to	 take	 on	 the	particular	 form	 of	 its	 host	 without	 becoming	 identical,	 much	 like	 the	 movable	species	 of	 thing	 analysed	 by	 Austin.	 As	 an	 ‘extraterrestrial	 life-form’,	 the	 Thing	originates	from	outside	any	actual	object	that	is	to	be	found	on	this	earth;	indeed,	it	originates	in	the	language	of	science-fiction,26	much	like	the	thing	of	jurisprudence.	And	as	a	‘parasite’,	the	Thing	needs	other	living	bodies	for	its	sustenance,	without	needing	 to	 care	 for	 the	 other	 in	 its	 self.	 Indeed,	 the	 Thing	 kills	 its	 host	 in	 the	process.	Thus	when	the	Thing	moves	on,	it	leaves	behind	a	corpse.		
																																																						24	‘Investment,	n.’,	OED	Online,	September	2015.	25	‘The	Thing	(1982	Film)’,	Wikipedia,	16	November	2015.	26	And	in	particular	the	novel	upon	which	the	movie	is	based,	by	John	W	Campbell,	Who	Goes	there?	(Rocket	Ride	Books,	1938).	
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136	 The	third	definition	of	investment	then	points	to	an	example	that	operates	through	the	logic	of	this	violent	realism:	money,	or	capital.	What	is	‘capital’?	Again	the	dictionary	provides	a	useful	set	of	definitions.27	As	a	noun,	‘capital’	means:	(1)	a	 ‘real	 asset’	 ‘possessing	a	monetary	value’;	 (2)	 the	 ‘holders	of	wealth	as	a	 class;	capitalists’;	 and	 (3)	 ‘any	 source	 of	 profit,	 advantage,	 power’.	 Thus	 the	 first	definition	points	to	capital	as	the	thing	of	investment:	operating	through	a	violent	realism	 straight	 out	 of	 science-fiction,	 it	 possesses	 its	 object	 by	 assimilating	 it	within	a	generalisable	value,	the	object	becoming	a	movable	species.28	The	second	definition	 points	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 class	 within	 which	 this	 thing	 circulates,	giving	 the	 class	 its	 name	 (capitalists)	 whilst	 maintaining	 its	 realism	 through	 its	circulation	within	this	class.	In	other	words,	without	capital,	this	class	would	cease	to	exist;	like	the	bodies	consumed	by	Carpenter’s	Thing,	once	the	Thing	has	taken	over,	 their	 continued	 existence	 as	 a	 class	 depends	 on	 it.	 Likewise,	 without	 this	class,	capital	(‘as	the	thing	of	investment’)	would	cease	to	be	a	‘real	asset’;	without	hosts,	the	Thing	would	die.		But	the	third	definition	points	to	a	much	more	general	meaning	of	‘capital’:	
power.	Indeed,	as	an	adjective,	‘capital’	was	first	used	to	mean	a	quality	of	power,	as	 in	 ‘standing	 at	 the	 head’.29	 But	 more	 than	 just	 power:	 power	 over	 life.	 Thus,	‘relating	 to	 the	 head’,	 the	 term	 capital	 initially	 meant	 ‘of	 an	 enemy	 or	 enmity:	deadly,	mortal’;	 ‘involving	loss	of	the	head	or	life’;	 ‘that	causes	death,	fatal’.30	This	understanding	of	capital	also	goes	back	to	Roman	law,31	where		Of	 Public	 Judgments,	 some	 were	 1.	 CAPITAL;	 in	 which	 the	 Punishment	prescribed	was	Death;	which	Death	was	(1)	Natural;	such	as	took	away	the	Life	 of	 the	 Criminal.	 (2)	 Civil;	 such	 as	 took	 away	 his	 Liberty,	 or	 his	Citizenship.	 2.	 NOT-CAPITAL;	 in	 which	 the	 Punishment	 prescribed	 was	short	of	Death,	Natural	or	Civil.32		One	form	of	capital	punishment	was	literally	decapitation—the	loss	of	one’s	head.	If	 the	 head	was	 a	 symbol	 of	 power,	 to	 lose	 one’s	 head	was	 the	 ultimate	 loss	 of	
																																																						27	See	‘capital,	adj.	and	n.2’,	OED	Online,	September	2015.	28	‘Species’	of	course	also	holds	this	meaning	in	it,	as	‘coinage,	coin,	money,	bullion’:	see	‘species,	n.’,	OED	Online,	September	2015.	29	‘Capital,	adj.	and	n.2’,	OED	Online,	September	2015.	30	Ibid.	31	See	also	etymology,	ibid.	32	Samuel	Hallifax,	An	Analysis	of	the	Roman	Civil	Law,	Compared	with	the	Laws	of	England	(Cambridge:	printed	by	J	Archdeacon	Printer	to	the	University,	1774),	116-117.	
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137power,	and	to	take	another’s	head	was	the	ultimate	exercise	of	power.	But	one	did	not	 need	 to	 lose	 one’s	 head	 literally	 to	 suffer	 capital	 punishment.	 ‘Civil	 death’	included	 ‘degradation	 to	 slavery’,	 ‘superseded	 by	 condemnation	 to	 the	 mines’,	which	included	being	‘sent	into	the	mines	themselves’	or	‘to	some	smelting-house	or	 other	 works	 connected	 with	 the	 mines’.33	 It	 also	 included	 deprivation	 of	citizenship.		B	 Overview		I	began	this	chapter	by	describing	the	scene	of	three	castles	overlooking	the	capital	of	Liberia.	Of	the	three,	I	said	the	most	critical	attention	should	be	paid	to	the	hotel	rather	than	the	US	Embassy	or	the	Masonic	Temple.	This	might	seem	like	an	odd	choice.	Why	would	it	be	more	important	to	scrutinise	the	crumbling	shell	of	a	hotel	than	the	seat	of	power	of	two	groups	who	arguably	influence	the	course	of	events	in	 Liberia	 like	 no	 other?	 The	 answer,	 I	 said,	 is	 because	 of	 the	 hotel’s	 radical	difference	 from	 both	 the	 embassy	 and	 the	 temple.	 Unlike	 them,	 it	 is	 a	 res	
fungibilis—a	 thing	 entirely	 fungible—a	 castle	 that	 defies	 its	 very	 castle-ness.	 As	‘castles’,	 the	embassy	and	the	temple	are	 immovable	by	 institution;	 they	could	of	course	change	locations,	but	they	must	remain	the	Embassy	of	the	United	States	in	Monrovia	and	the	Grand	Lodge	of	Masons	of	the	Republic	of	Liberia.	In	short,	they	have	an	essential	institutional	nature	that	binds	them	in	certain	ways	to	the	places	they	occupy	and	the	subjects	who	inhabit	them.	This	is	also	their	weakness,	to	the	extent	that,	should	their	institutions	be	destroyed,	so	too	would	be	the	power	they	represent.		The	hotel,	by	contrast,	 is	a	movable	species	of	 thing	without	any	essential	nature	in	itself.	It	is	a	capital	investment	that	takes	the	form	of	a	castle	on	the	hill,	its	 ‘essential	nature’	remaining	separate	from	the	object	 it	encases	 in	marble	and	glass,	and	when	it	moves	on,	it	leaves	behind	a	hollowed-out	site,	a	form	of	death.	Para-sitic,	it	lives	off	of	other	objects,	destroying	them	in	the	process.	And	because,	as	a	species,	 the	thing	that	once	animated	the	site	of	 the	hotel	 is	without	 its	own	actual	 or	 institutional	 nature,	 the	 power	 it	 represents	 cannot	 be	 destroyed	 by	destroying	either	object	or	 institution.	As	a	 real	asset,	 as	a	 class,	 and	as	a	power	
																																																						33	Patrick	Mac	Chombaich	de	Colquhoun,	A	Summary	of	the	Roman	Civil	Law,	vol	III	(London:	V	and	R	Stevens	and	Sons,	1849).	See	also	Hallifax,	Analysis	of	the	Roman	Civil	Law,	117.	
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138	over	 life,	 it	 is	 essentially	 a	 logic;	 and	 it	 is	 a	 logic	 that	 can	 be	 found	 to	 operate	through	the	institution	of	law,	its	rule	becoming	synonymous	with	law’s	rule.		What	 is	more,	 its	 object	 is	 indeterminate.	 To	 paraphrase	 Carpenter’s	The	
Thing,	 no	 subject	 is	 safe	 from	 this	 thing!	 Despite	 Austin’s	 positive-analytical	heroicism,	dividing	persons	from	things	with	the	formidable	strokes	of	his	pen,	the	logic	 of	 the	 representational	 framework	 is	 not	 so	 easily	 circumscribed.	 Recall:	‘Taken	with	the	most	extensive	sense,	it	embraces	every	object	[…]	which	may	be	the	subject	or	object	of	a	right	or	duty’.34	This	 includes	humans,	 if,	or	when,	 they	are	 treated	 as	 ‘persons	 considered	 mere	 subjects	 of	 rights:	 that	 is	 to	 say,	considered	as	the	subjects	of	rights	residing	in	other	persons’.35	Such	a	person	 is	not	a	human	but	a	thing	because,	on	this	analysis,	humans	are	considered	rightful	
in	themselves.	As	Austin’s	influential	forbear,	John	Locke,	argued,	‘every	man	has	a	property	in	his	own	person;	this	nobody	has	any	right	to	but	himself’.36	A	slave	is	thus	 styled	 a	 thing,	 as	 a	 mere	 subject	 of	 rights	 residing	 in	 another	 and	 not	 in	themself.		Following	this	 logic,	what	of	the	human	who	is	treated	as	an	empty	vassal	whose	subjectivity	can	only	be	fulfilled	through	the	investment	of	rights	residing	in	an	other?37	What,	for	instance,	of	an	African	man	who	is	thought	to	be	fully	human	only	 once	 he	 is	 invested	with	 the	 rights	 thought	 to	 reside	 in	 an	 American	man?	Does	 this	make	him	not	human	but	 thing?	 If	 a	 slave	 is	 a	 thing	because	he	 is	not	rightful	in	himself,	and	might	only	be	considered	human	if	the	rights	residing	in	an	other	 are	 invested	 in	 him,	making	 him	 free,	 then	what	 of	 the	 subject	 of	 human	rights	who	does	not,	in	fact,	already	have	those	rights?38		The	answer	I	examine	here	is	that	the	logic	of	making	an	object	rightful	 is	the	 logic	 of	 capital,	 whether	 the	 object	 of	 rights	 is	 land	 or	 human	 or	 otherwise.	Invested	with	a	general	value,	a	universal	currency—a	 ‘human	right’,	a	 ‘property	
																																																						34	Austin,	Lectures	in	Jurisprudence,	802.	35	Ibid.	36	John	Locke,	The	Second	Treatise	of	Government	and	a	Letter	Concerning	Toleration	(New	York:	Dover,	2002),	para	27.	37	I	say	‘empty	vassal’	because	a	vassal,	as	‘a	base	or	abject	person;	a	slave’,	is	nothing	other	than	a	vessel	of	an	other	subjectivity.	See	‘vassal,	n.	and	adj.’,	OED	Online,	December	2015.	38	This	question	follows	in	a	critical	theoretical	tradition.	See,	eg,	Arendt’s	critique	of	human	rights	in	Hannah	Arendt,	The	Origins	of	Totalitarianism,	3	ed	(London:	Allen	&	Unwin,	1967).	See	also	Emma	Larking,	Refugees	and	the	Myth	of	Human	Rights:	Life	Outside	the	Pale	of	the	Law	(Farnham:	Ashgate,	2014);	Jacques	Rancière,	‘Who	Is	the	Subject	of	the	Rights	of	Man?’,	South	Atlantic	
Quarterly,	vol	103,	no	2/3	(2004).	
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139right’—the	 object	 loses	 its	 own	 subjectivity	 and	 is	 reduced	 to	 a	 mere	 object	 of	rights	residing	in	an	other.	If	the	object	of	rights	is	a	human,	this	logic	substitutes	for	the	singularity	of	the	human,	a	person	that	remains	essentially	the	same	in	any	context,	 with	 a	 constancy	 that	makes	 them	 infinitely	 iterable,	 and	 presents	 that	person	as	if	they	were	the	human.	By	reflecting	this	juristic	logic	onto	a	human,	as	one	might	shine	a	light	onto	a	dark	face,	the	human	acquires	their	real	humanity	as	a	person	of	the	law.39		I	now	turn	to	examine	how	this	 logic	 informed	the	articulation	of	 ‘Liberia’	from	its	conception	as	an	idea	of	liberty	at	the	beginning	of	the	nineteenth	century	to	 its	consolidation	as	a	nation-state	 in	 the	 twentieth	century.	Operating	 through	the	 law	as	 its	 forceful	medium,	this	 logic	 informed	the	making	of	Liberia	through	the	super-imposition	of	a	representational	framework	over	country	in	west	Africa	that	 sought	 to	 render	 its	 lands	 and	 peoples	 productive	 as	 territory	 and	 citizens.	Having	begun	with	an	idea	of	liberty	that	was	supposed	to	make	free	all	of	Africa,	the	result	is	a	state	of	civil	death,	and	eventually,	revolution	and	war.		
2	 Res	colōnia		A	 The	idea	of	Liberia		 But	here	the	thing	is	impossible:	a	slave	cannot	be	really	emancipated.	You	cannot	raise	him	from	the	abyss	of	his	degradation.	You	may	call	him	free,	you	 may	 enact	 a	 statute	 book	 of	 laws	 to	 make	 him	 free,	 but	 you	 cannot	bleach	him	into	the	enjoyment	of	freedom.40	
Christian	Spectator,	1824		By	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 it	 was	 no	 longer	 possible	 to	 ignore	 the	immanent	problem	of	slavery	in	the	United	States	of	America,	that	is,	freedom.	Two	versions	of	 this	problem	 in	particular	 concerned	 the	 slave-holders	who,	 in	1816,	founded	the	American	Society	for	Colonizing	the	Free	People	of	Color	of	the	United	
																																																						39	See	also	Gerry	Simpson,	‘Humanity,	Law,	Force’,	in	Strengthening	the	Rule	of	Law	through	the	UN	
Security	Council,	ed	Jeremy	Matam	Farrall	and	Hilary	Charlesworth	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2016).	40	‘Review	of	the	Reports	of	the	American	Colonization	Society,	from	the	Christian	Spectator’,	in	American	Colonization	Society,	Seventh	Annual	Report	of	the	American	Society	for	Colonizing	the	
Free	People	of	Colour	of	the	United	States	(Washington:	printed	by	Davis	and	Force,	1824),	90.	
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140	States,	 and	who,	eight	years	 later,	would	name	 their	 colonial	experiment	 in	west	Africa	‘Liberia’.41		(1)	With	the	abolition	of	the	slave	trade	nationally,	along	with	the	abolition	of	 the	 institution	 of	 slavery	 in	 an	 increasing	 number	 of	 states,	 humans	who	had	once	 been	 styled	 a	 movable	 species	 of	 thing	 were	 gaining	 their	 legal	 status	 as	persons.	 Slavery,	 which	 always	 contains	 (holds	 within,	 and	 withholds	 from	manifesting)	 a	 condition	 of	 freedom,	 was	 visibly	 giving	 rise	 to	 its	 opposite.	 For	slave-holders	 this	was	problematic	because	 it	was	making	visible	a	contradiction	in	the	concept	of	slavery	that	threatened	to	destabilise	its	institution.	The	presence	of	 free	 people	 of	 colour	 in	 the	 United	 States	 presented	 a	 possibility—the	 free	African-American—which	 contradicted	 the	 norm—the	 enslaved	 African	 in	America.	 Against	 the	 non-human	 characterisation	 of	 Africans	 in	 America	 that	justified	 their	 enslavement	 in	 the	 language	 of	 the	 law,	 here	 were	 African-
Americans.	This	was	seen	as	a	threat	to	the	institution	of	slavery	still	foundational	in	many	parts	of	the	country,	because	the	appearance	of	this	possibility	threatened	to	 awaken	 their	 slaves	 from	 docility,	 or	 worse,	 excite	 them	 to	 rebellion,	 with	bloody	 consequences.42	 Securing	 the	 institution	 of	 slavery	 depended	 on	 keeping	their	 slaves	 docile,	 which	 depended	 on	 maintaining	 a	 reality	 in	 which	emancipation	was	impossible	to	imagine.		(2)	At	the	same	time,	as	persons,	free	people	of	colour	in	the	United	States	still	suffered	a	form	of	civil	death,	‘de-graded’,	if	not	by	law,	then	by	effect.	As	the	
Christian	Spectator	observed	in	1824,	in	its	review	of	the	reports	of	the	American	Colonization	 Society:	 ‘A	 barrier	 more	 difficult	 to	 be	 surmounted	 than	 the	institution	of	 the	Caste,	 cuts	off,	 and	while	 the	present	 state	of	 society	 continues	
																																																						41	For	a	history	of	the	American	Colonization	Society,	see	Eric	Burin,	Slavery	and	the	Peculiar	
Solution:	A	History	of	the	American	Colonization	Society	(Gainesville:	University	Press	of	Florida,	2005).	For	a	history	of	the	origins	of	Liberia,	see	also	Amos	J	Beyan,	African	American	Settlements	in	
West	Africa:	John	Brown	Russwurm	and	the	American	Civilizing	Efforts	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2005);	James	Ciment,	Another	America:	The	Story	of	Liberia	and	the	Former	Slaves	who	
Ruled	it	(New	York:	Hill	and	Wang,	2013);	Claude	A	Clegg	III,	The	Price	of	Liberty:	African	Americans	
and	the	Making	of	Liberia	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2004);	William	Jay,	An	
Inquiry	into	the	Character	and	Tendency	of	the	American	Colonization	and	American	Anti-Slavery	
Societies,	4	ed	(New	York:	R	G	Williams,	1837);	Tom	W	Shick,	Behold	the	Promised	Land:	A	History	of	
Afro-American	Settler	Society	in	Nineteenth-Century	Liberia	(Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1980).	42	See,	eg,	the	discussion	at	one	of	the	first	meetings	of	the	American	Colonization	Society,	in	A	View	
of	Exertions	Lately	Made	for	the	Purpose	of	Colonizing	the	Free	People	of	Color,	in	the	United	States,	in	
Africa,	or	Elsewhere	(Washington,	DC:	printed	by	Jonathan	Elliot,	1817),	4-11,	and	see	in	particular	the	statement	of	John	Randolph	at	9-10.		
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141must	always	cut	off,	 the	negro	from	all	 that	 is	valuable	 in	citizenship.’43	Although	no	 longer	 legally	 things,	 the	 freedom	 of	 these	 free	 people	 of	 colour	 was	 being	visibly	contradicted	by	a	virtual	enslavement	that	operated,	 like	the	caste	system	on	 the	 Indian	sub-continent,	 as	a	 social	 rather	 than	 formally	 legal	 condition.	The	result,	in	the	view	of	the	Christian	Spectator,	was	a	form	of	slavery	‘never	heard	of	[…]	 in	 any	 country,	 ancient	 or	modern,	 pagan,	Mahommedan,	 or	 christian’.44	 By	‘slavery’	the	Christian	Spectator	did	not	mean	physical	bondage:	‘We	do	not	mean	here	 to	speak	of	 slavery	as	a	system	of	bonds	and	stripes	and	all	kinds	of	bodily	suffering’.45	What	made	slavery	in	the	United	States	‘more	ominous	in	its	character	and	 tendency	 than	 any	 similar	 system	 which	 has	 ever	 existed’	 was	 that	 its	condition	did	not	cease	with	legal	emancipation.46	As	a	supporter	of	the	American	Colonization	Society	stated	in	1833,	free	people	of	colour	in	the	United	States	were	‘nominally	 free,	 it	 is	 true,	 but	 virtually	 slaves—a	proscribed	 and	degraded	 caste,	whose	liberty	(if	liberty	it	may	be	called)	is	but	negative,	giving	them	but	little,	and	exacting	from	them	every	thing.’47		In	summary,	these	are	the	two	main	ways	in	which	the	problem	of	slavery	was	manifesting	in	the	United	States	at	the	turn	of	the	nineteenth	century,	as	far	as	the	American	Colonization	Society	and	its	supporters	were	concerned.	On	one	side,	the	presence	of	free	people	of	colour	contradicted	the	presence	of	unfree	people	of	colour,	destabilising	the	institution	of	slavery	by	making	visible	the	contradiction	that	underwrites	 it.	On	 the	other	 side,	 the	ongoing	 ‘virtual	enslavement’	of	 these	free	 people	 of	 colour	 contradicted	 their	 presence	 as	 free	 people	 in	 the	 United	States.	 Wherever	 one	 looked,	 black	 people	 appeared	 simultaneously	 free	 and	unfree,	 never	wholly	 slaves,	 and	 yet	 never	wholly	 citizens—their	 degradation	 as	things	contradicted	by	the	appearance	of	their	freedom	as	humans;	their	freedom	as	humans	undermined	by	their	abyssal	degradation	as	things.48		
																																																						43	‘Christian	Spectator’,	in	American	Colonization	Society,	Seventh	Annual	Report,	87.	44	Ibid,	88-89.	45	Ibid.	46	Ibid,	90.	47	‘Motion	of	Z	C	Lee,	Esq,	seconded	by	Hon	J	W	Taylor’,	in	American	Colonization	Society,	Sixteenth	
Annual	Report	of	the	American	Society	for	Colonizing	the	Free	People	of	Colour	of	the	United	States	(Washington:	printed	by	James	C	Dunn,	1833),	x.	48	See	also	John	Seh	David,	The	American	Colonization	Society	and	the	Founding	of	the	First	African	
Republic	(Bloomington:	iUniverse,	2014),	Chapter	3.	
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142	 The	founders	of	the	American	Colonization	Society	conceived	of	‘Liberia’	as	the	 solution	 to	 this	 double-sided	 problem.	 Creating	 a	 colony	 ‘in	 Africa	 (or	elsewhere)’49	 for	 these	 free	 people	 of	 colour	 was	 conceived	 as	 the	 solution,	because	the	problem	was	understood	as	the	appearance	of	free	black	bodies	in	the	United	States.	Thus	the	institution	of	slavery,	they	argued,	would	remain	insecure	as	 long	as	 the	possibility	of	emancipation	was	made	apparent	by	the	presence	of	people	 of	 colour	 freely	 walking	 the	 streets.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 they	 argued,	emancipation	itself	would	remain	merely	apparent	as	long	as	these	free	people	of	colour	 remained	 in	 the	United	 States:	 here	 they	would	 only	 ever	 experience	 the	
semblance	of	 freedom,	and	not	real	 freedom;	for	 ‘[h]ere	the	thing	is	 impossible:	a	slave	 cannot	 really	 be	 emancipated’.50	 In	 short,	 whether	 they	 walked	 free	 or	laboured	 in	bonds,	 a	person	of	 colour	 remained	a	 thing	 in	 the	United	States,	but	
seeing	 them	 walk	 free	 was	 both	 fanciful	 and	 dangerous	 because	 it	 gave	 the	appearance	of	another,	unreal	reality	 that	 threatened	the	real	asset	of	slavery	by	revealing	the	crack	in	its	logic.	And	so	‘Liberia’	was	conceived	at	the	beginning	of	the	nineteenth	century	as	an	 alternative	 to	 bleach:51	 a	way	 of	making	 free	 the	 free	 people	 of	 colour	 of	 the	United	States,	by	making	 their	black	bodies	disappear	altogether.	 If	making	 their	skin	 white	 with	 a	 liberal	 dousing	 of	 bleach	 was	 not	 a	 Christian	 solution	 to	 the	perceived	problem	of	the	appearance	of	free	people	of	colour	in	the	United	States,	then	 the	 next	 best	 solution	 was	 to	 make	 them	 invisible,	 by	 colonising	 them	 in	Africa	 (or	 elsewhere).	 To	 quote	 the	 slave-owning	 member	 of	 the	 American	Colonisation	Society,	General	Harper,	who	coined	the	name	in	1824:		I	 have	 thought	 of	 a	 name	 that	 is	 peculiar,	 short,	 and	 familiar,	 and	 that	expresses	 the	 object	 and	 nature	 of	 the	 establishment—it	 is	 the	 term	LIBERIA;	 and	 denotes	 a	 settlement	 of	 persons	made	 free:	 for	 our	 Colony	may	 with	 truth	 be	 called	 the	 home	 and	 country	 of	 freedmen,	 in	contradistinction	to	the	slaves	of	whom	they	once	formed	a	part.52	
																																																						49	See	‘Constitution	of	the	American	Society	for	Colonizing	the	Free	People	of	Color	of	the	United	States’,	in	A	View	of	Exertions	Lately	Made,	11-12.	50	‘Christian	Spectator’,	in	American	Colonization	Society,	Seventh	Annual	Report,	90.	See	also	American	Colonization	Society,	Sixteenth	Annual	Report,	v,	xvii.	51	See	the	passage	from	the	Christian	Spectator,	cited	in	note	40	above:	‘But	here	the	thing	is	impossible:	a	slave	cannot	be	really	emancipated.	You	cannot	raise	him	from	the	abyss	of	his	degradation.	You	may	call	him	free,	you	may	enact	a	statute	book	of	laws	to	make	him	free,	but	you	cannot	bleach	him	into	the	enjoyment	of	freedom.’	52	American	Colonization	Society,	Seventh	Annual	Report,	5-6	(italics	in	original).	
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143Liberia	was	 thus	born	as	a	radical	concept	of	 liberty,	directed	at	making	 the	 free	positively	free	(whilst,	 incidentally,	making	the	unfree	positively	unfree).53	As	the	American	 Colonization	 Society	 proclaimed	 in	 its	 address	 to	 the	 people	 of	 the	United	States	on	the	tenth	anniversary	of	the	Colony	in	west	Africa,	speaking	of	the	condition	 of	 the	 African-American	 settlers	 there:	 ‘In	 Liberia,	 he	 exhibits	 not	 the	semblance,	but	 the	 reality	of	 freedom’.54	 If	 the	United	States	would	be	known	as	the	land	of	the	free,	then	Liberia	would	be	known	as	‘the	land	of	the	free’d.’55	But	there	is	also	a	third	way	in	which	‘Liberia’	was	conceived	as	a	force	of	liberty.	Not	 only	would	 colonisation	 emancipate	 the	 free	 people	 of	 colour	 of	 the	United	States	(whilst	securing	the	bonds	of	slavery	there),	but	the	establishment	of	an	African-American	colony	 in	Africa	would,	 it	was	 said,	 also	provide	a	model	of	civilisation	 that	would	 lead	 to	 the	 emancipation	 of	 all	 of	 Africa’s	 peoples.56	 This	was	 the	 great	 humanitarian	 mission	 of	 the	 day:	 to	 make	 Africans	 free	 from	enslavement	to	their	traditional	ways—or	as	one	of	the	founders	of	the	American	Colonization	Society	proclaimed	in	an	initial	meeting	of	the	organisation:	‘[i]t	is	the	hope	of	redeeming	many	millions	of	people	from	the	lowest	state	of	ignorance	and	superstition’.57	 Through	 this	 colonisation	 mission,	 ‘civilization	 and	 the	 christian	religion	 would	 be	 introduced	 into	 that	 benighted	 quarter	 of	 the	 world’.58	 Or	 as	another	supporter	wrote:	When	she	shall	have	done	the	work,	Sir,	it	will	be	seen	that	the	new	world	will	have	sent	back	to	the	old,	the	most	sublime	empire	of	reason	and	law,	ever	known	to	mankind.	She	will	have	planted	in	a	land,	once	illustrious,	but	long	darkened	by	 superstition	 and	despotism,	 the	 institutions	 of	 civil	 and	
																																																						53	On	the	connection	between	the	colonisation	mission	and	the	desire	to	secure	the	purity	of	white	America,	see	also	the	‘Memorial	of	the	President	and	board	of	Managers	of	the	American	society	for	colonizing	the	free	people	of	color	of	the	United	State’,	submission	to	Congress,	in	A	View	of	
Exertions	Lately	Made,	14.	54	American	Colonization	Society,	Address	of	the	Managers	of	the	American	Colonization	Society,	to	
the	People	of	the	United	States	(Washington,	DC:	printed	by	James	C	Dunn,	1832),	4.	55	Ibid,	11.	56	See,	eg,	‘Review	of	Christian	Spectator’,	in	American	Colonization	Society,	Seventh	Annual	Report,	86:	‘Such	is	the	history	of	the	American	Colonization	Society.	Its	design	is	general—the	benefit	of	the	whole	African	race.	Its	plan	of	operation	is	specific,	the	establishment	on	the	coast	of	Africa	of	a	colony	of	free	people	of	colour	from	America’	(italics	in	original).	See	also	Burin,	The	Peculiar	
Solution,	13-14.	57	Statement	of	Elias	Caldwell,	in	A	View	of	Exertions	Lately	Made,	7.	See	also	Ciment,	Another	
America,	9.	58	Statement	of	Elias	Caldwell,	in	A	View	of	Exertions	Lately	Made,	7.	On	the	aims	of	the	colonisation	mission,	see	also	American	Colonization	Society,	Seventh	Annual	Report,	7.	
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144	 religious	liberty;	and	savage	men	will	feel	their	influence,	and	be	converted	to	civilization	and	Christianity.59	This	was	 the	 light	 that	 the	American	Colonization	 Society	hoped	 to	 shine	on	 the	lands	 and	 peoples	 of	 Africa:	 Liberia,	 a	 beacon	 for	 the	 empire	 of	 logos	 and	 law,	enabling	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 institutions	 of	 liberty	 in	 a	 long-darkened	 land.	 ‘From	them,	under	Heaven,	the	voice	has	gone	forth—“let	there	be	light	in	Africa”.’60	And	
savage	men	will	feel	their	influence.		B	 Beyond	the	littoral		 I	beg	most	respectfully	to	call	Your	Excellency’s	attention	to	this	important	and	 valuable	 section	 of	 country	 a	 primeval	 forest,	 heavily	 timbered	 and	watered	 by	 the	 beautiful	Manah	River,	 brooks,	 rivulets,	 and	 creeks	 on	 all	sides	–	 just	such	a	site	as	would	be	desirable	for	the	building	up	of	one	or	two	good	 large	 towns	and	villages	without	 the	 least	molestation	 from	any	one.	 We	 should	 lose	 no	 time	 in	 taking	 possession	 of	 and	 occupying	 this	point	with	as	little	delay	as	possible.61		
Report	of	the	Special	Commissioner	for	the		
Demarkation	of	the	Anglo	Liberian	Boundary,	1903		In	1903	the	erstwhile	Colony	of	Liberia	celebrated	its	fifty-sixth	anniversary	as	the	Republic	 of	 Liberia.	 The	 African-American	 settlers	 had	 declared	 Liberia	 a	 Free,	Sovereign	 and	 Independent	 State	 in	 1847,62	 making	 it	 the	 only	 independent	African	republic	at	the	time,	and	the	only	other	‘black	republic’	in	the	world	after	Haiti.	 One	 of	 the	main	 reasons	 for	 the	 declaration	 of	 independence	was	 to	 gain	legal	 recognition	 as	 a	 member	 of	 the	 international	 community	 of	 states,	 to	empower	the	government	to	collect	customs	duties	from	foreign	merchants.63	The	problem	 was	 summarised	 by	 a	 British	 Commodore	 in	 a	 letter	 to	 the	 Americo-Liberian	Governor	in	1844:	
																																																						59	American	Colonization	Society,	Sixteenth	Annual	Report,	xvii.	60	‘Motion	of	Z	C	Lee,	Esq,	seconded	by	Hon	J	W	Taylor’,	in	ibid,	x.	61	Report	of	the	Special	Commissioner	for	the	Demarkation	of	the	Anglo	Liberian	Boundary	(Monrovia:	10	August	1903),	8-9.	62	Declaration	of	Independence	of	Liberia	(1847).	63	See	Yekutiel	Gershoni,	‘The	Formation	of	Liberia's	Boundaries,	Part	1:	Agreements’,	Liberian	
Studies	Journal,	vol	17,	no	1	(1992).	
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145For	the	rights	in	question,	those	of	imposing	custom	duties	and	limiting	the	trade	of	 foreigners	by	restrictions,	are	sovereign	rights,	which	can	only	be	lawfully	 exercised	 by	 sovereign	 and	 independent	 states,	 within	 their	 own	
recognized	borders	and	dominions.	 I	 need	not	 remind	your	excellency	 that	this	 description	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 ‘Liberia’	 which	 is	 not	 recognized	 as	 a	subsisting	 state,	 even	 by	 the	 government	 of	 the	 country	 from	 which	 its	settlers	have	immigrated.64	The	 settlers’	 Declaration	 three	 years	 later,	 that	 Liberia	 is	 a	 ‘Sovereign	 and	Independent	 State’,	 was	 their	 answer	 to	 the	 British	 Commodore.	 And	 the	Declaration	 succeeded	 in	 bringing	 the	 Americo-Liberian	 people	 their	 desired	status	in	international	law	of	nation-statehood—although	Britain	would	have	to	be	reminded	from	time	to	time	that	this	description	did	apply	to	Liberia.		After	Liberia’s	declaration	of	 independence	 in	1847,	European	recognition	of	Liberia’s	international	personality	remained	qualified	in	two	ways	in	particular.	As	the	‘scramble	for	Africa’	intensified	in	the	1880s,	Britain	and	France	made	clear	that,	 if	 Liberia	was	 to	 subsist	 as	 a	 sovereign	 and	 independent	 state,	 and	 not	 be	annexed	to	either	of	their	colonial	empires,	it	had	to	have	recognised	borders	and	exercise	 dominion	 over	 the	 peoples	 within	 that	 territory	 (as	 the	 British	Commodore	had	noted	in	1844).	The	problem	was	that,	since	its	inception,	Liberia	had	remained	an	unbounded	idea.	As	a	beacon	for	the	empire	of	reason	and	law	in	a	 long-darkened	continent,	 ‘Liberia’	was	supposed	to	be	without	 limit	 in	Africa.65	This	 was	 not	 just	 metaphorical;	 physically,	 Liberia	 was	 supposed	 to	 reach	‘indefinitely	into	the	interior’	of	Africa.	As	the	American	Colonization	Society	wrote	in	an	‘Address	to	the	People	of	the	United	States’	in	1832,	in	its	Description	of	the	
Colony:	 ‘The	tract	of	country	under	the	Colonial	jurisdiction	[…]	extends	from	one	hundred	and	fifty,	to	two	hundred	miles	along	the	coast,	and	indefinitely	into	the	interior.’66	 Liberia’s	 littoral	 reach	 might	 have	 been	 limited	 by	 the	 encroaching	forces	 of	Britain	 to	 the	north-west	 and	France	 to	 the	 south-east,	 but	 beyond	 the	littoral,	Liberia’s	constitution	was	left	entirely	open.67	At	least	that	was	the	original	
																																																						64	‘Letter	dated	September	9,	1844	sent	by	Commodore	Jones	of	the	HMS	Penelope	to	Joseph	Jenkins	Roberts,	governor	of	the	Liberian	commonwealth’,	cited	in	ibid,	25	(my	italics).	65	See	also	Gershoni,	‘Liberia's	Boundaries,	Part	1’,	26,	30-31.		66	American	Colonization	Society,	Address	of	the	Managers,	11.	See	also	American	Colonization	Society,	A	Few	Facts	Respecting	the	American	Colonization	Society	and	the	Colony	at	Liberia	(Washington,	DC:	printed	by	Way	and	Gideon,	1830),	5;	Gershoni,	‘Liberia's	Boundaries,	Part	1’,	26.	67	See,	eg,	Constitution	of	the	Commonwealth	of	Liberia	(1839)	and	Constitution	of	the	Republic	of	Liberia	(1847).	See	also	Gershoni,	‘Liberia's	Boundaries,	Part	1’,	26.	
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146	idea.	 By	 the	 end	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 Britain	 and	 France	 were	 forcefully	circumscribing	 it,	 making	 clear	 that,	 if	 the	 Black	 Republic	 was	 to	 subsist	 in	 the	twentieth	century	as	a	nation-state,	then	it	would	have	to	define	its	territory	and	population	and	bring	both	under	its	rule.	In	the	next	section	of	the	chapter	I	examine	the	implications	for	the	peoples	of	 Liberia	of	 these	 two	 requirements.	As	 I	 show,	 for	 the	Americo-Liberian	 ruling	class,	 complying	 with	 the	 European	 demands	 meant	 avoiding	 a	 form	 of	 capital	punishment—revocation	 of	 their	 international	 citizenship.	 Failure	 to	 satisfy	 the	requirements	 of	 this	 legal	 framework,	 by	 developing	 Liberia	 beyond	 its	 coastal	settlements,	would	 have	meant	 becoming	 vassals	 of	 either	 the	British	 or	 French	colonial	 empires.	 To	 avoid	 annexation,	 in	 addition	 to	 defining	 the	 territorial	boundaries	of	Liberia,	the	government	would	have	to	ensure	the	peoples	residing	within	 that	 territory	were	effectively	under	 its	dominion.68	However,	 if	 failure	 to	pacify	the	hinterland	would	have	meant	civil	death	for	the	Americo-Liberians,	with	the	revocation	of	their	international	citizenship,	then	for	a	majority	of	the	Africans	who	would	be	made	Liberian	in	the	government’s	attempt	to	realise	its	dominion	over	them,	‘the	redemption	of	the	African’69	would	come	to	mean	civil	death.		Before	 I	 get	 to	 the	 consequences,	 however,	 my	 concern	 here	 is	 with	 the	production	 of	 a	 metonym—‘Liberia’—through	 the	 deployment	 of	 this	 colonial	framework.	The	process	of	demarcating	‘Liberia’	can	be	seen	in	the	following	set	of	maps,	adapted	 from	Reed	Stewart’s	 study	of	Liberia’s	boundaries	 (set	out	on	 the	next	 page).70	 The	 first	 map,	 drawn	 in	 anticipation	 of	 Independence,	 shows	 the	limited	extent	of	Liberia’s	settlement	along	the	coast.	Known	as	‘littoral	Liberia’,71	this	thin	coastal	strip,	reaching	at	its	widest	points	little	more	than	65	kilometers	inland,	 was	 effectively	 the	 limits	 of	 Americo-Liberian	 dominion	 well	 into	 the	twentieth	century.		
																																																						68	The	problem,	as	a	‘Bishop	of	Africa’	commented	to	the	Washington	Times	in	1898,	was	that	‘[o]nly	a	small	portion	of	the	territory	[is]	under	the	absolute	control	of	the	government	and	the	remainder	of	its	square	miles	is	occupied	by	over	a	million	barbarous	natives,	[…].	They	are	very	slow	to	accept	governmental	restraint,	and	often	on	the	slightest	pretext,	resist	it’:	‘To	Ask	Our	Protection:	The	Liberian	Government	Needs	Aid	and	Advice.	Naturally	Turns	to	Us’,	The	Times,	Washington,	DC,	27	June	1898,	p	1.	69	Ibid.	70	Reed	F	Stewart,	‘Liberia's	Boundaries:	A	Preliminary	Study’,	Conference	on	Social	Science	in	
Liberia	(Stanford,	1-2	August	1969).	These	maps	are	reproduced	on	the	next	page.	My	‘Map	1’	is	Stewart’s	‘Map	B’;	‘Map	2’	is	‘Map	C’;	‘Map	3’	is	‘Map	E’;	‘Map	4’	is	‘Map	H’;	and	‘Map	5’	is	‘Map	J’.	71	See,	eg,	D	Elwood	Dunn	and	Svend	E	Holsoe,	Historical	Dictionary	of	Liberia	(Metuchen:	Scarecrow	Press,	1985),	1.	
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Map	1.	Littoral	Liberia,	1846		This	map	outlines	the	coastal	territory	of	Liberia	a	year	before	Independence,	stretching	from	Gallinas	River	to	San	Pedro	River.	The	arrows	point	interior-wise,	while	the	solid	line	marks	the	inward	limit	of	‘known’	Liberia.			
	
Map	2.	Coastal	limits,	1857		The	north-western	limit	has	contracted	to	Mannah	Point	(Mano	River)	under	British	force.	Dashes	mark	the	coastline;	arrows	point	indefinitely	into	the	interior.		
	
Map	3.	North-west	border,	1885		The	border	with	Sierra	Leone	set	by	the	1885	Anglo-Liberian	treaty	begins	by	following	the	Mano	River	(solid	line)	before	extending	indefinitely	into	the	interior	(dashes).	Note	the	question	mark	at	the	north-eastern	end.	
	
	
Map	4.	Hinterland,	1892			The	interior	boundaries	set	by	treaties	with	Britain	and	France	in	1885	and	1892,	showing	the	ambiguities	in	their	definition.	As	Stewart	notes,	‘the	map	clearly	shows	the	contradictory	nature	of	the	British	and	French	treaties’.				
Map	5.	Proposed	territory,	1906		A	solid	line	demarks	the	interior	boundaries	of	Liberia,	although	this	map	still	only	‘represents	the	proposals	at	one	stage	of	negotiations	between	France	and	Liberia’.	Whilst	the	most	imaginative	of	the	maps,	in	that	it	is	merely	a	proposition,	it	also	appears	the	most	complete,	and	is	said	to	be	the	most	geographically	accurate	of	the	maps.	
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148	If	Map	1	depicts	 the	extent	of	 the	Republic	on	 the	ground	at	 Independence,	 then	Map	2	shows	how	Liberia	nonetheless	remained	an	unbounded	 idea.	Despite	 the	encroachment	 of	 the	 British	 on	 the	 Republic’s	 north-western	 frontier,	 and	 the	French	 to	 the	 south-east,	 Liberia	 was	 still	 seen	 to	 reach	 indefinitely	 into	 the	interior.	 As	 Stewart	 notes,	 ‘no	 definite	 limits	 are	 available	 for	 the	 interiorward	extent	of	Liberia	on	this	or	on	many	of	the	following	maps,	even	though	such	limits	are	shown	on	the	maps’	(as	in	Maps	4	and	5).72		Maps	3	and	4	then	record	the	process	of	establishing	Liberia	as	a	bounded	reality.	Map	 3	 depicts	 the	 Republic’s	 north-western	 boundary	with	 Sierra	 Leone	according	 to	 the	 1885	 Anglo-Liberian	 treaty,	 which,	 as	 Stewart	 notes,	 ‘sets	 the	Mannoh	(Mano)	River	as	the	boundary;	the	left	bank	until	the	river	intersects	the	interior	boundary	of	Liberia,	or	if	the	river	does	not	extend	that	far,	a	line	from	its	farthest	 reaches	 extended	 in	 a	 northeasterly	 direction	 until	 it	 intersects	 that	boundary.’	 Stewart	 then	 adds:	 ‘The	 fact	 that	 there	 was	 no	 definite	 interior	boundary	 at	 that	 time	merely	 adds	 to	 the	 vagueness’.73	 The	 result	 is	 a	 solid	 line	that	begins	confidently,	before	fading	into	the	interior,	the	answer	it	is	supposed	to	provide	ending	 in	a	question	mark.	Likewise,	Map	4,	depicting	 the	 south-eastern	boundary	with	France’s	west	African	colonies,	‘tries	to	apply	the	provisions	of	the	1892	treaty	to	actuality’;74	and	yet,	as	Stewart	concludes,	the	result	is	‘two	sets	of	boundary	descriptions	[that]	do	not	jibe.’75		Whilst	 Maps	 3	 and	 4	 are	 an	 attempt	 to	 depict	 the	 bounded	 reality	 of	‘Liberia’,	 Map	 5	 is	 drawn	 as	 an	 imagined	 territory,	 proposed	 in	 1906	 during	negotiations	between	Liberia	 and	France.	Thus	 the	 least	 realistic	 of	 the	maps,	 in	
																																																						72	Stewart,	‘Liberia's	Boundaries:	A	Preliminary	Study’,	'Map	C'.	Even	after	the	boundaries	had	been	finalised,	the	interior	of	Liberia	remained	indefinite.	In	Graham	Greene’s	account	of	his	1936	walking	tour	through	Liberia,	he	notes:	‘I	could	find	only	two	large-scale	maps	for	sale.	One,	issued	by	the	British	General	Staff,	quite	openly	confesses	ignorance;	there	is	a	large	white	space	covering	the	greater	part	of	the	Republic,	with	a	few	dotted	lines	indicating	the	conjectured	course	of	rivers	(incorrectly,	I	usually	found)	[…].	The	other	map	is	issued	by	the	United	States	War	Department.	There	is	a	dashing	quality	about	it;	it	shows	a	vigorous	imagination.	Where	the	English	map	is	content	to	leave	a	blank	space,	the	American	in	large	letters	fills	it	with	the	word	“Cannibals”.	It	has	no	use	for	dotted	lines	and	confessions	of	ignorance;	it	is	so	inaccurate	that	it	would	be	useless,	perhaps	even	dangerous,	to	follow	it,	though	there	is	something	Elizabethan	in	its	imagination.	“Dense	Forest”;	“Cannibals”:	rivers	which	don’t	exist,	at	any	rate	anywhere	near	where	they	are	put;	one	expects	to	find	Eldorado,	two-headed	men	and	fabulous	beasts	represented	in	little	pictures	in	the	Gola	Forest.’	Graham	Greene,	Journey	Without	Maps	(London:	Vintage,	2002),	45-46.	73	Stewart,	‘Liberia's	Boundaries:	A	Preliminary	Study’,	'Map	E'.	74	This	is	a	reference	to	a	treaty	negotiated	between	Liberia	and	France	in	1892	to	settle	the	question	of	Liberia’s	south-eastern	boundary.	75	Stewart,	‘Liberia's	Boundaries:	A	Preliminary	Study’,	'Map	H'.	
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149the	sense	that	it	did	not	correspond	to	‘Liberia’	as	articulated	by	law,	it	is	also	the	most	realistic,	in	the	sense	that	it	comes	closest	to	the	actual	lay	of	the	land.76		Taken	 together	 this	 set	 of	 maps	 shows	 the	 high	 abstraction	 of	 the	representational	 framework	 that	 was	 projected	 onto	 the	 lands	 and	 peoples	 of	‘Liberia’	 in	 the	attempt	 to	 consolidate	 the	nation-state.	The	 lines	 crawling	across	the	 blank	 page	 suggest	 an	 indeterminate,	 movable	 species	 of	 thing,	 capable	 of	changing	place	without	an	essential	change	in	its	actual	nature.	At	the	same	time,	as	 a	 colonial	 technology,	 these	 lines	 were	 cutting	 deep	 into	 an	 actual	 place,	reflecting	 and	 facilitating	 the	 transformation	 of	 its	 lands	 and	 peoples	 into	 the	territory	and	citizens	of	Liberia.77	Thus	as	a	kind	of	performance	artwork,	the	map	series	shows	the	gradual	overlay	of	‘Liberia’	upon	the	country	over	which	it	sought	to	extend	its	jurisdiction	between	1846	and	1906;	whilst	as	a	work	of	surrealism,	the	maps	show	 just	how	 indefinite	 the	 territory	remained,	and	how	 fantastic	 the	process	was	of	consolidating	‘Liberia’.		The	fantastical	nature	of	this	process	can	be	read	in	the	Report	of	the	Special	
Commissioner	 for	 the	 Demarkation	 of	 the	 Anglo	 Liberian	 Boundary.78	 Written	 in	1903	 as	 a	 record	 of	 the	 Commissioner’s	 expedition	 to	 map	 the	 north-western	boundary	set	down	in	the	1885	treaty,79	the	report	reads	in	parts	like	the	journal	of	a	man	exploring	the	realms	of	a	mythical	country	that	exists	 in	name	alone,	as	‘Liberia’,	 but	 which	 has	 not	 yet	 been	 made	 conscious	 of	 itself	 as	 Liberian.	Throughout	 the	 report	 there	 is	 a	 striking	 dissonance	 in	 how	 the	 Commissioner	describes	 the	 places	 he	 passes	 through,	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 future-present	 Republic—present	 in	 the	minds	 of	 Americo-Liberians,	 only	 yet	 to	 be	made	 present	 on	 the	ground.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 as	 he	 describes	 these	 places	 as	 ‘our	 Republic’,	 and	advises	 the	 Government	 to	 ‘lose	 no	 time	 in	 taking	 possession	 of	 and	 occupying’	them,	he	notes	the	lack	of	presence	of	the	Republic	there.	Thus	at	one	point,	having	presented	the	Liberian	flag	to	some	Chiefs,	he	notes:	‘For	the	first	time	had	our	flag	been	seen	in	this	part	of	our	Republic	so	they	informed	us’.80	
																																																						76	Ibid,	'Map	J'.		77	Compare	Olivia	Barr,	‘A	Jurisprudential	Tale	of	a	Road,	an	Office,	and	a	Triangle’,	Law	and	
Literature,	vol	27,	no	2	(2015).	78	Report	of	the	Special	Commissioner.		79	On	the	demarcation	process,	see	also	Yekutiel	Gershoni,	‘The	Formation	of	Liberia's	Boundaries,	Part	2:	The	Demarcation	Process’,	Liberian	Studies	Journal,	vol	17,	no	2	(1992).	80	Ibid,	9-10.	In	his	study	of	the	‘pacification	of	the	Liberian	hinterland’,	Akingbade	also	notes	how	‘there	were	many	people	in	the	interior	who	were	totally	untouched	by	the	influence	of	the	
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150		 The	Americo-Liberian	vision	of	making	citizens	out	of	 the	African	peoples	living	 within	 the	 envisioned	 territory	 of	 the	 Republic	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 in	 this	report.	 At	 one	 point,	 on	 entering	 the	 town	 of	 Kailahun	 on	 the	 north-western	frontier,	 the	Commissioner	notes	that	 its	 ‘3000	or	4000	inhabitants’	were	 ‘kindly	disposed	 and	 friendly—in	 a	 word	 they	 are	 nice	 people	 and	 will	 make	 us	 good	citizens	by	and	by.	But	the	imitation	must	come	from	us.’81	This	reflects	the	view,	shared	 by	 the	 government	 and	 its	 supporters,	 that	 the	 process	 of	 extending	‘Liberia’	 into	 the	 interior	 would	 be	 uni-directional	 and	 top-down:	 these	 people	would	be	made	 into	our	 citizens.82	The	 sentence	 that	 follows—‘but	 the	 imitation	
must	 come	 from	us’—is	 remarkable,	 not	only	because	 it	 repeats	 the	 thought	 that	the	extension	of	‘Liberia’	into	the	interior	would	be	uni-directional	and	top-down,	but	 because	 of	 its	 apparent	 typographical	 error.	 Presumably	 the	 Commissioner	meant	 ‘invitation’	 and	 not	 ‘imitation’,	 in	 line	 with	 the	 European	 practice	 of	establishing	authority	over	an	African	people	and	their	land	through	the	signature	of	 a	 treaty.83	 The	 ‘invitation’	 would	 be	 to	 enter	 into	 a	 treaty	 with	 the	 Liberian	government,	 perhaps	 on	 the	 promise	 of	military	 protection	 and	 the	 provision	 of	infrastructure	and	schools,	in	return	for	recognising	the	sovereignty	of	Liberia	and	allowing	the	Republic	to	raise	 its	 flag	over	the	town.84	But	the	word	 ‘imitation’	 is	equally	appropriate,	pointing	to	the	implication	of	such	an	invitation.	Becoming	a	Liberian	citizen	would	involve	not	merely	a	change	in	legal	status:	it	would	involve,	by	 and	 by,	 becoming	 ‘civilised’.	 As	 the	 Commissioner	 writes	 early	 in	 his	 report,	after	carrying	out	‘an	inspection	of	these	stalwart	sons	of	our	forest’:	‘[I	was]	proud	to	know	that	we	had	thousands	of	such	good	strong	men	that	could	be	utilized	as	citizens,	 if	 civilized,	 in	 building	 up	 a	 strong	 commonwealth	 on	 our	 border	 and	Interior.’85	Of	course	to	‘utilise’	means	not	simply	to	‘use’,	but	to	use	in	a	way	that	
																																																																																																																																																														Americo-Liberians’,	and	that	‘their	first	awareness	began	when	they	were	required	to	pay	taxes	and	recruit	men	of	their	number	for	public	works	or	for	work	on	the	farms	of	individual	Americo-Liberians’.	Harrison	Akingbade,	‘The	Pacification	of	the	Liberian	Hinterland’,	Journal	of	Negro	
History,	vol	79,	no	3	(1994):	292-293.	81	Report	of	the	Special	Commissioner,	12	(spelling	‘mistakes’	in	original).	82	As	it	turned	out,	these	particular	people	and	their	land	would	be	annexed	to	Sierra	Leone	by	the	British.	83	See	Gershoni,	‘Liberia's	Boundaries,	Part	1’,	27.	84	See	Report	of	the	Special	Commissioner,	in	particular	the	summary	of	the	‘political	character’	of	the	mission	at	20-24.	On	the	importance	of	the	flag	as	a	sign	of	the	Republic’s	dominion	in	the	interior,	see,	eg,	at	9-10,	13-14,	18,	20-21.		85	Ibid,	5.	
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151alters	the	object	 in	use:	 it	 is	to	 ‘render	useful’;	 to	 ‘convert	to	use’.86	To	make	these	‘sons	of	the	forest’	into	citizens	would	be	to	make	them	useful	to	the	nation-state.	Not	only	would	 they	make	useful	 soldiers	 for	 the	Republic,	 as	 the	Commissioner	anticipated,	but	they	would	also	be	especially	useful	as	 labour.87	However,	as	the	Commissioner	also	notes,	to	make	these	‘hinterland	peoples’	useful	in	these	ways,	first	they	would	have	to	be	rendered	‘civilised’,	which	was	essentially	a	process	of	imitation,	 involving	conversion	to	Christianity	and	a	proper	 ‘book	education’	that	would	not	only	inform	their	beliefs	but	also	their	dress	and	manners.88		If	the	success	of	metonymy	is	in	the	fusion	of	signifier	and	signified—so	that	a	 name	 such	 as	 ‘Liberia’	 is	 thought	 to	 correspond	with	 the	 lands	 and	 peoples	 it	circumscribes—then	 key	 to	 this	 success	 is	 the	 realism	 of	 the	 representational	framework.	 This	 does	 not	 mean	 the	 representational	 framework	 must	 actually	correspond	with	the	given	form	of	its	object.	The	opposite:	as	an	act	of	articulation,	giving	new	form	to	what	 is,	 the	 framework	must	be	super-real.	 Indeed,	 the	more	surreal	 the	 framework’s	articulated	vision	 is,	 the	more	able	 it	will	be	 to	bend	 its	object	 into	 another	 form.	 This	 of	 course	 creates	 a	 dissonance	 between	 the	representational	 framework	 and	 its	 object.	 But	 that	 is	 why	 the	 success	 of	 the	metonym	depends	 on	 the	 realism	of	 the	 representation,	which	does	not	mean	 it	has	to	be	‘actually	real’,	but	only	imagined	to	be	real.		This	is	the	genius	of	a	metonym:	its	capacity	to	be	simultaneously	separate	and	inseparable	from	its	object—inseparable	in	the	sense	that	the	framework	and	its	 object	 become	 all-but	 indistinguishable	 (hence	 the	 realism);	 separate	 in	 the	sense	 that	 the	 two	 are	 never	 quite	 identical	 (hence	 the	 realism	 is	 over-laid	 or	super-imposed,	that	is,	surreal).	Thus	for	the	Commissioner	going	out	to	map	the	interior	of	Liberia,	 the	task	was	not	 to	describe	the	country	 ‘as	 is’,	but	 to	overlay	the	 territory	articulated	 in	 the	 treaty	onto	 the	 country.	As	visionaries,	 instead	of	seeing	 an	 existing	 country,	 the	 Americo-Liberians	 who	 set	 out	 to	 create	 Liberia	saw	a	fantasy	world	of	primeval	forests	‘heavily	timbered	and	watered’	by	‘brooks,	
																																																						86	‘Utilize,	v.’,	OED	Online,	September	2015	(my	italics).	87	I	discuss	this	in	the	next	section.	See	also	Akingbade,	‘The	Pacification	of	the	Liberian	Hinterland’,	279.	88	And	yet,	‘the	imitation	must	come	from	us’,	which	also	points	to	the	fact	that	the	colonisers,	rather	than	the	colonised,	would	have	to	be	the	ones	to	assimilate	to	the	other.	(With	thanks	to	Jeremy	Farrall	for	pointing	this	out.)	Of	course,	this	is	not	how	the	Americo-Liberian	settlers	saw	the	situation.	In	general,	they	saw	themselves	as	the	source	of	imitation,	and	not	the	ones	who	would	be	doing	the	imitating—although	in	the	end,	of	course,	the	influence	worked	both	ways,	with	both	‘colonisers’	and	‘colonised’	influencing	each	other.		
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152	rivulets,	and	creeks’	and	populated	by	primitive	‘sons	of	the	forests’.89	It	is	not	that	they	did	not	see	the	dissonance	between	their	vision	and	what	they	encountered	on	the	ground;	it	is	just	that	they	saw	their	vision	as	more	real.	After	all,	this	was	the	 light	 that	 would	 illuminate	 Africa’s	 true	 potential	 and	 enable	 its	transformation.		In	sum,	the	process	of	extending	Liberia	‘beyond	the	littoral’	was	meant	to	be	 a	 process	 of	 super-imposing	 the	 idea	 of	 Liberia	 over	 the	 blank	 space	 of	 the	‘hinterland’	 to	 consolidate	 the	 nation-state.	 In	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 nineteenth	century,	‘littoral	Liberia’—the	place	of	Americo-Liberian	coastal	settlements—was	a	place	in	flux,	its	north-western	limits	under	pressure	from	the	British,	its	south-western	 limits	 contested	 by	 the	 French,	 with	 both	 threatening	 to	 subsume	 the	nascent	 Republic	 within	 their	 colonial	 empires.90	 Extending	 Liberia	 ‘beyond	 the	littoral’	was	supposed	to	finally	settle	the	uncertain,	contested	place	of	‘Liberia’	in	west	 Africa	 by	 establishing	 definite	 boundaries	 and	 bringing	 the	 country—both	lands	 and	 peoples—under	 its	 dominion.	 And	 yet,	 as	 I	 now	 turn	 to	 show,	 super-imposing	the	idea	of	‘Liberia’	over	the	hinterland	using	the	surrealist	apparatus	of	the	colonial	legal	framework	did	not	place	Liberia	beyond	the	littoral,	in	the	sense	of	settling	its	place	in	west	Africa.	Rather,	the	effect	was	to	extend	littoral	Liberia	
into	 the	 interior.	 Desmond	 Manderson	 and	 Honni	 van	 Rijswijk	 describe	 ‘littoral	spaces’	 as	 ‘heightened	 and	 active,	 places	 of	 contested	 imaginaries’—‘an	environment	 of	 flux	 and	 change	 par	 excellence’.91	 Despite	 the	 attempt	 to	 settle	‘littoral	Liberia’	by	defining	its	territory	and	population,	what	had	been	throughout	the	nineteenth	century	a	largely	open	and	indeterminate	idea,	with	only	‘a	narrow	strip	squeezed	in	between	the	twin	perils	of	land	and	sea’,92	would	become	in	the	twentieth	century	a	littoral	space	par	excellence.			 	
																																																						89	See	notes	61	and	85	above.	90	See	Gershoni,	‘Liberia's	Boundaries,	Part	1’;	Gershoni,	‘Liberia's	Boundaries,	Part	2’.	91	Desmond	Manderson	and	Honni	van	Rijswick,	‘Introduction	to	Littoral	Readings:	Representations	of	Land	and	Sea	in	Law,	Literature,	and	Geography’,	Law	and	Literature,	vol	27,	no	2	(2015):	174.	See	also	Desmond	Manderson,	Kangaroo	Courts	and	the	Rule	of	Law	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2012),	Chapter	10.	92	Manderson	and	van	Rijswick,	‘Littoral	Readings’,	174.	
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153C	 Civil	death		 The	 genius	 of	 liberty	 shall	 go	 out	 from	 thence;	 the	 dominion	 of	 freedom	shall	be	extended;	tribe	after	tribe	shall	send	in	its	adhesion,	until	the	entire	of	 long	neglected—long	 injured	Africa—no	 longer	pillaged	 and	plundered	of	her	children,	shall	be	crowned	with	all	the	blessings	of	civil	liberty.	And	by	the	advancement	of	this	cause	shall	commerce	be	advanced.	The	hidden	treasures	of	another	continent	shall	be	developed	and	borne	upon	many	a	sea.		 The	Rev	Mr	Hammet	
Annual	Meeting	of	the	American	Colonisation	Society,	1822		The	vision	of	making	the	African	peoples	over	whom	Liberia	claimed	jurisdiction	into	citizens	was	not	formalised	until	1904.	Under	the	interior	policy	of	President	Arthur	Barclay	(1904–1912),	the	Constitution	of	the	Republic	was	finally	amended	to	 enable	 Liberia’s	 ‘indigenous	 peoples’	 to	 be	 recognised	 as	 subjects	 of—rather	than	just	subject	to—the	nation-state.	The	recognition	remained	partial,	however,	with	African-Liberians	given	the	constitutional	status	of	‘uncivilised	citizens’,	with	the	proviso	 that	 they	 could	 become	 ‘civilised	 citizens’,	 by	 and	by,	 at	which	point	they	 would	 be	 invested	 with	 the	 full	 body	 of	 rights	 that	 resided	 in	 Americo-Liberians.	 Finally,	 this	 would	 be	 the	 realisation	 of	 the	 promise	 of	 Liberia,	 as	 a	beacon	 for	 the	 empire	 of	 reason	 and	 law	 in	 Africa:	 the	 possibility	 of	 becoming	rightful	subjects,	marked	by	the	graduation	into	civilization;	this	was	the	invitation	(of	citizenship),	and	the	 imitation	(of	civilization),	 that	would	render	 ‘the	sons	of	the	forest’	useful	to	the	nation-state.		If	 this	 vision	 was	 a	 violent	 one,	 its	 violence	 was	 felt	 most	 in	 its	 non-realisation.	 Failure	 to	 become	 a	wholly	 rightful	 citizen	 of	 the	 nation-state	would	mean	 suffering	 a	 form	 of	 civil	 death	 as	 an	 ‘uncivilised	 citizen’.	 This	 is	 precisely	what	 happened	 to	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 Liberia’s	 citizens	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	twentieth	 century.	 The	 African	 peoples	 over	 whom	 the	 government	 sought	 to	exercise	dominion	would	 remain	 ‘Liberian’	 in	name	alone,	 the	 two	 (‘African’	 and	‘Liberian’)	 being	 synonymous	 only	 in	 the	 language	 of	 the	 national	 law	 of	 the	Republic.	 To	be	African-Liberian	 at	 this	 time	was	 like	 being	African-American	 in	the	United	States,	as	free	people	of	colour	who	remained	unfree	as	a	result	of	their	
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154	de-gradation	as	second-class	citizens.	This	experience	of	civil	death	is	writ	large	in	the	history	of	Liberia.		In	 the	 first	 decade	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 the	 government	 was	 still	struggling	to	establish	effective	occupation	of	the	interior,	in	large	part	because	it	lacked	 the	 resources	 to	 extend	 its	 presence	 beyond	 its	 coastal	 settlements.93	Without	 funds	 to	build	 infrastructure,	 and	without	 security	 forces	 to	deploy,	 the	hinterland	 remained	 ‘effectively	 unoccupied’,	 according	 to	 the	 terms	 of	 the	‘declaration	relative	 to	 the	essential	conditions	 to	be	observed	 in	order	 that	new	occupations	 on	 the	 coasts	 of	 the	 African	 continent	may	 be	 held	 to	 be	 effective’,	adopted	 by	 the	 General	 Act	 of	 the	 Berlin	 Conference	 in	 1885.94	 In	 attempt	 to	effectively	 occupy	 the	 interior,	 the	 Government	 had	 entered	 into	 an	 agreement	with	 the	British	owned	Liberian	Development	Company	 in	1904.	The	 agreement	was	 supposed	 to	 do	 two	 things:	 the	 Liberian	 Development	 Company	 would	provide	 the	Government	with	a	 loan,	 thus	addressing	 its	 financial	problems;	and	the	company	would	carry	out	commercial	operations	in	the	interior,	which	would	count	 towards	 ‘effective	occupation’.95	 In	1906,	 the	 government	 secured	another	large	 loan	 from	British	bankers	with	 the	assistance	of	 the	Liberian	Development	Company.96		Within	a	year—heavily	indebted,	unable	to	repay	its	loans,	and	still	without	control	 over	 the	 African	 peoples	 within	 its	 territory,	 to	 the	 frustration	 of	 the	British	and	French—the	government	was	forced	to	agree	to	a	set	of	reforms.	As	the	
																																																						93	See	Akingbade,	‘The	Pacification	of	the	Liberian	Hinterland’,	281.	94	General	Act	of	the	Berlin	Conference,	26	February	1885,	Chapter	VI.	On	what	would	constitute	‘effective	occupation’,	see	also	General	Act	of	the	Brussels	Conference	Relative	to	the	African	Slave	
Trade,	2	July	1890,	in	which	‘the	Powers’,	‘[e]qually	animated	by	the	ﬁrm	intention	of	putting	an	end	to	the	crimes	and	devastations	engendered	by	the	traffic	in	African	slaves,	of	effectively	protecting	the	aboriginal	populations	of	Africa,	and	of	assuring	to	that	vast	continent	the	beneﬁts	of	peace	and	civilization;	[…]	have	adopted	the	following	provisions’:	‘ARTICLE	1.	The	Powers	declare	that	the	most	effective	means	for	counteracting	the	Slave	Trade	in	the	interior	of	Africa	are	the	following:—	1.	Progressive	organization	of	the	administrative,	judicial,	religious,	and	military	services	in	the	African	territories	[…]	2.	The	gradual	establishment	in	the	interior	by	the	responsible	Power	in	each	territory	of	strongly	occupied	stations	in	such	a	way	as	to	make	their	protective	or	repressive	action	effectively	felt	[…]	3.	The	construction	of	roads,	and	in	particular	of	railways,	connecting	the	advanced	stations	with	the	coast	[…]	6.	Organization	of	expeditions	and	ﬂying	columns	to	keep	up	the	communication	of	the	stations	with	each	other	and	with	the	coast,	to	support	repressive	action,	and	to	assure	the	security	of	roadways.	7.	Restriction	of	the	importation	of	ﬁre-arms,	at	least	of	modern	pattern,	and	of	ammunition,	throughout	the	entire	extent	of	the	territories	infected	by	the	Slave	Trade.’	95	See	Akingbade,	‘The	Pacification	of	the	Liberian	Hinterland’,	280.	See	also	Brussels	Conference	Act	(1890),	Art	1.	96	See	also	Gershoni,	‘Liberia's	Boundaries,	Part	1’,	36-37.	
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155British	Consul-General	 in	Monrovia	put	 it	 to	the	Government,	Liberia	would	have	to	‘put	her	house	in	order,	or	be	prepared,	at	no	distant	date,	to	disappear	from	the	catalogue	of	 independent	 countries.’97	Or	 as	 the	US	 Secretary	 of	 State	 put	 it	 in	 a	letter	 to	 a	 delegation	 appointed	 to	 investigate	 the	 situation	 in	 Liberia	 two	 years	later:	 owing	 to	 the	 inability	of	 the	Liberian	Government	properly	 to	 control	 the	native	tribes	and	its	consequent	failure	to	maintain	order	upon	the	border,	there	is	reason	to	apprehend	the	temporary	and	eventually	the	permanent	occupation	 of	 Liberian	 territory	 by	 her	more	 powerful	 neighbors	 [Britain	and	France]	on	the	ground	of	the	necessity	of	assuring	order	and	safety	in	their	own	colimiting	territories.98	‘Putting	her	house	in	order’	meant	establishing	a	Frontier	Police	Force	as	well	as	reforming	its	Judiciary	and	Treasury,	under	the	supervision	of	Western	advisors.99	Complying	 with	 the	 British	 demands,	 the	 Government	 established	 the	 Liberian	Frontier	 Force	 in	 1908,100	 putting	 it	 first	 under	 the	 command	 of	 a	 British	 army	Major	with	the	assistance	of	two	British	officers,	and	within	a	few	years	under	US	supervision	and	command.101		In	 the	decades	 to	 follow,	 the	Liberian	Frontier	Force	would	be	used	as	an	administrative	 instrument	to	pacify	the	hinterland.102	Officially	mandated	 ‘for	the	maintenance	of	law	and	order	throughout	the	republic	and	for	the	prevention	and	detection	of	crimes	on	the	frontier	and	in	the	interior	of	the	country’,103	it	quickly	gained	 a	 reputation	 for	 ‘wanton	 cruelty,	 harassment,	 indiscipline,	 and	 rapine.’104	
																																																						97	Cited	in	Monday	B	Abasiattai,	‘European	Intervention	in	Liberia	with	Special	Reference	to	the	'Cadell	Incident'	of	1908-1909’,	Liberian	Studies	Journal,	vol	14,	no	1	(1989).	98	‘The	Secretary	of	State	to	the	Commissioners	of	Liberia’,	US	Department	of	State,	Washington,	DC,	13	April	1909.	99	See	Abasiattai,	‘European	Intervention	in	Liberia	1908-1909’,	79.	100	‘Joint	Resolution	Providing	for	the	Pay	and	Formation	of	a	Frontier	Police	Force’,	in	Acts	Passed	
by	the	Legislature	of	the	Republic	of	Liberia	during	the	Session	1907–1908	(Monrovia:	Government	Printing	Office,	1908),	23,	cited	in	Akingbade,	‘The	Pacification	of	the	Liberian	Hinterland’,	281-284.	101	See	Abasiattai,	‘European	Intervention	in	Liberia	1908-1909’,	79-85.	See	also	Akingbade,	‘The	Pacification	of	the	Liberian	Hinterland’,	281.	On	the	involvement	of	US	officers	in	the	Liberian	Frontier	Force	between	1912	and	1927,	see	Timothy	A	Rainey,	‘Buffalo	Soldiers	in	Africa:	The	US	Army	and	the	Liberian	Frontier	Force,	1912-1927’,	Liberian	Studies	Journal,	vol	21,	no	2	(1996).	102	See	Raymond	Leslie	Buell,	Liberia:	A	Century	of	Survival,	1847-1947	(Philadelphia:	University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	1947),	24-25.	See	also	Akingbade,	‘The	Pacification	of	the	Liberian	Hinterland’,	292.	103	Frontier	Force	Manual,	Article	2,	Section	5,	cited	in	Akingbade,	‘The	Pacification	of	the	Liberian	Hinterland’,	286.	104	Ibid.	
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156	Thus	 in	 1910,	 the	 Frontier	 Force	 was	 deployed	 to	 suppress	 an	 uprising	 of	 the	Grebo	 in	 the	 south-west	 of	 the	 country,	 which	 had	 begun	 as	 a	 revolt	 in	 protest	‘against	oppression,	excessive	taxation,	forced	labor,	and	other	irregularities.’105		The	Government’s	 justification	 for	 the	 oppressive	 conduct	 of	 the	 Frontier	Force	was	its	necessity	in	realising	the	vision	of	Liberia.	Not	only	would	this	Force	assist	in	establishing	the	authority	of	the	Republic	in	the	interior,	thereby	securing	Liberia’s	international	citizenship,	but	it	would	also	accelerate	the	development	of	Liberia’s	uncivilized	citizens.	As	the	Liberian	Secretary	of	State	Charles	King	wrote	in	1916,	through	the	Frontier	Force,	Liberia	‘strikes	at	the	very	root	of	[…]	political,	religious	 and	 social	 institutions	which	 are	 uncompromisingly	 antagonistic	 to	 the	laws	of	humanity	and	civilisation’.106		King	would	go	on	to	become	President	of	Liberia	from	1920	to	1930,	before	being	forced	from	office	along	with	his	Vice-President	and	several	members	of	his	cabinet	upon	the	release	by	the	League	of	Nations	of	an	International	Commission	of	Enquiry	report	into	‘the	existence	of	slavery	and	forced	labour	in	the	Republic	of	Liberia’.107	 From	 the	 earliest	 days	 of	 the	 Republic,	 African-Liberians	 were	systematically	 forced	to	provide	 labour	 for	public	works	as	well	as	 for	 individual	Americo-Liberians.108	In	answer	to	the	question	of	the	extent	to	which	‘compulsory	labour	exists	as	a	factor	in	the	social	and	industrial	economy	of	the	State,	either	for	public	or	private	purposes’,	the	Commission	of	Enquiry	found:	that	 forced	 labour	has	been	made	use	of	 in	Liberia	 chiefly	 for	motor	 road	construction,	 for	building	civil	 compounds	and	military	barracks,	 etc.,	 and	for	 porterage.	 That	 this	 labour	 has	 been	 wastefully	 recruited	 and	 used,	frequently	 under	 conditions	 involving	 systematic	 intimidation	 and	 ill-treatment	 on	 the	 part	 of	 Government	 officials,	 messengers	 and	 Frontier	Force	 soldiers.	 That	 labour	 recruited	 by	 County	 Superintendents	 and	District	Commissioners	for	public	purposes	we	find	in	many	instances	has	
																																																						105	Ibid,	286,	292.	106	‘Secretary	of	State	CDB	King	to	James	L	Curtis,	American	Minister	Resident’,	26	May	1916,	RDSL	882.00/540,	cited	in	Martin	Ford,	Ethnic	Relations	and	the	Transformation	of	Leadership	among	the	
Dan	of	Nimba,	Liberia	(ca.	1900-1940)	(Dissertation,	State	University	of	New	York	at	Binghamton,	1990),	93.	Again	compare	Simpson,	‘Humanity,	Law,	Force’.	107	League	of	Nations,	Report	of	the	International	Commission	of	Enquiry	into	the	Existence	of	Slavery	
and	Forced	Labour	in	the	Republic	of	Liberia,	Monrovia,	Liberia,	August	1930	(Geneva:	League	of	Nations,	1930).	The	findings	and	recommendations	are	reprinted	in	‘The	1930	Enquiry	Commission	to	Liberia’,	Journal	of	the	Royal	African	Society,	vol	30,	no	120	(1931):	277-290.	108	See	also	Harrison	Akingbade,	‘The	Liberian	Problem	of	Forced	Labor	1926-1940’,	Africa:	Rivista	
Trimestrale	di	Studi	e	Documentazione	dell'Istituto	Italiano	per	l'Africa	e	l'Oriente,	vol	52,	no	2	(1997).	
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157been	 diverted	 to	 private	 use	 on	 the	 farms	 and	 plantations	 of	 high	Government	officials	and	private	citizens.	That	none	of	this	labour	has	been	paid,	though	paid	labour	may	exist	on	the	plantations;	on	the	other	hand,	in	Maryland	[a	County	of	Liberia]	some	of	it	has	been	made	to	pay	large	sums	to	 the	plantation	owners	 to	be	 released	 from	a	 term	of	unpaid	 and	unfed	labour.109	The	 greatest	 international	 outcry	 followed	 the	 finding	 that	 ‘contract	 labourers’	shipped	 to	 the	 Spanish	 island	 colony	 of	 Fernando	 Pó	 had	 been	 ‘recruited	 under	conditions	of	criminal	compulsion	scarcely	distinguishable	from	slave	raiding	and	slave	trading’.110	On	the	question	of	whether	‘the	Liberian	Frontier	Force	or	other	persons	holding	official	positions	or	in	Government	employ,	or	private	individuals	have	 been	 implicated	 in	 such	 recruiting’,	 the	 Commission	 found	 that	 the	 Vice-President	 ‘and	 other	 high	 officials	 of	 the	 Liberian	 Government’	 had	 ‘given	 their	sanction	 for	 the	 compulsory	 recruitment	 of	 labour	 for	 road	 construction,	 for	shipment	abroad	and	other	work,	by	the	aid	and	assistance	of	the	Liberian	Frontier	Force’.111	Moreover,	 the	Commission	 found	that	 these	officials	had	 ‘condoned	the	utilisation	of	this	force’		for	 purposes	 of	 physical	 compulsion	 on	 road	 construction,	 for	 the	intimidation	of	villagers,	 for	 the	humiliation	and	degradation	of	chiefs,	 for	the	imprisonment	of	inhabitants,	and	for	the	convoying	of	gangs	of	captured	natives	to	the	coast,	there	guarding	them	till	the	time	of	shipment.112	A	further	effect,	the	Commission	found,	was	the	abandonment	of	villages	by	people	who	 had	 fled	 into	 exile.113	 In	 the	 Commission’s	 summation,	 ‘[t]he	 words	
																																																						109	‘The	1930	Enquiry	Commission	to	Liberia’,		279.	110	Ibid,	280.	111	Ibid.	See	also	at	289,	where	the	Commission	notes:	‘Much	of	the	ill-treatment	of	the	people	of	the	interior,	the	cessation	of	native	village	cultivation,	the	exodus	from	the	country	and	the	general	discontent	has,	in	our	opinion,	been	the	result	of	brigandage	on	the	part	of	Frontier	Force	soldiers,	who,	from	the	accounts	of	the	natives,	are	often	unaccompanied	by	their	officers,	and,	when	accompanying	them,	the	officers	seem	to	encourage	a	general	policy	of	intimidation’	(italics	in	original).	112	Ibid.	113	‘On	several	occasions	the	Commissioners	in	their	travels	have	passed	through	abandoned	villages,	or	seen	the	now	overgrown	sites	of	others.	Some	of	these	villages	may,	of	course,	have	been	abandoned	in	the	ordinary	way	in	favour	of	more	fertile	or	less	exhausted	sites,	or	as	the	result	of	the	death	of	the	chief	or	other	cause.	In	the	present	instances	observed	by	the	Commission,	however,	local	history	afforded	a	different	explanation.	Reports	have	repeatedly	reached	the	Commissioners	of	villages	by	the	score	in	other	parts	of	the	country	unoccupied	and	falling	into	disrepair,	and	of	gardens	reverting	to	bush’:	ibid,	284.	
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158	development	and	social	progress	are	unknown,	servitude	and	slavery	have	taken	their	place.’114	For	the	Africans	who	had	been	made	Liberian,	the	experience	was	an	abject	one.	Being	branded	an	African-Liberian	at	 this	 time	meant	civil	death115—denied	full	rightful	citizenship,	subjected	to	slavery,	forced	labour,	or	exile,	amongst	other	forms	 of	 degradation.116	 This	 was	 the	 opposite	 of	 ‘making	 free’	 the	 peoples	 of	Africa.	 Indeed	 it	 was	 the	 repetition	 of	 the	 very	 problem	 ‘Liberia’	 was	 meant	 to	resolve.	Having	 set	 out	 to	 emancipate	 all	 of	Africa,	 the	Government	had	 reduced	the	 vast	 majority	 of	 its	 population	 to	 the	 status	 of	 ‘uncivilised	 citizens’,	 with	terrible	consequences.	And	yet,	rather	than	see	these	results	as	a	logical	function	of	the	 original	 vision	 of	 colonisation,	 they	 were	 seen	 as	 a	 failure	 to	 properly	implement	that	vision.		This	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 report.	 ‘The	 now	 obvious	 fact’,	 the	Commission	 observes	 in	 prelude	 to	 its	 recommendations,	 is	 ‘that	 tropical	 Africa	can	never	 be	 developed,	 its	 agricultural,	mineral,	 and	 other	 sources	 utilised,	 nor	surplus	 Government	 funds	 be	 hoped	 for,	 without	 the	 willing	 co-operation	 and	assistance	 of	 the	 indigenous	 population.’117	 In	 a	 continuation	 of	 the	 nineteenth	century	 policy	 of	 enlightening	 the	 dark	 continent,	 the	 Commission	 then	recommends	gaining	that	‘co-operation	and	assistance’	by	finally	making	civilized	the	 uncivilized	 citizens	 of	 Liberia,	 thereby	 investing	 them	 with	 full	 rights	 of	citizenship	 under	 the	 Constitution.	 ‘We	 believe	 that	 the	 sooner	 class	 distinction	between	civilised	and	uncivilised	is	broken,	and	the	indigenous	native	allowed	an	equal	status	with	the	coast	dweller,	the	better	for	all	concerned.’118	Better	for	the	native,	and	better	for	the	nation-state,	because	civilisation	would	make	the	native	
truly	 useful.	 ‘It	 is	 now	 becoming	 everywhere	 recognised	 by	 tropical	 African	
																																																						114	Ibid.	115	Recall	the	definition	of	civil	death	discussed	in	Part	1	above,	which	includes	deprivation	of	citizenship,	degradation	to	slavery,	forced	labour,	exile,	amongst	other	forms	of	degradation	that	amounted	to	a	loss	of	liberty.	See	notes	32	and	33	above.	116	According	to	the	findings	of	the	Commission	of	Enquiry,	‘intimidation	has	apparently	been	and	is	the	keyword	of	the	Government’s	native	policy.	Not	only	have	the	native	village	classes	been	intimidated	and	terrorised	by	a	display	of	force,	cruelty	and	suppression,	but	the	chiefs	themselves,	men	whom	the	people	not	so	many	years	ago	looked	up	to,	were	glad	to	serve,	and	relied	upon	for	protection	[…]	have	been	so	systematically	humiliated,	degraded	and	robbed	of	their	power,	that	now	they	are	mere	go-betweens,	paid	by	the	Government	to	rob	the	people’:	‘The	1930	Enquiry	Commission	to	Liberia’,		284.	117	Ibid,	281.	118	Ibid,	282.	
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159administrators	 that	 the	 first	 considerations	 towards	 financial	 competence	 must	include	provision	for	the	civilisation,	education,	and	the	gaining	of	the	confidence	of	the	native’.119	Schools	are	of	the	first	importance,	not	merely	for	the	purpose	of	teaching	reading	and	writing,	but	for	improving	the	native’s	sociological	conditions;	and	specialist	instructors	invaluable	for	broadening	his	ideas,	teaching	him	market	 values,	 and	 the	 use	 he	 can	 make	 of	 the	 innumerable	 economic	products	and	raw	materials	around	him.	The	unsophisticated	native	learns	something	 of	 the	 outside	 world,	 and	 his	 wants	 are	 increased.	 The	missionary,	the	school	teacher,	and	the	trader	teach	him	what	he	may	buy	for	money,	and	he	then	wants	to	learn	what	he	can	grow,	what	he	should	do,	or	where	he	should	work	to	make	some	money,	with	the	result	 that	 trade	increases,	 the	 coast	 merchant	 flourishes,	 the	 revenues	 of	 Government	expand,	and	money	is	forthcoming	[…]120	The	 alternative	 to	 such	 development,	 the	 Commission	 cautions,	 is	 a	 situation	where	 ‘the	 native	 must	 continue	 his	 harried	 existence	 with	 a	 feeling	 that	 he	 is	really	and	truly	a	slave’.121	As	if	this	is	not	fantastic	enough,	the	Commission	then	points	 to	Belgian	Congo	as	an	exemplary	model	 for	 the	Government	of	Liberia	to	follow	 in	 developing	 a	 policy	 for	 civilising	 its	 natives,	 before	warning	 that	 if	 the	Government	 fails	 to	 act	 on	 its	 recommendations,	 ‘Liberia	 may	 discover	 that	 its	place	in	the	community	of	civilised	nations	is	jeopardised’.122	The	International	Commission	of	Enquiry	has	been	critiqued	as	an	attempt	to	undermine	the	Black	Republic	as	a	model	of	African	self-rule	at	a	time	of	anti-colonial	 revolution	across	 the	continent.123	However,	whether	or	not	 the	 indirect	
																																																						119	Ibid,	281.	120	Ibid.	121	Ibid.	Later	the	Commission	writes:	‘The	villagers	have	been	intimidated	by	soldiers	of	the	
Frontier	Force,	and	by	messengers	of	the	Paramount	Chiefs	and	District	Commissioners,	to	such	an	extent	that	they	find	themselves	obliged	to	labour	most	of	the	year	on	road	construction,	private	or	Government	farms,	and	other	work	so	continuously,	that	they	have	no	time	to	cultivate	their	own	food	supply.	They	have,	in	fact,	to	live	a	harried	and	half-starved	existence	or	leave	the	country’:	ibid,	284.	122	Ibid,	288.	123	As	Azikiwe	wrote	in	1932	in	response	to	the	Enquiry	and	the	coverage	of	its	findings:	‘Liberia	today	is	a	winter	resort	for	any	artist	who	is	interested	in	caricaturing	Negro	statehood’.	Ben	N	Azikiwe,	‘In	Defense	of	Liberia’,	Journal	of	Negro	History,	vol	17,	no	1	(1932):	45.	Azikiwe	goes	on	to	critique	the	‘systematically	organized	propaganda	that	Liberia,	Haiti,	and	Abyssinia	are	failures,	and	that	they	furnish	evidence	to	prove	the	incapacity	of	the	Negro	for	self-government	in	the	tropical	regions.	Discarding	all	problems	which	sovereign	states	must	face	in	order	to	maintain	their	de	jure	existence,	most	of	the	writers	on	Liberia,	excepting	Benjamin	Brawley,	McPherson,	Froude,	Jore,	Cuthbert	Christy,	and	Buell,	have	delighted	themselves	in	seeing	chaos,	disorder,	hopeless	anarchy	and	failure	of	the	Liberian	“experiment”	whenever	her	case	is	before	the	bar	of	international	
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160	aim	was	 to	make	 it	 a	 protectorate,	more	 insidious	was	 the	 Commission’s	 direct	goal,	 as	 expressed	 in	 its	 recommendations	 for	 reform.	 Liberia	 would	 keep	 its	international	 citizenship	 as	 long	 as	 it	 demonstrated	 progress	 in	 making	 its	population	 ‘useful’,	by	which	 it	meant	economically	productive.	At	 the	time	there	was	 a	 shortage	 of	 labour	 in	 Europe’s	 west	 African	 colonies,	 leading	 colonial	administrations	 to	 erect	 barriers	 to	 keep	 their	 domestic	 labourers	 within	 the	territories	 of	 their	 colonies.	 Against	 this	 policy,	 Liberia	 was	 committing	 two	offences:	 not	 only	 was	 its	 government	 failing	 to	 make	 its	 population	 into	productive	 citizens,	 but	 it	 was	 also	 ‘leaking’	 labourers	 from	 its	 neighbouring	colonies,	especially	Sierra	Leone,	by	acting	as	a	conduit	for	recruiters	to	ship	them	to	the	island	of	Fernando	Pó.124		The	 intervention	 by	 the	 League	 of	 Nations	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 Enquiry	succeeded	 in	 stopping	 that	 leak,	 to	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 British	 interests	 in	 Sierra	Leone.	 But	 it	 also	 satisfied	 US	 interests,	 by	 putting	 international	 pressure	 on	Liberia	 to	 create	 a	 domestic	 labour	 market.125	 In	 1926,	 four	 years	 before	 the	finalisation	of	the	Commission’s	report,	and	around	the	time	of	the	Commission’s	establishment	 ‘at	 the	 instigation	 of	 the	 United	 States	 Government’,126	 the	 US-owned	Firestone	Tire	and	Rubber	Company	had	signed	a	planting	agreement	with	the	 Government	 of	 Liberia	 to	 lease	 more	 than	 1	 million	 acres	 for	 its	 planned	rubber	plantations,	requiring	a	projected	350,000	labourers127—labourers	which,	the	 Company	 reminded	 the	 Liberian	 Government,	 it	 had	 promised	 to	 make	available.	As	Harvey	Firestone	Jr	stated	in	a	letter	to	President	King	in	1926:	 ‘We	desire	to	point	out	to	the	Government	again	that	the	success	of	our	development	in	
																																																																																																																																																														opinion.	Even	Emmett	J	Scott,	of	Howard	University,	holds	that	the	usual	charges	of	official	corruption	are	not	always	true.	This	is	generally	done	to	take	advantage	of	the	people	and	pave	way	for	economic	exploitation’.	Ibid,	46-47.	124	See	I	K	Sundiata,	‘Prelude	to	Scandal:	Liberia	and	Fernando	Po,	1880-1930’,	Journal	of	African	
History,	vol	15,	no	1	(1974):	110.	125	See	also	Azikiwe,	‘In	Defense	of	Liberia’.	Azikiwe	writes:	‘As	Dr	Buell	points	out	in	his	address	the	Firestone	Agreement	is	chiefly	responsible	for	the	economic	problems	of	Liberia	today.	This	document	is	unilateral	despite	its	imposing	signatories.	It	grants	Harvey	S	Firestone	not	only	a	veto	power	on	refinancing	this	country,	but	elevates	him	to	a	dictatorship	whereby	he	effectively	controls	the	immediate	economic	destiny	of	that	government.	Like	an	octopus	it	has	a	stranglehold	on	Liberia	which	will	ultimately	threaten	if	not	completely	decimate	the	political	existence	of	this	lone	African	Republic.	It	is	thus	held	in	some	quarters	to	have	paved	way	for	Yankee	imperialism	in	Africa’:	30.	On	the	connection	between	the	League	of	Nations	International	Commission	of	Enquiry	into	Liberia	and	the	Firestone	company/United	States	interests,	see	also	W	E	Burghardt	Du	Bois,	‘Liberia,	the	League	and	the	United	States’,	Foreign	Affairs,	vol	11,	no	4	(1933).	126	‘The	1930	Enquiry	Commission	to	Liberia’,		277.	127	See	Sundiata,	‘Liberia	and	Fernando	Po’,	108.	
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161Liberia	is	largely	dependent	upon	the	organization	of	a	permanent	and	contented	labour	 force.’128	 What	 Firestone	 needed	 was	 a	 mass	 of	 bodies	 to	 transform	Liberia’s	primeval	 forest	 into	 a	productive	 rubber	plantation.	 If	 Liberia’s	 already	scarce	 human	 resources	 were	 being	 shipped	 to	 Fernando	 Pó,	 Firestone’s	investment	would	fail.			
	
Figure	8.	‘Tappers	on	Firestone’s	plantations	in	Liberia	set	out	daily	at	sunrise	to	tap	250	to	300	trees	apiece.’129		The	International	Commission	of	Enquiry	into	slavery	and	forced	labour	in	Liberia	marked	a	turning	point	in	the	Republic.	In	1944,	the	new	Government	of	President	William	 V	 S	 Tubman	 (1944–1971)	 launched	 its	 National	 Unification	 Policy,	according	to	which	the	Government	would	‘strive	with	all	our	might	to	agglutinate	and	unify	our	populations	and	political	adherents	composing	the	body	politics	[…]	to	make	our	country	a	united	nation	with	LIBERTY	and	JUSTICE	for	all’.130	This	was	to	 be	 achieved	 through	 a	 government	program	 that	would	 seek,	 in	 line	with	 the	Commission’s	recommendations,	to	finally	realise	the	vision	of	 liberating	African-Liberians	by	overcoming	the	division	between	 ‘civilised’	and	 ‘uncivilised’	citizens	
																																																						128	Firestone	Plantations	Company,	Liberia	and	Firestone:	The	Development	of	a	Rubber	Industry,	a	
Story	of	Friendship	and	Progress	(Akron:	Firestone,	1956),	7.	See	also	ibid.	129	[image	omitted	from	digital	version]	130	Tubman,	cited	in	Varney	J	Fahnbulleh,	‘A	Concise	Synopsis	of	the	Tubman	National	Unification	Policy’,	William	V	S	Tubman	Papers,	Department	of	Internal	Affairs,	Republic	of	Liberia,	1967	(Bloomington:	Liberian	Collections,	Indiana	University	Libraries,	2008),	2-3.	
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162	and	 ensuring	 equal	 economic	 development	 for	 all.131	 Specifically,	 the	 Unification	Program	would	 finally	 invest	 full	 rights	 of	 citizenship	 in	 all	 Liberians,	 including	voting	 rights	 for	 women;	 it	 would	 abolish	 the	 distinction	 between	 ‘Americo-Liberian’	 and	 ‘tribal’	 jurisdictions,	 along	with	 the	parallel	 administrative	division	between	coastal	Counties	and	hinterland	Provinces;	and	it	would	extend	education	and	 employment	 opportunities	 to	 Liberia’s	 ‘indigenous’	 population.	 As	 one	 of	President	Tubman’s	admirers	wrote	in	1967	in	commemoration	of	the	Unification	Policy:	 ‘In	the	mid	1940’s,	a	great	event	occurred	in	the	history	of	the	indigenous	population	of	Liberia.	This	was	the	coming	into	power	of	the	Great	Emancipator	of	the	Liberian	Hinterland,	William	V	S	Tubman.’132			 And	yet,	rather	than	presenting	a	radical	new	vision	of	 ‘Liberia’,	Tubman’s	National	Unification	Policy	represented	an	attempt	to	consolidate	the	old	vision	by	making	 it	 total.	 The	 end	 of	 Unification,	 or	 ‘oneness’,133	 would	 be	 the	 absolute	triumph	 of	 ‘Americo-Liberianism’,	 as	 the	 identity	 under	 which	 all	 other	 socio-political	identities	would	be	subsumed.	The	identity	of	‘Americo-Liberian’	could	be	done	away	with,	as	President	Tubman	advocated,	because	there	would	no	longer	be	 anyone	within	Liberia	who	did	not	 fit	 its	 description.	As	 a	nation	of	 ‘civilised	citizens’,	all	would	be	effectively	 ‘Americo-Liberian’,	and	so	the	distinction	would	be	redundant.		With	 African	 peoples	 across	 the	 continent	 gaining	 momentum	 in	 the	struggle	for	self-rule,	 the	Unification	Policy	was	a	counter-revolutionary	program	designed	to	contain	(hold	within,	and	withhold	from	manifesting)	the	movements	of	Liberia’s	‘tribal’	peoples.	As	suggested	by	the	photograph	on	the	next	page,	these	movements,	once	contained	by	the	government,	would	become	little	more	than	a	state-sanctioned	‘traditional	performance’.		
																																																						131	On	the	National	Unification	Policy,	see	also	Yekutiel	Gershoni,	‘Liberia's	Unification	Policy	and	Decolonization	in	Africa:	A	Parallel	Process’,	Asian	and	African	Studies,	vol	16	(1982).	132	Fahnbulleh,	‘Tubman	National	Unification	Policy’,	5.	The	subtitle	reads:	‘A	Special	Literary	Work	done	for	DR	WILLIAM	V	S	TUBMAN	And	presented	during	his	72nd	Birthday	Celebration	in	Gbarnga,	Bong	County,	on	November	29,	1967	as	A	Birthday	Presentation	by	Varney	Jakema	Fahnbulleh,	Liason	Officer-General,	Department	of	Internal	Affairs’.	133	See	ibid,	1-2.	
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163
	
Figure	9.	‘A	traditional	performance	during	the	1952	inauguration’	of	President	Tubman.	The	flag	is	the	Liberian	‘lone-star’.134		If	 this	 monochrome	 image	 of	 ‘a	 traditional	 performance	 during	 the	 1952	inauguration’	 of	 President	 Tubman	 suggests	 a	 vision	 of	 Unification	 that	 would	contain	 African-Liberians’	 revolutionary	 movements,	 then	 the	 damaged	photograph	 itself,	 as	 the	 medium	 of	 the	 image,	 suggests	 what	 happened	 to	 the	government,	 as	 the	 medium	 of	 this	 vision.	 In	 the	 1970s,	 Liberia	 underwent	 a	revolution	 led	 by	 young	 African-Liberians	 that	 culminated	 in	 a	 massive	demonstration	in	1979.	A	year	later,	the	‘First	Republic’	of	Liberia	was	brought	to	an	 end	 with	 a	 coup	 d’état	 led	 by	 the	 young	 ‘indigenous’	 man,	 Master	 Sergeant	Samuel	 Doe,	 who	 would	 become	 Liberia’s	 21st	 President,	 and	 its	 first	 African-
																																																						134	[image	omitted	from	digital	version]	
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164	Liberian	leader.	In	one	of	the	first	acts	of	the	new	government,	thirteen	ministers	of	 the	old	regime	were	executed	 in	a	bloody	act	of	capital	punishment.	The	coup	also	precipitated	the	devastating	civil	wars	of	the	1990s	and	early	2000s	that	killed	a	 quarter	 of	 a	 million	 people,	 displaced	 millions	 more,	 and	 destroyed	 the	institutions	 and	 infrastructure	 of	 the	 state	 of	 Liberia.	 And	 yet,	 for	 very	 many	Liberians,	 this	 year—1980—and	 not	 1847,	 marks	 the	 year	 of	 Liberia’s	Independence.		
3	 Post-script		
	So	far	this	chapter	has	examined	how	a	logic	of	capital	informed	the	articulation	of	‘Liberia’	from	its	conception	as	an	idea	of	liberty	at	the	beginning	of	the	nineteenth	century	to	its	consolidation	as	a	nation-state	in	the	twentieth.	I	set	out	this	logic	in	Part	1,	focusing	on	how	it	operates	through	a	legal	framework	to	render	an	object	entirely	fungible.	In	Part	2,	I	then	showed	how	this	logic	operated	through	the	law	as	 its	 forceful	medium	to	 inform	the	making	of	Liberia.	To	make	this	argument,	 I	examined	 the	 super-imposition	of	 a	 representational	 framework	over	 country	 in	west	Africa	 that	 sought	 to	 render	 lands	 and	 peoples	 productive	 as	 territory	 and	citizens,	and	that	culminated	in	a	state	of	civil	death.		That	 is	 not	 the	 end	 of	 the	 story,	 however.	 Rather,	 it	 points	 to	 a	 new	beginning.	This	 final	 part	 of	 the	 chapter	 anticipates	 that	 beginning,	which	 I	 then	pursue	 through	 the	 subsequent	 chapters.	 To	 do	 so,	 I	 first	 consider	 here	 an	alternative	representational	framework.	This	 ‘independence	framework’	operates	on	the	same	logic	as	that	of	capital,	but	turns	it	from	a	medium	of	violent	realism	into	a	critical	form	that	enables	a	more	autobiographical	expression	of	subjectivity.	This,	 I	 argue,	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 underwrite	 the	 re-making	 of	 Liberia	 ‘post-conflict’.	 	
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165A	 Living	dead			
	
Figure	10.	‘Untitled,	1960’135		This	studio	portrait	was	taken	in	1960	by	the	Beninese	photographer	Joseph	Moise	Agbodjélou,	within	months	of	Benin	gaining	independence	from	France.	I	present	it	here	 in	 the	 place	 of	 Liberian	 material,	 because	 it	 works	 to	 intensify,	 and	 even	authorise,	the	analysis	of	Liberia	presented	in	this	chapter.	You	may	question	the	validity	of	this,	but	I	suggest	it	would	be	better	to	question	the	effect,	as	one	must	interrogate	 the	 effect	 of	 every	 representational	 framework	 that	 has	 been	studiously	laid	over	its	object.	
																																																						135	[image	omitted	from	digital	version]	
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166	 The	 photograph	 is	 in	 what	might	 be	 called	 critical	 vertretbar	 style,	 in	 its	self-conscious	use	of	the	representational	framework	of	the	art	form	to	create	the	art	work.	The	 art	 form	 is	 studio	photography,	which	 in	 its	 traditional	mode	was	developed	 to	 create	 an	 idealised	 image.	 The	 result	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 a	representation,	of	the	family	for	instance,	that	one	can	hang	in	the	entrance	of	the	home	as	a	reminder	of	 its	real	nature;	 thus	the	reality	of	 family	 life	 is	the	one	on	display	 in	 the	 photograph	 and	 not	 the	 dysfunctional	 one	 on	 display	 in	 everyday	life.136	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 traditional	 mode	 of	 studio	 photography	 uses	 the	representational	 framework	 uncritically	 to	 create	 a	 fantasy	 that	 is	 portrayed	 as	reality.	 This	 both	 substitutes	 for	 the	 actual	 dysfunction	 and	 authorises	 its	continuation,	 by	 making	 it	 present	 in	 a	 way	 that	 the	 contradiction	 can	 be	overlooked.	By	contrast,	the	representational	style	used	in	this	photograph	is	a	critique	of	this	traditional	mode	of	studio	portraiture	performed	from	within	the	mode	of	studio	portraiture.	The	photograph	presents	a	body	under	a	vestment,	in	keeping	with	 the	 traditional	 mode	 of	 studio	 portraiture.	 By	 ‘vestment’	 I	 mean,	 most	broadly,	 a	 ‘covering’,	which	 includes	not	 only	 the	 clothing	 but	 also	 the	 jewellery	and	drape	seen	in	the	photograph.	More	narrowly,	however,	I	also	mean	‘clothing’	‘worn	by	the	priest	or	priests	at	the	celebration	of	the	Eucharist’.137	This	points	to	the	double	effect	of	a	vestment,	covering	a	body	and	thereby	making	it	sacred,	but	in	so	doing,	reinforcing	the	unsacred	quality	of	the	unvested	body.	This	also	points	to	a	third	meaning	of	vestment:	‘A	right	or	privilege	with	which	a	person	or	body	is	invested	or	endowed’.138	Again,	 it	 is	 the	vestment	 that	makes	 the	body	a	 rightful	subject;	but	for	the	act	of	vestiture,	the	body	would	remain	a	mere	object.	Thus	the	young	 woman	 is	 presented	 in	 the	 fashion	 of	 a	 ‘civilised	 subject’,	 which,	 in	 the	attempt	to	dignify	her	by	endowing	her	 in	a	rightful	way,	also	does	the	opposite,	stripping	 her	 body	 of	 its	 own	 dignity.	 The	 result	 would	 be	 the	 equation	 of	 the	
																																																						136	There	is	an	episode	of	The	Simpsons	where	the	Simpson	family	are	having	their	Christmas	photograph	taken	in	a	studio	at	the	local	mall.	At	the	moment	the	photograph	is	taken,	Bart	is	yanked	out	of	the	frame	by	a	security	guard	who	had	previously	caught	him	shoplifting.	Precisely	as	an	accurate	portrayal	of	the	dysfunctional	Simpson	family,	this	portrait	could	not	be	hung	on	the	wall.	The	episode	ends	with	Bart	re-taking	his	portrait,	which	is	then	hung	over	top	of	the	dysfunctional	one.	See	The	Simpsons,	Series	7,	Episode	11,	‘Marge	be	Not	Proud’	(17	December	1995).	137	See	‘vestment,	n.1’,	OED	Online,	September	2015.	138	See	‘vestment,	n.2’,	OED	Online,	September	2015.	
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167rightful	 subject	with	 the	 rightly	 invested	 body,	which	 is	 to	 treat	 the	 body	 as	 an	empty	vassal.		That	is	the	first	or	 ‘initial’	effect	of	the	photograph:	to	present	the	body	as	an	 object	 that	 is	 the	 play-thing	 of	 the	 representational	 framework.	 The	 young	woman	might	 be	mistaken	 for	 a	 doll	 in	 a	 doll-house,	 or	 a	mannequin	 in	 a	 shop-front	display.	And	yet,	unlike	the	traditional	studio	portrait,	which	is	successful	to	the	extent	it	effectively	overlays	the	representational	framework	on	its	object,	this	photograph	works	against	 a	merger	of	body	and	vestment	and	 is	effective	 to	 the	extent	 it	 calls	 this	 unity	 into	question.	 This	 is	 the	 second	or	 ‘other’	 effect,	which	becomes	 the	 primary	 effect	 the	 more	 one	 looks	 at	 the	 photograph:	 body	 and	vestment,	far	from	merging,	appear	in	stark	separation.	The	contradiction	between	body	and	vestment	can	be	seen	in	the	ill-fitting	underwear	that	covers	the	young	woman’s	body	proprietorially.	 It	 can	be	 seen	 in	 the	young	woman’s	 eyes,	which,	instead	of	looking	into	the	camera,	thereby	seducing	the	viewer	into	the	portrait’s	reality—as	 is	 the	 desired	 effect	 of	 traditional	 studio	 portraits—are	 looking	askance,	directing	the	viewer	outside	the	scene,	thereby	disrupting	the	illusion	that	reality	is	contained	within	its	framework.	Above	all,	the	contradiction	is	seen	in	the	un-cropped	 framing	 of	 the	 portrait,	 which	 shows	 a	 faded	 and	 torn	 rendition	 of	European	Civilisation	draped	tackily	over	a	richly-textured	place.		Thus	 in	 a	 way	 that	 cannot	 be	 overlooked,	 the	 photograph	 shows	 the	fantastical	 and	 violent	 realism	of	 a	 representational	 framework	 that	would	 treat	her	body	as	 its	play-thing.	The	portrait	 is	 concerned	with	 the	woman	as	 a	 living	subject—with	 her	 dignity	 as	 a	 self-possessed	 young	 woman—rendered	 a	 mere	object	 through	 the	 attempt	 to	 dignify	 her	 by	 super-imposing	 upon	 her	 the	vestment	 of	 Civilised	 Europe.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 portrait	 is	 allegorical,	presenting	 a	 critique	of	 the	 colonial	 attempt	 to	 render	Benin	 ‘civilised’.	By	using	the	 representational	 framework	 of	 studio	 portraiture	 to	 critique	 the	 violent	realism	 of	 a	 representational	 framework,	 thereby	 highlighting	 the	 separation—indeed	 the	 independence—of	 the	 young	 woman’s	 body	 from	 its	 vestment,	 the	photograph	also	effectively	portrays	the	divestment	of	French	colonialism	from	the	body	of	Benin.		As	 an	 art	 work,	 the	 photograph	 thus	 establishes	 the	 conditions	 of	emancipation	by	 critiquing	 a	 framework	 that	 sought	 to	 subsume	 the	people	 and	country	of	Benin	within	its	realism.	But	this	is	not	merely	an	act	of	negation.	It	is	
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168	also	 a	 record	 of	 history	 that	 is	 actively	making	 history.	 After	 all,	 the	 art	 form	 is	studio	portraiture.	As	a	studio	portrait,	the	photograph	substitutes	in	the	place	of	a	French-colonial	 framework	 a	 framework	 of	 independence,	 and	 authorises	 the	independence	framework	through	the	critical	representation	of	the	colonial	one.	In	the	act	of	critiquing	the	reality	of	a	representational	framework,	it	is	presenting	an	alternative	reality	in	its	place,	and	using	the	critique	to	authorise	that	alternative.	That	was	Benin	in	1960,	the	year	of	Independence.	Fifty	years	later,	Leonce	Raphael	 Agbodjélou—who	 inherited	 his	 father’s	 photography	 studio	 as	 his	generation	 inherited	Benin—created	 the	portrait	 of	 a	 young	man	 reproduced	on	the	next	page.	 In	 the	 traditional	mode	of	studio	portraiture,	 this	photograph	also	presents	a	body	under	a	vestment,	but	like	the	portrait	of	the	young	woman,	it	also	works	 against	 a	merger	 of	 body	 and	 vestment.	What	makes	 this	 photograph	 so	different	from	the	photograph	of	the	young	woman,	however,	 is	how	it	treats	the	relation	 of	 body	 and	 vestment.	 The	 portrait	 of	 the	 young	 woman	 critiques	 the	treatment	 of	 the	 body	 as	 an	 object	 that	 is	 the	 play-thing	 of	 a	 representational	framework,	and	 thereby	 establishes	 the	body	as	 subject.	 In	a	 reversal	of	 this,	 the	portrait	 of	 the	 young	 man	 establishes	 the	 body	 as	 subject	 by	 presenting	 the	representational	framework	as	its	play-thing.			 	
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Figure	11.	‘Untitled,	2010’139	
																																																						139	[image	omitted	from	digital	version]	
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170	The	young	man	appears	dynamic	and	self-possessed,	his	gaze	seducing	the	viewer	into	 his	 reality—modern,	 vibrant,	 youthful.	 He	 smiles	 coolly	 as	 he	 poses	 for	 the	photo.	 With	 cheeky	 defiance	 he	 leans	 against	 the	 wooden	 chair	 that	 the	 studio	photographer	 presumably	 placed	 there	 for	 him	 to	 sit	 on.	 He	 holds	 up	 in	 mock	appreciation	the	flowers	that	the	studio	photographer	also	presumably	placed	on	the	 ground	 beside	 the	 chair	 (note	 that	 this	 is	 how	 the	 flowers	 appear	 in	 the	portrait	of	the	young	woman).		At	the	same	time,	this	is	not	a	traditional	studio	portrait.	The	effect	is	not	to	merge	body	and	vestment	 in	 the	production	of	a	 fantasy	 that	substitutes	 for	and	enables	the	perpetuation	of	a	dysfunctional	actuality.	Like	the	portrait	of	the	young	woman,	 this	photograph	calls	such	unity	 into	question.	The	colourfully	patterned	cloth	that	covers	both	body	and	place,	combined	with	the	silver	aviator	glasses	that	cover	the	young	man’s	eyes,	highlight	the	fantastical	nature	of	the	representational	framework.	And	like	the	portrait	of	the	young	woman,	the	effect	is	to	establish	the	body	as	subject	precisely	by	emphasising	its	separation	from	the	representational	framework.	There	 is	 an	 important	 difference,	 however,	 between	 this	 portrait	 and	 the	one	 of	 the	 young	woman.	 The	 portrait	 of	 the	woman	 presents	 the	 separation	 of	body	 and	 vestment	 in	 a	 way	 that	 records	 the	 moment	 of	 independence	 and	authorises	 that	 independence	 as	 a	 possible	 alternative	 framework,	 but	 the	independence	 framework	remains	negative.	Created	 in	1960,	 its	effect	 is	critique,	presenting	 the	possibility	of	an	other	 future	without	presenting	 that	 future.	Fifty	years	 and	 a	 generation	 later,	 the	portrait	 of	 the	 young	man	provides	 an	 answer,	presenting	a	 future	 in	which	the	body	is	realising	 its	own	subjectivity.	But	 it	also	remains	critical:	the	answer	is	no	more	the	realisation	of	an	authentic	subject	than	it	is	the	presentation	of	an	authentic	reality.	The	photograph	neither	presents	the	body	as	subject	in	any	absolute	way—the	body	is	still	under	a	vestment—nor	does	it	present	a	realistic	 reality—the	vestment	remains	a	 fantastical	 representational	framework.		In	 sum,	 whereas	 the	 portrait	 of	 the	 young	 woman	 uses	 the	 art	 form	 of	studio	 portraiture	 to	 critique	 a	 colonial	 framework	 and	 thereby	 record	 and	authorise	the	possibility	of	an	independence	framework,	the	portrait	of	the	young	man	uses	the	same	art	form	to	show	the	critical	possibilities	of	that	independence	framework.	 Presenting	 the	 body	 as	 subject	 playing	 with	 its	 independence,	 the	
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171portrait	 is	 both	 positive	 and	 negative:	 positive	 in	 that	 it	 presents	 the	 body	 as	 a	character	full	of	life;	negative	in	that	it	neither	allows	that	identity	to	dominate	the	body	(the	body	plays	with	 the	 identity)	nor	allows	the	viewer	 to	believe	 that	 the	portrait	is	simply	real.	This	is	not	some	pure	life	free	of	all	mediating	frameworks,	but	a	life	that	plays	with	the	identity	that	frames	it.	This	is	the	critical	possibility	of	‘living	dead’.140		B	 Vision	2030		Having	emerged	from	nearly	150	years	under	a	colonial	framework,	and	almost	25	years	 of	 civil	 conflict	 including	 two	 civil	 wars,	 the	 question	 for	 Liberia	 now	 is	whether	the	same	logic	of	capital	will	inform	the	country’s	post-colonial,	post-war,	independence	framework,	or	whether	the	re-making	of	Liberia	might	be	informed	by	a	more	critical	logic.	The	evidence	points	towards	the	further	 institutionalisation	of	the	 logic	of	capital.	 The	 Government’s	 primary	 policy	 documents	 for	 its	 state-building	 and	development	strategy	read	like	a	neo-liberal	manifesto,141	which	is	not	surprising	given	 that	 they	were	developed	according	 to	 the	 framework	of	 the	 International	Monetary	 Fund	 and	 World	 Bank	 standard	 ‘poverty	 reduction	 strategy’.142	 Thus	‘Pillar	 II’	 of	 the	 Government’s	 overarching	 five-year	 plan	 for	 2012–2017	 (also	referred	 to	 as	 Liberia’s	 ‘development	 framework’)	 is	 ‘economic	 transformation’,	with	 the	 ‘Goal:	 To	 transform	 the	 economy	 so	 that	 it	 meets	 the	 demands	 of	Liberians	through	development	of	the	domestic	private	sector’.143	‘Essential	to	this	
																																																						140	Compare	this	form	of	sovereignty,	in	which	the	condition	of	‘living	dead’	is	an	emancipatory	one,	with	Mbembe’s	analysis	of	sovereignty	under	conditions	of	‘necropolitics’	and	‘necropower’.	Recall	from	the	Preamble	and	Introduction	to	the	thesis,	Mbembe	describes	a	form	of	sovereignty	‘in	which,	in	our	contemporary	world,	weapons	are	deployed	in	the	interest	of	maximum	destruction	of	persons	and	the	creation	of	death-worlds,	new	and	unique	forms	of	social	existence	in	which	vast	populations	are	subjected	to	conditions	of	life	conferring	upon	them	the	status	of	living	dead.’	Achille	Mbembe,	‘Necropolitics’,	Public	Culture,	vol	15,	no	1	(2003):	40	(italics	in	original).	141	See	Republic	of	Liberia,	Interim	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	(2006–2008)	(Washington:	International	Monetary	Fund,	2007);	Republic	of	Liberia,	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	(2008–2011)	(Monrovia:	Republic	of	Liberia,	2008);	Republic	of	Liberia,	Agenda	for	Transformation:	Steps	toward	
Liberia	RISING	2030	–	Liberia’s	Medium	Term	Economic	and	Development	Strategy	(2012–2017)	(Monrovia:	Republic	of	Liberia,	2012).	142	See	World	Bank,	‘What	are	PRSPs?’:	http://go.worldbank.org/CSTQBOF730;	International	Monetary	Fund,	‘Factsheet:	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	in	IMF-supported	Programs’	(September	2015):	https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm.	143	Republic	of	Liberia,	Agenda	for	Transformation,	54	(italics	in	original).	
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172	economic	 transformation’,	 the	 strategy	 states,	 ‘is	 the	 growth	 of	 employment	 and	output	 in	agriculture,	 small-scale	mining	and	 forestry,	agro-processing	and	other	industries’.144	The	strategy	continues:		Ideally,	households	and	individuals	will	have	more	opportunity	to	work	or	engage	 in	 their	 own	 enterprises,	 leading	 to	 improved	 income	 and	 the	opportunity	 to	 purchase	 desired	 consumption.	 To	 support	 provision	 of	public	 services	 and	 infrastructure,	 the	 private	 economy	 and	 concessions	will	generate	tax	and	royalty	revenue	for	the	public	sector.145		On	one	hand,	there	is	nothing	remarkable	about	this	strategy.	Indeed	it	 is	part	of	the	 standard	 economic	 system	 modeled	 by	 advanced-capitalist	 economies	 and	pursued	 by	 ‘developing	 countries’	 globally.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 that	 it	 would	 go	without	 remark,	 remaining	 overlooked	 as	 a	 source	 of	 violence,	 would	 be	remarkable.	Also	remarkable	is	how	similar	the	language	in	this	paragraph	of	the	strategy	is	to	the	language	in	the	International	Commission	of	Enquiry’s	report	into	slavery	and	forced	labour	in	Liberia,	where	it	recommended	developing	the	labour	and	consumption	capacity	of	its	citizens	(‘teach	him	what	he	may	buy	for	money,	and	 he	 then	wants	 to	 learn	what	 he	 can	 grow,	what	 he	 should	 do,	 or	where	 he	should	work	to	make	some	money,	with	the	result	that	trade	increases,	the	coast	merchant	 flourishes,	 the	 revenues	 of	 Government	 expand,	 and	 money	 is	forthcoming’).146		The	repetition,	or	continuation,	does	not	end	there.	Central	to	achieving	the	primary	goal	 of	Pillar	 II	 is	 ‘private	 sector	development’,	 and	 central	 to	 achieving	this	 is	 ‘property	 rights	 and	 contract	 enforcement’.147	 However,	 two	 fundamental	problems	 arise	 at	 this	 point:	 (1)	 the	 necessary	 land	 rights	 regime	 is	 practically	non-existent	 in	Liberia;	 and	 (2)	 the	 state	 legal	 system	 is	dysfunctional.	Or	as	 the	strategy	 states:	 ‘Currently,	 there	 is	 high	 cost	 and	 risk	of	 investment	by	domestic	
																																																						144	Ibid.	145	Ibid.	146	See	note	120	above.	The	full	passage	reads:	‘Schools	are	of	the	first	importance,	not	merely	for	the	purpose	of	teaching	reading	and	writing,	but	for	improving	the	native’s	sociological	conditions;	and	specialist	instructors	invaluable	for	broadening	his	ideas,	teaching	him	market	values,	and	the	use	he	can	make	of	the	innumerable	economic	products	and	raw	materials	around	him.	The	unsophisticated	native	learns	something	of	the	outside	world,	and	his	wants	are	increased.	The	missionary,	the	school	teacher,	and	the	trader	teach	him	what	he	may	buy	for	money,	and	he	then	wants	to	learn	what	he	can	grow,	what	he	should	do,	or	where	he	should	work	to	make	some	money,	with	the	result	that	trade	increases,	the	coast	merchant	flourishes,	the	revenues	of	Government	expand,	and	money	is	forthcoming	[…]’:	‘The	1930	Enquiry	Commission	to	Liberia’,		281.	147	See	Republic	of	Liberia,	Agenda	for	Transformation,	Chapter	9.	
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173and	 foreign	 firms	 due	 to	 uncertainty	 of	 land	 claims,	 leasing	 arrangements	 and	other	 contracts.’148	 I	 examine	 the	 second	 problem	 of	 the	 state	 legal	 system	 in	Chapter	7.	Of	interest	here	is	the	‘non-existence’	of	the	land	rights	regime,	and	the	Government’s	‘development	framework’	that	will	make	land	rightful.149		In	2013	the	government	published	its	Land	Rights	Policy.150	The	Policy	has	yet	to	be	enacted	into	law,	at	the	time	of	writing,	but	 it	 looks	set	to	pass	through	the	 legislature	 to	 form	 the	 country’s	 new	 land	 rights	 law.	 The	 policy	 sets	 out	 a	framework	 for	 creating	 four	 categories	 of	 land	 rights:	 ‘public	 land’,	 ‘government	land’,	 ‘private	 land’,	 and	 ‘customary	 land’.	 The	 last	 of	 these	 is	 the	 most	 radical	proposition.	Rights	to	Customary	Land,	including	ownership	rights,	must	be	secured	by	ensuring	 that	 these	 rights	 are	 equally	 protected	 as	 private	 land	 rights.	Rights	 to	Customary	Land	 include	 rights	 of	 the	 community	 as	 a	 collective	land	 owner	 and	 rights	 of	 groups,	 families,	 and	 individuals	 within	 the	community.151		In	 other	 words,	 with	 the	 overlay	 of	 this	 framework,	 ‘customary	 land’	 will	 be	invested	 with	 the	 character	 of	 private	 land,	 capable	 of	 alienation,	 although	 the	rights	 will	 be	 possessed	 by	 ‘the	 community	 as	 a	 collective	 land	 owner’,	 with	‘groups,	families,	and	individuals	within	the	community’	also	possessed	of	certain	rights.152		However,	in	order	to	implement	this	policy—that	is,	to	invest	‘a	community’	and	 ‘its	 customary	 land’	 with	 these	 rights—two	 criteria	 must	 be	 met:	 ‘the	community’	must	 be	 clearly	 defined	 (‘community	 ownership	 of	 Customary	 Land	will	be	formalized	by	the	issuance	of	a	deed	to	a	legal	entity,	bearing	the	name	of	the	 community’),153	 as	 must	 the	 boundaries	 of	 ‘its	 land’.154	 The	 problem	 is	 that	there	are	no	such	clear	distinctions	on	the	ground.	Communities	and	their	lands	in	this	part	of	Africa	have	 littoral	 identities.	Extending	this	development	framework	over	these	communities	and	lands	will	not	put	them	‘beyond	the	littoral’.	Rather,	it	
																																																						148	Republic	of	Liberia,	Agenda	for	Transformation,	61.	149	Republic	of	Liberia,	Land	Rights	Policy	(Monrovia:	Land	Commission,	2013).		150	Ibid.	151	Ibid,	15.	152	See	ibid,	18	(‘nature	of	customary	land	rights’).	153	Ibid.	154	See	ibid,	19	(‘boundaries	of	customary	land’).	
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174	will	 extend	 the	 littoral	 back	 over	 Liberia.	 That	 is,	 the	 attempt	 to	 define	 these	communities,	by	identifying	their	precise	membership,	along	with	the	boundaries	of	their	land,	will	create	more	conflict,	not	less.	The	Government	is	aware	of	this;	indeed	 ‘the	 policy	 recommendations	 recognize	 this	 diversity’.155	 That	 is	why	 the	Government	has	created	a	parallel	policy	for	‘land	conflict	management’,156	whilst	at	the	same	time	ensuring	that	the	communities	self-define	their	membership,	lead	the	process	of	demarcating	their	boundaries,	and	have	a	large	degree	of	regulatory	autonomy	 over	 ‘Customary	 Land	management,	 use,	 and	 allocation	 decisions	 […]	within	a	framework	of	shared	responsibility	with	the	Government.’157	Still	the	question	remains:	does	this	vision	present	the	possibility	of	a	future	in	which	 the	bodies	 of	 ‘Liberia’	 can	 realise	 their	 subjectivity?	Or	 is	 it	merely	 the	most	recent	attempt	to	transform	the	lands	and	peoples	of	Liberia	into	productive	things	through	the	overlay	of	another	framework	informed	by	the	logic	of	capital?	On	one	hand,	it	seems	Liberia	is	beginning	again	in	the	twenty-first	century	under	the	same	 logical	 framework	 that	has	operated	para-sitically	 in	 this	 country	since	its	 colonial	 settlement.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 there	 remains	 the	 possibility	 that	Liberians	can	now	play	with	it	as	their	own,	to	capitalise	on	its	critical	possibilities	as	an	independence	framework.	This	would	not	be	a	complete	break	from	the	logic,	but	rather	than	ending	in	civil	death	it	might	offer	the	hope	of	a	living	death,	with	the	bodies	of	Liberia	as	subjects	playing	with	their	independence.		
4	 An	insecure	future		
Saturday,	 17	 August	 2013,	 noon,	 on	 a	 street	 parallel	 to	 Benson	 Street	 in	 central	
Monrovia.	I	have	just	turned	off	Newport	Street	to	walk	into	the	centre	of	Monrovia	when	I	hear	the	sound	of	drums	and	singing	coming	from	further	up	the	hill.	I	wait	on	 the	 sidewalk	with	 a	 growing	 crowd	of	 curious	bystanders	 as	 a	parade	 slowly	makes	its	way	down	the	road,	framed	by	the	hulking	shell	of	Ducor	Hotel	high	on	the	rise.	A	banner	held	by	the	parade’s	leaders	reads:		
Liberian	Cultural	Union,	celebrating	10	years	of	peace	
																																																						155	Ibid,	15.	156	Author	interviews	with	officers	of	the	Liberian	Land	Commission:	Monrovia,	14	August	2013	(MG5,	MG7,	and	MG8);	Zorzor,	29	August	2013	(Li18);	Harper,	27	September	2013	(Li39).	See	also	Liberian	Land	Commission,	2014	Annual	Report	(Monrovia:	LC,	2014).	157	Republic	of	Liberia,	Land	Rights	Policy,	19	(‘community	governance	and	management’).	
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175Dancing	behind	the	banner	are	a	dozen	or	so	small	‘cultural	troupes’,	each	dressed	in	their	own	colourful	uniforms,	most	of	them	with	one	or	two	djembe	players.	In	stark	contrast,	a	dozen	men	dressed	in	uniform	long	black	pants,	shiny	black	shoes,	and	light	brown	khaki	shirts	with	a	Liberian	flag	stitched	to	the	shoulder	lead	the	Cultural	 Union	 down	 the	 street,	 their	 troupe	 marching	 to	 the	 beat	 of	 a	 small	military-style	 band.	 Standing	 at	 the	 head	 of	 the	 parade,	 marching	 in	 military	uniform,	the	message	seems	clear:	the	Government	leads	this	Union.		And	 yet,	 as	 I	 watch	 the	 parade	 pass	 by,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 Government’s	troupe	 is	not	 leading	the	Cultural	Union	down	the	street.	 I	am	struck	by	how	the	parade	 frames	 the	 Government	 as	 just	 another	 cultural	 group	 amongst	 Liberia’s	many	diverse	groups;	although	not	quite.	Amongst	the	dozen	cultural	troupes,	the	Government’s	 representatives	 stick	 out	 awkwardly.	 Compared	 with	 the	 mature,	comfortable	 way	 the	 other	 groups	 appear—their	 women,	 men,	 and	 children	dancing,	singing,	and	laughing—the	Government’s	troupe	of	unsmiling	men	appear	stilted.	 Stilted:	 ‘furnished	 with	 or	 having	 stilts;	 raised	 artificially	 as	 on	 stilts’,	‘supported	on	props	or	posts	so	as	 to	be	raised	above	 the	ground’,	 ‘artificially	or	affectedly	 lofty;	 unnaturally	 elevated;	 formally	 pompous.	 (The	 usual	 current	sense.)’158	 It	 is	as	 if	 the	youngest	brother,	aware	of	his	own	impotence	compared	with	 his	 much	 older	 sisters	 and	 brothers,	 is	 seeking	 to	 assert	 his	 identity	 and	power	 by	 placing	 himself	 at	 the	 head,	whilst	 his	more	mature	 siblings	 carry	 on,	tolerating	his	adolescent	conceit	if	it	keeps	him	quiet	and	allows	them	to	continue	down	the	street	in	peace.		And	yet	still,	as	 I	watch	the	parade	pass	by,	 I	cannot	overlook	that	behind	the	 stilted	 leadership	 of	 the	 Government’s	 troupe	 is	 a	 very	 real	 power.	Overshadowing	the	celebration	of	this	decade	of	peace:	a	hotel	on	the	rise.		But	then	my	focus	returns	to	the	street	again;	and	there,	in	contrast	to	both	the	 hotel’s	 hulking	 shell	 and	 the	 Government’s	 monochrome	 troupe,	 dancing,	singing,	 and	 laughing	 their	 way,	 are	 Liberia’s	 cultural	 groups—the	 life	 of	 the	parade.		 ∞		
																																																						158	‘Stilted,	adj.’,	OED	Online,	September	2015.	
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176	Through	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	 sought	 to	 show	how	a	particular	 logic	 informed	 the	articulation	of	‘Liberia’	from	its	conception	as	an	idea	of	liberty	at	the	beginning	of	the	 nineteenth	 century	 to	 its	 consolidation	 as	 a	 nation-state	 in	 the	 twentieth	century.	Operating	through	the	law	as	its	forceful	medium,	this	logic	gave	form	to	Liberia	 by	 super-imposing	 over	 country	 in	 west	 Africa	 a	 representational	framework	 that	would	 render	 its	 lands	 and	 peoples	 productive	 as	 territory	 and	citizens.	This	logic,	I	argued,	is	the	logic	of	capital.	I	 began	 by	 examining	 the	 logic	 itself	 through	 a	 reading	 of	 John	 Austin’s	lecture	 on	 ‘things’	 in	 his	 influential	 nineteenth	 century	 treatise	 on	 English	 law,	
Lectures	on	 Jurisprudence,	or	 the	Philosophy	of	Positive	Law.	This	 revealed	a	 logic	operating	 through	 a	 legal	 framework	 that,	 at	 its	 extreme,	 can	 render	 an	 object	entirely	 fungible.	 Through	 the	 super-imposition	 of	 this	 representational	framework,	 a	 singular	 object	 is	 invested	 with	 a	 general	 value,	 rendering	 it	 a	movable	species	of	thing,	without	an	essential	nature	of	its	own.	On	one	hand,	as	an	act	of	realism,	the	effect	is	to	give	form	to	the	object	as	a	real	asset.	Thus	lands	and	peoples	become	rightfully	possessed	as	territory	and	citizens.	On	the	other	hand,	as	 an	 act	 of	 surrealism,	 the	 result	 is	 a	 super-imposed	 reality	 that	 denies	 the	‘subjectivity’	 of	 the	 object,	 as	 being	 self-possessed.	 On	 this	 logic,	 ‘rightful	possession’	 is	 a	 function	 of	 investment;	 thus	 an	 enslaved	person	might	 be	made	free	as	a	 rightful	human	 through	a	process	of	 civilisation	 that	would	 invest	 their	person	 with	 human	 rights;	 whilst	 land	 might	 be	 made	 productive	 through	 a	process	of	cultivation	that	would	invest	it	with	property	rights.		In	the	second	part	of	the	chapter	I	then	examined	how	this	logic	was	super-imposed	over	 the	peoples	and	 lands	of	Liberia	 through	a	process	of	colonisation,	which,	since	the	Roman	colōnia,	has	involved	both	the	introduction	of	civilisation	and	the	cultivation	of	new	land.	I	began	here	with	‘the	idea	of	Liberia’,	to	show	how	‘Liberia’	was	conceived	at	the	beginning	of	the	nineteenth	century	as	a	solution	to	the	 problem	 of	 slavery	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 created	 as	 a	 conceptual	 schema	 to	achieve	in	practice	what	Austin	had	sought	to	do	in	his	Lectures,	that	is,	establish	a	clear	 distinction	 between	 a	 human	 person	 and	 a	 non-human	 thing.	 The	increasingly	 common	 sight	 of	 African-Americans	 walking	 freely	 in	 the	 United	States	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century	was	 seen	 to	 contradict	 the	 ongoing	enslavement	of	Africans	 in	America,	whilst	 their	ongoing	treatment	as	a	movable	species	 of	 thing	was	 seen	 to	 contradict	 their	 freedom	as	African-Americans.	 The	
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177result	 was	 a	 situation	 where	 people	 of	 colour	 in	 the	 United	 States	 appeared	simultaneously	free	and	unfree,	never	wholly	slaves,	and	yet	never	wholly	rightful	citizens.	 ‘Liberia’	 was	 supposed	 to	 resolve	 this	 logical	 contradiction	 by	 re-establishing	a	clear	line	of	separation	between	human	and	thing.	Liberia	in	Africa	would	be	a	place	where	people	of	colour	would	be	wholly	free;	the	United	States	would	be	a	place	where	people	of	colour	would	be	wholly	things	of	capital;	and	the	distinction	would	be	kept	in	place	by	a	vast	ocean.		The	idea	of	Liberia	was	thus	born	as	an	analytical	conceit	to	secure	the	logic	of	slavery	in	the	United	States	by	transporting	the	offending	category	(‘free	people	of	colour	in	the	United	States’)	across	the	ocean	to	Africa,	where	it	would	have	the	ancillary	 effect	 of	 making	 free	 all	 of	 Africa.	 However	 this	 did	 not	 resolve	 the	paradoxical	 condition	of	 the	African-American	migrants,	 of	 being	 simultaneously	free	and	unfree.	As	Americo-Liberians,	 their	 ‘sovereignty	and	 independence’	as	a	people	remained	contingent	on	recognition	of	their	international	personality.	The	problem	was	that,	throughout	the	nineteenth	and	well	into	the	twentieth	century,	this	 recognition	 remained	 extremely	 uncertain,	 with	 Americo-Liberians	 living	under	constant	threat	of	becoming	vassals	of	either	the	British	or	French	empires.	To	resolve	 this	situation—of	being	a	 ‘sovereign	and	 independent’	people	and	yet	treated	 as	 a	 res	 colōnia,	 that	 is,	 as	 a	 thing	 of	 colonialism—the	 Americo-Liberian	government	 sought	 to	 define	 its	 lands	 and	 peoples	 and	 bring	 both	 under	 its	dominion	as	territory	and	population,	in	accordance	with	the	requirements	of	the	international	 legal	 framework.	However,	 as	 I	 showed	 through	 an	 examination	 of	the	demarcation	process,	the	super-imposition	of	this	framework	involved	a	work	of	surrealism,	both	fantastical	and	violent,	fusing	name	and	country	in	the	creation	of	a	metonym	that	would,	it	was	said,	ensure	the	liberty	of	Liberia.	The	nation-state	of	Liberia	was	thus	born	as	an	attempt	to	finally	make	free	the	Americo-Liberian	people;	extending	Liberia	beyond	the	littoral	would	settle	its	place	 in	 the	 world.	 The	 result,	 however,	 was	 to	 extend	 littoral	 Liberia	 into	 the	
interior,	making	the	Republic	a	place	‘of	contested	imaginaries’,	‘an	environment	of	flux	 and	 change	 par	 excellence’,159	 culminating	 in	 revolution	 and	 the	 eventual	overthrow	of	the	Americo-Liberian	regime.	Thus	at	the	beginning	of	the	twentieth	century	the	government	extended	citizenship	to	Liberia’s	‘natives’,	whilst	bringing	the	 hinterland	 under	 Provincial	 administration.	 The	 effect	was	 to	 leave	 ‘African-
																																																						159	Manderson	and	van	Rijswick,	‘Littoral	Readings’,	174.	
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178	Liberians’	 in	 this	 ‘tribal	 jurisdiction’	 of	 the	 hinterland	 in	 a	 similar	 situation	 to	African-Americans	in	the	United	States,	as	not	wholly	rightful	citizens.	The	effect,	in	 other	 words,	 was	 a	 form	 of	 civil	 death,	 their	 degradation	 manifesting	 at	 the	extreme	 in	 slavery,	 forced	 labour,	 and	 exile.	 And	 yet,	 again,	 when	 the	 problem	could	 no	 longer	 be	 ignored,	 the	 Government	 sought	 to	 resolve	 it	 by	 extending	littoral	 Liberia	 into	 the	 hinterland,	 properly	 this	 time.	 Under	 the	 Government’s	National	Unification	Policy,	 the	hinterland	Provinces	were	made	 the	 same	as	 the	coastal	Counties,	as	a	matter	of	territorial	jurisdiction,	and	African-Liberians	were	possessed	 of	 all	 the	 rights	 residing	 in	 Americo-Liberians.	 Finally,	 the	 vision	 of	‘Liberia’	as	the	land	of	the	free’d	would	be	realised.	And	in	a	sense,	this	is	precisely	what	happened,	with	African-Liberians	making	‘Liberia’	consonant	with	them.	The	 argument	 running	 through	 this	 history	 is	 that,	 at	 each	 point,	 the	representational	framework	that	was	supposed	to	liberate	its	object—human	and	land—was	 informed	 by	 the	 logic	 of	 capital.	 On	 this	 logic,	 liberation	would	 come	with	 the	 super-imposition	 of	 a	 general	 value:	 rendering	 humans	 productive	citizens,	 through	 the	 investment	of	human	 rights,	 and	 rendering	 land	productive	territory,	through	the	investment	of	property	rights.	On	one	hand,	the	investment	of	 the	 general	 value	would	make	 the	object	 into	 a	 real	 asset	 that	 could	 circulate	freely	(at	least	within	a	certain	class),	giving	it	great	power.	On	the	other	hand,	this	general	value	would	come	at	the	cost	of	denying	the	object	its	self	worth.	Each	time	in	this	history,	this	problem	with	the	logic,	and	indeed	its	devastating	violence,	was	revealed	most	clearly	in	its	non-realisation.	Thus	African-Americans	in	the	United	States	at	the	beginning	of	the	nineteenth	century	suffered	a	form	of	civil	death	as	a	result	 of	 their	 non-recognition	 as	 wholly	 rightful	 persons	 in	 the	 United	 States.	Americo-Liberians	suffered	from	a	similar	condition	at	the	turn	of	the	nineteenth	century	 and	 into	 the	 twentieth	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 non-recognition	 as	 wholly	rightful	persons	 in	 the	 ‘international	 community’.	And	African-Liberians	 suffered	as	 degraded	 citizens	 up	 until	 the	 overthrow	 of	 the	 Americo-Liberian	 regime.	 In	each	 case,	 having	 been	 denied	 their	 own	 particular	 value	 as	 self-possessed	humans,	 but	 not	 fully	 possessed	 of	 the	 general	 value,	 the	 result	 was	 a	 form	 of	capital	 punishment—being	 abject	 before	 the	 law,	 suspended	 in	 a	 state	 of	 civil	death.	 Finally,	 in	 a	 post-script	 to	 this	 history,	 I	 considered	 an	 alternative	representational	framework.	This	independence	framework	operates	on	the	same	
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179logic	but	turns	it	from	a	medium	of	violent	realism	into	a	critical	form	that	enables	a	 more	 autobiographical	 expression	 of	 subjectivity.	 This,	 I	 suggested,	 might	underwrite	 Liberia’s	 independence	 ‘post-colonialism’	 and	 ‘post-war’.	 However,	 I	also	considered	the	government’s	new	development	framework	for	its	2030	vision	of	the	country.	Rather	than	a	break	with	the	logic	that	informed	the	making	of	the	First	 Republic,	 this	 suggests	 a	 continuation,	 if	 not	 an	 intensification,	 of	 the	institutionalisation	of	 this	 logic	 in	 the	re-making	of	Liberia.	Given	 the	violence	of	this	logic,	the	question	for	the	Government	is	how	it	will	deal	with	this,	that	is,	how	it	will	secure	a	state	of	peace	against	the	violence	of	the	logic	that	informs	it.	This	is	the	question	I	now	turn	to	examine	through	the	next	chapter.			
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1	 Peace	through	justice		Standing	in	the	entrance	hall	of	the	Peace	Palace	in	The	Hague	is	a	marble	statue	entitled	 ‘Peace	 through	 Justice’.	The	 statue	depicts	 a	 figure	who	 appears	 at	 once	female	 and	male,	 merging	 feminine	 and	masculine	 types.	 This	 is	 the	 figure	 of	 a	‘modern	 Lady	 Justice’1—of	 Justitia	 bulging	 with	 strength.	 Resembling	Michelangelo’s	marble	statue	of	David	poised	for	battle	against	Goliath—and	as	the	very	 embodiment	 of	 Pascal’s	pensée—this	 image	 poses	 a	 disturbing	 truth:	peace	
requires	a	forceful	justice.	
Justice,	force.—	[…]	Justice	without	force	is	impotent;	force	without	justice	is	tyrannical.	 Justice	without	 force	 is	 contradictory,	 as	 there	 are	 always	 the	wicked;	force	without	justice	is	accused	of	wrong.	And	so	it	is	necessary	to	put	justice	and	force	together;	and,	for	this,	to	make	sure	that	what	is	just	be	strong,	or	what	is	strong	be	just.2	Why	 is	 this	 image	 and	 what	 it	 poses	 disturbing?	 How	 does	 it	 differ	 from	 the	conventional	figure	of	Lady	Justice	brandishing	a	sword?	In	both,	justice	and	force	together	 constitute	 the	 image	 of	 Justitia,	 leaving	 no	 doubt	 about	 the	 capacity	 of	justice	 for	 violence.	 There	 is	 a	 terrible	 difference.	 In	 the	 conventional	 image,	
Justitia	 holds	 a	 sword,	 she	 has	 picked	 up	 the	 sword,	 and	 she	 wields	 it	 as	 her	instrument—an	 animate	 justice	 in	 control	 of	 an	 inanimate	 force.	 What	 is	 so	disturbing	about	the	statue	in	the	Peace	Palace	is	the	ambiguity	it	introduces	into	this	image.	Force	is	no	longer	a	mere	object	at	the	disposal	and	under	the	control	of	Lady	 Justice;	 force	 ripples	 through	 her	 limbs,	 force	 pulses	 through	 her	 veins.	 The	wind	blowing	aside	her	gown	reveals	not	the	typically	feminine	legs	of	justice	but	brute	trunks	of	force:						
																																																						1	This	is	how	the	statue	is	described	in	US	Department	of	State,	‘Sites	relating	to	US	history	in	the	Netherlands’,	20	August	2013:	http://photos.state.gov/libraries/netherlands/328666/pdfs/Sites%20of%20memory%20Ranked%20by%20Theme%202013-8.pdf,	35.	2	Blaise	Pascal,	Pascal’s	Pensées	(New	York:	E	P	Dutton	&	Co,	1958),	85.	This	translation	is	from	Jacques	Derrida,	‘Force	of	Law:	The	"Mystical	Foundation	of	Authority"’,	Cardozo	Law	Review,	vol	11	(1989-1990):	937.	See	also	Marin’s	discussion	in	Louis	Marin,	Portrait	of	the	King	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	1988),	17-23.		
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Figure	12.	‘Peace	through	Justice’3		
																																																						3	[image	omitted	from	digital	version]	
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183The	 experience	 of	 aporia	 in	 seeing	 this	 figure	 of	 Justitia	 is	 the	 impossibility	 of	distinguishing	 justice	 from	 force,	 as	 one	 might	 distinguish	 the	 Lady	 from	 her	sword.	Here	is	justice	and	force	embodied	as	one;	and	this,	we	are	told,	is	necessary	for	 peace.	 This	 is	 ‘Peace	 through	 Justice’.	Here	 justice	 is	 a	 force	 that	 is	 not	 only	capable	 of	 great	 violence	 in	 itself,	 but	 depends	 on	 this	 self-defining	 capacity	 for	violence	to	function	in	the	service	of	peace.		∞		A	growing	body	of	United	Nations	policy	literature	represents	justice	and	force	as	mutually	constitutive	conditions	for	and	of	peace.	As	the	UN	Secretary-General	has	made	 clear,	peace	must	be	 secured:	 ‘the	most	 fundamental	 lesson	 for	 the	United	Nations	 is	 that	 security	 is	 a	 precondition	 for	 sustainable	 peace’;4	 and	 it	must	 be	secured	through	the	UN’s	peace	operations	by	assisting	 in	 the	reform	of	a	state’s	‘security	sector’.5	The	Secretary-General	has	also	made	clear	that	the	UN’s	vision	of	security	combines	justice	and	force:	The	 United	 Nations	 has	 devoted	 considerable	 attention	 to	 articulating	 a	common	 understanding	 of	 security.	 The	 United	 Nations	 Millennium	Declaration	(General	Assembly	resolution	55/2)	captures	the	principle	that	lies	 at	 the	 core	 of	 this	 vision:	 that	men	 and	women	have	 the	 right	 to	 live	their	lives	and	raise	their	children	in	dignity,	free	from	hunger	and	the	fear	of	violence,	oppression	or	injustice.6	Thus	at	the	core	of	the	UN’s	vision	of	security	is	a	principle	of	justice;	but	make	no	mistake	 that	 this	 vision	 is	 not	 a	 forceful	 one.	 ‘Security’	 may	 be	 presented	 as	 a	heart-warming	vision	of	 justice,	 in	which	children	are	free	to	play,7	but	look	over	
																																																						4	UN	Doc	A/62/659–S/2008/39	(23	January	2008),	Report	of	the	Secretary	General:	Securing	Peace	
and	Development:	The	Role	of	the	United	Nations	in	Supporting	Security	Sector	Reform	(‘S-G	Report:	Securing	Peace’),	para	35.	See	also	UN	Doc	A/47/277–S/2411	(17	June	1992),	Report	of	the	
Secretary-General	Pursuant	to	the	Statement	Adopted	by	the	Summit	Meeting	of	the	Security	Council	
on	31	January	1992:	An	Agenda	for	Peace:	Preventive	Diplomacy,	Peacemaking	and	Peace-Keeping	(‘An	Agenda	for	Peace’),	para	22,	where	it	states	that	the	UN’s	peace	operations,	‘taken	together,	and	carried	out	with	the	backing	of	all	Members,	offer	a	coherent	contribution	towards	securing	peace	in	the	spirit	of	the	Charter’.	5	See	also	the	UN	Secretary-General’s	second	report	on	‘security	sector	reform’:	UN	Doc	A/67/970–S/2013/480	(13	August	2013),	Report	of	the	Secretary	General:	Securing	States	and	Societies:	
Strengthening	the	United	Nations	Comprehensive	Support	to	Security	Sector	Reform	(‘S-G	Report:	Securing	States	and	Societies’).	6	‘S-G	Report:	Securing	Peace’,	para	5.	7	Or	at	least	where	they	might	grow	up	‘free	from	hunger	and	the	fear	of	violence,	oppression	or	injustice’:	see	passage	quoted	ibid.	
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184	the	children’s	shoulders	at	the	sector	that	secures	this	vision	and	one	will	see	‘the	structures,	 institutions	and	personnel	responsible	 for	the	management,	provision	and	 oversight	 of	 security	 in	 a	 country’	 including	 ‘defence,	 law	 enforcement,	corrections,	 intelligence	 services	 and	 institutions	 responsible	 for	 border	management,	 customs	 and	 civil	 emergencies’	 as	well	 as	 ‘elements	 of	 the	 judicial	sector	 responsible	 for	 the	 adjudication	 of	 cases	 of	 alleged	 criminal	 conduct	 and	misuse	of	force’	along	with	‘actors	that	play	a	role	in	managing	and	overseeing	the	design	 and	 implementation	of	 security,	 such	 as	ministries,	 legislative	bodies	 and	civil	 society	 groups’	 not	 to	 mention	 the	 ‘other	 non-State	 actors	 that	 could	 be	considered	part	of	the	security	sector’	such	as	 ‘customary	or	informal	authorities	and	private	security	services’.8	The	security	sector	is	as	vast	as	justice	is	core.		So	when	the	UN	says,	‘security	is	a	precondition	for	peace’,	it	is	also	saying,	justice	 and	 force	 brought	 together	 in	 a	 single	 mold—‘the	 security	 sector’—is	 a	precondition	for	peace,	which	is	to	say,	peace	requires	a	forceful	justice.		In	this	discourse,	however,	security	is	not	just	a	pre-condition	for	peace:	it	is	also	 a	 condition	 of	peace.	 The	UN	 Secretary-General	 highlights	 this	 foundational	nature	 of	 security	 when	 he	 emphasises	 the	 role	 of	 the	 security	 sector	 in	‘preventing	countries	from	relapsing	into	conflict	and	in	laying	the	foundations	for	sustainable	 peace’.9	 Indeed,	 security	 is	 so	 foundational	 of	 peace	 that	 the	 two—‘peace	and	security’—have	become	 indistinguishable	 in	UN	discourse	on	security	sector	 reform.	 Thus	 five	 years	 after	 the	 Secretary-General’s	 initial	 report	 on	security	sector	reform	in	2008,	the	Secretary-General	published	a	second	report	in	2013,	with	the	central	message	that:	The	 security	 of	 the	 State	 and	 the	 state	 of	 security	 (of	 individuals	 and	communities)	 are	 mutually	 interdependent;	 in	 other	 words,	 we	 have	learned	that	when	populations	are	not	secure,	neither	is	the	State.10	If	the	Secretary-General’s	first	report	on	security	sector	reform	set	out	a	vision	for	the	 UN	 to	 strengthen	 its	 capacity	 to	 ‘secure	 peace’	 (as	 that	 report	 is	 titled)—emphasising	 security	 as	 a	 pre-condition	 for	 peace—then	 this	 second	 report	extends	the	vision	to	see	security,	and	the	State’s	security	sector	in	particular,	as	a	
																																																						8	Ibid,	para	14.	This	is	the	UN’s	definition	of	‘security	sector’.		9	Ibid,	para	3.	10	‘S-G	Report:	Securing	States	and	Societies’,	para	9.	
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185necessary	condition	of	this	state	of	peace.11	In	this	report	on	 ‘securing	States	and	societies’	(as	it	is	titled),	‘State’	and	‘society’	merge	in	a	singular	peace-and-security	complex:	 when	 a	 ‘population’	 (itself	 a	 category	 of	 governmental	 control12)	 is	secure,	the	State	is	secure,	and	the	result	is	a	state/State	of	peace.		These	two	reports	together	present	a	vision	of	peace	as	secured	only	when	security	becomes	 indistinguishable	 from	 the	 state	of	 the	State.	Recalling	 that	 the	UN’s	 ‘common	 understanding	 of	 security’	 merges	 justice	 and	 force	 in	 the	 single	concept,	 this	 vision	 of	 ‘securing	 a	 state/State	 of	 peace’	 resembles	 the	 figure	 of	‘Peace	 through	 Justice’,	with	 justice	 and	 force	 conjoined	 as	 conditions	 for	 and	of	peace.		A	 The	logic	of	security		This	 vision	 of	 ‘securing	 peace’	 is	 held	 together	 by	 a	 configuration	 of	 three	antagonistic	propositions:	(1)	peace	contains	the	force	of	war;	(2)	law	contains	the	force	 of	 peace;	 and	 (3)	 justice	 contains	 the	 force	 of	 law.	 Each	 of	 these	 three	propositions	 is	an	unstable,	 internally	combustible	arrangement,	with	 force—the	very	 thing	 that	 is	 their	 generative	 essence—threatening	 to	 explode	 each	 in	 turn.	When	 brought	 together	 the	 three	 propositions	 are	 supposed	 to	 be	 sustainable,	securing	 a	 state/State	 of	 peace	 by	 containing	 force	 through	 a	 just	 rule	 of	 law.	However,	 the	 antagonisms	 that	 bind	 this	 arrangement	 become	 its	 combined	logic.13	
																																																						11	That	justice	and	force	are	considered	within	UN	discourse	as	inseparable,	coming	together	in	a	concept	of	security	that	constitutes	a	condition	of	peace,	is	recognised	in	the	academic	literature.	See,	eg,	the	contributions	to	the	‘Special	Issue	on	Rule	of	Law	and	Security	Sector	Reform’,	Hague	
Journal	on	the	Rule	of	Law	4	(2012).	For	instance,	Schröder	and	Kode	discuss	how	the	UN	defines	‘justice’	and	‘security’	as	inseparable	conditions	of	peace,	constituting	(in	the	words	of	the	UN	Development	Programme)	a	‘comprehensive	and	integrated	whole’:	Ursula	C	Schröder	and	Johannes	Kode,	‘Rule	of	Law	and	Security	Sector	Reform	in	International	State-building:	Dilemmas	of	Converging	Agendas’,	Hague	Journal	on	the	Rule	of	Law,	vol	4,	no	1	(2012):	32.	See	also	Till	Blume,	‘Review	Essay:	Security,	Justice	and	the	Rule	of	Law	in	Peace	Operations’,	International	
Peacekeeping,	vol	15,	no	5	(2008).	12	See	Michel	Foucault,	Security,	Territory,	Population:	Lectures	at	the	Collège	de	France,	1977-1978	(Palgrave	Macmillan,	2007).	13	In	implicit	ways,	and	at	times	explicitly,	the	discussion	here	is	in	conversation	with	Benjamin’s	study	of	law	and	force	in	his	‘critique	of	violence’:	Walter	Benjamin,	‘Critique	of	Violence’,	in	Walter	
Benjamin:	Selected	Writings,	Volume	1,	1913-1926,	ed	Marcus	Bullock	and	Michael	W	Jennings	(Cambridge:	Belknap	Press,	2002).	This	is	implicit,	rather	than	explicit,	due	to	the	focus	and	scope	of	this	chapter,	which	unfortunately	works	against	a	more	direct	and	sustained	engagement	in	the	text	with	Benjamin’s	arguments	about	the	relation	of	means	and	ends	and	‘law-making’	and	‘law-preserving’	violence.		
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(i)	 peace	contains	the	force	of	war		The	first	proposition	is	that	peace	contains	the	force	of	war.	This	means	two	things.	First,	 peace	 ‘contains’	 force	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 peace	 ‘withholds’	 force	 from	 its	violent	manifestation.	Second,	peace	‘contains’	force	in	the	sense	that	peace	‘holds	within	it’	the	very	force	that	would	manifest	violently.	This	is	in	keeping	with	how	peace	is	imagined	throughout	the	Peace	Palace	in	the	Hague,	as	a	violent	character	that	 overpowers	 war, posing	 peace	 as	 the	 forceful	 opposition	 to	 the	 manifest	violence	of	war.	This	can	be	seen	most	strikingly	 in	the	stained-glass	windows	of	the	International	Court	of	 Justice,	where	the	figure	of	Peace	 is	depicted	stomping	mercilessly	on	the	head	of	War	even	while	War	is	down.14	In	this,	peace	is	not	the	absence	 of	 violence	 but	 its	 containment.15	 Peace	withholds	 force	 from	 its	 violent	manifestation	 by	 holding	 within	 it	 overwhelming	 force.	 Peace	 as	 such	 is	 ‘made’,	‘kept’,	and	‘built’	through	the	forceful	containment	of	violence,	erecting	a	barrier	to	the	manifestation	of	violent	conflict	by	subsuming	its	potential	within	a	state/State	of	peaceful	violence.		This	 is	peace	 through	 force,	 and	 the	 result	 is	 a	 combustible	proposition:	 a	state/State	 of	 peaceful	 violence;	 or	 in	 the	 UN’s	 terminology,	 a	 state/State	 of	security.	 The	 combination	 of	 ‘peace’	 and	 ‘force’	within	 a	 single	mold	makes	 this	peace	 antagonistic.	 If	 ‘peace	 contains	 force’,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 peace	 forcefully	opposes	the	manifestation	of	violent	conflict	by	subsuming	its	potential	as	its	own	condition,	 then	what	 contains	 the	 force	 of	 peace?	What	 keeps	 the	 forces	 of	 this	peaceful	State	from	manifesting	violently,	as	is	its	condition?	What	keeps	this	State	of	 peace—this	 State	 of	 security—from	 being	 tyrannical?	 The	 difficulty	 is	 this:	peace,	we	are	 told,	must	be	 secured	against	 the	manifestation	of	 violent	 conflict,	
																																																																																																																																																														In	line	with	this,	throughout	the	discussion	I	use	the	word	‘force’	in	the	multiple	senses	of	the	German	word	Gewalt,	as	used	by	Benjamin,	which	carries	the	meanings	‘violence’,	‘(public)	force’	and	‘(legitimate)	power’;	on	this	see	Derrida,	‘Force	of	Law’,	927.	To	retain	the	unsettling	sense	of	connection	between	these	meanings	I	have	retained	the	ambiguity	in	the	word	‘force’	rather	than	attempt	to	specify	the	‘most	fitting’	meaning	in	each	case.		14	This	recalls	the	Biblical	image	of	David	standing	on	the	head	of	Goliath:	see,	eg,	Donatello’s	bronze	figure	of	David	(with	thanks	to	Desmond	Manderson	for	drawing	my	attention	to	this).	15	Compare	Michael	Howard,	‘The	Concept	of	Peace’,	Encounter,	vol	61,	no	4	(1983).	For	discussion	of	Howard’s	approach	as	part	of	a	‘minimalist	approach	to	peace’,	see	William	Maley,	‘Peace,	Needs	and	Utopia’,	Political	Studies,	vol	33,	no	4	(1985):	579.	See	also	Johan	Galtung,	‘Twenty-Five	Years	of	Peace	Research:	Ten	Challenges	and	Some	Responses’,	Journal	of	Peace	Research,	vol	22,	no	2	(1985).	
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187but	 what	 secures	 this	 peace	 against	 itself?	 What	 secures	 this	 state/State	 from	becoming	the	manifestation	of	violence,	in	the	name	of	‘peace	and	stability’?			
(ii)	 law	contains	the	force	of	peace		The	 first	 proposition	 (peace	 contains	 the	 force	 of	 war)	 is	 therefore	 unstable	 in	itself,	 containing	 the	 potential	 to	 destroy	 the	 very	 state	 of	 peace	 it	 seeks	 to	establish,	requiring	a	second	proposition	to	secure	its	peaceful	intent.	The	second	proposition	is	that	law	contains	the	force	of	peace.	This	is	often	formulated	in	the	more	specific	proposition	of	‘the	rule	of	law’,	namely	that	the	rule	of	law	contains	the	force	of	peace	by	guarding	against	its	arbitrary	exercise.	‘Law	contains	force’	by	subsuming	the	violence	that	is	the	condition	of	peace	within	a	legal	framework	that	regulates	its	exercise	and	makes	it	 ‘accountable’	and	‘legitimate’.16	Under	the	rule	of	law,	the	force	of	peace	might	be	exercised	in	the	interests	of	its	state/State.		This	 proposition	 is	 central	 to	 the	 UN’s	 discourse,	 according	 to	 which	 a	State’s	security	sector	must	be	contained	‘within	a	framework	of	the	rule	of	law’.17	As	 the	 UN	 Secretary-General	 emphasises	 in	 his	 2008	 report	 on	 security	 sector	reform,	 if	 the	 first	 lesson	 the	 UN	 has	 learnt	 in	 its	 60-year	 ‘search	 for	 effective	responses	to	address	insecurity	based	on	its	Charter’	is	that	security	is	a	condition	for	and	of	peace,	then	the	second	lesson	is	that	this	‘can	be	achieved	only	within	a	broad	 framework	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law’.18	 Above	 all,	 this	 means	 ensuring	‘accountability	 to	 law’.19	 The	 UN	 thus	 qualifies	 its	 support	 for	 strengthening	 a	
																																																						16	For	reasons	that	will	become	clear	in	the	following	discussion,	this	resembles	Benjamin’s	argument	in	his	‘Critique	of	Violence’,	which	might	be	summed	up	in	his	observation	that	‘one	might	perhaps	consider	the	surprising	possibility	that	the	law’s	interest	in	a	monopoly	of	violence	vis-à-vis	individuals	is	explained	not	by	the	intention	of	preserving	legal	ends	but,	rather,	by	the	intention	of	preserving	the	law	itself;	that	violence,	when	not	in	the	hands	of	the	law,	threatens	it	not	by	the	end	that	it	may	pursue	but	by	its	mere	existence	outside	the	law.’	Benjamin,	‘Critique	of	Violence’,	239.	17	‘S-G	Report:	Securing	States	and	Societies’,	para	8.		18	‘S-G	Report:	Securing	Peace’,	paras	1	and	2.	The	same	line	is	repeated	by	the	UN	Security	Council	in	its	first	resolution	on	‘security	sector	reform’	(SSR),	in	‘recalling	that	SSR	must	take	place	within	a	broad	framework	of	the	rule	of	law’:	UN	Doc	S/Res/2151	(28	April	2014),	preambular	para	15.	As	indicated	above,	the	point	is	also	repeated	in	the	UN	Secretary-General’s	report	when	he	writes	that	the	objective	of	security	sector	reform	is	‘enhanced	effectiveness	and	accountability	of	security	institutions	operating	under	civilian	control	within	a	framework	of	the	rule	of	law’:	‘S-G	Report:	Securing	States	and	Societies’,	para	8.	19	‘S-G	Report:	Securing	Peace’,	para	12,	citing	the	definition	of	the	rule	of	law	set	out	in	UN	Doc	S/2004/616	(23	August	2004),	Report	of	the	Secretary-General:	The	Rule	of	Law	and	Transitional	
Justice	in	Conflict	and	Post-Conflict	Societies,	para	6	(‘S-G	Report:	Rule	of	Law’).	The	definition	is	reproduced	in	note	29	below.	On	the	discursive	relation	between	‘the	rule	of	law’	and	
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188	State’s	capacity	for	peaceful	violence	with	the	proviso	that	security	sector	reform	must	seek	to	enhance	the	‘accountability’	of	the	security	sector.20	And	as	the	2008	report	emphasises,	 the	first	common	feature	of	 ‘accountable	security	sectors’	 is	a	‘legal	 and/or	 constitutional	 framework	 providing	 for	 the	 legitimate	 and	accountable	 use	 of	 force’.21	 That	 is,	 if	 security	 is	 a	 condition	 for/of	 peace,	 then	accountability	 to	 law	 is	 a	 condition	 for/of	 the	 security	 sector	 as	 the	 domain	 of	legitimate	violence.	This	is	the	UN’s	‘vision	of	security	based	on	the	rule	of	law’.22		And	 yet	 this	 vision	 of	 securing	 peace	 through	 the	 institution	 of	 a	 legally	accountable	 security	 sector	 does	 not	 overcome	 the	 antagonism	 of	 peaceful	violence.	Rather,	 the	proposition	 that	 law	 contains	 the	 force	 of	 peace	by	making	that	 force	 ‘legitimate	 and	 accountable’	 takes	 over	 this	 antagonism	 as	 its	 own	condition.	The	force	of	peace	becomes	the	force	of	law.23	Law	‘contains’	the	force	of	peace	by	‘holding	within	it’	a	monopoly	on	legitimate	violence	in	order	to	‘withhold	it	 from’	 any	 unlawful	 manifestation.	 This	 makes	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 fundamentally	
arbitrary	at	the	same	time	as	it	guards	against	the	arbitrary	exercise	of	power.	To	serve	the	 interests	of	peace,	 the	fundament	or	condition	of	 law’s	rule	must	be	 its	monopoly	on	violence:	peace	 requires	 law	 to	 contain	 force,	 and	 to	 contain	 force,	law	must	become	its	monopoly.24	Force,	in	other	words,	defines	the	rule	of	law:	law	secures	the	state/State	of	‘peaceful	violence’	by	making	violence	coincidental	with	itself.25	 In	the	same	way	that	 justice	and	force	must	 inhabit	the	same	body	in	the	figure	of	‘Peace	through	Justice’,	law	and	force	must	merge	indistinguishably	in	the	rule	 of	 law	 in	 order	 to	 sustain	 this	 arrangement	 of	 ‘peace	 through	 law’.	 This	 is	arbitrary	because	 it	means	 that	 the	 rule	of	 law	 is	ultimately	directed	at	 securing	
itself.	The	end	of	the	rule	of	law	becomes	the	rule	of	law—an	absurd	tautology	that	
																																																																																																																																																														‘accountability’	in	the	context	of	UN	peace	operations,	see	Jeremy	Matam	Farrall,	‘Rule	of	Accountability	or	Rule	of	law?	Regulating	the	UN	Security	Council’s	Accountability	Deficits’,	Journal	
of	Conflict	and	Security	Law,	vol	19	(2014).	20	See,	eg,	‘S-G	Report:	Securing	Peace’,	paras	3,	12,	15,	17,	35,	45.	That	the	‘objective	of	SSR	is	to	help	ensure	that	people	are	safer	through	the	enhanced	effectiveness	and	accountability	of	security	institutions	operating	under	civilian	control	within	a	framework	of	the	rule	of	law’	is	reaffirmed	in	the	Secretary-General’s	second	report;	see,	eg,	‘S-G	Report:	Securing	States	and	Societies’,	para	8.	21	‘S-G	Report:	Securing	Peace’,	para	15.	22	Ibid,	para	4.	23	See	also	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns,	‘Introduction’,	in	Law's	Violence,	ed	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns	(Ann	Arbor:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	1995).	24	See	also	Benjamin’s	argument	that	the	thing	most	threatening	to	the	rule	of	law	is	the	manifestation	of	a	force	that	is	outside	itself:	Benjamin,	‘Critique	of	Violence’.	25	This	is	also	how	I	read	Benjamin’s	argument	on	the	self-constituting	and	self-preserving	force	of	law:	ibid.	See	also	Derrida’s	reading	of	Benjamin’s	essay	in	Derrida,	‘Force	of	Law’.	
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189is	nonetheless	necessary	to	sustain	the	telos	of	 ‘peace’.26	To	secure	peace	through	law,	the	law	of	this	state/State	of	peace	must	become	the	absolute	arbiter	of	force;	but	 in	 this,	 force	becomes	the	arbiter	of	 law.	Hence	the	antagonism	that	enlivens	this	second	proposition:	‘law	contains	the	force	of	peace’	means	that	law	and	force	must	be	conjoined	indistinguishably.	This	is	arbitrary	in	the	precise	meaning	of	the	word:	the	use	of	force	must	be	according	to	law	(law	must	be	its	arbiter),	but	force	
is	law,	and	so	the	force	of	law	becomes	its	own	arbiter.27			
(iii)	 justice	contains	the	force	of	law		The	second	proposition	of	‘peace	through	law’	is	thus	as	unsustainable	as	the	first	proposition	of	‘peace	through	force’	that	it	is	supposed	to	secure.	If	the	rule	of	law	is	concerned	with	the	stability	of	this	state/State	of	peace,	and	must	 legitimately,	according	 to	 its	 concept,	 exercise	 violence	 at	will	 in	 order	 to	 uphold	 ‘the	 peace’,	what	 ensures	 law’s	 rule	does	not	become	endlessly	 tyrannical?	What	makes	 this	state/State	 of	 peace	 under	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 bearable?	 To	 recall	 Pascal:	 justice	without	 force	 might	 be	 impotent,	 but	 force	 without	 justice	 is	 tyrannical.	 And	arbitrariness	 is	 by	 definition	 tyrannical:	 ‘unrestrained	 in	 the	 exercise	 of	 will;	 of	uncontrolled	power	or	authority,	absolute;	hence,	despotic,	tyrannical’.28		The	two	propositions	just	considered	(‘peace	contains	the	force	of	war’	and	‘law	 contains	 the	 force	of	 peace’)	 say	 little	 about	 justice	 and	both	 risk	becoming	tyrannical.	This	vision	of	peace	thus	requires	a	third	proposition	to	ensure	that	its	antagonistic	arrangement	does	not	go	up	 in	 flames.	The	 third	proposition	 is	 that	justice	contains	the	force	of	law.	Justice	must	contain	the	force	of	law	if	the	rule	of	law	 is	 not	 to	 become	 tyrannical,	 which	 means	 the	 force	 of	 law	 must	 be	indistinguishable	 from	justice,	held	within	the	body	of	 Justitia	 in	order	 that	 law’s	
																																																						26	See	also	Slaughter’s	examination	of	how	an	‘impossible	tautological-teleological	developmental	complex’	animates	the	‘formal,	paradoxical	structure	of	international	human	rights	law	and	the	narrative	of	human	personality	development	that	it	charters’:	Joseph	Slaughter,	‘Enabling	fictions	and	novel	subjects:	The	Bildungsroman	and	international	human	rights	law’,	PMLA,	vol	121,	no	5	(2006):	1412.	27	Compare	Mary	Ellen	O'Connell,	‘Peace	through	Law	and	the	Security	Council:	Modelling	Law	Compliance’,	in	Strengthening	the	Rule	of	Law	through	the	United	Nations	Security	Council,	ed	Jeremy	Matam	Farrall	and	Hilary	Charlesworth	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2016).	O’Connell	argues	that	‘[l]aw	is	the	principle	alternative	to	violence	for	settling	disputes	and	ordering	societies.	When	the	ROL	[rule	of	law]	prevails,	violence	does	not.	Definitions	of	the	ROL	are	premised	on	these	understandings.	[…]	Thus,	if	a	robust	ROL	is	established,	the	use	of	violence	will	by	definition	be	the	exceptional	and	not	the	normal	means	of	establishing	social	order’.	Ibid,	257.	28	‘Arbitrary,	adj.	and	n.’,	OED	Online,	December	2015.	
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190	violence	is	withheld	from	its	unjust	exercise.	Or	to	put	this	another	way,	force,	as	law,	must	be	a	means	for	and	of	justice	if	its	rule	is	not	to	threaten	the	state/State	of	 peace	 that	 it	 exists	 to	 secure.	 Finally,	 this	 is	what	 is	meant	 by	 ‘peace	 through	justice’.	This	 proposition	 is	 also	 apparent	 in	 the	 UN’s	 discourse.	 While	 the	 UN	Secretary-General’s	reports	on	security	sector	reform	tell	us	that	security	must	be	accountable	to	law	for	peace	to	prevail,	they	say	very	little	explicitly	about	justice.	The	implication	is	there,	of	course;	as	noted	earlier,	a	principle	of	justice	is	said	to	be	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	 UN’s	 vision	 of	 security.	 However,	 one	 has	 to	 turn	 to	 the	Secretary-General’s	2004	report	on	‘the	rule	of	law	and	transitional	justice’	to	read	that	the	full	definition	of	the	rule	of	law	also	requires	‘fairness	in	the	application	of	the	 law’.29	 It	 is	 in	this	report	on	the	rule	of	 law	that	we	learn	that	 ‘for	the	United	Nations,	 justice	 is	 an	 ideal	 of	 accountability	 and	 fairness’,30	 and	 that	 the	‘consolidation	 of	 peace	 in	 the	 immediate	 post-conflict	 period,	 as	 well	 as	 the	maintenance	 of	 peace	 in	 the	 long	 term’	 requires	 ‘legitimate	 structures	 for	 the	peaceful	settlement	of	disputes	and	the	fair	administration	of	justice’.31		
(iv)		 securing	peace		Drawing	 these	 three	 antagonistic	 propositions	 together,	 the	 logic	 of	 ‘securing	peace’	can	be	summarised	as	follows:	(1)	peace	contains	the	force	of	war,	and	yet	this	gives	rise	to	a	state/State	of	peaceful	violence	that	 is	highly	combustible;	(2)	therefore	 peace	 requires	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 to	 contain	 the	 exercise	 of	 peaceful	violence,	 and	 yet	 the	 forcefulness	 of	 law	 makes	 it	 fundamentally	 arbitrary;	 (3)	therefore	 peace	 requires	 justice	 to	 contain	 the	 force	 of	 law—or	 in	 other	words,	
peace	 requires	 a	 forceful	 justice.	Without	 justice	 containing	 the	 force	 of	 law,	 the	
																																																						29	‘S-G	Report:	Rule	of	Law’,	para	6:	‘The	rule	of	law	is	a	concept	at	the	very	heart	of	the	Organization’s	mission.	It	refers	to	a	principle	of	governance	in	which	all	persons,	institutions	and	entities,	public	and	private,	including	the	State	itself,	are	accountable	to	laws	that	are	publicly	promulgated,	equally	enforced	and	independently	adjudicated,	and	which	are	consistent	with	international	human	rights	norms	and	standards.	It	requires,	as	well,	measures	to	ensure	adherence	to	the	principles	of	supremacy	of	law,	equality	before	the	law,	accountability	to	the	law,	fairness	in	the	application	of	the	law,	separation	of	powers,	participation	in	decision-making,	legal	certainty,	avoidance	of	arbitrariness	and	procedural	and	legal	transparency.’	30	Ibid,	para	7.	31	Ibid,	para	2	and	see	also	para	4.		
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191arbitrariness	of	the	rule	of	law	would	turn	the	exercise	of	peaceful	violence	against	peace	itself.		And	 yet,	 just	 as	 the	 antagonism	 of	 peaceful	 violence	 that	 is	 the	 condition	for/of	a	state/State	of	peace	is	not	resolved	by	the	institution	of	the	rule	of	law,	so	the	antagonism	of	lawful	violence	that	is	the	condition	for/of	a	state/State	of	peace	under	the	rule	of	law	is	not	resolved	by	the	inclusion	of	a	principle	of	justice	at	the	core	of	 security.	Rather,	 justice	and	 force	merge	 in	 this	 state/State	of	 security.	A	state	 of	 peace,	 in	 other	 words,	 might	 be	 maintained	 only	 so	 long	 as	 the	 State’s	violence	 is	 just	 and	 its	 justice	 is	 violent.	 This	 is	 the	 residual	 antagonism—a	 just	violence—that	holds	the	whole	arrangement	together;	this	is	what	‘secures	peace’.			B	 Overview		In	the	previous	chapter	I	examined	how	a	particular	logic	informed	the	articulation	of	 ‘Liberia’	 from	 its	 conception	 as	 an	 idea	 of	 liberty	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	nineteenth	 century	 to	 its	 realisation	 as	 a	 nation-state	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century.	Operating	through	the	law	as	its	forceful	medium,	this	logic	gave	form	to	Liberia	by	super-imposing	 over	 country	 in	 west	 Africa	 a	 representational	 framework	 that	sought	 to	 render	 its	 lands	 and	peoples	 productive	 as	 territory	 and	 citizens.	 This	logic,	I	argued,	is	the	logic	of	capital.	At	the	end	of	the	chapter,	I	then	turned	to	the	Liberian	Government’s	 post-war	 vision	 for	 the	 country—a	vision	 that	 suggests	 a	continuation,	 if	 not	 an	 intensification,	 of	 the	 institutionalisation	 of	 this	 logic	 of	capital.	This	raises	a	question,	which	I	posed	in	closing:	how	will	the	Government	realise	its	envisioned	peace,	given	the	violence	of	the	logic	that	informs	it?		I	address	this	question	in	Part	2	of	the	chapter	in	examining	what	is	taking	place	 in	 the	 attempt	 to	 consolidate	 a	 state/State	 of	 peace	 in	 Liberia	 post-war.	There	are	four	sections	to	the	analysis.	(1)	I	begin	with	the	Government’s	vision	of	Liberia	for	2030,	introduced	at	the	end	of	the	previous	chapter—a	vision	based	on	a	strategy	of	growth	that	aims	to	achieve	a	Gross	Domestic	Product	growth	rate	of	9%	every	year	between	2012	and	2030.	Based	on	an	analysis	of	the	Government’s	peace	framework	for	realising	this	vision,	I	show	how	the	logic	of	security	set	out	above	also	 informs	 this	 vision	of	 securing	peace	 through	 the	 institution	of	 a	 just	rule	 of	 law.	 (2)	 I	 then	 examine	 the	 UN’s	 vision	 for	 assisting	 the	 Government	 to	build	 this	 peace	 through	 its	 peace	 operations	 in	 Liberia.	 This	 reveals	 an	
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192	operational	 vision	 that	 is	 concerned	 above	 all	 with	 securing	 stability	 and	 order,	bringing	 the	 rule-of-law	 and	 justice	 components	 of	 the	 UN’s	 peace	 operation	within	 the	 logic	 of	 security.	 (3)	Having	 set	 out	 the	Government’s	 vision	of	 peace	and	the	UN’s	vision	of	peace-building	in	Liberia,	I	then	turn	to	examine	how	the	UN	is	 supporting	 the	 Government	 to	 ‘establish	 a	 State	 based	 on	 the	 rule	 of	 law’	through	UNMIL.	This	shows	a	peace	operation	directed	at	securing	peace	through	the	 institution	 of	 a	 forceful	 rule	 of	 law.	 However,	 this	 also	 gives	 rise	 to	 the	question:	 what	 of	 justice?	 I	 address	 this	 question	 in	 the	 final	 analysis	 (4)	 by	examining	the	Government’s	attempt	to	fortify	Liberia	by	bringing	together	force,	law,	and	justice	in	five	Regional	Justice	and	Security	Hubs.	What	this	analysis	shows	is	an	attempt	to	secure	peace	by	combining	force,	law,	and	justice	in	a	unified	state/State.	Whilst	this	is	directed	at	containing	force	so	 it	does	not	manifest	violently,	by	bringing	 it	within	 the	State’s	security	sector,	this	 also	 has	 the	 effect	 of	 turning	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 into	 a	 medium	 of	 the	 State’s	security	sector.	Not	only	does	this	inform	how	the	rule	of	law	is	taking	place,	as	a	medium	of	security,	but	it	also	enables	the	logic	of	security	to	take	place	through	the	institution	of	the	rule	of	law.	At	the	same	time,	the	proposition	‘justice	contains	the	force	of	law’	is	supposed	to	make	this	arrangement	bearable.	The	justice	of	this	peace,	brought	within	 the	 logic	of	security,	 is	supposed	to	secure	the	state	of	 the	State.		 This	is	peace	through	justice—and	the	result	is	potentially	explosive.	Just	as	the	 propositions	 ‘peace	 contains	 the	 force	 of	war’	 and	 ‘law	 contains	 the	 force	 of	peace’	have	the	potential	to	become	tyrannical,	there	is	the	danger	that	the	attempt	to	secure	peace	in	this	way	will	result	in	the	institutionalisation	of	an	increasingly	violent	 authoritarian	 regime.	 This	 risk	 is	 not	 merely	 hypothetical:	 it	 is	 the	historical	experience	of	the	First	Republic	of	Liberia.	As	I	discuss	in	the	post-script	to	 this	 chapter	 (Part	 3),	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘Liberia’	 as	 a	 vision	 of	 justice	was	 forcefully	consolidated	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 and	 twentieth	 centuries	 as	 an	 African-American	republic	 in	 west	 Africa,	 securing	 the	 State	 of	 Liberia	 through	 the	institutionalisation	 of	 an	 unjust	 rule	 of	 law	 that	 became	 a	 mere	 instrument	 of	domination.	The	result	was	revolution	and	war.	
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2	 Securing	peace		A	 A	peace	framework		In	2012	 the	Government	of	Liberia	 launched	a	 ‘long-term	national	vision’	 for	 the	country	 to	 pursue	 between	 2012	 and	 2030.32	 The	 vision	 is	 introduced	 in	 the	Government’s	 overarching	 development	 framework,	 the	 Agenda	 for	
Transformation:	 Steps	 Toward	 Liberia	 RISING	 2030,33	which	 provides	 an	 ‘action	plan’	for	the	first	five	years	(2012–2017).34	The	Government	describes	its	national	vision	in	Chapter	2	of	the	Agenda	for	Transformation.	In	a	passage	that	evokes	the	Liberian	Commissioner’s	1903	report	on	the	demarcation	of	 the	hinterland,35	 the	description	creates	the	sense	of	a	truly	future-present	vision	of	Liberia:	The	goal	is	to	have	a	vibrant	economy;	one	in	which	more	than	half	of	the	workforce	is	employed	in	the	formal	sector.	This	is	led—but	not	dominated	by—the	[natural	resource]	concessions	economy,	which	is	integrated	into	a	prosperous	 Liberian	 economy.	 Liberians	 are	 successful	managers	 and	 are	entrepreneurs	 by	 choice.	 People	 trust	 that	 contracts	 and	 business	agreements	will	be	honored,	all	of	which	are	supported	by	transparent,	fair	and	efficient	Commercial	Courts.	[…]	A	special	economic	zone	in	Buchanan	permits	complex	activities	to	service	the	extractive	sector	in	the	sub-region,	while	 also	 acting	 as	 a	 staging	 ground	 for	 institutional	 reforms	 at	 the	national	 level.	 […]	 Smaller	 commercial	 zones	 on	 the	borders	with	Guinea,	Sierra	 Leone	 and	 Ivory	 Coast	 serve	 as	 bridges	 of	 peace	 and	 prosperity,	backstopping	a	broader	regional	integration	of	tariffs	and	infrastructure.36	The	 vision	 continues	 in	 the	 same	 way	 before	 ending	 with	 a	 note	 on	 the	 future	beyond	 this	present:	 ‘Liberians	are	saving,	 confidently,	 for	 their	own	 futures	and	average	incomes	have	reached	the	middle-income	threshold.’37	The	 Agenda	 for	 Transformation	 sets	 out	 a	 development	 framework	 for	consolidating	this	national	vision,	based	on	four	main	‘pillar	goals’	that	combine	a	capitalist-economic	 regime	 (Pillar	 II)	with	 institutions	 of	 democratic	 governance	
																																																						32	See	Republic	of	Liberia,	Agenda	for	Transformation:	Steps	Toward	Liberia	RISING	2030	(Monrovia:	Republic	of	Liberia,	2012),	29.	33	Ibid,	Chapter	2.	34	Ibid,	29.	35	Discussed	in	Part	2	of	Chapter	4	of	the	thesis.	36	Republic	of	Liberia,	Agenda	for	Transformation,	9-10.	37	Ibid,	10.	
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194	(Pillar	IV),	concern	for	human	rights	and	development	(Pillar	III),	secured	through	the	rule	of	law	(Pillar	I).38	I	briefly	discussed	‘Pillar	II—Economic	Transformation’	in	the	closing	section	of	the	previous	chapter	of	the	thesis.	My	focus	now	is	on	the	pillar	that	is	supposed	to	secure	the	entire	edifice,	that	is,	‘Pillar	I—Peace,	Justice,	Security	and	Rule	of	Law’.39		The	overarching	goal	of	Pillar	I	is	to	establish	the	conditions	for	and	of	the	peace	 envisioned	 by	 the	 Government.40	 The	 framework	 for	 achieving	 this	overarching	 ‘pillar	 goal’	 has	 four	 sector	 goals:	 (1)	 ‘security’;	 (2)	 ‘peace	 and	reconciliation’;	 (3)	 ‘justice	 and	 rule	 of	 law’;	 and	 (4)	 ‘judicial	 reform’.	 The	 sector	goals	of	‘justice	and	rule	of	law’	and	‘judicial	reform’	are	both	concerned	with	the	institution	of	law,	whilst	the	sector	goal	of	‘peace	and	reconciliation’	is	concerned	with	 social	 justice.	 Along	 with	 ‘security’,	 which	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	institutionalisation	of	force,	these	sector	goals	constitute	three	propositions,	which	together	 provide	 a	 peace	 framework	 for	 realising	 the	 new,	 post-war	 idea	 of	Liberia.		The	 diagram	 on	 the	 following	 page	 (Figure	 13)	 juxtaposes	 the	Government’s	framework	for	realising	its	post-war	idea	of	Liberia	(the	phrases	in	brackets)	with	my	analysis	 of	 that	 framework	 (the	phrases	 in	bold).	 Thus	Vision	
2030:	Liberia	Rising	corresponds	with	the	Government’s	post-war	idea	of	Liberia;	the	Agenda	for	Transformation	corresponds	with	the	Government’s	framework	for	realising	this	vision;	whilst	‘Pillar	I’	of	the	Agenda	for	Transformation	provides	the	‘peace	 framework’	 that	 is	 supposed	 to	 secure	 the	 entire	 edifice.	 This	 peace	framework,	 as	 I	 now	 turn	 to	 show,	 is	 based	 on	 the	 same	 three	 propositions	considered	above,	that	is,	the	logic	of	securing	peace.		 	
																																																						38	The	four	main	‘pillars’	are:	Pillar	I—Peace,	Justice,	Security	and	Rule	of	Law;	Pillar	II—Economic	Transformation;	Pillar	III—Human	Development;	and	Pillar	IV—Governance	and	Public	Institutions.	A	fifth	pillar	includes	‘cross-cutting	themes’.	See	ibid.		39	See	ibid,	Chapter	8.	40	As	the	government	writes,	the	Agenda	for	Transformation	will	‘coordinate	all	activities	for	peace	and	security	into	one	development	framework’:	ibid,	41.	
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idea	of	Liberia	
(‘Vision	2030:	Liberia	Rising’)	
|	
development	framework		
(‘Agenda	for	Transformation’)	
|	
peace	framework		
(‘Pillar	I—Peace,	Justice,	Security	and	Rule	of	Law’)	
																															|	 																																																						|	 																																																				|	
peace	contains	the	force	of	war	 law	contains	the	force	of	peace	 justice	contains	the	force	of	law	
(‘Sector	Goal	1:	Security’)	 (‘Sector	Goal	3:	Justice	and	Rule	
of	Law;	Sector	Goal	4:	Judicial	
Reform’)	
(‘Sector	Goal	2:	Peace	and	
Reconciliation’)	
	
Figure	13.	The	framework	for	realising	Vision	2030:	Liberia	Rising				
(i)	 peace	contains	the	force	of	war		The	Government	provides	the	following	narrative	in	introducing	the	sector	goal	of	‘security’:	Ten	 years	 ago,	 security	 forces	 intimidated	 and	 terrorized	 the	 population,	intervened	in	political	processes	and	disregarded	the	rule	of	law.	Today,	the	police	 force,	armed	 forces	and	all	other	security	 forces	are	being	restored	into	professional	and	capable	institutions.41	These	first	two	sentences	in	the	Government’s	narrative	set	out	the	transition	from	a	state	of	war	to	a	state	of	peace.	In	2002	(‘ten	years	ago’)	Liberia	was	experiencing	its	second	civil	war	and	some	of	the	worst	violence	of	the	fourteen-year	conflict;	in	2012	(‘today’)	the	same	forces	that	had	‘intimidated	and	terrorized	the	population’	‘are	being	restored	into	professional	and	capable	institutions’.	The	narrative	then	emphasises	 how	 the	 Government	 has	 ‘exerted	 immense	 efforts	 to	 effectively	address	the	negative	attributes	of	the	security	sector’	and	how	it	plans	to	continue	‘building	 on	 these	 efforts’	 with	 a	 focus	 ‘on	 sustaining	 and	 augmenting	 progress	made	in	creating	a	secure	environment’.42	As	it	states	in	summary:	‘Goal:	Maintain	a	 secure	and	safe	environment	 to	enable	sustainable	socio-economic	growth	and	development.’43		
																																																						41	Ibid,	section	8.1	(‘security’).	42	Ibid.	43	Ibid.	
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196	 The	 primary	 ‘strategic	 objective’	 for	 achieving	 this	 sector	 goal	 is	 to	‘maintain	 security	 nation-wide	 and	 protect	 territorial	 integrity’	 after	 the	withdrawal	 of	 the	UN’s	 peace	 operation	 in	 Liberia,	UNMIL,	 by	 ‘consolidating	 […]	the	 new	 Liberian	 security	 architecture’.44	 In	 other	 words,	 having	 brought	 the	forces	 of	 war	 under	 the	 control	 of	 the	 Government,	 and	 transformed	 them	 into	forces	of	peace,	the	goal	of	‘security’	will	be	achieved	through	the	consolidation	of	force	within	the	State’s	‘security	sector’	(peace	will	contain	the	force	of	war).		However,	 the	 action	plan	also	 includes	 two	other	 ‘strategic	objectives’	 for	achieving	the	sector	goal	of	 ‘security’.	The	first	of	 these	 is	 ‘increasing	operational	effectiveness’;	 the	 second	 is	 ‘increasing	 the	 accountability	 and	 legitimacy	 of	national	security	 institutions	and	the	public’s	confidence	 in	them’,	 to	be	achieved	in	 part	 by	 ‘building	 synergies’	 between	 the	 security	 sector	 and	 the	 state	 legal	system.45	Thus,	whilst	the	primary	goal	of	‘security’	is	to	ensure	peace	contains	the	force	 of	 war,	 the	 action	 plan	 recognises	 that	 this	 is	 a	 combustible	 proposition,	requiring	more	than	just	‘operational	effectiveness’.	To	ensure	the	forces	of	peace	do	 not	 become	 tyrannical,	 there	 must	 be	 ‘oversight,	 accountability,	professionalization,	and	legitimacy	of	the	security	sector’.46			
(ii)	 law	contains	the	force	of	peace			The	Government	sets	out	two	‘ends’	in	its	discussion	of	‘Sector	Goal	3:	justice	and	rule	of	 law’.47	One	is	to	provide	a	medium	for	the	capitalist-economic	regime:	 ‘an	effective	 justice	 system’	 is	 ‘essential	 to	 economic	 revitalization	 because	 it	 can	provide	a	 framework	 for	 resolving	 contractual	 and	property	disputes,	 increasing	commercial	 certainty	 and	 promoting	 private	 sector	 growth’.48	 The	 other	 is	 to	secure	this	regime:	‘an	effective	justice	system	is	vital	to	addressing	Liberia’s	most	significant	security	threat—the	growth	in	crime.’49		
																																																						44	Ibid.	45	Ibid.	46	Ibid.	47	Ibid,	section	8.3	(‘justice	and	rule	of	law’).	48	Ibid.	49	Ibid.	
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197By	 ‘justice	 system’	 and	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 law’,	 the	 Government	 means	 the	institutions	 of	 the	 State	 legal	 system.50	 The	 Government’s	 goal	 of	 ‘extending	 the	rule	of	 law’	 is	 therefore	 intended	 to	 strengthen	 the	 institutions	of	 the	State	 legal	system,	to	achieve	the	overarching	goal	of	securing	peace.51	At	the	same	time,	the	Government	 is	 clearly	 concerned	about	 the	 justice	of	 its	 legal	 system.52	Thus	 the	overarching	sector	goal	is	not	only	‘to	build	the	effectiveness	and	integrity	of	legal	institutions’,	but	also	‘to	increase	equitable	access	to	justice	and	to	strengthen	the	rule	of	law	for	the	social	and	economic	benefit	of	all	Liberians.’53	That	is,	whilst	the	Government’s	goal	of	‘extending	the	rule	of	law’	is	to	strengthen	the	institutions	of	the	State	legal	system,	to	ensure	‘law	contains	the	force	of	peace’,	the	Government	also	recognises	that	more	is	needed	than	institutional	‘effectiveness	and	integrity’.	The	rule	of	law	must	be	as	just	as	it	is	forceful.		
(iii)	 justice	contains	the	force	of	law		The	Government	addresses	the	question	of	justice	in	the	sector	goal	of	‘peace	and	reconciliation’.	The	narrative	for	this	section	begins	with	the	following	lines:	Reconciliation	remains	an	indispensible	goal	for	cultivating	and	protecting	Liberia’s	 still-fragile	 peace.	 The	 civil	 war	 opened	 and	 exacerbated	 social	cleavages	that	must	be	bridged—inter-tribal	tensions	must	be	resolved	and	economic,	 social	 and	 political	 exclusion	 and	 marginalization	 must	 be	addressed.	The	goal	of	 this	development	strategy	 is	 to	 increase	 the	equity	and	fairness	necessary	to	build	prolonged	peace.54	The	Government	then	summarises	the	sector	goal:		
																																																						50	‘The	Justice	and	Rule	of	Law	sector	includes	prosecutors,	public	defenders,	legal	aid	practitioners	and	corrections	officials.	It	also	includes	the	court	[…].	Institutions	such	as	the	Louis	Arthur	Grimes	School	of	Law,	the	James	A.A.	Pierre	Judicial	Institute,	the	Liberia	National	Bar	Association	and	the	Liberian	National	Police	Training	Academy	play	a	major	role	in	shaping	the	direction	and	effectiveness	of	the	country’s	legal	system.	Traditional	justice	providers,	such	as	tribal	and	village	chiefs,	also	play	an	important	role	in	the	arbitration	of	disputes.	To	extend	the	rule	of	law	nationally,	
linkages	between	these	institutions	will	be	strengthened.’	Ibid	(my	italics).		51	I	examine	the	Government’s	legal	system	reform	in	Part	2	of	Chapter	7	of	the	thesis,	where	I	consider	in	particular	the	Government’s	efforts	to	address	‘traditional	justice’.	52	As	I	examine	in	Chapter	7,	the	justice	of	the	Government’s	vision	of	what	is	‘for	the	benefit	of	all	Liberians’	is	questionable.	Again,	however,	the	point	here	is	not	to	evaluate	the	Government’s	vision	of	justice,	but	to	highlight	its	awareness	that	the	proposition	of	‘peace	through	law’	is	a	combustible	one.		53	Republic	of	Liberia,	Agenda	for	Transformation,	section	8.3	(my	italics).	54	Ibid,	section	8.2	(‘peace	and	reconciliation’).	
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198	 To	ensure	 long-term	peace	and	stability	through	(1)	managing	tensions	 in	society	to	reduce	the	risk	of	 future	conflict;	(2)	 increasing	social	cohesion;	and	(3)	ensuring	that	the	principles	of	human	rights	are	upheld.55		Thus	 the	 concern	 here	 is	 to	 ensure	 ‘peace	 and	 stability’	 through	 justice.	 In	 this,	‘justice’	 is	 framed	 primarily	 in	 terms	 of	 achieving	 social	 cohesion—in	 bridging	social	 cleavages,	 resolving	 tensions,	 and	 generally	 reducing	 marginalisation	 and	exclusion.	 Thus	 ‘justice’	 is	 directed	 above	 all	 at	 overcoming	 the	 separation	 of	subjects	 in	 society.	 This	 recalls	 the	UN’s	 global	 policy	 on	 security	 sector	 reform,	which	 is	 directed	 at	 achieving	 a	 singular	 peace-and-security	 complex	 in	 which	‘State’	and	‘society’	merge	in	a	state/State	of	peace.	To	achieve	this	state/State	of	peace,	‘society’	must	first	be	reconciled.	In	this	way,	having	achieved	reconciliation	of	the	nation-state,	the	national	legal	system	will	be	‘legitimate’	and	‘equitable’	to	the	extent	that	all	will	be	equally	before	the	law	of	the	nation.	As	the	Government	writes,	 the	 aim	of	 this	 sector	 goal	 is	 to	 ensure	peace	 and	 stability	 by	 ‘increasing	social,	 economic	 and	 legal	 justice’,	 as	 well	 as	 ‘political	 reconciliation	 and	procedural	justice’	in	State	governance.56			
(iv)	 securing	peace		Pillar	 I	 of	 the	 Agenda	 for	 Transformation	 thus	 sets	 out	 a	 peace	 framework	 for	realising	 its	 national	 vision	 that	 brings	 together	 three	 propositions.	 The	configuration	 of	 these	 propositions	 are	 seen	most	 clearly	 in	 the	 introduction	 to	Pillar	I:	The	 government	will	 continue	 to	 address	 the	 key	 sources	 of	 conflict	 and	insecurity,	 protecting	 the	 citizens	 of	 Liberia	 from	 violence	 and	 crime;	delivering	 justice	 and	 upholding	 the	 rule	 of	 law;	 reconciling	 all	 Liberian	people	and	together	building	a	more	peaceful	and	more	secure	nation.57	In	other	words:	 the	overall	goal	of	 this	Pillar	 is	 to	achieve	a	state/State	 in	which	‘the	 government’/‘all	 Liberian	 people’	 together	 constitute	 ‘a	 more	 peaceful	 and	more	secure	nation’;	and	this	will	be	achieved	by	(1)	‘address[ing]	the	key	sources	of	conflict	and	insecurity’	and	‘protecting	the	citizens	of	Liberia	from	violence	and	crime’	(peace	will	contain	the	force	of	war);	(2)	‘upholding	the	rule	of	law’	(law	will	
																																																						55	Ibid.	56	Ibid.	57	Ibid.	
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contain	the	force	of	peace);	and	(3)	‘reconciling	all	Liberian	people’	and	‘delivering	justice’	 (justice	 will	 contain	 the	 force	 of	 law).	 Thus	 the	 Government’s	 envisioned	state/State	of	peace	will	be	secured	by	containing	force	through	a	just	rule	of	law.		 In	the	next	three	sections,	I	examine	how	the	Government,	with	the	support	of	the	UN’s	peace	operation,	 is	working	to	consolidate	this	vision,	beginning	with	the	UN’s	operational	vision	for	building	peace	in	Liberia	post-war.			B	 Peace-building			In	 September	 1997,	 in	 his	 final	 report	 to	 the	UN	 Security	 Council	 on	 the	United	Nations	 Observer	 Mission	 in	 Liberia	 (UNOMIL),	 the	 UN	 Secretary-General	observed:	The	 conflict	 in	 Liberia	was	 essentially	 a	 power	 struggle	with	 some	 ethnic	elements,	 but	 the	 command	and	 control	 exercised	by	 faction	 leaders	over	their	 commanders	 and	 troops	 in	 the	 field	 was	 often	 loose.	 The	 central	government,	law	and	order	and	physical	infrastructure	of	Liberia	had	been	either	 seriously	 degraded	 or	 had	 disappeared	 altogether.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	fighting	was	characterized	by	widespread	lawlessness,	the	easy	availability	of	 small	 arms	and	gross	 violations	of	 human	 rights	by	 all	 factions	 against	innocent	civilians.58	Forming	part	of	the	epilogue	(the	‘Observations	and	Conclusions’)	of	the	ultimate	report	 on	 a	 Mission	 that	 had	 reached	 its	 ‘successful	 conclusion’,59	 this	 passage	offers	an	account	of	the	situation	in	Liberia	at	a	moment	of	peace.	The	paragraphs	that	precede	and	succeed	it	in	this	part	of	the	report	recount	a	short	history	of	the	UN	Observer	Mission’s	establishment.60	They	recall	 the	devastating	 facts	 that	 the	war	 had	 taken	 as	 many	 as	 150,000	 civilian	 lives	 and	 driven	 700,000	 people	 to	flee.61	 They	 also	 retrace	 the	 failed	 attempts	 since	 1993	 to	 resolve	 the	 conflict,62	before	the	‘turning	of	the	tide’	in	1996,63	which	saw	‘the	restoration	of	a	climate	of	security’	 that	 was	 ‘crucial’	 to	 the	 ‘successful	 organization	 and	 conduct	 of	 the	
																																																						58	UN	Doc	S/1997/712	(12	September	1997),	Final	Report	of	the	Secretary	General	on	the	United	
Nations	Observer	Mission	in	Liberia,	para	23.	59	Words	of	the	UN	Secretary-General:	ibid,	paras	21	and	31.	60	Ibid,	paras	21-34	(‘VIII.	Observations	and	Conclusions’).	61	Ibid,	para	22.	62	Ibid,	paras	24	and	25.		63	Ibid,	para	25.	
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200	elections’.64	The	human	rights	activities	of	the	Mission	receive	special	mention	for	their	‘important	role	in	the	peace	process’,65	as	does	the	‘successful	completion	of	the	 disarmament	 and	 demobilization	 exercise’	 and	 the	 ‘initial	 reintegration	programs’	 which	 were	 ‘crucial	 in	 providing	 useful	 employment	 to	 thousands	 of	former	 fighters	and	war-affected	populations	as	a	means	both	of	 restoring	social	stability	and	of	rehabilitating	some	of	the	country’s	basic	infrastructure’.66	These	 themes—violent	 conflict,	 law	 and	 order,	 stability;	 humanitarian	relief,	 disarmament	 and	 demobilisation	 and	 reintegration;	 democratic	 elections,	national	 reconciliation,	 human	 rights;	 the	 country’s	 physical	 infrastructure—characterise	the	focus	of	the	first	UN	peace	operation	in	Liberia	that	had	begun	in	1993	and	culminated	in	1997	in	the	election	of	Charles	Taylor	to	the	presidency.67	These	 themes	 also	 characterise	 the	 subsequent	 UN	 peace	 operations	 in	 Liberia,	from	 the	 UN	 Peace-building	 Support	 Office	 (UNOL)	 that	 replaced	 the	 Observer	Mission	 in	 1997,	 to	 the	 Multilateral	 Force	 that	 oversaw	 the	 transition	 with	 the	signing	of	the	Comprehensive	Peace	Agreement	in	2003	and	the	arrival	of	the	UN	Mission	in	Liberia	(UNMIL).68		What	 is	missing	 from	 the	UN’s	 characterisation	of	 the	 situation	 in	Liberia	between	 1993	 and	 1997	 and	 the	 mandate	 of	 the	 UN	 Observer	 Mission	 is	 the	expression	that	this	has	anything	to	do	with	the	rule	of	law.	The	term	‘rule	of	law’	only	 entered	 the	 Security	 Council’s	 lexicon	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 UN’s	 peace	operations	 in	Liberia	 in	September	2000,	when	 it	was	used	by	the	UN	Secretary-
																																																						64	Ibid,	paras	28-30.	That	the	elections	were	seen	as	a	core	benchmark	of	success	is	made	clear	in	UN	Doc	S/1997/643	(13	August	1997),	24th	Progress	Report	of	the	Secretary	General	on	the	United	
Nations	Observer	Mission	in	Liberia,	para	45,	where	the	UN	Secretary-General	writes:	‘With	the	establishment	of	a	democratically	elected	government	in	Liberia,	the	principal	objective	of	UNOMIL	has	now	been	achieved’.	65	Final	Report	of	the	Secretary	General	on	the	United	Nations	Observer	Mission	in	Liberia,	para	31.	66	Ibid,	para	27.	67	This	can	be	read	in	the	UN	Security	Council	resolutions	creating	and	adjusting	the	mandate	of	UNOMIL:	UN	Doc	S/Res/866	(22	September	1993)	and	UN	Doc	S/Res/1020	(10	November	1995).	It	can	also	be	read	in	the	rest	of	the	Security	Council	resolutions	extending	the	mandate	of	UNOMIL:	UN	Doc	S/Res/911	(21	April	1994);	UN	Doc	S/Res/950	(21	October	1995);	UN	Doc	S/Res/972	(13	January	1995);	UN	Doc	S/Res/985	(13	April	1995);	UN	Doc	S/Res/1001	(30	June	1995);	UN	Doc	S/Res/1014	(15	September	1995);	UN	Doc	S/Res/1041	(29	January	1996);	UN	Doc	S/Res/1059	(31	May	1996);	UN	Doc	S/Res/1071	(30	August	1996);	UN	Doc	S/Res/1083	(27	November	1996);	UN	Doc	S/Res/1100	(27	March	1997);	UN	Doc	S/Res/1116	(27	June	1997).	68	For	the	text	of	the	CPA,	see	UN	Doc	S/2003/850	(29	August	2003),	Peace	Agreement	between	the	
Government	of	Liberia,	Liberians	United	for	Reconciliation	and	Democracy	(LURD),	The	Movement	for	
Democracy	in	Liberia	(MODEL)	and	the	Political	Parties,	annex.	For	discussion	and	evaluation	of	the	activities	and	performance	of	UNMIL	during	the	transitional	period,	see	Jeremy	Matam	Farrall,	‘Recurring	Dilemmas	in	a	Recurring	Conflict:	Evaluating	the	UN	Mission	in	Liberia	(2003–2006)’,	
Journal	of	International	Peacekeeping,	vol	16	(2012).	
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201General	 in	 a	 letter	 to	 the	Council	 to	 justify	 the	 extension	of	UNOL’s	mandate	 for	another	twelve	months.69	In	November	2002,	in	what	appears	to	be	the	first	use	of	the	term	by	the	Council	itself	with	respect	to	Liberia,	the	President	of	the	Council	directed	UNOL	to	‘[offer]	assistance	to	the	Liberian	authorities	and	to	the	public	for	strengthening	democratic	institutions	and	the	rule	of	law’.70		The	 Security	 Council	 did	 not	 mention	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 law’	 in	 its	 resolution	authorising	 a	Multinational	 Force	 to	 ‘support	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 17	 June	2003	ceasefire	agreement’,	‘to	help	establish	and	maintain	security’,	‘to	secure	the	environment	 for	 the	delivery	of	humanitarian	assistance’,	and	 ‘to	prepare	 for	 the	introduction	 of	 a	 longer-term	 United	 Nations	 stabilization	 force’.71	 Rather,	 the	focus	was	on	these	other	themes,	and	above	all,	security.72		It	 was	 only	 with	 the	 establishment	 of	 UNMIL	 in	 2003	 that	 the	 Security	Council	began	to	use	the	term	‘rule	of	law’	more	prominently	and	frequently	in	its	resolutions	on	the	UN’s	peace	operation	in	Liberia.	Even	then	the	Council	used	the	term	sparingly	at	first.	In	Resolution	1509	(2003)	establishing	UNMIL,	the	Council	‘urged’	the	transitional	government	of	Liberia	to	prioritise	‘the	establishment	of	a	State	 based	 on	 the	 rule	 of	 law’.73	 The	 Council	 did	 not	 mention	 the	 priority	 of	establishing	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 its	 resolutions	 extending	 UNMIL’s	 mandate	 in	2004,74	 2005,75	 or	 2006,76	 and	only	 returned	 to	 it	 in	 2007,	 in	 ‘[r]ecognizing	 that	significant	 challenges	 remain	 in	 the	 consolidation	 of	 Liberia’s	 post-conflict	transition,	including	[…]	extension	of	the	rule	of	law	throughout	the	country’.77	In	
																																																						69	UN	Doc	S/2000/945	(3	October	2000),	Letter	Dated	28	September	2000	from	the	Secretary	
General	Addressed	to	the	President	of	the	Security	Council.	70	UN	Doc	S/2002/1305	(29	November	2002),	Letter	Dated	29	November	2002	from	the	President	of	
the	Security	Council	Addressed	to	the	Secretary	General,	1.	This	direction	was	reinforced	two	weeks	later	in	a	presidential	statement:	UN	Doc	S/PRST/2002/36	(13	December	2002),	Statement	by	the	
President	of	the	Security	Council,	3.	71	UN	Doc	S/Res/1497	(1	August	2003),	para	1.	72	Ibid.	73	UN	Doc	S/Res/1509	(19	September	2003),	preambular	para	7.	74	UN	Doc	S/Res/1561	(17	September	2004).		75	UN	Doc	S/Res/1626	(19	September	2005);	UN	Doc	S/Res/1638	(11	November	2005).	76	UN	Doc	S/Res/1667	(31	March	2006);	UN	Doc	S/Res/1694	(13	July	2006);	UN	Doc	S/Res/1712	(29	September	2006).	77	UN	Doc	S/Res/1750	(30	March	2007),	preambular	para	8.	The	same	language	is	used	in	UN	Doc	S/Res/1777	(20	September	2007).	
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202	2008	 the	 Council	 again	 ‘recognized’	 the	 need	 for	 ‘extension	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	throughout	the	country’.78		The	Security	Council’s	language	on	the	rule	of	law	then	shifted	in	2009.	In	a	preambular	recital	of	its	2009	resolution	extending	UNMIL’s	mandate,	the	Council	‘recognized’	 that	 ‘lasting	 stability’	 in	 Liberia	 and	 the	 sub-region	 would	 require	‘well-functioning	 and	 sustainable	 security	 and	 rule	 of	 law	 sectors’.79	 A	 second	reference	 to	 the	rule	of	 law	 in	 the	same	resolution	 ‘called	upon’	 the	Government	and	 UN	 ‘to	 redouble	 efforts	 to	 develop	 national	 security	 and	 rule	 of	 law	
institutions’.80	This	 language,	coupling	 ‘security’	and	 ‘the	rule	of	 law’	and	 framing	them	as	technical	matters	for	development,	is	repeated	in	the	Council’s	resolutions	extending	UNMIL’s	mandate	in	2010,81	2011,82	and	2012.83		By	 2012	 reference	 to	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 law’	 had	 become	 common-place	 in	 the	Security	Council’s	characterisation	of	UNMIL.	In	addition	to	its	usage	already	noted	above,	 the	 Council	 included	 the	 term	 an	 additional	 three	 times	 in	 the	 operative	paragraphs	 of	 Resolution	 2066	 (2012):	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 ‘goal	 of	 increasing	 the	capacity	 of	 the	 Government	 of	 Liberia,	 particularly	 the	 LNP	 [Liberian	 National	Police],	 to	 implement	 sustainable	 rule	 of	 law,	 justice,	 governance	 and	 SSR	programs’;84	to	‘emphasize’	that	‘in	order	to	be	sustainable,	the	transition	planning	process	should	take	 into	account	broad	challenges,	 including	governance	and	the	
																																																						78	The	only	difference	in	2008	is	the	additional	emphasis	on	developing	‘the	Liberian	National	Police’	as	part	of	the	security	architecture,	and	the	note	‘that	crimes	of	corruption	and	violence,	in	particular	with	regard	to	exploitation	of	Liberia’s	natural	resources,	threaten	to	undermine	progress	towards	those	ends’:	UN	Doc	S/Res/1836	(29	September	2008).	79	UN	Doc	S/Res/1885	(15	September	2009),	preambular	para	5	(my	italics).	80	Ibid,	para	10	(my	italics).	81	UN	Doc	S/Res/1938	(15	September	2010),	preambular	paras	5	and	10.	82	UN	Doc	S/Res/2008	(16	September	2011),	preambular	paras	4	and	11.	83	UN	Doc	S/Res/2066	(17	September	2012),	preambular	paras	7	and	18.	On	the	technocratic	turn,	Taylor	notes	how:	‘Formulations	of	rule-of-law	programming,	such	as	“law	and	justice	reform”,	“security	sector	reform”	(SSR),	and	“rule-of-law	promotion”	itself,	all	display	a	tension	between	technocratic	and	substantive	justice	concerns.	For	instance,	in	SSR	discourse,	“justice”	denotes	a	technical	“sector”	and	is	an	analogue	for	criminal	law,	procedure,	adjudication,	sanctions	and	corrections,	regardless	of	whether	the	processes	and	outcomes	of	these	are	just.	The	potential	slippage	between	the	externally	funded	justice	“fix”	and	the	substantive	realisation	of	justice	locally	varies	with	each	rule-of-law	intervention,	but	it	is	not	unusual	for	the	formal,	technical	face	of	the	rule	of	law	to	dominate	the	more	complex,	indeterminate	negotiation	of	“justice”.’	Veronica	Taylor,	‘Big	Rule	of	Law©®℠™(pat.pending):	Branding	and	Certifying	the	Business	of	the	Rule	of	Law’,	in	
Strengthening	the	Rule	of	Law	through	the	United	Nations	Security	Council,	ed	Jeremy	Matam	Farrall,	and	Hilary	Charlesworth	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2016),	29.		84	UN	Doc	S/Res/2066	(17	September	2012),	para	7,	repeated	in	UN	Doc	S/Res/2116	(18	September	2013),	para	8.	
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203rule	of	law	as	well	as	the	political	context’;85	and	to	‘call	upon’	UNMIL	to	enhance	‘its	 support	 for	 security	 sector	 and	 rule	 of	 law	 reforms’.86	 Only	 one	 of	 these	references	was	dropped	from	the	2013	resolution.	This	account	shows	three	things.	(1)	It	shows	continuity	in	how	the	Security	Council	has	characterised	the	UN’s	peace	operations	in	Liberia	from	1993	to	2013,	concerned	above	all	with	 security	 and	 stability.	 (2)	At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 shows	a	
shift	in	language	to	‘the	rule	of	law’	as	the	peace	operation	transitions	from	peace-keeping	to	peace-building.	(3)	It	shows	that	the	shift	in	language	to	‘the	rule	of	law’	does	 not	 change	 the	 characterisation	 of	 the	 peace	 operation;	 rather,	 ‘the	 rule	 of	law’	enters	the	Council’s	resolutions	only	to	be	coupled	with	‘security’	and	brought	within	its	logic.	This	is	remarkable	because	it	shows	how	‘the	rule	of	law’	emerges,	not	as	a	break	from	the	logic	of	security,	but	as	a	concept	of	security.	It	leaves	little	doubt	 that	 ‘establishing	 the	 rule	 of	 law’	 is	 supposed	 to	 contain	 (hold	 within,	 to	withhold	from	manifesting)	the	force	of	peace.	These	 finding	 are	 not	 surprising;	 indeed	 they	 are	 in	 keeping	 with	 the	Security	 Council’s	 primary	 responsibility	 for	 the	 maintenance	 of	 international	peace	and	security	under	the	UN	Charter.87	Yet,	no	matter	how	obvious	it	might	be	that	 Council	 resolutions	 would	 characterise	 a	 UN	 peace	 operation	 as	 being	fundamentally	 about	 stabilising	a	 state	of	 conflict	 and	 securing	 that	 stability,	 the	point	 is	 nonetheless	 important.	 Its	 importance	 lies	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 ‘security’	ultimately	frames	the	terms	of	the	UN’s	peace	operation	in	Liberia.	Nothing	enters	the	 peace	 operation	 through	 the	 Council	 without	 becoming	 ‘securitised’.88	 The	question	of	‘peace’	becomes	a	matter	of	‘stability’;	the	question	of	‘law’	becomes	a	matter	 of	 ‘order’	 (to	 pacify	 the	 population)	 and	 ‘accountability’	 (to	 pacify	 the	government	and	its	armed	forces);	and	the	question	of	 ‘justice’	becomes	a	matter	of	the	injustices	resulting	from	armed	conflict	and	addressing	them	in	the	interests	
																																																						85	UN	Doc	S/Res/2066	(17	September	2012),	para	8,	not	repeated	in	UN	Doc	S/Res/2116	(18	September	2013).	86	UN	Doc	S/Res/2066	(17	September	2012),	para	8,	repeated	in	UN	Doc	S/Res/2116	(18	September	2013),	para	8.	87	See	Article	24	and	Chapter	VII	of	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations	(adopted	26	June	1945,	entered	into	force	24	October	1945)	1	UNTS	16.	88	On	‘securitisation’,	see	Luckham	and	Kirk’s	analysis	of	the	‘evolving	concept	of	security’	in	Robin	Luckham	and	Tom	Kirk,	‘The	Two	Faces	of	Security	in	Hybrid	Political	Orders:	A	Framework	for	Analysis	and	Research’,	Stability:	International	Journal	of	Security	and	Development,	vol	2,	no	2	(2013);	Robin	Luckham	and	Tom	Kirk,	‘Security	in	Hybrid	Political	Contexts:	An	End-User	Approach’,	Justice	and	Security	Research	Program	(Paper	2,	2012).	
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204	of	‘securing	stability’,	or	else	a	matter	of	criminal	justice	and	therefore	a	matter	of	‘law	 and	 order’.	 This,	 in	 other	 words,	 is	 the	 UN’s	 vision	 of	 peace	 in	 Liberia:	 a	reconciled	state/State	with	a	strong	security	sector	capable	of	maintaining	stability	and	order.		C	 Establishing	a	state	based	on	the	rule	of	law		I	 began	 the	 account	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 by	 quoting	 a	 passage	 from	 the	 final	report	of	the	UN	Secretary-General	on	the	UN	Observer	Mission	in	Liberia.	Written	at	a	moment	of	peace	in	1997	and	looking	back	on	the	first	civil	war	in	Liberia,	the	passage	reflects	on	how	the	state/State	of	peace	in	Liberia	had	broken	down	(‘the	central	government,	law	and	order	and	physical	infrastructure	of	Liberia	had	been	either	seriously	degraded	or	had	disappeared	altogether’).	This	state/State	of	‘non-peace’	 was	 characterised	 by	 three	 elements	 in	 particular.	 (1)	 The	 conflict	 was	defined	by	a	lack	of	control	over	the	use	of	force	(‘command	and	control	exercised	by	faction	leaders	over	their	commanders	and	troops	in	the	field	was	often	loose’,	combined	with	 ‘the	easy	availability	of	small	arms’).	This	was	the	opposite	of	the	proposition	‘peace	contains	force’:	this	was	a	state	in	which	force	was	uncontained.	(2)	The	 conflict	was	defined	by	 a	 lack	of	 law	 (‘the	 fighting	was	 characterized	by	widespread	 lawlessness’).	This	was	 the	opposite	of	 the	proposition	 ‘law	contains	force’:	 this	was	a	state	 in	which	force	was	wielded	 lawlessly.	 (3)	The	conflict	was	defined	 by	 injustice	 (‘gross	 violations	 of	 human	 rights	 by	 all	 factions	 against	innocent	 civilians’).	 This	 was	 the	 opposite	 of	 the	 proposition	 ‘justice	 contains	force’:	this	was	a	state	in	which	violence	was	inflicted	on	civilians	unjustly.		This	 passage	 thus	presented	 an	 image	 of	 the	 state/State	 that	 the	 first	UN	peace	operation	 in	 Liberia	 had	 confronted,	 and	 it	was	 the	opposite	 of	 ‘peace’.	Or	rather,	because	 this	passage	was	written	as	a	 reflection	on	what	had	supposedly	been	overcome,	 the	 state/State	of	peace	 that	 the	UN	was	 celebrating	 in	 its	1997	report	was	 the	opposite	of	 this	 image	of	war.	This	was	 the	 ‘peace’	 that	had	 to	be	secured,	defined	in	opposition	to	a	state	of	uncontained,	lawless,	unjust	violence.	Before	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 entered	 Security	 Council	 discourse	with	 respect	 to	the	UN’s	peace	operations	 in	Liberia,	 its	 concern	was	with	 ‘law	and	order’,	or	 its	absence,	 ‘lawlessness’.	 This	 is	not	 the	 same	as	 a	 concern	 for	 ‘the	 rule	of	 law’.	As	Nick	 Cheesman	 has	 persuasively	 argued,	 the	 two	 concepts	 are	 ‘asymmetrically	
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205opposed’.89	 By	 this	 Cheesman	 means	 that	 ‘law	 and	 order’	 is	 in	 an	 antagonistic	relation	with	 ‘the	rule	of	 law’,	not	as	 its	negation	(its	symmetrical	opposite,	as	 in	‘non-rule	 of	 law’)	 but	 as	 a	 positive	 concept	 with	 its	 own	 contents	 that	 make	 it	inherently	 antagonistic	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 law’.90	 Following	 Michel	Foucault,	Cheesman	highlights	how	 ‘law	and	order’	 is	concerned	above	all	with	a	police-like	‘concern	to	maintain	order,	to	abolish	disorder,	through	good	use	of	the	state’s	forces’.91	‘The	rule	of	law’,	by	contrast,	‘does	not	aim	to	eliminate	disorder’	nor	 does	 it	 ‘purposefully	 design	 and	 pursue	 activities	 for	 the	 obtaining	 and	maintenance	 of	 order’.92	 Rather	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 seeks	 order	 in	 itself—or	 as	Cheesman	puts	 it,	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 law	 is	orderly’.93	 Cheesman	does	 not	 elaborate	 on	what	he	means	by	this,	beyond	saying	that	the	rule	of	 law	is	 ‘characterized	by	an	inherent	type	of	order	[…]	it	is	orderly’.94	I	agree	to	the	extent	that	the	rule	of	law	is	characterised	by	its	relation	to	force,	which,	as	discussed	in	Part	1	of	the	chapter,	seeks	 to	 make	 law	 and	 force	 coincidental.	 In	 this	 sense,	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 law’	 is	 an	ordering	of	force	in	itself.	Whereas	‘law	and	order’	is	concerned	with	maintaining	an	orderly	population	through	the	use	of	force	(and,	therefore,	maintaining	order	
exogenously,	 in	 others),	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 law’	 is	 concerned	 with	 maintaining	 its	monopoly	of	force	(and,	therefore,	maintaining	order	endogenously,	in	itself).95	The	distinction	 is	 important	here	because	 it	assists	 in	seeing	how	the	 two	propositions—‘law	 and	 order’	 and	 ‘rule	 of	 law’—merge	 in	 this	 account	 of	 the	attempt	 to	 secure	 the	 state/State	 of	 Liberia	 against	 a	 return	 to	 uncontained,	lawless,	 unjust	 violence.	 Indeed,	 the	 antagonism	 that	 makes	 the	 two	 concepts	asymmetrically	opposed	is	what	brings	them	together	in	the	UN’s	discourse.	Thus	 in	2003,	when	 the	Security	Council	decided	 to	establish	UNMIL,	 ‘the	stabilization	force	called	for	in	Resolution	1497	(2003)’,	it	further	decided	that	this	‘stabilization	force’	would	 ‘consist	of	up	to	15,000	UN	military	personnel	[…]	and	up	 to	 1,115	 civilian	 police	 officers,	 including	 formed	 units	 to	 assist	 in	 the	
																																																						89		Nick	Cheesman,	‘Law	and	Order	as	Asymmetrical	Opposite	to	the	Rule	of	Law’,	Hague	Journal	on	
the	Rule	of	Law,	vol	6,	no	1	(2014).	90	Ibid,	111.	91	Ibid,	108.	92	Ibid,	111.	93	Ibid.		94	Ibid.	95	Compare	ibid.	
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206	maintenance	of	 law	and	order	throughout	Liberia’.96	At	the	same	time,	one	of	the	‘key	 priorities’	 of	 this	 stabilisation	 force	 was	 to	 support	 ‘the	 establishment	 of	 a	state	 based	 on	 the	 rule	 of	 law’.97	 So	 from	 the	 outset	 the	 peace	 operation	 was	defined	as	a	stabilisation	mission	with	a	primary	objective	of	maintaining	law	and	order	 (to	 assist	 in	 securing	 the	 State	 of	 Liberia	 from	 a	 return	 to	 a	 state	 of	uncontained,	 lawless,	 unjust	 violence),	 but	within	 the	 broader	 framework	 of	 the	rule	 of	 law.	 The	 preambular	 position	 of	 the	 reference	 to	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 the	mandate	 is	 important	 here,	 setting	 it	 up	 as	 a	 threshold	 term	 of	 the	 peace	operation.98		However,	 in	bringing	the	two	propositions	together	 in	 the	same	discourse	of	securing	peace,	‘the	rule	of	law’	cannot	avoid	becoming	conjoined	with	‘law	and	order’.99	As	a	threshold	term,	its	contents	(what	is	meant	by	‘the	establishment	of	a	state	based	on	the	rule	of	law’)	become	concrete	through	the	operative	paragraphs	that	 direct	 UNMIL’s	 work.	 And	 there	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 maintaining	 order	 and	stability	is	the	dominant	concern	of	the	operative	paragraphs	of	UNMIL’s	mandate,	making	 the	 Mission’s	 core	 tasks	 to	 assist	 in	 monitoring	 and	 restructuring	 the	police	force	of	Liberia	and	to	develop	a	civilian	police	training	program,100	as	well	as	 to	 assist	 in	 developing	 a	 strategy	 to	 consolidate	 governmental	 institutions,	including	the	national	legal	framework	and	judicial	and	correctional	institutions.101	UNMIL’s	 rule-of-law	 mandate	 thus	 faithfully	 pursues	 the	 UN	 Department	 of	Peacekeeping	Operation’s	operational	 concept	of	 the	 rule	of	 law,	 focusing	on	 the	so-called	 justice-chain	 institutions	 of	 police,	 prisons,	 and	 courts,	 with	 the	preambular	goal	of	‘establishing	a	state	based	on	the	rule	of	law’	acquiring	its	core	operative	meaning	in	relation	to	this	overarching	objective.102		
																																																						96	UN	Doc	S/Res/1509	(19	September	2003),	para	1.	97	Ibid,	preambular	para	1.	98	On	the	preamble	to	law,	see	Shane	Chalmers,	‘The	Beginning	of	Human	Rights:	The	Ritual	of	the	Preamble	to	Law’,	Humanity	Journal	(forthcoming).	99	I	part	company	with	Cheesman	here	in	that,	whereas	Cheesman	insists	on	keeping	the	two	concepts	separate	in	order	to	more	clearly	see	what	is	meant	by	‘the	rule	of	law’,	I	suggest	‘the	rule	of	law’	is	more	clearly	understood	in	its	confused	relation	with	‘law	and	order’.	That	is,	precisely	because	they	are	asymmetrical	opposites,	the	two	cannot	be	kept	apart	as	clearly	as	Cheesman	would	like—at	least	not	in	this	discourse	of	peace.	100	UN	Doc	S/Res/1509	(19	September	2003),	para	3(n).	101	Ibid,	para	3(q).	102	This	is	not	to	deny	that	there	are	some	elements	of	UNMIL’s	mandate	that	speak	to	the	more	substantive	justice	potential	of	the	Secretary-General’s	2004	definition	of	the	rule	of	law	(set	out	in	note	29	above).	These	elements	have	included	undertaking	human	rights	promotion,	protection,	
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207Thus	 ‘establishing	a	state	based	on	the	rule	of	 law’	can	be	seen	to	require,	according	to	the	implementation	of	UNMIL’s	mandate,	bringing	Liberia’s	forces	of	law	and	order—its	police,	prisons,	courts—within	the	concept	of	‘the	rule	of	law’.	On	one	hand,	 this	means	ensuring	Liberia’s	security	sector	 is	accountable	 to	 law,	with	appropriate	democratic	oversight	and	civilian	control.	On	the	other	hand,	this	means	making	the	security	sector	the	focus	or	subject-matter	of	‘the	rule	of	law’.	In	this,	 the	 exogenous	 condition	 of	 securing	 stability	 and	 order	 becomes	 the	endogenous	condition	of	maintaining	the	rule	of	law.		What	this	shows	is	how	‘establishing	a	State	based	on	the	rule	of	law’	was	initially	 included	 in	UNMIL’s	mandate	 as	 a	 preambular	 concern	 to	 the	 operative	objective	of	securing	the	state/State	of	peace	in	Liberia.	At	this	point,	the	term	was	included	as	an	aspirational	vision,	an	ideal	on	the	horizon	of	the	peace	operation.	The	timing	of	this	mandate	(2003)	also	coincided	with	the	entry	of	‘the	rule	of	law’	as	 a	 discrete	 item	 on	 the	 Security	 Council’s	 agenda,	 and	 in	 the	 lead-up	 to	 the	publication	 of	 the	 Secretary-General’s	 definitional	 report	 on	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	2004.103	This	was	a	time	of	high	aspiration	for	promoting	the	rule	of	law	through	the	 UN	 and	 the	 Council	 in	 particular.	 As	 UNMIL	 became	 more	 established,	however,	and	especially	as	it	began	to	transition	from	a	peace-keeping	to	a	peace-building	 operation	 after	 the	 2006	 presidential	 elections,	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 law’	 was	brought	 increasingly	within	UNMIL’s	mandate	 as	 an	operative	 term	and	 coupled	with	its	security	objectives.	From	2009,	the	vision	of	establishing	a	State	based	on	the	 rule	 of	 law	 became	 a	 reminder	 that	 ‘lasting	 stability	 in	 Liberia	 and	 the	subregion	 requires	 well-functioning	 and	 sustainable	 security	 and	 rule	 of	 law	sectors’	 and	 ‘re-doubled	 efforts’	 ‘to	 develop	 national	 security	 and	 rule	 of	 law	institutions’.104			
																																																																																																																																																														and	monitoring	activities	(see	UN	Doc	S/Res/1509,	paras	3(l)	and	(m));	assisting	with	the	holding	of	democratic	elections	(see	UN	Doc	S/Res/1509,	para	3(s));	and,	since	2012,	assisting	in	advancing	a	range	of	priorities,	including	national	reconciliation	and	constitutional	reform	(see	UN	Doc	S/Res/2066,	para	8).	The	point	is	that	this	orientation	to	justice	has	been	marginal	compared	with	the	security	focus	on	maintaining	law	and	order.	Thus	by	2009	justice	was	clearly	playing	second	fiddle	to	security	in	the	‘Security	and	Justice	Development	Plans’	being	promoted	by	both	the	Security	Council	and	UNMIL	(see	UN	Doc	S/Res/1885,	para	10)	and	by	2015	building	and	strengthening	the	capacity	of	the	Liberian	National	Police	had	become	the	dominant	priority	(see,	eg,	UN	Doc	S/Res/2116,	paras	3	and	8).	I	discuss	this	further	in	the	next	section	on	the	justice-and-security	complex.	103	See	note	29	above.	104	See	notes	79	and	80		above.	
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208	D	 The	justice-and-security	complex		By	 2015	 it	was	 clear	 that	 a	 securitised	 rule	 of	 law	 had	 become	 definitive	 of	 the	UN’s	operation	to	assist	the	Government	of	Liberia	to	secure	its	vision	of	peace.	If	in	2003	it	was	implicit	that	the	aim	of	establishing	a	State	based	on	the	rule	of	law	contained	the	peace	operation’s	objectives	of	securing	stability	and	order,	then	by	2015	the	contingent	relation	of	‘the	rule	of	law’	and	‘security’	could	not	have	been	more	explicit.	So	far	this	is	in	keeping	with	the	first	two	propositions	in	the	logic	of	securing	peace.	As	 I	have	shown,	 the	UN’s	peace	operations	 in	Liberia	have	been	directed,	first	and	foremost,	at	ensuring	peace	contains	the	force	of	law.	I	have	also	shown	how	UNMIL’s	mandate	became	 increasingly	concerned	with	consolidating	this	State	by	ensuring	 law	contains	 the	 force	of	peace.	But	 the	question	remains:	what	about	the	third	proposition,	of	securing	this	State	of	peace	by	ensuring	justice	contains	the	force	of	law?		At	the	time	of	writing,	as	the	withdrawal	of	UNMIL	becomes	an	increasingly	unavoidable	 fact,	 with	 UN	 troops	 leaving	 the	 country	 in	 large	 numbers	 and	 a	complete	 exit	 anticipated	 by	 2017,105	 building	 the	 capacity	 of	 Liberia’s	 security	sector	 has	 become	 the	main	priority	 for	 the	 first	 time	 since	 the	peace	 operation	began	 in	 2003.106	 Up	 until	 2012,	 UNMIL’s	 main	 security	 focus	 was	 to	 provide	operational	support	to	the	Liberian	National	Police	and	the	Bureau	of	Immigration	and	Naturalization	 as	 part	 of	 its	 peacekeeping	 strategy,	 rather	 than	 develop	 the	capacity	 of	 these	 agencies.107	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 with	 UNMIL	 providing	 security	under	 its	 peacekeeping	 mandate,	 the	 Government	 was	 reluctant	 to	 commit	resources	 from	 its	 limited	 budget	 to	 develop	 the	 capacity	 of	 its	 security	agencies.108	This	meant	that	in	2013	the	police	and	immigration	forces	lacked	the	
																																																						105	In	2013	UNMIL	was	in	‘the	first	phase	of	the	second	military	draw	down’:	author	interview	with	United	Nations	Department	of	Peacekeeping	Operations	official,	New	York	City,	22	June	2013	(NY7).	See	also	UN	Doc	S/Res/2215	(2	April	2015),	para	1.	In	this	Resolution,	the	Security	Council	‘Reaffirms	its	expectation	that	the	Government	of	Liberia	will	assume	fully	its	complete	security	responsibilities	from	UNMIL	no	later	than	30	June	2016	and	also	reaffirms	its	intention	to	consider	the	continued	and	future	reconfiguration	of	UNMIL	accordingly’:	para	3.	106	Author	interview	with	NY7.	107	Ibid.		108	Ibid.	The	reason	for	this	reluctance	is	unclear,	but	a	common	interpretation	within	UNMIL	is	that	it	was	at	least	partly	a	form	of	strategic	dependence	intended	to	prolong	the	UN	Mission	in	Liberia.	Once	Liberia	could	maintain	peace	and	stability	on	its	own,	UNMIL	would	no	longer	be	necessary.	As	one	UN	official	put	it:	‘In	terms	of	political	will	[…]	the	Government	of	Liberia	would	like	the	UN	Mission	to	be	there	forever.	That	is	unusual—we	have	been	literally	kicked	out	of	other	countries,	
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209capacity	to	take	control	of	domestic	security	in	Liberia.	Fearful	that	this	would	lead	to	 a	 ‘security	 vacuum’	 that	would	 allow	non-government	 actors	 to	 challenge	 the	Government’s	monopoly	on	the	use	of	force,	especially	in	the	interior,	the	Liberian	Government	 began	 to	 focus	 on	 building	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 police	 and	immigration.109		In	2010	the	Government	had	submitted	a	request	to	the	UN	Peacebuilding	Commission	 to	 be	 placed	 on	 its	 agenda,	 which	 would	 open	 up	 access	 to	international	 resources	 through	 the	 UN	 Peacebuilding	 Fund.	 The	 request	 was	granted	 and	 a	 Statement	 of	Mutual	 Commitments	 between	 the	 Government	 and	the	Peacebuilding	Commission	 identified	 three	core	commitments	 in	 the	areas	of	‘security	 sector	 reform’,	 ‘rule	 of	 law’,	 and	 ‘national	 reconciliation’.110	 As	 its	‘centrepiece’	 the	Statement	of	Mutual	Commitments	envisioned	a	network	of	 five	Regional	 Justice	 and	 Security	Hubs	 covering	 the	 interior	 of	 Liberia.	 The	promise	was	 a	 new	 ‘peacebuilding	 technology’:111	 a	 decentralised	 network	 of	 fortified	government	 complexes	 that	 would	 draw	 together	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 security	
																																																																																																																																																														such	as	Chad	recently—but	in	Liberia	the	Government	feels	very	comfortable	with	the	Mission.	And	you	know,	maybe	the	budget	is	part	of	the	overall	strategy	of	the	Government	in	order	to	prolong	the	presence	of	the	Mission—that	is	kind	of	a	conspiracy	theory.’	Ibid.		109	Ibid.	See	also	UN	Doc	S/2013/124	(28	February	2013),	Twenty-fifth	progress	report	of	the	
Secretary-General	on	the	United	Nations	Mission	in	Liberia;	UN	Doc	S/2013/479	(12	August	2013),	
Twenty-sixth	progress	report	of	the	Secretary-General	on	the	United	Nations	Mission	in	Liberia;	UN	Doc	S/2014/123	(18	February	2014),	Twenty-seventh	progress	report	of	the	Secretary-General	on	
the	United	Nations	Mission	in	Liberia;	UN	Doc	S/2014/598	(15	August	2014),	Twenty-eighth	
progress	report	of	the	Secretary-General	on	the	United	Nations	Mission	in	Liberia;	UN	Doc	S/2015/275	(23	April	2015),	Twenty-ninth	progress	report	of	the	Secretary-General	on	the	United	
Nations	Mission	in	Liberia.	See	also	Rory	Keane,	‘Reviewing	the	Justice	and	Security	Hub	Modality	as	Piloted	in	Liberia’,	Stability:	International	Journal	of	Security	and	Development,	vol	1,	no	1	(2012).	Keane	notes:	‘The	strategic	focus	on	SSR	and	rule	of	law	is	based	on	the	fact	that	the	UN	Peacekeeping	Mission	in	the	country,	known	as	UNMIL,	will	gradually	reduce	troop	numbers	between	2012	and	2015	by	up	to	50%.		In	order	to	ensure	that	there	is	no	security	vacuum	during	or	after	this	drawdown	process,	it	is	critical	to	build	up	and	support	Liberian	security	and	justice	services’:	87.	110	UN	Doc	PBC/4/LBR/2	(16	November	2010),	Statement	of	mutual	commitments	on	peacebuilding	
in	Liberia.	The	Statement	of	Mutual	Commitments	was	revised	in	2012	as	set	out	in	UN	Doc	PBC/6/LBR/2	(9	May	2012),	Outcome	of	the	first	review	of	the	implementation	of	the	statement	of	
mutual	commitments	on	peacebuilding	in	Liberia.		111	As	Keane	notes	in	his	review	of	the	hubs:	‘If	the	hub	concept	is	capable	of	being	adapted	and	successful	elsewhere,	the	United	Nations	will	not	only	have	added	a	new	instrument	to	its	peacekeeping	toolkit	but	will	also	firmly	demonstrate	how	the	UN	Peacebuilding	Fund	can	in	essence	be	catalytic	in	fostering	long-term	and	comprehensive	approaches	to	peacebuilding’:	Keane,	‘Justice	and	Security	Hub	Modality’,	87.	However,	as	Veronica	Taylor	pointed	out	to	me,	these	Hubs	resemble	the	Provincial	Reconstruction	Teams	previously	designed	and	implemented	in	Afghanistan	and	then	in	Iraq.	
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210	sector	priorities	in	a	way	that	would	address	both	the	feared	‘security	vacuum’	and	the	perceived	‘justice	vacuum’.112	The	vision	is	set	out	in	a	report	published	in	early	2013	by	the	Government	to	update	international	stakeholders	on	the	status	of	the	project:	The	Justice	and	Security	Regional	Hubs	are	designed	to	extend	security	and	justice	services	to	all	Liberians	throughout	the	country.	The	Regional	Hubs	seek	to	promote	a	comprehensive	approach	to	address	justice	and	security	problems	 through	 co-location	 of	 the	 regional	 Liberian	 National	 Police	headquarters	 (including	 a	 robust	 Police	 Support	 Unit	 (PSU)	 element),	 as	well	 as	a	Bureau	of	 Immigration	and	Naturalization	 (BIN)	Patrol	Unit	 and	elements	 of	 the	 justice	 system	 such	 as	 county	 attorneys,	 city	 solicitors,	public	defends,	magistrates	and	judges.113	The	first	Hub,	completed	in	2013,	was	built	just	outside	of	Gbarnga	to	serve	Region	
3,	 the	north-western	security	bloc	comprising	the	interior	Counties	of	Bong,	Lofa,	and	Nimba.	At	 least	three	reasons	stand	out	 for	why	Gbarnga	was	chosen	for	the	location	of	 the	 first	Hub.	 (1)	Gbarnga	was	 the	capital	of	Charles	Taylor’s	 ‘Greater	Liberia’,	the	area	he	controlled	during	the	civil	war,	and	it	remains	a	stronghold	for	his	supporters,	many	of	whom	still	occupy	Taylor’s	farm	just	south	of	the	city.	(2)	The	social	cleavages	 that	hold	the	greatest	potential	 to	return	Liberia	 to	war	run	through	Lofa	 and	Nimba	Counties.	 (3)	Nimba	County	 is	 the	 centre	of	 the	mining	industry	and	economic	activity	outside	of	Monrovia.		From	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 Government	 and	 its	 international	 partners,	these	are	all	good	reasons	to	build	the	first	Hub	in	Gbarnga,	before	extending	the	model	 to	 the	 other	 four	 security	 blocs	 in	 the	 country.	 And	 yet,	 the	 vision	 is	 for	these	Hubs	to	enhance	access	to	justice	in	the	process	of	strengthening	security	in	the	interior.	Given	this,	the	fact	that	the	Gbarnga	Hub	stands	as	a	fortified	complex	beyond	 the	 outskirts	 of	 town,	 and	 well	 beyond	 the	 physical	 access	 of	 the	 vast	majority	of	 the	people	 it	 is	supposed	to	serve,	 is	perplexing.	 If	 the	 intention	 is	 to	bring	 the	 law	closer	 to	 the	people,	 the	only	 sense	 in	which	 this	 is	achieved	 is	by	reducing	the	time	needed	for	police	to	respond	to	security	threats	in	the	region.			
																																																						112	See	ibid,	88.	113	Justice	and	Security	Joint	Program,	‘Introduction’,	Gbarnga	Regional	Justice	and	Security	Hub	
January	2012	–	January	2013	Report,	3.	
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Figure	14.	Gbarnga	Regional	Justice	and	Security	Hub114		The	implication	is	that	the	Regional	Justice	and	Security	Hub	in	Gbarnga	is	directed	at	 strengthening	 the	 police	 and	 immigration	 forces	 in	 the	 interior.	 Indeed,	 the	Government	originally	conceived	of	the	Hubs	as	regional	command	centres	for	the	Liberian	National	Police	to	have	‘forward	operating	bases’	in	the	interior,115	and,	as	the	Government	states	in	its	2013	report,	‘this	is	precisely	one	of	the	reasons	why	the	 hub	was	 established,	 as	 a	 rapid	 response	 forward	 operational	 base.’116	 Thus	brought	 together	 within	 the	 same	 complex,	 ‘justice’	 and	 ‘security’	 would	complement	each	other	 just	as	 the	Government	and	 the	UN	hoped	 they	would:	a	new	police	force	deployed	in	the	interior,	with	courthouses	and	lawyers	co-located	on-site	for	processing	offenders	of	the	national	law.		
	 	
																																																						114	Photograph	by	Shane	Chalmers.	115	Author	interview	with	NY7.	The	design	was	‘scaled	up’	to	include	legal	services	with	the	intervention	of	the	UN	Peacebuilding	Commission.	See	also	Keane,	‘Justice	and	Security	Hub	Modality’,	88.		116	Justice	and	Security	Joint	Program,	Gbarnga	Regional	Justice	and	Security	Hub	January	2012	–	
January	2013	Report,	11.	
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3	 Post-script	
	A	 Justice	to	come			 Light	appeared	in	the	horizon:	a	triumph	was	before	this	Society	such	as	the	wisest	man	might	 envy,	 and	 the	most	 virtuous	man	 long	 to	 realize.	 They	would	triumph,	not	as	conquerors,	binding	bleeding	nations	to	their	chariot	wheels;	 but	 as	 liberators,	who	 came	 not	 to	 destroy	 but	 to	 save.	 […]	 their	march	would	be	 surrounded	by	 the	 songs	of	 the	 grateful,	 the	blessings	of	the	 free;	 their	 triumph	 would	 be	 recorded	 in	 two	 hemispheres,	 and	 its	lasting	memorial	would	be	written	in	heaven.	117		 George	Washington	Park	Custis	
Address	to	the	Annual	Meeting	of	the	American	Colonization	Society		
Imagine	 this.	The	year	 is	1821,	 the	month	 is	winter,	and	 the	day	 is	 stretched	out	radially	 between	 the	 unbroken	 circumference	 of	 the	 horizon,	 as	 the	 US	 brig	 the	
Nautilus	 courses	 across	 the	Atlantic	Ocean	 in	 the	 direction	 of	Africa.	 Aboard	 are	thirty	 three	 free	 black	 women,	 men,	 and	 children,	 under	 the	 command	 of	 two	white	 officers	 of	 the	 US	 Government	 and	 two	 white	 agents	 of	 the	 American	Colonization	 Society.118	 The	 Nautilus	 is	 bound	 for	 the	 British	 colony	 of	 Sierra	Leone,	where	it	is	to	join	another	group	of	black	colonists	who	departed	the	United	States	 a	 year	 earlier	 aboard	 the	 Elizabeth,	 before	 continuing	 to	 search	 for	 their	promised	land	along	the	Windward	Coast.		But	all	of	that	is	to	come.	Out	at	sea	for	now,	there	they	are:	coursing	across	the	Atlantic,	 gazing	beyond	 the	 railings	of	 the	Nautilus	 at	 an	apparently	 limitless	expanse	 of	 sky	 and	 ocean,	 cut	 only	 by	 the	 horizon.	And	 the	 light	 on	 the	 horizon	holds	out	a	promise:	imagine,	Africa	ahead!	A	land	of	justice	to	come!		∞		
																																																						117	George	Washington	Park	Custis,	address	to	the	Annual	Meeting	of	the	American	Colonization	Society	in	support	of	their	colonisation	mission:	American	Colonization	Society,	Seventh	Annual	
Report	of	the	American	Society	for	Colonizing	the	Free	People	of	Colour	of	the	United	States	(Washington:	printed	by	Davis	and	Force,	1824),	15-16.	118	See	Charles	Henry	Huberich,	The	Political	and	Legislative	History	of	Liberia,	vol	1	(New	York:	Central	Book	Company,	1947),	143.	See	also	Frederick	Starr,	Liberia:	Description,	History,	Problems	(Chicago:	[no	publisher],	1913),	57.	
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213To	begin	with,	the	American	Colonization	Society	was	dominated	by	slaveholders,	and	 there	 is	 little	 doubt	 about	 their	 motivations	 in	 organising	 the	 colonisation	mission	that	would	establish	Liberia	in	Africa:	to	secure	the	institution	of	slavery	still	foundational	in	the	south	of	the	country,	as	well	as	the	whiteness	of	the	United	States.	The	answer	to	a	visible	contradiction	was	to	make	it	less	visible,	in	this	case	by	 deporting	 ‘the	 free	 people	 of	 colour	 of	 the	 United	 States’,	 whose	 presence	threatened	 the	 security	 and	 purity	 of	 whites	 and	 the	 docility	 of	 their	 slaves.	However,	 the	 idea	 of	 colonising	 these	 free	 people	 of	 colour	 ‘in	 Africa	 (or	elsewhere)’	was	also	seen	by	some,	both	white	and	black,	as	a	promise	of	liberty,	equality,	and	fraternity.119	Colonisation	would,	it	was	said,	make	black	people	free	in	a	way	they	could	never	be	in	the	United	States.	What	is	more,	the	establishment	of	 an	 African-American	 colony	 in	 Africa	 would,	 it	 was	 said,	 provide	 a	 model	 of	African	civilisation	that	would	lead	to	the	emancipation	of	all	of	Africa’s	peoples.120		This	was	 the	 colour	 of	 justice	 to	 come	with	 the	 realisation	of	 Liberia:	 the	flourishing	of	the	United	States	as	a	white	homeland,	and	the	flourishing	of	Africa	as	a	black	homeland.	On	one	side	this	vision	was	propagated	by	slaveholders	and	white	 supremacists;	 on	 another	 side	 it	 was	 championed	 by	 radical	 black	nationalists,	 along	 with	 pragmatists,	 black	 and	 white;	 whilst	 the	 views	 of	 the	Africans	 who	 were	 to	 be	 made	 civilised	 were	 nowhere	 to	 be	 seen.	 And	 this	troubled	 vision	 underwrote	 ‘Liberia’.	 The	 colony,	 which	 had	 been	 referred	 to	simply	by	its	geographical	indicator—Cape	Montserado—and	therefore	by	a	name	that	‘meant	nothing’,	by	a	name	that	signified	no	more	than	the	outcrop	of	rubble	that	 history	 had	 piled	 at	 the	 place	 where	 the	 settlers	 now	 stood,	 was	 named	‘LIBERIA’,	expressing	the	‘object	and	nature’	of	the	American	Colonization	Society’s	vision,	not	simply	of	liberty,	but	of	the	kind	of	liberty	that	comes	with	being	made	free.	This	was	the	justice	of	Liberia	to	come,	just	over	the	horizon.			 	
																																																						119	See	also	Eric	Burin,	Slavery	and	the	Peculiar	Solution:	A	History	of	the	American	Colonization	
Society	(Gainesville:	University	Press	of	Florida,	2005),	Chapter	1.	120	See	discussion	in	Part	2	of	Chapter	4.	
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214	B	 A	peace	formidable	to	any	eye		Cape	Montserado,	November	26th,	1822,	(morning.)	Sir:	I	had	the	honour	of	writing	 you	 by	 the	 Shark,	 on	 the	 9th	 ultimo,	 and,	 subsequently,	 by	 the	‘Strong’,	 in	 a	 very	 weak	 and	 sickly	 condition.	 We	 are	 now	 engaged	 in	 a	bloody	 and	 perilous	 war	 with	 all	 the	 native	 tribes	 around	 us.	 On	 the	morning	of	 the	11th,	were	attacked	by	eight	hundred,	who	were	 repulsed,	after	doing	us	some	injury,	with	the	loss	of	nearly	one	hundred	killed	on	the	spot.	 Subsequently,	 we	 have	 been	 employed	 in	 a	 negotiation	 for	 peace,	which	I	fear	will	fail.	We	expect	another	assault	to	be	made	on	us	in	two	or	three	days.	[…]	I	have	the	honour,	sir,	to	be,	your	most	obedient	servant,			 J.	ASHMUN,		
Acting	Agent	for	liberated	Africans.		 November	26th,	(evening.)	Sir:	Our	negotiation	with	our	perfidious	enemies	seems	to	have	entirely	failed	of	its	object.	They	are	bent	on	our	ruin.121	
	
Now	imagine	this.	It	is	December	1822,	mere	months	after	the	Nautilus	was	at	sea,	and	the	 tiny	colony	erected	on	Cape	Montserado	 is	on	the	brink	of	ruin.	Without	food	or	adequate	shelter,	 its	 fifty-odd	residents,	 sick	and	dying	 from	disease,	are	under	attack	from	an	alliance	led	by	the	Dey,	who	are	demanding	the	return	of	land	‘purchased’	from	them	by	the	two	white	American	agents	with	the	assistance	of	a	cocked	pistol.122	Two	battles	ensue.	The	first,	in	late	November,	is	described	by	the	American	Colonization	Society’s	‘Acting	Agent	for	liberated	Africans’	in	the	letter	to	the	 Secretary	 of	 the	US	Navy	 quoted	 above.	 The	 second	 assault,	 foreseen	 by	 the	Agent	 in	his	 letter,	 occurs	 five	days	 later.	During	 this	battle,	 an	estimated	 fifteen	hundred	 soldiers	 led	 by	 the	 Dey	 attack	 the	 American	 settlers.	 The	 settlement	barely	avoids	destruction.	Its	survival	is	attributed	to	cannon	fire,	forcing	the	Dey	to	retreat.		This	war	will	be	memorialised	as	the	Providential	beginning	of	Liberia.	Half	a	 century	 later,	 the	 first	 President	 of	 the	 Republic,	 Joseph	 Jenkins	 Roberts,	 will	recall	it	as	‘that	signal	triumph	of	freedom	over	the	implacable	enemies	of	human	progress	 and	 the	 rights	 of	 man’—a	 triumph	 ‘which	 permanently	 established	 on	
																																																						121	Letter	from	the	acting	Agent	of	the	American	Colonization	Society	at	Cape	Montserado,	J	Ashmun,	to	the	Secretary	of	the	US	Navy,	in	American	Colonization	Society,	Seventh	Annual	Report,	49-50.		122	See,	eg,	‘Extract	of	a	letter	from	Captain	Robert	T	Spence	to	the	Secretary	of	the	US	Navy’,	in	American	Colonization	Society,	Seventh	Annual	Report,	58-9.	
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215this	 hill	 the	 foundations	 of	 our	 present	 political	 fabric’.123	 Or	 in	 the	 words	 of	President	William	V	 S	Tubman,	 addressing	 the	 legislature	 a	 century	 later:	 ‘If	 the	defenders	of	 the	Commonwealth	had	 lost	 the	day	 in	 the	Battle	 of	 Fort	Hill	 there	would	have	been	no	Liberia’.124		But	 there	 is	more	 to	 this	scene.	Shortly	after	 the	second	battle,	a	US	Navy	ship	 arrives	 at	 the	 Cape,	 having	 heard	 the	 cannon	 fire.	 The	 Captain	 offers	 his	assistance	in	constructing	a	fort—or	as	he	describes	it	later,	 ‘a	tower	of	strength’.	This,	 the	 Captain	 notes,	 ‘I	 conceived	 well	 suited	 to	 effect	 the	 object	 in	 view’,	 to	make	an	‘impression	on	the	minds’	of	those	who	might	threaten	the	colony	and	its	just	claims.125	He	describes	the	construction	of	this	‘tower	of	strength’	in	a	letter	to	the	Secretary	of	the	US	Navy:		In	 fifteen	 days,	 a	 circular	massive	work	 of	 stone,	measuring	 one	 hundred	and	 twelve	 feet	 in	 circumference,	 eight	 feet	 in	 thickness,	 and	 ten	 feet	 in	elevation,	was	seen	 to	 tower	above	 the	surrounding	heights,	 commanding	the	site	for	the	town,	and	a	wide	range	of	the	circumjacent	country.126		The	result,	he	writes,	is	‘formidable	to	any	eye’.	And	indeed	the	Captain	is	left	with	no	doubt	about	‘its	effect	in	neutralizing,	in	no	small	degree,	the	menacing	designs	of	 the	 natives.	 Every	 day	 brought	 me	 additional	 proof	 of	 a	 change	 in	 their	intentions	 […]	 I	was	happy	 in	perceiving	 this	 revolution	 in	 their	 sentiments,	 this	change	in	their	designs’.127		 	∞		Not	 long	 after	 the	 settlers	 declared	 Liberia	 a	 Free,	 Sovereign	 and	 Independent	Republic	 in	1847,	accounts	began	to	circulate	that	 it	was	a	young	settler	woman,	Matilda	 Newport,	 who	 had	 fired	 the	 cannon	 that	 saved	 the	 colony	 during	 the	Providential	battle	of	Fort	Hill.128	Whether	she	did	or	not	is	unknown;	but	that	fact	is	 insignificant	 to	 this	 history.	 What	 is	 significant	 is	 that	 she	 came	 to	 be	
																																																						123	Cited	in	Svend	E	Holsoe,	‘Matilda	Newport:	The	Power	of	a	Liberian-Invented	Tradition’,	Liberian	
Studies	Journal,	vol	32,	no	2	(2007):	30.	124	William	V	S	Tubman,	‘Annual	Message	to	the	Legislature,	November	16,	1965’,	in	D	Elwood	Dunn,	ed,	The	Annual	Messages	of	the	Presidents	of	Liberia	1848–2010,	vol	1	(Gottingen:	De	Gruyter,	2011),	1348.	125	American	Colonization	Society,	Seventh	Annual	Report,	55	and	60	(my	italics).	126	Ibid,	60.	127	Ibid	(my	italics).	128	See	Holsoe,	‘Matilda	Newport’.	
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216	represented	as	if	she	had.	What	is	significant	is	that	this	image	of	‘Matilda	Newport’	substituted	for	a	woman	whose	trace	 in	history	 is	 little	more	than	the	name	that	would	give	birth	to	‘Liberia’	as	a	republic.	As	another	Liberian	woman	proclaimed	admiringly	almost	a	century	later:		It	 was	 […]	 our	 noble	 Matilda,	 seeing	 the	 handful	 of	 men	 dispirited,	observing	 the	 shattered	 condition	 of	 affairs	 and	 the	 gloom	 which	 the	menacing	 advance	 of	 the	 natives	 had	 cast	 upon	 the	 lives	 of	 the	 pioneers,	stepped	 forth,	 lighted	 the	 cannon	 […]	 and	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 Republic	became	a	possibility.129		
	
Figure	15.	Part	of	a	relief	depicting	the	origin	myth	of	Liberia,	set	at	the	base	of	a	monument		on	Cape	Montserrado130			
																																																						129	Ibid,	34.	130	Photograph	by	Shane	Chalmers.	
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Figure	16.	Stamp	issued	in	1947131	
	
And	the	existence	of	the	Republic	became	a	possibility.	There	she	stands:	on	public	monuments	and	commemorative	stamps,	 in	children’s	school	books,132	 in	poems,	parades,133	 and	 civic	 names,134	 her	 heroism	 re-told	 and	 re-enacted—Lady	Newport,	always	behind	the	cannon	with	a	hand	to	the	fuse,	a	figure	both	just	and	
formidable	to	any	eye.	The	timing	of	the	emergence	of	the	myth	of	Matilda	Newport	is	important.	In	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 the	 European	 ‘scramble	 for	 Africa’	was	 accelerating,	 and	 the	 government	 of	 the	 black	 republic	 was	 under	 intense	pressure	 to	 secure	both	 its	external	 sovereignty	against	 the	 incursions	of	France	and	 Britain,	 and	 its	 internal	 sovereignty	 against	 the	 African	 peoples	 who	 were	rebelling	 against,	 or	 simply	 ignoring,	 the	 claims	 of	 the	 Americo-Liberian	government.	In	this	situation	of	colonial	nation-state	building,	the	name	of	Matilda	
																																																						131	Source:	Manfred	Beier,	Philately	of	Liberia,	philib.org.	132	Holsoe,	‘Matilda	Newport’,	38.	133	‘The	Story	of	Matilda	Newport	–	Liberian	Heroine,’	AFRO	Magazine,	3	February	1953,	8.	134	A	main	street	and	a	school	in	central	Monrovia	are	named	after	Matilda	Newport.	An	Act	to	establish	a	township	named	‘in	honor	of	the	heroine	Matilda	Newport’	was	also	passed	in	1854:	see	American	Colonization	Society,	The	African	Repository,	vol	30	(Washington:	ACS,	1854),	241.	
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218	Newport	was	given	to	a	company	of	the	Republic’s	first	militia.135	Around	the	same	time,	December	1	was	proclaimed	a	public	holiday—to	be	named	Matilda	Newport	Day—in	honour	of	the	1822	battle	of	Fort	Hill	and	the	birth	of	the	nation.	In	this	way,	 and	 very	 importantly	 at	 this	 time,	when	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 Republic	was	once	 again	 imperilled	 by	 its	 ‘perfidious	 enemies’,136	 both	 the	 militia	 created	 to	secure	 Liberia’s	 future	 presence,	 and	 the	 holiday	 created	 to	 commemorate	 the	battle	that	secured	Liberia’s	 	past	presence,	were	drawn	together	 in	the	 figure	of	Matilda	Newport.137		Matilda	 Newport	 thus	 emerged	 as	 an	 image	 in	 and	 of	 this	 history,	connecting	 what	 was	 behind—the	 Providential	 battle	 for	 Liberia’s	 past—with	what	 was	 ahead—the	 Promise	 of	 Liberia’s	 future—through	 an	 image	 that	legitimated	and	propagated	the	legality	and	force	of	this	history.138	Where	‘Liberia’	remained	an	abstraction	even	after	its	declaration	as	a	Republic	in	1847—with	an	uncertain	presence	in	international	law	and	an	uncertain	presence	on	the	ground	in	 west	 Africa139—the	 figure	 of	 Matilda	 Newport	 came	 to	 sediment	 a	 place	 for	‘Liberia’	both	as	an	image	of	justice	and	as	an	historical	reality.		Thus	 the	 body	 of	 the	 settler	woman,	 now	 the	 body	 of	 the	 Republic,	 gave	birth	to	‘Liberia’	in	two	ways.	As	an	interpretive	resource,	an	origin	myth,	Matilda	Newport	 came	 to	 signify	 the	 history	 of	 Liberia,	 visualising—making	 visible—its	providence	 as	 a	 settlement	 of	 pioneers	 under	 a	 banner	 of	 liberty.	 And	 as	 a	technology,	a	tool	of	colonial	nation-state-building,	the	image	of	Matilda	Newport	deployed	to	make	this	history.140	In	these	two	ways,	not	only	did	Matilda	Newport	come	 to	 represent	 the	 past	 and	 future	 of	 Liberia	 in	 west	 Africa—and	 thus	 a	narrative	 of	 history	 that	 placed	 Liberia	 in	 history—but	 she	 also	 combined	 the	
																																																						135	Holsoe,	‘Matilda	Newport’,	33.	136	See	note	121	above.	137	Thus	an	historian,	writing	in	1926,	claimed	that	Matilda	Newport’s	heroic	deeds	contributed	to	securing	Liberia’s	independence	from	external	powers,	France	and	Britain:	see	Siahyonkron	Nyanseor,	‘Putting	to	Rest	the	Matilda	Newport	Myth	–	Part	2,’	The	Perspective,	7	January	2004:	http//:www.theperspective.org/2004/jan/matildanewportmyth.htm.	138	For	a	theoretical	framework	for	thinking	about	images	‘in’	and	‘of’	history,	see	Shane	Chalmers,	‘The	Visual	Force	of	Justice	in	the	Making	of	Liberia’,	in	Law	and	the	Visual:	Transition,	
Transformation,	and	Transmission,	ed	Desmond	Manderson	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2016).	139	See	discussion	in	Part	2	of	Chapter	4.	140	On	the	‘image’	as	‘interpretive	resource’	and	as	‘technology’,	see	the	introduction	to	Desmond	Manderson,	ed,	Law	and	the	Visual:	Transition,	Transformation,	and	Transmission	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	forthcoming).	
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219justice	 of	 Liberia	 with	 the	 force	 that	 had	 and	 would	 secure	 its	 presence	 as	 a	Republic	 in	Africa	and	 the	world.	Conjugating	woman	and	cannon	 in	 the	act	 that	gave	birth	to	the	Republic,	 the	 image	unites	feminine	 justice	with	phallic	 force	to	make	 its	 vision	 of	 ‘Liberia’	 manifest.	 There	 is	 nothing	 rigid,	 nothing	 timeless,	nothing	placeless,	about	Matilda	Newport.	Like	Bernini’s	version	of	David,141	she	is	tensed	 in	action,	a	bandana	keeping	her	hair	and	sweat	 from	blinding	her	vision,	the	barrel	of	the	cannon	directed	in	no	uncertain	way	at	whatever	would	deny	her	place	in	the	promised	land.	This	is	not	an	anaemic	figure	of	Justitia	for	all	times	and	for	all	places;	she	is	active,	determined,	forceful.	And	 that	 is	 precisely	 why	 the	 image	 of	 Matilda	 Newport	 was	 eventually	condemned	 as	 a	 representation	 of	 ‘Liberia’.	 Following	 the	 revolution	 that	culminated	 in	 1980	 with	 the	 overthrow	 of	 the	 Americo-Liberian	 regime,	 the	celebration	 of	 Matilda	 Newport	 Day	 was	 swept	 away,	 and	 the	 image	 publicly	denounced	 for	glorifying	 ‘the	defeat	of	one	group	of	citizens	by	another	group	of	citizens’.142	The	image	that	had	represented	and	that	had	deployed	to	achieve	the	consolidation	of	Liberia	as	a	nation-state,	through	the	forceful	seizure	of	the	lands	and	the	institution	of	control	over	the	peoples	of	this	place,	was	condemned	along	with	a	government	that	had	failed	to	see	the	problem	with	the	state/State	of	peace	secured	through	Matilda	Newport.143			 	
																																																						141	With	thanks	to	Desmond	Manderson	for	drawing	my	attention	to	the	comparison	with	the	statues	of	David	by	Michelangelo	and	Bernini.	142	Holsoe,	‘Matilda	Newport’,	37-38.	143	As	President	Tubman	stated	in	1965:	‘Adverse	comments	on	the	Celebration	of	Mathilda	Newport	Day	are	being	made	but	I	see	no	objections	to	the	celebration’;	indeed,	‘a	day	dedicated	to	her	would	appear	to	be	most	appropriate’:	Tubman,	‘Annual	Message	to	the	Legislature,	November	16,	1965’,	in	Dunn,	ed,	The	Annual	Messages	of	the	Presidents:	1348.	
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Figure	17.	Relief	at	the	base	of	the	Centennial	Pavilion	in	Monrovia144	
	
	
	
	 	
																																																						144	[image	omitted	from	digital	version]	
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4	 Justice	to	come		The	idea	of	 ‘Liberia’	survived	the	revolution	that	swept	the	country	in	the	second	half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 as	well	 as	 the	wars	 of	 the	 1990s	 and	 early	 2000s.	Whereas	 the	 figure	of	Matilda	Newport,	as	a	representation	of	 ‘Liberia’,	 sunk	 too	deeply	 into	 a	 specific	 colonial	 history	 to	 remain	 viable	 as	 a	 dynamic	 image	 of	 a	revised,	post-colonial	Republic,	the	idea	of	Liberia	as	a	nation-state	remains	wholly	acceptable	 today.	 But	 the	 very	 floating	 quality	 that	 has	 kept	 the	 idea	 of	 Liberia	from	 sinking	 into	 history	 along	 with	 Matilda	 Newport	 has	 also	 kept	 it	 from	providing	a	solid	basis	 for	re-making	the	nation-state	 in	 the	twenty-first	century.	The	abstract	idea	of	‘Liberia’	that	required	the	figure	of	Matilda	Newport	to	ground	it	keeps	 it	on	the	surface	of	history.	What	 it	means	to	 ‘be’	Liberian	 in	 the	second	decade	of	the	twenty-first	century	remains	as	fluid	and	plural	as	the	peoples	who	inhabit	 its	 lands.	Liberia	 remains	a	 state	without	a	nation,	 and	more	 than	 that,	 a	state	 without	 a	 definite	 image	 of	 itself	 as	 a	 nation.	 Like	 the	 figure	 of	 Matilda	Newport,	the	official	symbols	of	the	Republic—its	flag,	patterned	on	the	US	flag,	its	coat	of	arms,	with	its	colonial	motifs,	and	its	motto,	‘the	love	of	liberty	brought	us	here’—are	of	 a	 vision	 that	was,	 a	 vision	 that	 a	 violent	 history	has	 submerged.145	Thus	‘Liberia’	remains	an	unsettled	and	disembodied	ideal,	still	a	promise	of	justice	to	come,	just	over	the	horizon.	The	 aim	 of	 this	 chapter	 has	 been	 to	 examine	what	 is	 taking	 place	 in	 the	attempt	to	consolidate	‘Liberia’	post-war,	at	the	start	of	the	twenty-first	century.	I	began	in	Part	1	by	considering	a	logic	that	I	argued	informs	the	UN’s	global	vision	of	 ‘securing	peace’.	This	logic	brings	together	three	propositions	in	a	combustible	arrangement,	requiring	 in	the	end	a	 forceful	 justice	to	secure	a	state/State	based	on	the	rule	of	law,	which	is	itself	directed	at	containing	the	manifestation	of	violent	conflict.	I	then	turned	in	Part	2	to	show	how	this	logic	of	securing	peace	can	also	be	seen	 to	 inform	 the	 Liberian	 Government’s	 twenty-first	 century	 vision	 of	 Liberia	Rising,	a	vision	that	would	consolidate	the	logic	of	capital.	I	examined	this	vision	as	set	 out	 in	 the	 Government’s	 development	 framework,	 the	 Agenda	 for	
Transformation.	At	the	core	of	this	‘action	plan’	is	the	Government’s	framework	for	
																																																						145	On	the	debate	on	Liberia’s	national	symbols,	see	eg,	Fred	P	M	van	der	Kraaij,	‘Liberia’s	national	symbols	–	What	happened	to	the	national	debate?’,	Liberian	Perspectives,	31	May	2015:	blog.liberiapastandpresent.org.	
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222	securing	 peace,	 the	 forces	 of	 which	 are	 to	 be	 contained	 by	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 the	violence	of	which	 is	 to	be	contained	by	 justice—conjuring	an	 image	of	 the	statue	that	stands	in	The	Hague,	of	‘Peace	through	Justice’.	I	then	examined	how	the	UN	is	assisting	to	build	this	state/State	of	peace.		What	 this	 examination	 shows	 is	 an	 attempt	 to	 secure	 peace	 in	 Liberia	 by	establishing	an	effective	and	accountable	 security	 sector,	directed	at	maintaining	order	 and	 stability,	 with	 rule-of-law	 and	 justice	 components	 brought	within	 the	logic	 of	 security.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 examination	 shows	 an	 attempt	 to	 secure	peace	by	 combining	 force,	 law,	 and	 justice	 in	 a	unified	 state/State.	Whilst	 this	 is	ultimately	 directed	 at	 containing	 force	 by	 bringing	 the	 forces	 of	 war	 within	 the	State’s	 security	 sector,	 this	 also	 has	 the	 effect	 of	 making	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 into	 a	medium	of	security.	Not	only	does	this	inform	how	the	rule	of	law	is	taking	place,	as	 a	 medium	 of	 security,	 but	 it	 also	 enables	 the	 logic	 of	 security	 to	 take	 place	through	the	institution	of	law’s	rule.	Thus,	 after	 a	 decade	 of	 peace-building,	 with	 an	 increasing	 emphasis	 on	establishing	a	State	based	on	the	rule	of	law,	new	fortifications	have	been	erected	and	 new	 military	 and	 police	 forces	 commissioned,	 as	 the	 Liberian	 Government	seeks	to	realise	its	vision	of	Liberia	as	a	nation-state	integrated	into	a	transnational	corporate-capitalist	economy.	Although	the	proposition	‘justice	contains	the	force	of	 law’	 is	 supposed	 to	 make	 this	 arrangement	 bearable—by	 ensuring	‘reconciliation’,	‘equality’,	and	‘access	to	justice’—the	justice	of	this	peace,	brought	within	the	logic	of	security,	is	ultimately	directed	at	securing	the	state	of	the	State.	The	resemblance	is	clear:	this	is	peace	through	justice—and	the	result	is	potentially	explosive.	 Just	 as	 the	 propositions	 ‘peace	 contains	 the	 force	 of	 war’	 and	 ‘law	contains	 the	 force	of	peace’	have	 the	potential	 to	become	 tyrannical,	 there	 is	 the	danger	 that	 the	 attempt	 to	 secure	 peace	 in	 this	 way	 will	 result	 in	 the	institutionalisation	 of	 an	 increasingly	 violent	 and	 combustible	 authoritarian	regime.	This	 risk	 is	not	merely	hypothetical:	 it	 is	 the	historical	experience	of	 the	First	 Republic	 of	 Liberia.	 As	 I	 showed	 in	 the	 post-script	 in	 Part	 3,	 the	 idea	 of	‘Liberia’	 as	 a	 vision	 of	 justice	 was	 forcefully	 consolidated	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 and	twentieth	 centuries	 as	 an	African-American	 republic	 in	west	Africa,	 securing	 the	State	of	Liberia	through	the	institutionalisation	of	an	unjust	rule	of	law.	The	result	was	revolution	and	war.		
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223Lady	 Justice	 of	 the	 Peace	 Palace	 might	 have	 taken	 the	 place	 of	 Lady	Newport	of	Colonial	Liberia,	as	the	image	that	is	to	secure	the	new	Liberia,	but	the	question	 remains:	 how	 just	 is	 this	 justice?	 The	 arrangement	 of	 ‘peace	 through	justice’	 is	 a	 highly	 combustible	 one,	 making	 the	 force	 of	 law’s	 rule	 just,	 but	 its	justice	 violent.	 This	 is	 a	 delicate	 balance	 at	 the	 best	 of	 times,	 but	 it	 becomes	especially	 fragile	 when	 the	 ‘justice’	 of	 law’s	 rule	 is	 not	 in	 fact	 just,	 and	 merely	violent.	 This	 was	 the	 case	 during	 the	 First	 Republic,	 when	 the	 forceful	 justice	represented	and	propelled	by	the	image	of	Matilda	Newport	was	experienced	as	an	instrument	 of	 domination	by	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 Liberians.	 The	development	 of	the	Regional	 Justice	 and	 Security	Hubs	 in	 Liberia	 point	 to	 a	 similar	 prospect	 for	Liberia	 post-war,	 with	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 State	 based	 on	 the	 rule	 of	 law	appearing	 to	 be	 in	 the	 service	 of	 a	 forceful	 justice	 that	 risks	 becoming	 a	 mere	instrument	of	domination.	Thus	the	question	remains:	how	just	is	the	justice	of	this	arrangement?							
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1	 Law	at	sea		
Re-imagine	this.	The	year	is	1821,	the	month	is	winter,	and	the	day	is	stretched	out	radially	 between	 the	 unbroken	 circumference	 of	 the	 horizon,	 as	 the	 US	 brig	 the	
Nautilus	courses	across	the	Atlantic	Ocean	in	the	direction	of	Africa.		Now	 the	 Nautilus	 is	 sailing	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 another	 vessel,	 carrying	 a	
Constitution	For	the	Government	of	the	African	Settlement	at	 	 	 .	 ‘At’:	like	the	thirty	three	free	black	women,	men	and	children	aboard	the	Nautilus,	this	is	 an	 unsettled	 law;	 defined	 by	 a	 blank	 space,	 imaginatively	 conceived	 so	 that	 it	might	take	form	elsewhere	and	otherwise,	 this	 is	a	 law	to	come—the	 light	on	the	
horizon.			 ∞		The	 first	 iteration	 of	 Liberia’s	 national	 law	 was	 inscribed	 in	 this	 sea-borne	Constitution,	adopted	in	1820	by	the	United	States-based	Board	of	Managers	of	the	American	Colonization	Society	at	the	request	of	one	of	its	Agents.1	Along	with	this	Constitution,	the	Board	of	Managers	also	provided	a	code	of	laws	in	Instructions	to	its	Agents.2	What	is	remarkable	about	these	legal	texts	is	that	they	were	adopted	in	anticipation	of	 the	creation	of	a	settlement	on	 the	west	coast	of	Africa,	while	 the	ship	that	would	eventually	deliver	the	first	emigrants	to	the	shores	of	Liberia	was	still	anchored	off	the	coast	of	Sierra	Leone.		The	initial	 lack	of	a	territorial	basis	for	this	 law—and	therefore,	according	to	the	intentions	of	the	ACS,	the	fact	that	it	was	not	yet	law	when	it	was	set	down	in	18203—appears	as	two	blank	spaces	in	the	text	of	this	Constitution,	like	a	call	that	is	waiting	to	be	answered:		
	 	
																																																						1	See	Charles	Henry	Huberich,	The	Political	and	Legislative	History	of	Liberia,	vol	1	(New	York:	Central	Book	Company,	1947),	145-146.	2	Reproduced	in	ibid,	95-96,	103-105,	146-148.	3	Ibid,	148.	
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Constitution	
For	the	
Government	of	the	African	Settlement	at		ARTICLE	1ST.	All	persons	born	within	the	limits	of	the	territory	held	by	the	American	Colonization	Society	in																 	or	 removing	 there	 to	 reside,	 shall	be	free,	and	entitled	to	all	the	rights	and	privileges	of	the	free	people	of	the	United	States.		The	answer	 that	would	be	 inscribed	 in	 the	blank	space	 is	of	 course	 ‘Liberia’,	but	even	that	would	remain	more	an	open	question	than	an	answer	…		Despite	Liberia’s	formative	shifts	throughout	the	nineteenth	and	twentieth	centuries—from	 Colony	 to	 Commonwealth	 to	 Republic,	 through	 revolution	 and	war—the	law	under	the	1820	Constitution	has	continued	to	inform	the	subsequent	manifestations	of	Liberia’s	national	law.	This	includes	both	what	was	posited	in	the	1820	 Constitution,	 and	 what	 was	 left	 blank.	 What	 was	 posited	 as	 the	 law	 that	would	 apply	 at	 settlement	 was	 most	 clearly	 expressed	 in	 Article	 6	 of	 the	 1820	Constitution:	 ‘The	common	law	as	in	force	and	modified	in	the	United	States,	and	applicable	 to	 the	 situation	 of	 the	 people,	 shall	 be	 in	 force	 in	 the	 Settlement’—a	provision	 that	 was	 essentially	 replaced	 in	 each	 of	 Liberia’s	 subsequent	Constitutions.4	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 blank	 space	 that	 signified	 the	 law’s	groundlessness	in	west	Africa	has	also	allowed	it	to	become	grounded	there.	From	1847,	 at	 least,	 when	 Liberia	 declared	 itself	 a	 Free,	 Sovereign	 and	 Independent	State,	Americo-Liberians	could	speak	of	this	law,	as	the	national	law	of	a	sovereign	republic,	as	the	organic	law	of	the	land.	From	this	point	the	unsettled	nature	of	the	law	that	marked	the	Constitution	in	1820	was	history.		…	and	yet,	 the	question	 lingers.	Precisely	because	 it	was	history,	 the	 initial	fact	of	terra	nullius—of	being	‘without	settled	law’—has	continued	to	underlie	the	Constitution	of	Liberia,	as	a	law	that	was	on	first	encounter	empty	of	its	new	land,	as	a	law	that	had	to	have	inscribed	upon	it	this	land.5	The	blank	space	that	marked	the	 first	 iteration	 of	 the	 Constitution	 of	 Liberia	 could	 not	 be	 filled	 in	 simply	 by	
																																																						4	For	example,	Article	17	of	the	Constitution	of	the	Commonwealth	of	Liberia	(1839);	Article	V(1)	of	the	Constitution	of	the	Republic	of	Liberia	(1847);	and	generally	the	Constitution	of	the	Republic	of	Liberia	(1984).	5	Or	as	Farrall	writes,	‘Liberia	began	its	existence	as	a	constitution	in	search	of	a	country’:	Jeremy	Matam	Farrall,	‘Recurring	Dilemmas	in	a	Recurring	Conflict:	Evaluating	the	UN	Mission	in	Liberia	(2003–2006)’,	Journal	of	International	Peacekeeping,	vol	16	(2012):	313.	
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227printing	 over	 it	 the	 name	 of	 this	 settled	 land,	 especially	 when	 that	 name	 itself	signified	an	idea	without	any	immediate	grounding.	‘Liberia’:	an	imaginary	land	of	liberty	to	come,	for	emigrants	to	come,	in	Africa	(or	elsewhere).			
2	 The	problem	of	our	laws	
	The	 blank	 space	 is	 one	 dimension	 of	 the	 chasmic	 structure	 of	 law,	 undermining	every	grounded	expression	of	the	law.	This	blank	space	is	what	leaves	law	open	to	being	an	oppressive	conceit,	but	it	also	points	to	the	ethical	possibilities	of	law	as	a	medium	of	justice.		In	 Chapters	 4	 and	 5,	 I	 examined	 the	 violent	 consequences	 of	 law’s	conceptual	blankness.	In	Chapter	4,	I	showed	how	the	blank	space	that	separates	law	from	its	subjects	enables	the	super-imposition	of	a	legal	framework	over	land	and	peoples	that	transforms	them	into	fungible	things.	Likewise,	the	separation	of	law	from	its	subjects	is	at	the	core	of	the	logic	of	‘securing	peace’	that	I	examined	in	Chapter	5.	As	 I	 showed	 there,	 the	proposition	of	 ‘peace	 through	 justice’	 requires	the	institution	of	a	rule	of	law	that	is	both	forceful	and	just	for	the	very	reason	that	law’s	 rule	 is	 fundamentally	 arbitrary,	 disconnected	 from	 the	 subjects	 within	jurisdiction.		Having	examined	the	violent	consequences	of	law’s	conceptual	blankness,	I	continue	the	analysis	in	this	chapter	by	examining	how	this	problem	of	law	is	also	its	 ethical	possibility,	 leaving	 law	open	 to	 its	object,	 that	 is,	 the	experience	of	 its	subjects.	 I	 address	 this	 problem	 in	 Part	 3	 of	 the	 chapter	 by	 examining	 how	 the	national	law	is	taking	form	on	the	ground	in	Liberia.	Before	I	get	to	that,	however,	first,	what	exactly	is	the	‘problem	of	our	laws’	in	the	case	of	Liberia?	
	A	 Talking	drums		On	the	threshold	of	the	national	museum	of	Liberia,	set	down	between	the	curated	expression	of	history	contained	within	the	building	and	the	normality	of	everyday	life	taking	place	on	the	streets	of	Monrovia	below,	is	a	drum	standing	two-and-a-half	meters	 tall.	An	official	 sign	 introduces	 the	artefact	as	a	 ‘Dukpa	drum’	and	 in	brackets	 ‘communication	 drum’.	 The	 sign	 then	 begins	 with	 the	 following	description:	
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		I	had	heard	about	the	talking	drums	of	west	Africa	before	I	arrived	in	Liberia,	and	I	asked	the	museum	guide	(once	a	glimpse	of	the	drum	from	the	street	drew	me	in)	if	this	was	one	of	them.	The	official	laughed.	Pointing	through	the	door	to	the	street	below,	 he	 said	 ‘talking	 drum’	 is	 what	 it	 is	 normally	 called.	 I	 asked	 if	 Liberians	would	 know	 it	 as	 a	 ‘communication	 drum’.	 He	 laughed	 again.	 No,	 he	 said,	 they	would	 call	 it	 a	 ‘talking	 drum’.	 Why	 then,	 I	 asked,	 does	 the	 museum	 call	 it	 a	‘communication	 drum’.	 Because,	 he	 said,	 ‘communication	 drum’	 better	 explains	what	 the	 drum	 is	 used	 for.	 It	 disseminates	 information;	 it	 does	 not	 talk.	 And	 he	laughed	again.6	Several	weeks	later,	in	the	interior	of	Liberia,	a	man	in	a	teashop	said	to	me	in	response	to	a	question	about	the	rule	of	law:	‘The	rule	of	law?	How	can	you	have	the	 rule	 of	 law	when	 we	 don’t	 even	 know	 our	 own	 laws?’7	 Unlike	 the	museum	official	 this	 man	 was	 not	 laughing,	 and	 yet	 the	 irony	 was	 there.	 For	 him	 the	national	law	of	Liberia	is	law—he	spoke	of	it	in	terms	of	‘our	own	laws’—and	there	is	no	doubt	it	could	be	enforced	against	him,	that	he	would	feel	it	as	one	can	only	feel	the	law.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	not	law,	not	his	law.	How	could	it	be,	when	its	laws	are	unknown	to	him?	Like	in	the	museum,	in	this	man’s	response	was	a	finger	pointing	 past	 the	 official	 signs	 that	 hold	 up	 the	 national	 law	 of	 Liberia	 as	 ‘the	organic	law	of	the	land’,8	to	law	in	a	form	that	is	also	not	law.	Like	the	museum’s	drum,	the	law	in	this	form	might	‘disseminate	information’	but	it	does	not	talk.	Set	down	on	the	threshold	of	curated	expression	and	the	normativity	of	everyday	life,	it	lacks	the	connection	that	would	ground	it	and	make	it	law;	and	yet	it	is	the	law	of	the	nation.		
																																																						6	Conversation	with	author,	Monrovia,	Liberia,	28	March	2013.	7	Conversation	with	author,	Zorzor,	Liberia,	2	August	2013.	8	This	is	how	Liberians	often	refer	to	the	national	law	of	Liberia	today,	as	the	‘organic	law	of	the	land’.	
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229B	 Talking	back	
	There	 is	 a	 Kafkaesque	 quality	 to	 the	 response	 of	 the	man	 in	 the	 teashop	 to	my	enquiry	about	the	rule	of	law,	although	Franz	Kafka	would	not	have	been	the	first	to	reflect	on	how	‘it	is	an	extremely	painful	thing	to	be	ruled	by	laws	that	one	does	not	know’.9	By	‘not	knowing’	Kafka	was	clear	that	he	did	not	mean	a	simple	lack	of	information	about	 the	 laws,10	as	 if	disseminating	 information	would	be	sufficient	to	overcome	 the	problem.	What	 is	 so	painful	about	being	 ruled	by	 laws	 that	one	does	 not	 know	 is	 the	 pain	 of	 not	 knowing	 ‘the	 very	 existence	 of	 these	 laws’.11	Existing	 entirely	 otherwise,	 no	more	 than	 a	 secret	 code,	 the	 essence	 of	which	 is	pure	mystery—to	be	ruled	by	such	laws	is	the	very	definition	of	arbitrariness:	it	is	‘whatever	the	nobles	do’.12	It	is	to	be	ruled	in	a	way	that	denies	you	the	possibility	of	talking	back,	because	the	law	does	not	talk	to	you.	Left	speechless,	one	option	is	to	laugh	at	the	absurdity;	another	is	to,	as	Kafka	put	it,	‘repudiate	the	nobility’	in	a	more	forceful	manner.13		The	First	Republic	of	Liberia	was	brought	to	a	bloody	end	in	1980.	Led	by	Master-Sergeant	Samuel	Doe,	a	25	year	old	African-Liberian	man,	 the	coup	d’état	was	the	culmination	of	a	revolution	that	had	been	building	since	the	1960s	against	the	 oligarchic	 Americo-Liberian	 regime	 that	 had	 ruled	 Liberia	 since	 1847.	 The	revolution’s	driving	force	was	the	pain	experienced	by	the	vast	majority	of	African-Liberians,	whose	ancestors	had	known	the	 lands	of	Liberia	 long	before	 it	was	an	idea,	and	who	were	reduced	to	a	state	of	abjection—of	civil	death—as	the	idea	was	consolidated	 into	 a	 nation-state.14	 For	 African-Liberians,	 the	 pain	 that	 drove	 the	revolution	 and	 ultimately	 manifested	 in	 the	 bloody	 overthrow	 of	 the	 Americo-Liberian	regime,	precipitating	the	civil	wars	that	engulfed	Liberia	in	the	1990s	and	early	 2000s,	was	 the	pain	 of	 being	 left	 speechless	 by	 the	 law	of	 this	 regime,	 the	
																																																						9	Franz	Kafka,	‘The	Problem	of	Our	Laws’,	in	The	Collected	Short	Stories	of	Franz	Kafka	(London:	Penguin,	1988),	437-438.	10	Ibid.	11	Ibid.	12	Ibid.	13	Ibid.	14	The	Liberian	Truth	and	Reconciliation	Commission	also	highlighted	the	connection	between	the	unjust	rule	of	the	Americo-Liberian	regime	and	the	civil	conflict	in	its	final	report:	Republic	of	Liberia,	Truth	and	Reconciliation	Commission:	Consolidated	Final	Report,	vol	2	(2009),	Part	V.	
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230	existence	of	which	was	known	to	them	through	the	ways	in	which	it	was	enforced	against	them.	Kafka	 ends	 his	 parable	 on	 ‘the	 problem	 of	 our	 laws’	 not	 with	 the	repudiation	of	the	nobility,	however,	but	with	a	paradox:	‘Any	party	which	would	repudiate,	not	only	all	belief	in	the	law,	but	in	the	nobility	as	well,	would	have	the	whole	 people	 behind	 it;	 yet	 no	 such	 party	 can	 come	 into	 existence,	 for	 nobody	would	dare	 to	 repudiate	 the	nobility’.15	Kafka	 summarizes	 the	problem	 in	a	 final	line:	 ‘The	sole	visible	and	indubitable	law	that	is	 imposed	upon	us	is	the	nobility,	and	must	we	ourselves	deprive	ourselves	of	that	one	law?’16		Having	 dared	 to	 repudiate	 the	 nobility	 in	 the	 bloodiest	 fashion,	 with	 the	overthrow	of	the	Americo-Liberian	oligarchy,	Liberians	are	now	facing	a	reversal	of	 this	 paradox.	With	 the	 national	 law	 opened	 up	 to	 the	whole	 people,	 the	 ‘sole	visible	and	indubitable	law’	has	been	broken.	The	one	law	that	provided	absolute	certainty,	 in	that	 its	existence	might	be	known	at	 least	 in	 its	enforcement	against	them,	in	‘whatever	the	nobles	do’,	has	been	shattered	by	a	quarter-century	of	civil	conflict	that	has	left	the	State	of	Liberia	in	fragments.	The	question	now	is:	how	can	law	rule	in	Liberia	when	there	is	no	longer	a	sole	visible	and	indubitable	authority	to	 signify	 its	 existence?	 Existing	 entirely	 otherwise,	 the	 arbitrariness	 of	 the	national	law	is	no	longer	‘whatever	the	nobles	do’	but	whatever	Liberia’s	different	peoples	do,	in	as	much	as	they	talk	and	talk	back	in	so	many	different	ways.	For	the	Liberian	man	 in	 the	 teashop,	 the	 pain	 of	 not	 knowing	 the	 very	 existence	 of	 ‘our	laws’	is	now	the	pain	of	having	to	know	the	national	law	in	its	non-existence	as	a	wholly	given	form.	This	is	the	pain	of	having	to	know	a	law	that	exists	otherwise,	as	an	unsettled	concept	that	is	substantial	only	to	the	extent	that	it	takes	form	on	the	ground—which	is	also	the	pain	of	speech,	of	having	to	recognise	that	every	act	of	articulation	is	only	ever	substantiated	through	the	acts	of	others	talking	back.17	My	 aim	 in	 the	 next	 part	 of	 the	 chapter	 is	 to	 address	 this	 paradox,	 by	examining	 how	 the	 national	 law	 is	 taking	 form	 on	 the	 ground	 in	 Liberia,	undermined	by	a	blank	space.		
																																																						15	Kafka,	‘The	Problem	of	Our	Laws’,	437-438.	16	Ibid.	17	On	the	notion	of	talking	back	as	a	kind	of	‘call	and	answer’,	see	Desmond	Manderson,	Kangaroo	
Courts	and	the	Rule	of	Law	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2012),	Chapter	9.	
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3	 Law	on	the	ground		In	2013	a	coalition	of	civil	 society	groups	 led	by	young,	aspiring	political	 leaders	threatened	to	orchestrate	a	massive	day	of	protest	on	the	12th	of	April,	unless	the	Government	of	Liberia	met	its	list	of	demands.	Two	grievances	in	particular	were	used	 to	 rally	 the	 masses	 in	 support	 of	 the	 protest:	 the	 failure	 to	 improve	 the	economic	 situation	 for	 the	 majority	 of	 Liberians,	 despite	 ‘ten	 good	 years	 of	peace’;18	and	the	impunity	with	which	the	country’s	ruling	class	have	continued	to	enrich	themselves	through	corruption.19		The	significance	of	 the	chosen	date	 for	this	rally—‘April	12’—was	not	 lost	on	 Liberians.	 It	 was	 on	 the	 12th	 of	 April,	 1980,	 that	 the	 last	 Americo-Liberian	government	 was	 overthrown	 in	 a	 revolutionary	 coup	 that	 brought	 to	 power	Liberia’s	 first	 ‘indigenous’	 government.	More	 hauntingly,	 a	 year	 before	 the	 1980	coup,	 almost	 to	 the	 day—the	 14th	 of	 April,	 1979—the	 capital	 was	 thrown	 into	violent	chaos	as	a	similar	planned	demonstration	descended	into	deadly	riots	and	looting.	The	same	two	grievances	had	fuelled	that	protest,	which	became	known	as	the	1979	‘rice	riots’:	impoverishment	of	the	majority,	and	corruption	of	the	ruling	class.		 With	this	in	mind,	and	with	the	civil	wars	of	the	1990s	and	early	2000s	still	a	 living	 memory,	 there	 is	 little	 wonder	 that	 Monrovians	 saw	 in	 the	 proposed	demonstrations	 of	 the	 12th	 of	 	 April,	 2013,	 the	 spectre	 of	 violence	 and	 war.	 A	passionate	 counter-campaign	 by	 a	 representative	 cross-section	 of	 Liberian	 civil	society	 sought	 to	 persuade	 the	 organisers	 to	 call	 off	 the	 protest,	 for	 the	 sake	 of	peace	 and	 stability;20	 which	 they	 finally	 did,	 but	 not	 without	 allegations	 and	 a	widespread	 perception	 that	 the	 protest	 leaders	 had	 been	 ‘bought	 off’	 by	 the	Government,21	reflecting	Liberians’	profound	distrust	of	people	in	authority.		
																																																						18	A	number	of	times	during	my	fieldwork	I	heard	this	phrase	used	by	Liberians	when	critiquing	the	(in)action	of	the	government.		19	In	the	words	of	one	of	the	organisers,	the	protest	was	intended	to	give	voice	‘to	the	cries	of	thousands	of	Liberians	that	are	subjected	to	poverty	in	the	midst	of	abundant	resources	[…]	to	champion	the	cause	of	the	downtrodden	masses	for	a	better	living	condition	and	for	an	equitable	distribution	of	our	resources.’	‘The	Storm	Passes	Over	–	April	12	Demonstration	Suspended’,	The	
Analyst,	Monrovia,	9	April	2013:	http://allafrica.com/stories/201304090983.html?viewall=1.	20	Ibid.	21	‘Government	Admits	Bribing	“April	12”	Protesters’,	The	New	Dawn,	Monrovia,	18	April	2013:	http://allafrica.com/stories/201304180788.html.	
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232	 What	 made	 this	 cynical	 view	 of	 political	 leadership	 striking	 was	 its	juxtaposition	with	an	apparent	universal	belief	in	the	good	of	‘the	rule	of	law’.	All	sides	to	the	debate	framed	their	arguments	using	the	language	of	law	and	stressed	how	 their	 actions	 were	 within	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 Constitution	 of	 Liberia.	 The	Government’s	public	position	was	that	the	protest	would	be	permissible	so	long	as	the	 organisers	 followed	 ‘the	 rules	 and	 procedures	 allowing	 protests’,22	 which	 in	effect	 meant	 obtaining	 a	 permit	 from	 Government.	 With	 such	 permission,	‘Government	 would	 not	 obstruct	 its	 citizens	 from	 exercising	 their	 rights	 as	provided	by	the	Constitution	of	Liberia’.23	The	protest	leaders	refused	to	apply	for	a	 permit,	 arguing	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 constitutional	 law	 that	 they	 did	 not	 need	 one.	‘Peaceful	 assembly’—which	 is	 how	 they	 characterised	 the	 proposed	demonstration—is	 protected	 under	 the	 Constitution	 and	 therefore,	 they	 argued,	could	be	held	 lawfully	without	a	permit.	The	Government	rejected	 this	argument	and	repeated	its	demand,	eliciting	from	the	organisers	a	blunt	reply:	‘we	are	going	to	oppose	it	in	the	full	concept	of	the	rule	of	law	of	the	Republic	of	Liberia.’24		A	 The	national	law,	accepted		It	seems	clear	that	most	if	not	all	Liberians	accept	the	national	law	of	Liberia	as	the	predominant	 form	of	 law	in	 the	country	today.	What	 that	acceptance	means,	and	how	 deeply	 it	 resonates	 in	 everyday	 life,	 is	 much	 less	 clear.	 At	 least	 Liberians	appear	united	 in	a	common	acceptance	of	 the	national	 law	as	a	political	 ideal,	as	much	as	 they	accept	 the	 idea	of	Liberia	as	a	nation-state.	During	 the	 fervent	and	divisive	debate	that	played	out	on	the	radio,	in	newspapers,	and	on	the	streets	in	response	 to	 the	planned	 ‘April	12’	protest,	which	 threatened	 to	return	Liberia	 to	civil	war,	 the	single	point	of	agreement	was	 the	need	to	 ‘respect	 the	rule	of	 law’,	which	 appeared	 to	 mean	 ensuring	 the	 Constitution	 of	 Liberia	 and	 its	 law	 was	upheld	 and	 not	 threatened	 by	 the	 actions	 of	 any	 group.25	 In	 this	 situation,	 the	
																																																						22	‘Observing	the	Law	in	Protest’,	New	Democrat,	Monrovia,	1	April	2013:	http://allafrica.com/stories/201304011077.html%3fviewall=1.	23	Ibid.	24	‘Planned	Rally	Invokes	Violent	Past’,	New	Democrat,	Monrovia,	9	April	2013:	http://allafrica.com/stories/201304091169.html%3fviewall=1.	25	For	example,	see	newspaper	articles	in	the	previous	footnotes.	
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233common	 acceptance	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 appeared	 to	 reflect	 a	 commitment	 to	 the	idea	of	Liberia	itself.		In	line	with	this	idealistic	commitment,	however,	to	some	extent	acceptance	of	 the	 national	 law	 also	 appears	 to	 reflect	 resignation	 to	 what	 is	 seen	 as	 the	inevitability	of	 ‘modernity’.	Human	rights—one	of	the	core	aspects	of	the	concept	of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	promoted	by	national	 and	 international	 actors	 in	Liberia26—is	exemplary	 in	 this	regard.	When	I	asked	a	Liberian	scholar	who	researches	 in	 the	field	 of	 legal	 anthropology	 in	 the	 country	 about	 how	 Liberians	 tend	 to	 perceive	human	 rights,	 his	 response	 was	 to	 point	 out	 that	 ‘human	 rights	 are	 not	 going	anywhere’,	that	they	are	here	to	stay.27	In	other	words,	my	question—premised	on	the	 notion	 that	 human	 rights	 is	 something	 that	might	 be	 accepted	 or	 rejected—naively	missed	the	point.	According	to	him,	for	people	in	Liberia	it	is	not	a	question	of	 whether	 human	 rights	 might	 be,	 or	 ought	 to	 be,	 accepted	 or	 rejected;	 the	question	is	how	to	accept	it	as	part	of	their	future.		The	 same	 view	 was	 expressed	 to	 me	 by	 another	 Liberian	 scholar	researching	 at	 the	 community	 level	 in	 the	 field	 of	 land	 rights.	 In	 a	 conversation	about	the	shift	that	is	currently	taking	place	to	a	formalised	system	of	land	rights	under	a	proposed	national	law	that	would	require	communities	to	precisely	define	their	membership	and	the	boundaries	of	their	land,28	he	did	not	see	any	reason	to	resist	the	change.	Again,	for	him	the	question	is	not	whether	this	shift	should	take	place,	because	 it	 is	 taking	place.	The	question	 for	him	 is	how	 it	 takes	place—and	critically,	whether	those	leading	the	change	are	‘now	sincere	in	trying	to	transform	the	society	for	the	better’.29	‘To	me,	that	is	more	important	as	a	question	than	the	
																																																						26	See,	eg,	the	UN’s	definition	of	the	rule	of	law	set	out	by	the	Secretary-General	in	his	2004	report	on	‘The	Rule	of	Law	and	Transitional	Justice	in	Conflict	and	Post-Conflict	Societies’,	UN	Doc	S/2004/616	(23	August	2004),	para	6.	27	Author	interview	with	Liberian	researcher,	May	2013	(MC2).	28	See	discussion	in		Part	3	of	Chapter	4.	29	Author	interview	with	Liberian	researcher,	15	August	2013	(MN5).	The	contrast	he	appears	to	have	had	in	mind	here	is	with	the	previous	attempt	at	social	transformation,	following	the	revolution	of	1980	(although	he	did	not	say	this).	From	the	Doe	Government	to	Charles	Taylor	to	the	array	of	faction	leaders	and	financiers	living	abroad,	the	consensus	amongst	historians	and	Liberians	is	that	the	people	who	led	Liberia	into	war	were	acting	out	of	self-interest	rather	than	being	‘sincere’	in	trying	to	transform	the	society	as	a	whole	for	the	better.	See	also	William	Reno,	‘Predatory	Rebellions	and	Governance:	The	National	Patriotic	Front	of	Liberia,	1989-1992’,	in	Rebel	
Governance	in	Civil	War,	ed	Ana	Arjona,	Nelson	Kasfir,	and	Zachariah	Mampilly	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2015).	
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234	fact	 that	 the	society	will	be	 transformed	 from	what	 it	was	originally,	because	 it’s	not	like	that	anymore.	Things	have	changed.	You	can’t	go	back’.30		It	 is	 not	 just	 educated	 Liberians	 in	 Monrovia	 who	 are	 resigned	 to	 a	modernity	defined	by	 the	nation-state	and	 its	 law.	There	appears	 to	be	a	 similar	view	 amongst	 traditional	 leaders	 concerning	 changes	 to	 traditional	 practices	considered	repugnant	to	a	modern	nation,	such	as	the	use	of	magic	to	determine	violations	 of	 traditional	 law	 and	 the	 cutting	 of	 girls’	 genitals	 as	 part	 of	 their	initiation	 into	 womanhood.	 A	 female	 head	 zoe,31	 and	 ‘one	 of	 the	most	 powerful	traditional	leaders	in	Liberia’,	is	quoted	as	saying	in	response	to	a	national	push	to	abolish	the	traditional	sande	society:		We	 know	 the	 country	 has	 changed.	 We	 are	 in	 modern	 days.	 So	 we	 are	changing	 the	system	small	 small	until	we	reach	 to	 the	end.	But	 it	 can’t	be	the	way	they	want	it	to	happen,	as	quickly	as	they	want	it	to	happen.	We’re	not	ready	for	people	to	say,	‘No	more	Sande’.32	
																																																						30	Ibid.	31	Also	spelt	‘zo’.	The	term,	as	noted	in	the	Historical	Dictionary	of	Liberia,	is	‘used	in	Central	and	Western	Liberia	to	refer	to	an	individual,	male	or	female,	who	is	a	respected	elder.	Often	these	individuals	are	considered	to	have	medicial	and	spiritual	powers,	as	well.’	D	Elwood	Dunn	and	Svend	E	Holsoe,	Historical	Dictionary	of	Liberia	(Metuchen:	Scarecrow	Press,	1985),	192.	32	‘Female	Circumcision	Temporarily	Stopped	in	Liberia’,	PRI’s	The	World,	29	March	2012:	http://www.pri.org/stories/2012-03-29/female-circumcision-temporarily-stopped-liberia.	The	terms	sande	and	poro	refer	to	institutions	of	‘traditional	society’	of	peoples	in	central	and	western	Liberia.	See,	eg,	the	entry	for	‘sande’	in	ibid,	153.	A	female	sodality	found	among	various	peoples	located	in	central	and	western	Liberia.	[…]	The	main	function	of	the	Sande	is	to	serve	as	an	enculturative	institution	and	to	make	the	transition	of	girls	to	women.	The	Sande	sessions	in	the	past	have	lasted	for	three	years.	Among	some	groups,	particularly	the	Vai,	Gola	and	Mende,	the	main	spirit	of	the	society	is	represented	by	a	helmet-masked	figure	which	makes	its	appearance	at	important	social	events,	such	as	the	death	of	a	prominent	female.	The	male	counterpart	of	this	institution	is	the	Poro.	See	also	the	entry	for	‘poro’	in	ibid,	140.	A	male	sodality	found	among	several	groups	in	central	and	western	Liberia	[…]	The	society	serves	two	primary	functions.	It	is	the	main	institution	to	enculturate	young	males	and	to	formally	carry	them	through	the	rite	of	passage	from	child	to	adult.	In	addition,	the	elders	of	the	Poro	serve	as	the	intermediaries	between	the	ancestors	and	the	living,	and	thus	act	as	the	ultimate	arbitors	of	asocial	actions	which	affect	the	society.	The	female	counterpart	of	this	organization	is	the	Sande	society.	See	also	Warren	L	d’Azevedo,	‘Gola	Poro	and	Sande:	Primal	Tasks	in	Social	Custodianship’,	
Ethnologische	Zeitschrift	Zürich,	vol	1	(1980);	Kjell	Zetterström,	‘Poro	of	the	Yamein	Mano,	Liberia’,	
Ethnologische	Zeitschrift	Zürich,	vol	1	(1980);	William	C	Siegmann,	‘Spirit	Manifestation	and	the	Poro	Society’,	Ethnologische	Zeitschrift	Zürich,	vol	1	(1980);	Svend	E	Holsoe,	‘Notes	on	the	Vai	Sande	Society	in	Liberia’,	Ethnologische	Zeitschrift	Zürich,	vol	1	(1980);	Marie	Jeanne	Adams,	‘Afterword:	Spheres	of	Men's	and	Women's	Creativity’,	Ethnologische	Zeitschrift	Zürich,	vol	1	(1980);	George	W	Harley,	Notes	on	the	Poro	in	Liberia	(New	York:	Kraus	Reprint	Corporation,	1968	[1941]).	
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235Liberians	might	be	resigned	to	the	idea	of	the	national	law	under	the	Constitution	as	 an	 abstract	 reality,	 but	 as	 this	 comment	 shows,	 they	 are	 also	 contesting	 its	implications.	Far	from	accepting	the	changes	as	given,	they	are	deeply	engaged	in	how	this	new	Liberia	takes	form.	In	making	the	question	of	change	a	matter	of	how	change	 takes	 place,	 rather	 than	 whether	 it	 takes	 place	 at	 all,	 Liberians	 are	including	 their	 resistance	 within	 the	 process	 of	 transformation.	 ‘Resignation’	 as	such	 is	 not	 the	 same	as	passive	 acceptance	of	 or	 absolute	 submission	 to	 a	 given	state.	From	this	perspective,	‘to	resign’	has	a	much	more	dynamic	meaning	than	its	popular	definition	suggests	(‘to	give	up’	or	 ‘to	yield’	 to	 the	will	of	another,33	as	 if	there	 is	 ever	 an	 instance	of	 simply	being	 acted	upon).	 From	 this	 perspective,	 ‘to	resign’	is	to	accept	the	given	situation,	but	it	is	also	to	‘sign	again’,	which	is	to	reject	what	is	given	as	something	that	signifies	itself.	Thus	it	is	to	accept	the	nation-state	and	the	rule	of	 its	 law	as	a	modern	reality	and	 to	have	a	hand	 in	signifying	what	that	means	in	terms	of	the	normativity	of	everyday	life.	Resignation	to	the	national	law	of	Liberia,	in	other	words,	can	be	seen	as	no	less	than	an	act	of	writing	the	land	of	Liberia	into	its	given	constitution.	The	vast	majority	of	Liberians	appear	to	accept	the	national	law	as	such	for	this	 reason:	 precisely	 because	 it	 represents	 an	 abstract	 expression	 of	 how	 they	ought	to	be,	as	an	idea,	as	a	gesture,	as	a	future	state.	At	this	moment	in	history—a	moment	 when	 Liberia	 is	 beginning	 again	 as	 a	 nation	 post-war—the	 rule	 of	 law	appears	 to	 represent	 a	 possibility	 of	 being	 together	 under	 the	 Constitution	 of	Liberia.	Whether	 for	a	Liberian	on	the	street,	a	stakeholder	 in	the	political	status	quo,	or	a	 traditional	 leader,	 the	national	 law	 is	acceptable	because	 it	 is	seen	as	a	process	of	becoming,	a	change	that	is	taking	place,	rather	than	an	immediate	order	of	 things.	 Without	 doubt	 some	 Liberians	 accept	 the	 national	 law	 in	 a	 more	grounded	way,	as	a	form	of	law	that	already	more	or	less	reflects	and	informs	the	normativity	of	everyday	life.	However,	for	the	vast	majority,	the	opposite	appears	to	be	the	case:	the	national	law	is	acceptable	for	the	very	reason	that	it	is	still	not	
yet	 law.	 The	 blank	 space	 that	 was	 written	 into	 the	 Constitution	 in	 1820	 by	 the	American	 Colonization	 Society,	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 it	 was	 an	 unsettled	 law,	 still	underlies	the	Constitution	of	Liberia;	and	so	it	is	as	an	idea	with	no	grounding,	with	no	settled	content	to	speak	of,	that	the	national	law	is	acceptable	today.		
																																																						33	‘Resign,	v.1’,	OED	Online,	December	2015.	
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236	 Acceptance	as	such—as	a	commitment	to	an	idea	of	how	things	ought	to	be,	without	conforming	to	how	that	idea	ought	to	take	form	in	practice	(according	to	the	conceptual	schema	of	those	who	are	promoting	it	as	given)—is	transgressive.	It	 is	 to	undermine	what	 is	given;	 to	accept	and	 to	reject	 it	at	 the	same	time.	And	indeed	 for	 many	 Liberians,	 especially	 those	 who	 stand	 to	 lose	 power	 as	 the	national	 law	 is	 strengthened,	 that	 is	 no	 doubt	 the	 point.	 For	 many	 traditional	leaders,	chiefs	and	government	officials	more	generally,	acceptance	of	the	national	law	 is	 little	 more	 than	 a	 political	 gesture,	 necessary	 to	 satisfy	 a	 system	 of	patronage	 that	 is	 structured	 according	 to	 the	model	 of	 the	modern	 nation-state	and	 the	 rule	 of	 its	 law.34	 Certainly	 whenever	 I	 spoke	 with	 legal	 authorities	 in	Liberia,	 whether	 ‘traditional’,	 ‘customary’,	 or	 ‘statutory’,	 they	 were	 careful	 to	repeat	 to	 me	 the	 official	 government	 position	 about	 the	 rule	 of	 law:	 chiefs	 are	administrative	 and	 not	 judicial	 actors,	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 doctrine	 of	 the	separation	of	powers;	all	criminal	matters	are	to	be	dealt	with	by	the	national	legal	system;	 rape	 and	 other	 instances	 of	 ‘sexual	 and	 gender	 based	 violence’	must	 be	apprehended	as	criminal	conduct	and	not	treated	as	‘family	matters’;	communities	are	permitted	to	articulate	their	own	laws	as	long	as	they	are	consistent	with	the	national	law,	as	set	out	in	the	Constitution	of	the	Republic;	and	so	on.		These	 messages	 were	 repeated	 to	 me	 precisely	 and	 formulaically	 in	interviews,	which	 is	not	surprising	as	 they	were	 the	current	 focus	of	workshops,	training	sessions	and	civic	education	campaigns	being	run	by	the	government	and	international	and	national	organisations	to	disseminate	information	about	the	law.	The	 messages	 were	 also	 widely	 contradicted	 in	 practice,	 however,	 leaving	 the	distinct	 impression	 that	 the	 acceptance	 exhibited	 by	 these	 legal	 authorities	was	little	 more	 than	 a	 line	 expressed	 for	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 Western	 donors,	 the	Government	of	Liberia,	the	UN	Mission,	and	a	researcher	who	might	as	well	be	an	informant	for	those	authorities.		B	 The	national	law,	subverted		On	the	periphery	of	 the	administrative	square	of	a	small	 town	in	Liberia’s	north-western	foothills,	on	a	slope	leading	down	to	a	residential	quarter,	its	zinc-paneled	
																																																						34	On	the	patronage	system	in	Liberia,	see	Amos	Sawyer,	The	Emergence	of	Autocracy	in	Liberia:	
Tragedy	and	Challenge	(San	Francisco:	Institute	for	Contemporary	Studies	Press,	1992).		
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237roof	 and	 flagpole	only	 just	 visible	 from	 the	other	 administrative	buildings,	 I	 find	the	Chief’s	Office.	The	Office	is	similar	in	layout	to	the	Magisterial	Court	located	on	the	opposite	 side	of	 the	administrative	 square,	 except	 that	 the	main	 room	of	 the	Chief’s	Office—its	hearing	room—is	enclosed	only	by	lattice	with	wide	gaps	in	the	woodwork	opening	it	to	the	outside.	Rows	of	wooden-plank	benches	in	the	middle	of	the	hearing	room	lead	up	to	where	the	chief	and	clerks	sit	under	a	Liberian	flag	pinned	high	on	the	wall.	Columns	of	manila	folders	containing	the	Office’s	files	are	arranged	on	 the	only	 table	 in	 the	room.	Each	column	of	 folders	contains	 files	 for	the	 different	 areas	 of	 Office	work,	 including	 a	 column	 of	 four	 folders	 containing	Case	Documents.	The	arrangement	of	these	files,	elevated	on	the	desk	next	to	the	chief’s	chair,	 is	striking	 in	a	room	with	 few	other	objects,	with	the	exception	of	a	large	United	States	Agency	for	International	Development	poster	on	the	wall	below	the	flag	illustrating	the	concept	of	‘Alternative	Dispute	Resolution’.	I	am	meeting	with	the	Chiefdom	Clerk	to	learn	about	the	role	of	the	Chief’s	Office.	In	the	middle	of	describing	the	difference	between	the	Chief’s	Office	and	the	Magisterial	Court—how	the	 latter	 ‘deals	directly	with	 the	Constitution’	while	 the	function	 of	 the	 Chief’s	 Office	 is	 to	 ‘bring	 people	 together’	 and	 is	 not	 about	 ‘the	law’35—a	small	group	of	women	enter.	I	ask	the	clerk	if	the	women,	who	are	sitting	behind	us,	 are	waiting	 to	 speak	with	him.	They	are,	 and	 I	 offer	 to	 sit	 to	 the	 side	while	he	hears	from	them.	Two	young	women	come	forward	and	sit	at	the	bench	before	the	clerk.	One	of	them	explains	that	she	has	come	to	see	the	chief	because	her	ex-husband	 is	no	 longer	abiding	by	their	divorce	settlement.	The	woman	has	made	a	complaint	 to	another	official,	but	 the	official	 said	 there	 is	nothing	he	can	do:	he	does	not	have	the	power	to	enforce	the	settlement.	And	so	she	has	come	to	the	 Chief’s	 Office.	 The	 chiefdom	 clerk	 then	 addresses	 the	 women.	 They	 should	come	back	the	next	day	with	the	other	party	and	‘all	the	papers’	so	the	chief	will	be	able	to	assess	the	complaint.	The	Office	has	a	record	of	the	divorce	on	file	setting	out	the	settlement,	he	says,	as	evidence	of	the	agreement.	He	appears	to	say	this	in	order	 to	 assure	 the	 woman	 that	 enforcement	 will	 not	 be	 a	 problem.	 The	 two	women	thank	the	clerk	and	promise	to	come	back	the	next	day.	After	 meeting	 with	 the	 chiefdom	 clerk,	 I	 walk	 over	 to	 meet	 with	 a	magistrate	 on	 the	 opposite	 side	 of	 the	 administrative	 square.	 The	 entry	 to	 the	magistrate’s	 office	 is	 inside	 the	 small	 concrete-block	 building	 that	 houses	 the	
																																																						35	Author	interview	with	Paramount	Chiefdom	Clerk,	4	September	2013	(Li19).	
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238	Magisterial	 Court,	 through	 the	 courtroom,	 past	 the	 bailiff	 and	 clerk,	 the	 rows	 of	wooden	benches	 leading	up	 to	 the	bar,	under	 the	Liberian	 flag	 spread	above	 the	magistrate’s	 court-room	 desk	 and	 the	 door	 behind	 it,	 which	 is	 the	 door	 to	 the	magistrate’s	 office.	 Sitting	 in	 the	 enclosure	 of	 this	 small	 room	 the	 magistrate	explains	 to	 me,	 in	 answer	 to	 a	 question	 about	 the	 kinds	 of	 matters	 that	 come	before	the	Court,	how	the	Magisterial	Court	has	trial	jurisdiction	for	minor	criminal	matters	 and	 that	 any	 case	 exceeding	 its	 jurisdiction	 is	 referred	 to	 the	 superior	court	 located	 in	 the	 County	 capital.	 Having	 said	 this,	 he	 then	 explains	 how	 he	usually	seeks	a	compromise	between	parties	out	of	court.	To	be	clear,	 I	ask	 if	he	conducts	these	out-of-court	proceedings	 in	criminal	matters.	He	says	he	does.	He	then	adds	that	he	is	well	respected	in	town	as	a	community	leader	and	people	trust	him	to	help	resolve	their	disputes.	At	the	time	of	our	meeting	a	young	man	and	an	older	woman	are	also	sitting	 in	 the	magistrate’s	office.	To	 illustrate	his	point	 the	magistrate	 introduces	 them	 to	me	 and	 explains	 that	 they	 are	 there	 to	 reach	 an	understanding	so	they	can	return	to	the	community.	The	young	man	is	said	to	have	assaulted	the	older	woman,	a	neighbour	in	town.36			 ∞		One	of	the	most	 important	rule-of-law	messages	being	promoted	during	the	time	of	my	fieldwork	in	2013	was	that	chiefs,	who	are	officers	of	the	Ministry	of	Internal	Affairs,	 and	 therefore	 part	 of	 the	 executive	 branch	 of	 government,	 perform	 an	administrative	 and	 not	 a	 judicial	 function,	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 doctrine	 of	separation	of	powers.37	As	the	chiefdom	clerk	in	that	small	town	in	the	foothills	of	Liberia’s	 north-west	 said	 to	me,	 in	 describing	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 Chief’s	Office	 and	 the	Magisterial	 Court,	 the	 latter	 ‘deals	 directly	with	 the	 Constitution’,	whereas	the	function	of	the	Chief’s	Office	is	to	‘bring	people	together’	and	is	not,	he	was	careful	to	emphasise,	about	‘the	law’.		My	point	 in	describing	 the	scene	 in	 the	Chief’s	Office	 is	not	 to	suggest	 the	officials	are	wrong	when	they	say—as	they	repeatedly	did	to	me—that	what	chiefs	do	 is	 ‘not	 law’.	From	one	perspective,	 the	official	perspective,	 it	 is	no	doubt	 true	
																																																						36	Author	interview	with	Magistrate,	4	September	2013	(Li22).	37	For	a	summary	of	rule-of-law	reform	initiatives	in	Liberia,	including	the	need	for	separation	of	powers,	see	Amanda	C	Rawls,	‘Policy	Proposals	for	Justice	Reform	in	Liberia:	Opportunities	under	the	Current	Legal	Framework	to	Expand	Access	to	Justice’,	Traditional	Justice:	Practitioner’s	
Perspectives	(IDLO	Working	Paper	Series,	2011).	
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239that	 what	 they	 are	 doing	 is	 not	 law.	 In	 hearing	 and	 resolving	 disputes	 in	 their	Offices,	 chiefs	 are	 conducting	 ‘Alternative	 Dispute	 Resolution’,	 they	 are	 dealing	with	 ‘customary	 matters’,	 they	 are	 doing	 ‘peace-building’,	 and	 they	 are	 not	performing	 a	 judicial	 function	 properly	 so	 called.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 certainly	appears	 to	 be	 law,	 albeit	 in	 a	 confused	 form,	 combining	 different	 sources	 of	authority	in	a	way	that	leaves	its	conceptual	definition	open	as	to	whether	it	is	‘the	law’	or	otherwise.	One	 of	 the	 other	 important	 rule-of-law	 messages	 being	 promoted	 at	 the	time	was	that	all	criminal	matters	are	to	be	dealt	with	through	the	national	 legal	system,	 and	 not	 ‘informally’	 by	 community	 leaders.	 This	 message	 was	 being	promoted	 in	response	to	the	 fact	 that	 the	vast	majority	of	criminal	matters—like	almost	 all	 civil	 matters—are	 still	 dealt	 with	 at	 the	 community	 level.38	 This	 is	especially	 the	 case	 in	 north-west	 Liberia,	 where	 traditional	 leaders	 are	 still	powerful	 legal	 authorities,	 as	well	 as	 in	 the	 south-east,	where	 traditional	 society	remains	 strong.39	 In	 the	 Mandingo	 district	 of	 Quardugboni	 in	 Lofa	 County,	 for	instance,	only	one	matter—a	murder	case—had	come	to	 the	superior	court	 from	Quardugboni	 in	 the	 past	 six	 or	 so	 years,	 according	 to	 an	 officer	 of	 the	 superior	court	in	Voinjama,	the	capital	of	Lofa	County.	The	reason,	he	thought,	was	‘because	of	 their	 beliefs’,	 meaning	 they	 dealt	 with	 offensive	 conduct	 by	 community	members	under	Islamic	law.		This	may	undermine	the	national	law,	which	is	supposed	to	have	exclusive	jurisdiction	 over	 criminal	 matters,	 but	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 local	 legal	authorities	are	continuing	to	enforce	their	own	laws	rather	than	refer	violations	to	the	national	 legal	system.	This	reflects	 the	separation	between	national	and	 local	law	 that	has	marked	 the	 legal	 landscape	 in	Liberia	since	 the	 first	encounter.	The	situation	 becomes	more	 interesting,	 however,	 when	 one	 considers	 how	 officials	within	 the	 national	 legal	 system	 are	 also	 contradicting	 the	 official	 refrain	 that	criminal	matters	are	 to	be	 referred	 to	 the	police	and	dealt	with	by	 the	 judiciary.	That	is,	not	only	are	traditional	 leaders	and	chiefs	subverting	the	official	 line,	but	so	 too	 are	 members	 of	 the	 Liberian	 judiciary	 and	 police.	 This	 is	 all	 the	 more	
																																																						38	See,	eg,	Deborah	H	Isser,	Stephen	C	Lubkemann,	and	Saah	N'Tow,	Looking	for	Justice:	Liberian	
Experiences	with	and	Perceptions	of	Local	Justice	Options	(Washington:	USIP	Peaceworks,	2009).		39	According	to	a	prominent	legal	aid	worker	with	a	long	history	working	in	communities	in	the	south-east	of	Liberia,	traditional	leaders	are	still	the	predominant	legal	authorities	in	all	community-level	disputes,	including	criminal	matters:	author	interview	with	civil	society	actor,	26	September	2013	(Li35).		
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240	remarkable,	and	perplexing,	because	it	is	here—the	point	at	which	the	national	law	is	enlivened	by	its	own	authorities	on	the	ground—that	the	line	separating	what	is	‘the	 law’	 and	 what	 is	 ‘not	 law’	 again	 dissolves.	 The	 result	 is	 an	 understandable	confusion:	the	national	law,	in	a	form	that	both	reflects	and	informs	local	law;	the	national	law,	in	a	form	that	is	also	not	the	national	law	and	a	local	law.				Thus	 national	 legal	 officials,	 such	 as	 the	 magistrate	 in	 the	 small	 town	 in	Liberia’s	north-western	foothills,	are	dealing	with	criminal	matters	unofficially,	in	ways	 that	might	 be	 said	 to	 pervert	 the	 course	 of	 justice	 by	 violating	 rule-of-law	principles	 such	 as	 due	 process.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 unofficial	 treatment	 of	criminal	matters	is	taking	place	under	the	authority	of	the	national	law.	Just	as	the	columns	of	manila	folders	containing	Case	Documents	could	be	seen	to	represent	and	 thereby	 enhance	 the	 legal	 authority	 of	 the	 Chief’s	 Office	 (despite	 not	 being,	officially,	 an	 office	 of	 law),	 the	 symbolism	 of	 being	 a	 Court	 officer	 no	 doubt	enhances	the	authority	of	the	magistrate	as	a	respected	community	leader.	Just	as	what	was	 taking	 place	 in	 the	 Chief’s	 court	 under	 the	 sign	 of	 Alternative	Dispute	Resolution	 was	 ‘not	 law’,	 and	 yet	 a	 form	 of	 law,	 what	 was	 taking	 place	 in	 the	magistrate’s	office	under	the	sign	of	the	Court	was	also	not	law,	not	officially,	and	yet	surely	a	form	of	law	for	those	whose	disputes	were	dealt	with	in	his	office.40	Resolving	 disputes	 in	 the	 shadow	 of	 a	 courthouse,	 with	 and	 without	 the	intervention	 of	 a	 judge	 who	 might	 order	 a	 first	 round	 of	 alternative	 dispute	resolution,	 is	 not	 necessarily	 perverse.	 Nor	 is	 an	 out-of-court	 deal	 between	 the	prosecution	 and	 an	 accused	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	 avoiding	 trial.	 However,	something	else	was	taking	place	here:	it	was	clear	that	the	magistrate	was	acting	as	a	mediator	to	resolve	disputes,	civil	and	criminal,	through	a	process	that	was	not	the	 official	 one	 but	 that	 nonetheless	 derived	 its	 authority,	 like	 the	 magistrate’s	reputation	 in	 town,	 from	 the	 national	 legal	 system.	 On	 one	 hand,	 the	 criminal	matters	 that	are	 referred	 to	 the	magistrate	are	being	dealt	with	 ‘informally’,	 in	a	way	that	might	be	said	to	pervert	the	course	of	justice	by	negating	the	principles	of	due	process,	 the	 rights	 of	 the	defendant,	 and	 the	duty	of	 the	 state	 to	uphold	 the	rights	of	the	victim.	On	the	other	hand,	the	‘informal’	out-of-court	proceedings	are	taking	 place	 with	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 national	 law.	 These	 matters	 must	 cross	
																																																						40	See	also	Harry	Arthurs,	‘Without	the	Law’:	Administrative	Justice	and	Legal	Pluralism	in	
Nineteenth-Century	England	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1985);	Robert	Mnookin	and	Lewis	Kornhauser,	‘Bargaining	in	the	Shadow	of	the	Law:	the	Case	of	Divorce’,	Yale	Law	Journal,	vol	88,	no	5	(1979).	
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241through	the	court	to	be	resolved	by	the	magistrate,	and	yet	they	are	resolved	based	on	an	approach	that	prioritises	‘peace’	in	the	community	over	‘the	law’	under	the	Constitution.		This	 magistrate	 was	 not	 alone	 in	 taking	 this	 approach.	 When	 discussing	with	 two	 other	 magistrates	 in	 another	 district	 about	 the	 referral	 of	 criminal	matters	 to	 the	 courts,	 they	 repeated	 the	 line	 to	me	 that	 ‘all	 criminal	matters	 are	heard	by	the	judiciary’,	before	pointing	out	that	some	of	these	matters	nonetheless	‘must	be	resolved	at	 the	community	 level’	because	 ‘law	doesn’t	necessarily	mean	peace’.41	Of	six	magistrates	I	spoke	with	in	four	Counties	across	the	country,	 four	emphasised	this	difference	between	 ‘law’	and	 ‘peace’	and	expressed	a	preference	for	 taking	 the	 ‘restorative’	 or	 ‘peacebuilding’	 approach,	 whilst	 the	 other	 two	commented	 on	 the	 value	 of	 out-of-court	 ‘mediation’	without	 comparing	 it	 to	 the	court	 process.	 The	 same	 view	 was	 shared	 by	 a	 prominent	 para-legal	 service	provider	whose	profession	is	to	promote	the	national	law	in	communities	through	the	provision	of	 legal	 aid	 and	education.	Despite	his	 obvious	 commitment	 to	 the	national	 law,	 he	 still	 held	 the	 view	 that	 only	 ‘serious’	 matters	 that	 cannot	 be	handled	 by	 community	 leaders	 should	 be	 dealt	 with	 through	 the	 national	 legal	system,	such	as	violent	crimes,	otherwise	disputes	should	be	handled	‘informally’,	in	a	way	that	 ‘brings	the	parties	together’.	Taking	these	matters	to	court,	he	said,	‘only	causes	bitterness	in	the	community’.42	Subversion	 of	 the	 national	 law	 is	 not	 only	 taking	 place	 in	 the	 process	 of	resolving	disputes,	but	also	prior	to	that	in	the	criminal	justice	system,	at	the	point	of	police	apprehension.	A	Human	Rights	Officer	from	UNMIL	told	me	about	a	case	that	had	perplexed	their	Field	Office.43	The	case	involved	a	police	investigation	into	conduct	 relating	 to	 ‘female	 genital	 mutilation’.	 Whilst	 the	 ritual-cutting	 of	 girls’	genitals	was	 not	 a	 crime	 under	 the	 Criminal	 Code	 of	 Liberia,	 it	was	 alleged	 that	crimes	 had	 been	 committed	 in	 connection	 with	 this	 particular	 instance.	 The	Liberian	National	Police,	initially	reluctant	to	investigate,	eventually	carried	out	an	investigation	 under	 the	 supervision	 of	 UN	 Police	 and	 UNMIL	 Human	 Rights	monitors.	The	matter	was	 referred	 to	 the	County	Attorney	 (as	prosecutor)	along	with	 a	 brief	 of	 evidence,	 however	 the	 case	 failed	 to	 progress	 through	 the	 court	
																																																						41	Author	interview	with	Magistrates,	12	September	2013	(Li7	and	Li8).	42	Author	interview	with	Li35.	43	Author	interview	with	UN	officer,	21	June	2013	(NY8).		
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242	system,	and	was	eventually	dropped.	According	to	the	Human	Rights	Officer,	it	was	clear	that	there	was	an	unwillingness	to	prosecute	these	particular	crimes.	Despite	being	 listed	 as	 offences	 in	 the	 Liberian	 Criminal	 Code,	 there	was	 apparently	 ‘no	shared	 understanding’	 about	 the	 imperative	 to	 prosecute.	 Curious	 to	 hear	more	about	 this,	 I	 asked	 whether	 the	 Human	 Rights	 Officer	 thought	 this	 reflected	different	 understandings	 of	what	 is	 ‘the	 law’.	 The	Officer	 responded	 by	 pointing	out	 that	 the	 crux	 of	 the	 problem	 in	 this	 case	 was	 probably	 the	 fact	 that	 the	prosecution	and	judicial	officers	did	not	see	the	crimes	as	‘crimes’.		On	the	assumption	that	the	case	had	failed	because	the	police	and	judiciary	were	 operating	 incoherently,	 the	 UNMIL	 Human	 Rights	 Field	 Office	 held	 a	workshop	 that	 aimed	 to	 bring	 together	 the	 local	 Liberian	 police	 and	 judicial	officers	 to	 enhance	 their	 professional	 and	 institutional	 coordination	 and	cooperation.	The	outcomes	of	the	workshop	included:	(1)	proposed	reforms	to	the	standard	operating	procedures	 for	dealing	with	 the	 transition	 from	 investigation	to	prosecution	 in	general,	 and	 in	particular	 for	dealing	with	 sexual	offences;	 and	(2)	the	proposed	creation	of	a	liaison	mechanism	to	coordinate	and	strengthen	the	relationship	between	the	police	and	the	judiciary.	Thus	the	response	was	to	treat	the	 different	 understandings	 of	 the	 law	 as	 an	 information	 asymmetry,	 to	 be	overcome	with	more	and	better	information	sharing.	It	may	be	 the	case	 that	 the	 failed	prosecution	was	a	matter	of	 inadequate	institutional	coordination	between	police	and	judiciary.	No	one	doubts	the	‘justice-chain	 institutions’	 in	 Liberia	 are	 dysfunctional	 and	 can	 be	 improved	with	 better	operating	procedures	and	institutional	mechanisms.44	Even	so,	the	issue	here	was	fundamentally	 a	 normative	 one.	 The	 crimes	 were	 not	 prosecuted	 because	 they	were	 also	not	 crimes,	 which	 is	what	 the	 Human	 Rights	 Officer	 pointed	 out,	 and	what	UNMIL	appeared	to	recognise	as	the	problem.	From	what	the	Human	Rights	Officer	 told	me,	 and	what	 I	was	 told	 by	 other	UN	officers	 about	 the	way	 the	UN	Police	and	Liberian	National	Police	co-operate,	it	seems	that	the	matter	in	this	case	was	only	 investigated	and	referred	to	the	County	Attorney	for	prosecution	 in	the	first	place	because	of	 the	 intervention	by	the	UN,	both	through	the	co-location	of	UN	police	with	Liberian	police	and	the	watchful	gaze	of	a	UN	Human	Rights	Officer.	Thus	 the	 critical	 problem	 was	 not	 a	 lack	 of	 institutional	 coordination	 or	shared	understanding	between	Liberian	National	Police	and	the	Judiciary.	Indeed	
																																																						44	See,	eg,	Isser,	Lubkemann,	and	N'Tow,	Looking	for	Justice.	
talking	drums,	talking	back	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 									
	
	
243the	 opposite	 is	 much	 more	 likely,	 with	 the	 Liberian	 police	 and	 judicial	 officers	sharing	the	understanding	that,	as	a	matter	of	local	law,	the	case	had	no	grounds.	The	practice	of	cutting	girls’	genitals	is	part	of	an	initiation	rite	into	sande	society	in	many	parts	of	Liberia,	 and	as	 such	 it	 comes	under	 the	authority	of	 the	 female	
zoes.	Any	conduct	carried	out	in	the	course	of	sande	business	would	likewise	come	under	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 zoes.	 Subjects	 and	 authorities	 of	 this	 local	 law—including	 members	 of	 the	 police	 and	 judiciary—would	 have	 known	 that	 the	conduct	 in	question	was	within	the	 jurisdiction	of	 the	sande	society,	and	that	 the	question	 of	 whether	 the	 conduct	 constituted	 a	 crime	 would	 have	 been	 decided	under	 this	 law.	What	 is	more,	 given	 the	 law	of	 secrecy	 that	 regulates	 traditional	society,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 this	 information	would	 have	 been	 shared	with	 the	UN	officers,	as	uninitiated	outsiders.	The	incoherence,	in	other	words,	would	not	have	been	between	the	local	police	and	judiciary,	but	between	the	UN	officers	and	their	Liberian	counterparts.		It	became	clear	 in	 the	course	of	my	 fieldwork	 that	officers	of	 the	Liberian	National	Police	tend	not	to	intervene	in	traditional	society,	unless	a	dispute	arises	between	communities	or	threatens	the	peace	more	broadly.	This	contradicts	both	the	official	role	of	the	Liberian	police	as	officers	of	the	national	law,	as	well	as	the	refrain	that	all	criminal	matters	are	referred	to	the	national	courts.	The	police	have	this	power	as	officers	of	national	law,	and	they	do	exercise	it;	the	prisons	are	not	vacant.	 Yet,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 there	 are	 no	 grounds	 for	 the	 police	who	 are	 also	subjects	of	 the	 local	 law	 to	 investigate	 ritual	killings	and	other	 forms	of	violence	that	are	lawful	under	that	 local	 law,	even	if	there	are	grounds	to	do	so	under	the	Criminal	 Code	 of	 Liberia.	 The	 authority	 of	 the	 national	 law	 is	 still	 subject	 to	 the	authority	of	 local	 law,	with	officers	of	the	judiciary	and	executive	also	subjects	of	local	law.		C	 The	national	law,	ignored		Authorities	in	Liberia	are	not	alone	in	undermining	how	the	national	law	is	taking	form.	Its	subjects	are	also	rejecting	the	national	law,	turning	instead	to	local	forms	of	 law	 in	 the	 resolution	 of	 their	 disputes.	 In	 2009	 the	 United	 States	 Institute	 of	Peace	conducted	 the	 first	extensive	post-war	study	of	 ‘Liberian	experiences	with	
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244	and	 perceptions	 of	 local	 justice	 options’.45	 One	 of	 the	 study’s	 most	 significant	findings	was	a	clear	preference	by	Liberians	across	the	country	to	use	‘customary	dispute	resolution	processes’	rather	than	resort	to	the	‘formal’	legal	system.		The	 researchers	 identified	 a	 number	 of	 structural	 problems	 with	 the	national	legal	system	as	reasons	for	this	preference:	it	is	considered	unaffordable,	inaccessible,	 untimely;	 non-transparent,	 un-accountable,	 corrupt;	 and	 simply	ineffective	 in	 delivering	 ‘justice’.46	 Underneath	 this	 structural	 dysfunction,47	however,	the	researchers	also	identified	a	deeper	normative	problem:	the	national	law	articulates	a	fundamentally	different	approach	to	justice.		One	 of	 the	 most	 striking	 findings	 of	 our	 research	 is	 that	 most	 Liberians	would	still	be	unsatisfied	with	the	justice	meted	out	by	the	formal	system,	even	if	it	were	able	to	deliver	on	the	basics	discussed	earlier	[the	structural	problems].	 This	 is	 because	 the	 core	 principles	 of	 justice	 that	 underlie	Liberia’s	formal	system,	which	is	based	on	individual	rights,	adversarialism,	and	 punitive	 sanctions,	 differ	 considerably	 from	 those	 valued	 by	 most	Liberians.48	The	 perceived	 inappropriateness	 of	 the	 national	 legal	 system	 as	 a	 medium	 for	resolving	disputes	was	also	a	consistent	theme	in	my	conversations	with	Liberians.	The	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 well-known	 and	widely	 discussed	 in	 Liberia:	 the	 national	law,	based	on	the	Anglo-American	Common	Law	tradition	of	dispute	resolution,	is	fundamentally	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 ‘restorative’	 approach	 that	 informs	 the	 African	legal	 traditions	 in	 Liberia.49	 Unlike	 the	 national	 legal	 system,	 which	 seeks	 a	determination	 of	 individualised	 cause	 and	 remedy	 through	 an	 oppositional	 trial	process	 concerned	 only	 with	 a	 temporally	 limited	 set	 of	 facts,	 the	 African	 legal	systems	in	Liberia	tend	to	be	based	on	compromise	and	community	well-being	and	a	deep	concern	for	the	past	and	future.50		This	 is	 about	more	 than	what	Liberians	 ‘value’	 as	 ‘core	 legal	 principles’,51	however.	 It	 is	 about	 a	normative	disposition	 that	 informs	and	 reflects	how	most	
																																																						45	Ibid.	46	Ibid,	3.	47	I	address	the	problems	of	structural	dysfunction	in	the	national	legal	system	in	Chapter	7.	48	Isser,	Lubkemann,	and	N'Tow,	Looking	for	Justice,	3.	49	See	also	ibid,	69.		50	This	was	how	a	Liberian	elder	described	the	difference	to	me:	author	interview	with	civil	society	actor,	16	September	2013	(Li25).	I	consider	these	different	approaches	in	more	detail	in	Part	3	of	Chapter	7.	51	See	note	48	above.	
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245Liberians	see	the	world.	It	is	therefore	unsurprising	that	this	understanding	of	law	and	 justice	 grounds	 the	 dispute	 resolution	 processes	 that	 take	 place	 at	 the	 local	level	 in	 Liberia.	 This	 is	 certainly	 true	 of	 the	 ‘traditional’	 legal	 systems	 that	 still	function	 in	 many	 parts	 of	 the	 country,	 but	 it	 is	 also	 true	 of	 ‘modern’	 dispute	resolution	processes	being	used	by	community	‘peacebuilders’	throughout	Liberia	who	are	working	to	repair	relationships	fractured	during	the	civil	wars.52	It	is	also	true	of	 how	government	 officials,	 including	 legal	 authorities,	 understand	what	 is	‘appropriate’	 dispute	 resolution.	 This	 should	 not	 be	 surprising,	 given	 the	 deep	social	roots	of	this	approach	in	the	world-views	of	most	Liberians.		What	makes	 this	 remarkable	 is	 that	 the	 difference	 in	 approach	 underlies	one	 of	 the	 most	 perplexing	 dilemmas	 that	 rule-of-law	 promoters	 face	 in	 the	country:	the	fact	that	traditional	 leaders,	chiefs,	magistrates,	as	well	as	the	police	and	the	population	in	general,	are	not	engaging	with	the	national	law	as	they	ought	to,	 according	 to	 its	 official	 concept.	When	 they	 do	 engage	with	 the	 national	 law,	they	 do	 so	 in	 ways	 that	 undermine	 its	 conceptual	 schema.	 This	 dilemma	 is	 a	contemporary	 manifestation	 of	 the	 blank	 space	 that	 was	 written	 into	 the	Constitution	in	1820,	reflecting	the	remaining	groundlessness	of	the	national	 law	of	Liberia.	The	national	law	remains	unsettled	and	this	underlies	the	contradictory	ways	in	which	law	is	taking	form	on	the	ground.	One	critical	implication	is	that	Liberians’	repudiation	of	the	national	law	has	to	be	seen	in	light	of	its	acceptance	and	not	in	spite	of	it.	If	the	problem	is	seen	in	terms	of	the	national	law	being	rejected	in	spite	of	its	acceptance,	doubt	is	cast	on	its	acceptance.	If	the	law	is	rejected,	then	it	cannot	really	be	accepted,	as	it	appears	to	 be.	 The	 acceptance	 as	 such	must	 be	 only	 apparent	 and	 not	 actual;	 it	must	 be	empty	rhetoric,	a	political	gesture,	and	nothing	more.	On	this	equation	the	solution	that	follows	is	to	find	ways	to	make	‘the	law’	more	acceptable.	Only	then	might	the	rule	of	law	exist.	If	Liberians’	repudiation	of	the	national	law	is	seen	in	light	of	its	acceptance,	however,	rejection	is	not	equated	with	a	lack	of	acceptance	but	is	seen	as	a	form	of	acceptance.	From	this	perspective,	acceptance	as	such—as	a	rhetorical	commitment	 to	 a	 groundless	 idea,	 as	 resignation,	 as	 a	 political	 gesture—is	 not	merely	 ‘apparent’,	 without	 ‘actual’	 substance,	 but	 also	 a	 productive	 enactment.	‘The	 law’	may	not	 be	 taking	 form	 as	 expected,	 according	 to	 its	 concept,	 but	 it	 is	nonetheless	taking	form.	The	dilemma,	then—although	now	it	begins	to	look	less	
																																																						52	See	discussion	of	‘community	peacebuilders’	in	Part	3	of	Chapter	7.	
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246	like	a	dilemma	and	more	like	an	answer—is	that	acceptance	of	the	national	law	in	Liberia	is	taking	place	in	the	form	of	repudiation.		This	 is	 no	doubt	 frustrating	 for	 those	who	 are	 attempting	 to	 institute	 the	rule	of	 law	according	to	their	own	conceptual	schema.	For	them,	instituting	law’s	rule	 is	 not	 about	 supporting	 acceptance	 of	 the	 national	 law	 as	 such,	 but	fundamentally	 about	 promoting	proper	 acceptance,	 relegating	 any	 other	 form	 of	acceptance	 to	 non-acceptance	 (rejection).	 Framing	 the	 intervention	 in	 terms	 of	increasing	 rates	 of	 acceptance	 and	 decreasing	 rates	 of	 rejection	 may	 make	 the	process	seem	more	neutral,	scientific—and	therefore	more	legitimate—but	it	does	not	overcome	the	fact	that	what	is	taking	place	is	an	attempt	to	dictate	the	grounds	of	law	according	to	a	particular	imagination	of	it.		This	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 increasing	 use	 of	 ‘civic	 education’	 as	 a	 tool	 for	developing	 the	 rule	 of	 law.53	Recognising	 the	 subjectivity	 of	 law,	 interveners	 are	using	a	range	of	media,	including	workshops	and	more	general	public	awareness-raising	campaigns,	 to	 teach	people	 the	 ‘proper’	concept	of	 law.54	The	assumption	underpinning	 these	 programs	 is	 that	 the	 national	 law	 is	 not	 taking	 form	 on	 the	ground	as	it	ought	to,	because	Liberians	at	large	do	not	know	how	it	ought	to	take	form.	The	mistake,	however,	is	in	thinking	that	this	ignorance—this	not	knowing—is	 simply	 a	 matter	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 information,	 to	 be	 resolved	 through	 the	dissemination	of	more	information	about	the	concept	of	law.	This	is	fundamentally	about	Liberians	being	out-of-order	in	their	knowledge.	To	those	who	know	this	is	‘the	 law’,	 to	know	this	otherwise	becomes	a	negative	 infraction:	 it	 is	 to	not	know	‘the	law’	at	all.	But	as	a	negative	infraction,	not	knowing	is	of	course	also	a	form	of	knowing—it	 is	 just	 a	 form	of	 knowing	 that	 does	 not	 register	 positively	with	 the	given	concept.	Just	as	repudiation	is	acceptance	in	negative	form,	to	not	know	‘the	law’	is	to	know	law	otherwise.			
																																																						53	On	the	increasing	use	of	‘legal	awareness’	in	United	Nations	rule-of-law	assistance,	see	Richard	Zajac	Sannerholm	and	Frida	Wall,	‘Rule-of-Law	Assistance	in	UN	Peace	Operations:	Securitisation,	Sectorisation	and	Goal	Displacement’,	in	Strengthening	the	Rule	of	Law	through	the	United	Nations	
Security	Council,	ed	Jeremy	Matam	Farrall	and	Hilary	Charlesworth	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2016).	See	also	Richard	Zajac	Sannerholm,	et	al,	UN	Peace	Operations	and	Rule	of	Law	Assistance	in	Africa	1989-
2010:	Data,	Patterns	and	Questions	for	the	Future	(Stockholm:	Folke	Bernadotte	Academy,	2012).	54	See,	eg,	the	training	manual	developed	by	the	Carter	Center	in	Liberia,	Handbook	for	Civil	Society	
Partners	Community	Education	and	Awareness	Program	on	the	Rule	of	Law	(2008):	www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/liberia/Civil-Society-Partner-Handbook.pdf.	
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4	 The	littoral	law	of	Liberia	
	When	confronted	with	a	law	that	does	not	talk	with	you,	one	response	is	laughter;	another	is	to	take	the	law	in	its	given	form	and	ground	it	in	such	a	way	that	it	does	talk	with	you.		Communities	in	Liberia	are	doing	exactly	this	at	the	moment,	in	the	process	of	 articulating	 what	 one	 government	 official	 referred	 to	 as	 their	 own	Constitutions.55	I	was	given	a	copy	of	one	of	these	Constitutions,	entitled	the	Rules	
and	 Regulations	 Governing	 the	 Town	 of	 Killiwu	 (see	 extracts	 on	 the	 following	pages).56	The	choice	of	title	reflects	the	national	legislation	that	has	regulated	the	lives	of	Liberia’s	 ‘indigenous’	peoples	since	1905,	and	which	since	1949	has	been	referred	 to	 as	 the	 Rules	 and	 Regulations	 Governing	 the	 Hinterland.57	 More	generally,	as	a	written	text,	its	format	and	language	reflects	an	Act	of	the	Liberian	legislature	 or	 of	 an	 official	 delegated	 authority.	 Thus	 on	 the	 face	 of	 it,	 this	Constitution	 expresses	 the	 law	of	Killiwu	 in	 an	 official	 form;	 and	 yet,	 just	 as	 the	museum	official	had	to	point	through	the	door	to	the	street	in	order	to	give	a	full	account	 of	 the	 ‘communication	 drum’,	 this	 Constitution	 has	 to	 point	 through	 its	text	 to	 another	 source	 in	 order	 to	 give	 a	 full	 account	 of	 the	 law.	 Or	 to	 put	 that	another	way,	this	Constitution	too	is	defined	by	a	blank	space	that	must	be	known	otherwise.		 		 	
																																																						55	Author	interview	with	Li19.	56	‘Rules	and	Regulations	Governing	the	Town	of	Killiwu’,	Zorzor	District,	Lofa	County,	Liberia,	8	August	2013	(copy	on	file	with	author).	57	‘Revised	Rules	and	Regulations	Governing	the	Hinterland	of	Liberia’,	7	January	2001.	
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Figure	18.	Extracts	from	Rules	and	Regulations	Governing	the	Town	of	Killiwu			
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Figure	19.	Extract	from	Rules	and	Regulations	Governing	the	Town	of	Killiwu						
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250	Section	1(b)	of	the	Constitution	states:	‘All	laws	governing	our	sacred	institutions	(Poro,	 Sande,	 and	 their	 associates)	 shall	 be	 respected	 at	 all	 times	 by	 all	 persons	living	in	the	territorial	limit	of	Killiwu	Town’.	Section	2(c)	also	refers	to	the	‘moral	guidelines’	 set	 forth	 in	 the	 sacred	 institutions	 (that	 is,	 ‘violators	 of	 “section	 II	 b”	shall	pay	a	fine	in	addition	to	our	sacred	institutions	as	per	their	moral	Guideline	set	 forth’).	 And	 yet,	 apart	 from	 the	prohibition	 on	 violence	 in	 section	2(b),58	 the	Constitution	does	not	expressly	 lay	down	the	 laws	of	 the	sacred	 institutions.	Nor	can	it.	Only	those	who	are	initiated	through	the	sacred	institutions	might	know	and	speak	of	its	laws.59	To	specify	these	laws	of	Killiwu	in	this	document	would	be	to	violate	 these	 laws	 of	 Killiwu.	 And	 so	 it	 is	 by	 pointing	 to	 the	 sacred	 institutions	through	a	blank	space	that	the	Constitution	of	Killiwu	succeeds	in	articulating	law	in	an	official	form	that	nonetheless	connects	with	its	subjects	normatively.	From	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 people	 of	 Killiwu,	 this	 overcomes	 the	contradiction	in	the	national	law	under	the	Constitution	of	Liberia.	By	leaving	the	text	blank	as	to	‘the	law’,	referring	through	it	to	the	sacred	institutions	of	poro	and	
sande,	through	which	boys	and	girls	are	initiated	into	society	through	a	process	of	education,	the	Constitution	gives	form	to	both	national	and	local	law.	As	an	official	expression	of	law—signed	by	officials	of	the	Ministry	of	Internal	Affairs	and	filed	in	the	 Office	 of	 the	 Paramount	 Chief—it	 is	 also	 grounded	 in	 the	 land	 of	 the	 law,	informed	 by	 and	 reflecting	 how	 the	 people	 of	 Killiwu	 imagine	 it	 to	 be.	 Thus	 the	blank	space	of	 law,	which	opens	 ‘the	 law’	 to	contradiction	when	 it	 takes	 form	on	the	ground,	can	be	seen	to	provide	a	positive	opening	for	the	people	of	Killiwu	to	articulate	 their	 own	 law	 in	 conversation	with	 the	 national	 law.	 This	would	 be	 a	littoral	law	par	excellence.60	Resolving	the	contradiction	in	this	way,	however—by	having	it	talk	back,	by	making	 the	 national	 law	 of	 Liberia	 fundamentally	 local—does	 not	 overcome	 the	contradiction.	The	law,	inverted	under	the	Constitution	of	a	local	community,	is	at	best	 inconsistent	 with	 and	 at	 worst	 repugnant	 to	 the	 national	 law	 under	 the	
																																																						58	‘There	shall	be	no	violence	(physical	assaults,	profanity,	fighting,	or	any	form	of	violence)	instigated	or	encouraged	by	any	person	in	the	territorial	limit	of	Killiwu	Town.	Any	violator	shall	pay	the	fine	of	LD	2,500’:	section	2(b)	of	the	‘Rules	and	Regulations	Governing	the	Town	of	Killiwu’.	59	The	‘sacred	institutions’	of	poro	and	sande	(‘and	their	associates’)	are	often	referred	to	as	‘secret	societies’	for	this	reason.	See	also	note	32	above.	60	See	Manderson,	Kangaroo	Courts;	Desmond	Manderson	and	Honni	van	Rijswick,	‘Introduction	to	Littoral	Readings:	Representations	of	Land	and	Sea	in	Law,	Literature,	and	Geography’,	Law	and	
Literature,	vol	27,	no	2	(2015).	See	also	Part	2	of	Chapter	4	of	the	thesis.	
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251Constitution	 of	 the	 Republic.	 Most	 critically	 in	 this	 case,	 the	 law	 of	 the	 sacred	institutions	 covers	 subject	matter	 that	 the	 central	 government	 has	 arrogated	 to	itself,	 and	 legalises	 practices	 that	 are	 unlawful	 under	 the	 national	 law.	 This	includes	the	authority	to	take	 life.	 In	 this	 form,	 the	 law	under	the	Constitution	of	Killiwu	might	be	said	 to	undermine	 the	rule	of	 law.	 Inverting	 the	national	 law	 in	this	way	certainly	violates	the	principle	of	sub-ordination	that	informs	the	kind	of	rule	that	rule-of-law	promoters	have	in	mind.	The	charge	might	be	that	this	verges	on	a	state	in	which	there	is	no	proper	ordering	of	law,	where	local	law	contradicts	national	 law.	Such	an	 inordinate	 rule	of	 law	(the	argument	would	go)	 is	no	such	thing	at	all.		And	without	doubt,	this	does	violate	that	sole	and	indubitable	order	of	law.	But	in	the	harmony	of	voices	that	fearfully	question	whether	it	is	wise	‘to	deprive	ourselves	of	that	one	law’—of	certain	order	imposed	from	somewhere	outside	and	above—and	promote	 the	 rule	 of	 law	as	 the	 very	 thing	 that	would	 avoid	 such	 an	inordinate	state,	the	response	continues	to	resound	so	discordantly	on	the	ground:	
‘How	can	you	have	the	rule	of	law	when	we	don’t	even	know	our	own	laws?’			 ∞		My	aim	 in	 this	chapter	has	been	to	draw	out	a	contradiction	that	began	with	 the	constitutional	 act	 of	 1820,	 when	 the	 Board	 of	 Managers	 of	 the	 American	Colonization	Society	laid	down	a	law	defined	by	a	blank	space,	and	show	through	a	configuration	of	 scenes	how	 the	 simultaneous	 grounded-	 and	groundless-ness	of	this	 law	 continues	 to	 inform	 its	 life	 in	 Liberia.	 My	 argument	 is	 not	 that	 this	contradiction	undermines	the	national	law	of	Liberia	to	the	point	that	it	is	simply	
not	 law,	 negating	 in	 turn	 the	 possibility	 of	 its	 rule.	 The	 national	 law	 might	 be	subverted	by	chiefs	and	traditional	leaders,	it	might	be	perverted	by	its	own	legal	authorities,	it	might	be	ignored	by	its	subjects,	and	ultimately	flipped	on	its	head—and	yet	at	the	same	time,	and	because	of	this,	the	national	law	is	taking	form	as	law.		Repudiation	might	define	the	plurality	of	ways	in	which	the	national	law	is	accepted	 in	 Liberia	 today,	 its	 authority	 being	 undermined	 by	 its	 subjects	 and	authorities	 alike,	 but	 this	 does	 not	 negate	 the	 fact	 of	 its	 acceptance,	 nor	 does	 it	completely	 negate	 its	 authority.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 its	 adverse	 treatment	 is	 what	makes	acceptance	of	the	national	law	also	the	opposite	of	empty	rhetoric	and	what	grounds	its	authority	in	Liberia.	By	making	resistance	a	constitutive	dimension	of	
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252	acceptance,	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 national	 law	 under	 the	 Constitution	 of	 Liberia—an	otherwise	 groundless	 vision	 of	 how	 things	 ought	 to	 be—is	 taking	 form	 on	 the	ground	 in	 ways	 that	 leave	 it	 open	 to	 its	 ethical	 possibility	 as	 a	 responsive	 law.	Undermined	by	a	blank	space,	it	has	place	to	take	root.		Law	might	take	form	as	the	law	in	contradictory	ways	as	a	result,	violating	the	rule	of	law	as	conceived	by	rule-of-law	promoters,	but	such	is	its	imaginary	life	as	law.	Seen	through	the	imaginary,	the	law	on	the	ground	is	only	law	to	the	extent	that	 it	 is	 also	not	 law:	 a	 contradictory	 form	 in	which	 the	 idea	 of	 it	 is	 acceptable	because,	as	a	law	of	the	land,	it	is	defined	by	a	blank	space	that	calls	for	the	place	of	its	settlement	to	be	written	back	into	it	again	and	again.	That	is	why	for	Liberians	‘the	problem	of	our	laws’	is	not	whether	the	national	law	ought	to	be	accepted	or	repudiated,	 but	 how	 it	 might	 be	 accepted	 and	 repudiated	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 In	answer	to	Kafka’s	question—how	is	 it	possible	 for	a	people	to	repudiate	the	sole	and	 indubitable	 law	 of	 the	 nobility?—Liberians	 appear	 to	 be	 answering:	 by	accepting	it	through	and	through.	Grounding	it	as	their	own,	rather	than	rejecting	it	outright,	 the	existence	of	 the	national	 law	is	no	 longer	apparent	 in	 ‘whatever	the	nobles	do’	but	in	all	manner	of	other	ways.		
	
Figure	20.	At	sea:	the	Atlantic	Ocean	seen	through	a	war-torn	villa,	Monrovia61	
																																																						61	[image	omitted	from	digital	version]	
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253At	the	end	of	Chapter	4,	I	considered	the	Liberian	Government’s	national	vision	for	the	 country	 post-war—a	 vision	 that	 suggests	 a	 continuation,	 if	 not	 an	intensification,	of	the	institutionalisation	of	the	logic	of	capital	through	the	rule	of	law.	In	Chapter	5,	I	then	examined	the	work	that	is	being	done	to	secure	this	vision	through	a	peace	framework	and	peace-building	operation	aimed	at	establishing	a	state	based	on	a	rule	of	law	that	is	both	forceful	and	just.	The	analysis	in	Chapter	5	ended	 with	 a	 caution,	 however:	 the	 arrangement	 of	 ‘peace	 through	 justice’	 is	 a	highly	combustible	one,	making	the	force	of	 law’s	rule	 just,	but	its	 justice	violent.	This	 is	a	delicate	balance	at	 the	best	of	 times.	 It	becomes	especially	 fragile	when	the	 ‘justice’	of	 law’s	 rule	 is	not	 in	 fact	 just,	 and	merely	violent.	This	was	 the	case	during	 the	 First	 Republic	 of	 Liberia,	 when	 the	 forceful	 justice	 represented	 and	propelled	by	 the	 image	of	Matilda	Newport	was	experienced	as	an	 instrument	of	domination	 by	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 Liberians.	 As	 I	 showed	 in	 Chapter	 5,	 the	development	of	the	Regional	Justice	and	Security	Hubs	in	Liberia	point	to	a	similar	prospect	for	Liberia	post-war,	with	the	establishment	of	a	state	based	on	the	rule	of	 law	 appearing	 to	 be	 in	 the	 service	 of	 a	 forceful	 justice	 that	 risks	 becoming	 a	mere	 instrument	 of	 domination.	 The	 question	 that	 remains	 is	 whether,	 or	 the	extent	to	which,	the	justice	of	this	arrangement	is	just.		 With	this	question	in	mind,	I	examined	in	this	chapter	how	the	national	law	of	 Liberia	 is	 taking	 form	 on	 the	 ground	 in	 post-war	 Liberia.	 This	 showed	 two	things.	 One,	 it	 showed	 that	 the	 justice	 of	 the	 national	 law	 as	 conceived	 by	 the	Government	 and	 its	 international	 supporters	 is	 not	 perceived	 as	 just	 by	 the	majority	 of	 Liberians.	 But	 two,	 it	 showed	 that	 the	 national	 law	 is	 nonetheless	taking	form	in	ways	that	might	make	it	just.		This	 raises	 a	 critical	 problem,	 however.	 If	 the	 proposition	 ‘peace	 through	justice’	is	to	secure	the	state/State	of	Liberia,	and	not	destroy	it,	the	institution	of	the	rule	of	law	has	to	be	open	to	the	contradiction	that	makes	the	national	law	of	Liberia	only	law	to	the	extent	that	it	is	also	not	law.	That	is,	‘peace	through	justice’	requires	 an	 inordinate	 rule	 of	 law—a	 rule	 of	 law	 that	 is	 responsive	 to	 the	contradictory	demands	of	justice	it	confronts	on	the	ground.	Recall	the	alternative	representational	framework	I	considered	at	the	end	of	Chapter	 4.	 This	 ‘independence	 framework’	 operates	 on	 the	 same	 logic	 as	 that	 of	capital,	 but	 turns	 it	 from	 a	 medium	 of	 violent	 realism	 into	 a	 critical	 form	 that	enables	 a	 more	 autobiographical	 expression	 of	 subjectivity.	 This,	 I	 suggested,	
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254	might	 frame	Liberia’s	 independence	 ‘post-colonialism’	 and	 ‘post-war’.	 This	 holds	out	a	possibility:	 if	this	critical	 logic	informs	the	institution	of	the	rule	of	law,	the	logics	 of	 both	 capital	 and	 security	might	 be	 flipped	 on	 their	 heads.	 The	 logic	 of	capital	would	become	the	logic	of	independence,	and	this	independence	would	be	secured	through	an	inordinate	rule	of	law	that	is	both	forceful	and	just.		Of	course,	such	a	framework	for	peace	would	be	based	upon	a	contradictory	logic—indeed,	 it	would	require	facing	the	contradiction	in	law	and	its	rule	rather	than	 attempting	 to	 resolve	 or	 dismiss	 it.	 Whether,	 and	 how,	 such	 a	 critical	approach	to	the	rule	of	 law	might	be	 instituted	 is	 the	question	to	which	I	 turn	 in	the	final	chapter,	in	examining	the	legal	system	reform	process	in	Liberia.					
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1	 Mediation	of	law			Chapters	 4	 and	 5	were	 concerned	with	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 attempt	 to	 give	form	to	‘Liberia’	through	law.	In	Chapter	4	I	showed	how	African-Americans	in	the	United	 States	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 suffered	 a	 form	of	 civil	death	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 non-recognition	 as	wholly	 rightful	 persons.	 Likewise,	 I	showed	 how	 Americo-Liberians	 suffered	 a	 similar	 sentence	 in	 the	 nineteenth	century	 and	 into	 the	 twentieth	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 non-recognition	 as	 wholly	rightful	persons	 in	 the	 ‘international	 community’.	 Finally,	 I	 showed	how	African-Liberians	 suffered	 as	 degraded	 citizens	 up	 until	 the	 overthrow	 of	 the	 Americo-Liberian	 regime	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century.	 In	 each	 case,	 having	 been	denied	 their	 own	 particular	 value	 as	 self-possessed	 humans,	 but	 not	 fully	possessed	of	the	general	value	expressed	by	 law,	the	result	was	a	 form	of	capital	punishment—being	abject	before	the	law,	suspended	in	a	state	of	civil	death.	I	then	turned	 in	 Chapter	 5	 to	 examine	 what	 is	 taking	 place	 in	 Liberia	 post-war	 to	consolidate	peace	through	the	establishment	of	a	state	based	on	the	rule	of	law.	I	showed	how	this	risks	establishing	a	tyrannical	state	secured	through	an	arbitrary	rule	of	law	that	is	forceful	but	unjust.			 If	the	problem	in	Chapters	4	and	5	is	the	institutionalisation	of	an	arbitrary	rule	of	law	that	is	entirely	directed	at	securing	the	logic	of	the	regime	that	animates	it,	then	the	problem	examined	in	Chapter	6	is	the	opposite:	a	law	that	rules	entirely	otherwise.	Again,	the	problem	is	one	of	arbitrariness,	but	it	is	not	the	arbitrariness	of	being	abject	before	a	law	that	rules	in	disregard	of	its	subjects.	Rather,	it	is	the	arbitrariness	of	an	inordinate	rule	of	law—a	rule	of	law	that	verges	on	whatever	its	subjects	make	 of	 it.	 As	 I	 showed	 in	 Chapter	 6,	 Liberians	 are	 facing	 a	 reversal	 of	Kafka’s	paradox.	Having	dared	to	 ‘repudiate	the	nobility’	 in	the	bloodiest	fashion,	by	 overthrowing	 the	 Americo-Liberian	 oligarchy,	 Liberians	 have	 broken	 the	 one	law	that	provided	absolute	certainty,	in	that	its	existence	was	at	least	known	in	its	enforcement	against	them.	Now	the	national	law	of	Liberia	has	been	opened	up	to	the	whole	people.	Existing	entirely	otherwise,	the	arbitrariness	of	the	national	law	is	no	longer	‘whatever	the	nobles	do’,	but	whatever	Liberia’s	different	peoples	do,	in	as	much	as	they	talk	and	talk	back	in	so	many	different	ways.		 Thus	from	the	first	perspective	(Chapters	4	and	5),	law’s	rule	is	seen	to	be	arbitrary	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 what	 it	 affirms	 as	 given	 is	 experienced	 otherwise;	
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257whilst	from	the	other	perspective	(Chapter	6),	law’s	rule	is	seen	to	be	arbitrary	to	the	 extent	 that	 it	 leaves	 law	 open	 to	 take	 form	 in	 ways	 other	 than	 expressed.	Neither	 position	 is	 entirely	 satisfactory.	 On	 one	 side,	 law’s	 rule	 risks	 becoming	tyrannical,	 its	 expressions	 no	more	 than	 an	 instrument	 of	 domination,	 closed	 to	subjects	who	remain	abject	before	it.	On	the	other	side,	law’s	rule	risks	becoming	lawless,	its	expressions	no	more	than	what	its	subjects	make	of	it,	opening	it	to	all	manner	 of	 perversion,	 subversion,	 inversion,	 and	 ignorance.	 Neither	 position	 is	entirely	 satisfactory;	 and	 yet	 neither	 can	 be	 entirely	 avoided.	 Law’s	 rule	 must	remain	decisive,	expressing	what	is	‘the	law’	as	a	matter	of	common	good,	and	law’s	rule	must	remain	responsive,	articulating	normativity	in	a	way	that	is	open	to	the	experience	of	subjects	who	are	abject	before	it.1		 The	 question	 I	 address	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 how	 to	 deal	 with	 this	 ‘double	demand	 of	 modernity’	 institutionally.2	 If	 law	 takes	 place	 in-between	 these	 two	positions,	making	the	articulation	of	normativity	both	potentially	dominating	and	emancipating,3	then	what	does	this	mean	for	instituting	the	rule	of	law?	To	answer	the	 question,	 I	 begin	 here	 by	 considering	 how	 law	 can	 become	 both	 ‘over-mediated’,	 articulating	 normativity	 ‘from	 outside	 and	 above’,	 as	 well	 as	 ‘under-mediated’,	articulating	normativity	‘from	within’—and	how	the	critical	function	of	a	legal	system	is	to	mediate	the	contradiction,	to	ensure	law	does	not	rest	on	either	extreme	and	 remains	 in-between	 the	 two.	 In	Parts	2	 and	3	of	 the	 chapter	 I	 then	examine	what	is	taking	place	in	reforming	Liberia’s	national	legal	system.		A	 Over-mediated	law		When	 an	 expression	 of	 law	 has	 little	 basis	 in	 its	 object,4	 the	 law	 is	 potentially	radically	transformative	and	potentially	an	instrument	of	domination.		One	 way	 this	 occurs	 is	 when	 law	 does	 not	 articulate	 the	 normative	dispositions	of	its	subjects,	informed	by	their	experiences	in	and	of	the	world,	and	
																																																						1	See	Part	2	of	Chapter	1.	2	As	noted	in	the	Introduction	to	the	thesis,	Fitzpatrick	describes	the	‘double	demand	of	modernity’	as	‘the	demand	for	assured	position	integrated	with	a	responsiveness	to	all	that	is	beyond	position,	a	demand	to	be	met	now	without	resort	to	erstwhile	solutions	of	a	transcendent	kind.’	Peter	Fitzpatrick,	Modernism	and	the	Grounds	of	Law	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2001),	2.		3	See	Part	2	of	Chapter	2.	4	Recall	the	object	of	law	is	the	experience	of	subjects	within	jurisdiction,	to	whom	law	is	speaking,	and	therefore	speaking	against,	contra-dictorily.	See	Chapter	2.	
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258	instead	 articulates	 an	 other	 sense	 of	 normativity	 as	 ‘the	 law’	 and	 imposes	 that	vision	on	them	(‘from	above’).	This	occurs	‘from	outside’	rather	than	‘from	within’	when	 the	 law	 is	 expressed	 primarily	 from	 a	 standpoint	 external	 to	 the	 subject	within	 jurisdiction.	When	 the	concern	 is	 to	 transform	 the	subject	as	a	normative	matter,	 the	 intervention	 is	 ‘from	 outside’	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	 reflects	 an	 other’s	dissatisfaction	with	 the	 norm	more	 than	 internal	 revolt.	 Individuals	 and	 groups	might	come	to	identify	with	the	law	in	this	form	and	seek	to	bring	the	normative	disposition	of	society	in	line	with	it	‘from	within’.	Even	so,	the	more	the	law	is	used	to	bring	about	 radical	 transformation,	by	 imposing	an	other	 sense	of	how	 things	ought	 to	 be,	 the	 more	 over-mediated	 law	 becomes,	 and	 the	 more	 likely	 the	contradiction	will	manifest	in	a	violent	reaction	to	the	law.5	The	intention	might	be	to	bring	about	social	change	by	law,	but	it	might	be	concerned	 only	 with	 enforcement	 by	 law.	 Of	 course	 these	 alternatives	 are	extremes.	On	one	 side:	 attempting	 to	 radically	 transform	how	 things	 are	by	 law,	from	a	standpoint	that	is	set	against	the	subject	whose	experience	is	the	object	of	articulation.	On	the	other	side:	enforcing	the	law	as	given	in	total	disregard	of	the	subject.	Yet	despite	their	differences—one	directed	at	transforming	what	is	before	the	 law,	 the	 other	 directed	 at	 enforcing	 what	 is	 posited	 by	 law—these	 two	positions	are	highly	complementary.	 In	the	absence	of	a	responsive	dimension	to	the	process,	enforcement	provides	a	means	of	containing	the	unavoidable	reaction.	Enforcement	 makes	 law	 ‘responsive’	 in	 a	 perverse	 way,	 with	 force	 providing	 a	proxy	 for	 critical	 reflection.	 Through	 an	 enforced	 transformation,	 rather	 than	 a	genuinely	responsive	one,	an	over-mediated	system	of	law	might	sustain	itself,	at	least	as	 long	as	those	who	control	expressions	of	 ‘the	 law’	also	control	the	use	of	force.	 Law	enforcement	 is	 generally	 directed	 at	 informing	 the	minds	of	 subjects	about	‘the	law’	through	the	use	of	force.	The	aim	might	be	to	bring	subjects	closer	to	 the	 law	 as	 expressed,	 but	 it	 might	 be	 merely	 to	 make	 them	 compliant—to	
																																																						5	Sarat	and	Kearns	discuss	a	similar	approach	to	law	in	terms	of	‘instrumentalism’,	which	they	contrast	with	a	‘constitutive’	approach;	see	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns,	‘Beyond	the	Great	Divide:	Forms	of	Legal	Scholarship	and	Everyday	Life’,	in	Law	in	Everyday	Life,	ed	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns	(Ann	Arbor:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	1993).	Another	way	the	law	might	be	said	to	be	‘over-mediated’	is	when	there	is	‘too	much’	mediation.	This	occurs	when	the	medium	used	to	express	the	law	displaces	law’s	normative	foundation	in	society	and	the	law	becomes	an	expression	of	itself,	as	if	‘the	law’	were	also	the	object	of	law.	This	has	been	thoroughly	examined	in	the	scholarship	of	Legal	Realists	and	Critical	Legal	Studies	in	terms	of	the	problem	of	‘legal	formalism’.			
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259remind	them	of	the	law	without	necessarily	intending	to	bring	them	closer	to	it	as	a	normative	matter.	Either	way	enforcement	is	about	overcoming	the	impotence	of	what	is	posited	by	law,	by	trying	through	force	to	make	the	law	identical	with	the	experience	of	its	subjects,	or	at	least	felt	by	them.		In	contemporary	state	legal	systems,	still	one	of	the	most	popular	means	of	achieving	this	 is	 through	the	use	of	brute	 force.6	With	brute	 force,	 the	 law	is	 laid	down	on	the	bodies	of	subjects,	with	the	rationale	that	this	will	inform	their	minds.	In	this	way,	‘the	law’	is	brought	closer	to	a	subject	as	a	matter	of	fact;	and	in	a	very	real	way,	the	law,	brought	violently	into	contact	with	the	body,	could	be	no	closer	to	the	subject.	But	as	a	normative	matter,	brute	enforcement	also	has	the	opposite	effect.	By	realising	the	contradiction	 in	 law	with	such	visceral	means,	brute	 force	acts	to	reify	the	separation	of	the	law	from	subjects.	The	more	brute	force	is	used,	the	more	 the	body	recoils,	 the	more	 the	contradiction	 is	 reinforced	as	a	physical	reality—to	 the	point	where	 ‘the	 law’	becomes	a	mere	 instrument	of	domination,	bludgeoning	the	subject	as	if	it	were	nothing	more	than	an	object.	At	this	point	the	true	 nature	 of	 brute	 enforcement	 is	 clear:	 rather	 than	working	 to	 bring	 the	 law	closer	 to	 a	 subject,	 it	 works	 to	maintain	 the	 contradiction	 in	 law	 through	 sheer	force;	and	the	result	only	aggravates	the	situation.7	A	 genuinely	 responsive	 law	 enforcement,	 by	 contrast,	 involves	 the	 use	 of	force	in	a	way	that	is	critically	concerned	with	a	subject	as	subject—with	the	fact	that	every	subject	of	law	is	always	also	law-maker	and	not	merely	an	object	to	be	beat	into	subjection.	A	responsive	use	of	force	thus	aims	to	bring	about	a	change	in	behaviour	 from	 within	 the	 minds	 of	 subjects.8	 This	 is	 still	 a	 violent	 process.	Whether	brutish	or	 responsive,	 the	need	 for	enforcement	 is	always	a	 function	of	
																																																						6	But	compare	this	with	the	regulatory	scholarship	on	other	forms	of	regulation,	such	as	the	use	of	supportive	tools	to	assist	regulatees	to	comply.	See,	eg,	Ian	Ayres	and	John	Braithwaite,	Responsive	
Regulation:	Transcending	the	Deregulation	Debate	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1992);	Neil	Gunningham	and	Peter	Grabosky,	Smart	Regulation:	Designing	Environmental	Policy	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1998);	John	Braithwaite	and	Peter	Drahos,	Global	Business	Regulation	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2000);	Hilary	Charlesworth	and	Christine	Chinkin,	‘Regulatory	Frameworks	in	International	Law	’,	in	Regulating	Law,	ed	C	Parker,	et	al	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2004);	John	Braithwaite,	‘Fasken	Lecture:	The	Essence	of	Responsive	Regulation’,	UBC	Law	
Review,	vol	44,	no	3	(2011);	Jeremy	Matam	Farrall	and	Hilary	Charlesworth,	eds,	Strengthening	the	
Rule	of	Law	through	the	UN	Security	Council	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2016).	7	This	has	motivated	the	search	for	alternative	approaches	to	regulation,	such	as	‘responsive’	and	‘smart’	regulation.	See,	eg,	the	literature	cited	in	note	6	above.	8	Compare	the	work	on	‘responsive	regulation’,	eg,	Braithwaite,	‘Fasken	Lecture:	The	Essence	of	Responsive	Regulation’.	
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260	law’s	impotence.9	That	law	is	always	in	a	state	of	failure	as	a	result	of	its	separation	from	subjects	 is	not	the	problem,	however.	The	critical	problem	is	not	the	fact	of	the	 contradiction	 in	 law,	 which	 makes	 the	 law	 a	 violent	 conceit,	 but	 how	 the	contradiction	is	dealt	with.		I	examine	this	problem	in	Part	2	of	the	chapter	by	analysing	what	is	taking	place	 in	 reforming	 Liberia’s	 national	 legal	 system	 post-war.	 On	 one	 hand,	 the	analysis	 shows	 a	Government,	 supported	by	 a	 coalition	of	Western	 international	actors,	 intent	on	reforming	the	national	legal	system	in	a	way	that	would	make	it	articulate	normativity	from	‘outside	and	above’	the	majority	of	subjects,	informed	by	 a	 liberal-modernist	 ideology.10	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 there	 is	 a	 genuine	responsiveness	to	the	reform	process	that	might	ensure	the	national	legal	system	articulates	normativity	‘from	within’.	At	the	same	time,	however,	the	legal	system	reform	 process	 is	 being	 overshadowed	 by	 another	 reform	 process—that	 of	 the	security	sector—which	is	set	to	provide	the	Government	with	the	means	to	enforce	its	 law	against	 the	subjects	who	are	 talking	back	 in	 the	process	of	 reforming	 the	legal	system.	The	result	points	to	the	institutionalisation	of	an	over-mediated	legal	system	that	depends	on	brute	force	to	uphold	the	rule	of	law.		B		 Under-mediated	law		Another	set	of	problems	arises	when	the	medium	through	which	law	is	expressed	is	dysfunctional.	‘Under-mediated’,	a	legal	system	becomes	incapable	of	mediating	the	articulation	of	normativity.	To	the	extent	that	the	system	functions	at	all,	what	takes	form	as	the	law	is	no	less	arbitrary	than	when	law’s	acts	of	articulation	are	over-mediated.	The	arbitrariness	of	the	law	is	no	longer	that	it	gives	expression	to	an	other	vision	and	forces	subjects	to	conform	to	that	vision.	The	arbitrariness	of	an	 under-mediated	 law	 is	 that	 law	 takes	 form	 subjectively,	 according	 to	 the	contradictory	ways	in	which	its	subjects	give	expression	to	it	in	everyday	life,	from	moment	to	moment,	without	certainty,	consistency,	or	equality.		Thus	if	the	problem	of	over-mediation	is	the	reification	of	the	separation	of	law	 from	 its	 subjects,	 then	 the	 problem	 of	 under-mediation	 is	 the	 opposite:	 the	more	the	articulation	of	normativity	is	under-mediated,	the	more	the	contradiction	
																																																						9	See	discussion	in	Part	2	of	Chapter	2	on	the	impotence	of	law.	10	I	discuss	what	I	mean	by	a	‘liberal-modernist	ideology’	below,	in	Part	2	of	the	chapter.	
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261in	 law	 manifests	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 inseparability	 of	 law	 and	 its	 subjects.	 This	 is	potentially	no	less	violent	than	an	over-mediated	legal	system.	The	more	‘the	law’	is	 indistinguishable	 from	 the	 normative	 disposition	 of	 the	 subject	 who	 gives	expression	to	it,	the	more	‘the	law’	is	disconnected	from	other	subjects,	who	have	had	no	part	in	authorising	it,	for	whom	law	in	this	form	is	only	experienced	as	an	arbitrary	 will.	 This	 is	 the	 corruption	 of	 law:	 when	 what	 is	 ‘the	 law’	 is	indistinguishable	from	what	a	subject	expresses	it	to	be.	This	is	corruption	in	the	sense	of	dissolution:	when	the	chasmic	structure	of	law	collapses	to	the	point	that	‘law’	and	 ‘the	 law’	are	all-but	 inseparable.	 In	 this	state,	 the	will	of	 the	expressive	subject	becomes	all-but	equivalent	to	the	law—and	potentially	terrifyingly	so,	the	more	powerful	the	subject.11	The	 more	 dysfunctional	 a	 legal	 system,	 the	 more	 prone	 law	 is	 to	 such	corruption.	Yet	even	the	most	dysfunctional	legal	system	mediates	the	articulation	of	 normativity	 to	 some	 extent	 and	 limits	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 law	 is	 merely	 a	subjective	act	of	articulation.	The	law	might	be	corrupted	in	the	process,	but	there	is	still	a	system	to	speak	of.	When	a	situation	is	said	to	be	‘lawless’,	more	often	than	not	this	reflects	a	failure	to	see	the	system	that	mediates	the	madness.		Although	 that	 is	 not	 necessarily	 the	 case.	 It	 may	 be	 that	 there	 is	 no	functioning	system	at	all—no	structuring	medium—in	which	case	law	would	take	form	unmediated.	On	one	hand,	 this	would	be	 the	absolute	corruption	of	 law;	on	the	other	hand,	it	would	be	the	purest	expression	of	normativity.	Unmediated,	law	would	 lose	 all	 positive	 constraint	 and	 take	 form	 in	 an	 uncontrolled	 outburst:	 a	subject	 giving	 immediate	 expression	 to	 how	 things	 ought	 to	 be	 at	 that	 very	moment—indeed,	 how	 they	 will	 be.	 At	 this	 point,	 law	 and	 normativity	 would	collapse	in	on	each	other.	As	the	articulation	of	normativity,	this	would	be	law	in	its	most	negative	form;	and	as	an	entirely	negative	force,	it	would	be	incapable	of	articulating	 normativity	 in	 any	 positive	 way.	 As	 a	 result,	 law	 would	 be	 wholly	normative,	 and	 normativity	 would	 be	 wholly	 law:	 a	 form	 of	 law	 that	 is	simultaneously	 the	 antithesis	 of	 law,	 and	 a	 form	 of	 normativity	 that	 could	 not	realise	 itself	 in	 any	 positive	 way.	 This	 is	 lawlessness—a	 pure	 expression	 of	
																																																						11	Recall	‘the	subject’	might	be	an	individual	subject,	but	it	might	also	be	a	collective	subject.	Thus,	as	I	discuss	below,	‘the	will	of	the	subject’	might	be	the	will	of	a	police	officer	on	patrol	who	demands	a	bribe	in	the	name	of	the	law,	or	it	might	be	the	will	of	a	mob	who	lynch	a	man	in	the	name	of	the	law.	
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262	normativity	without	any	positive	dimension,	erupting	straight	 from	its	subjective	source—with	all	the	force	of	law.		For	those	who	know	law	primarily	through	a	highly	mediated	legal	system,	and	in	terms	of	the	orthodoxy	of	legal	positivism,	which	sets	‘the	law’	in	opposition	to	 something	 called	 ‘lawlessness’,	 an	 unmediated	 form	 of	 law—a	 law	 without	jurisprudence,	without	institutions,	without	lawyers—can	only	appear	lawless,	as	utterly	other	than	what	is	the	law.	It	may	no	longer	be	contentious	to	say	that	law	takes	many	forms;	however,	it	is	still	contentious	to	say	that	one	of	those	forms	is	‘lawlessness’	 itself.	Acting	 lawfully	and	rioting	are	surely	opposites:	one	respects	the	 rule	 of	 law,	 the	 other	 manifests	 a	 complete	 disregard	 for	 it.	 And	 yet,	 as	opposites,	 so-called	 ‘lawfulness’	 and	 ‘lawlessness’	 are	 identical	 in	 one	 critical	respect:	 both	 involve	 the	 articulation	 of	 normativity.	 The	 difference—which	 is	 a	difference	of	quality—is	how	the	act	of	articulation	is	mediated.12		I	examine	this	problem	of	under-mediation	in	Part	3	of	the	chapter,	where	I	consider	the	dysfunction	in	the	national	legal	system	of	Liberia	and	its	connection	not	only	with	 increasing	corruption	of	 the	police	and	 judiciary,	but	also	with	 the	rising	incidences	of	mob	violence	across	the	country.	Both	official	corruption	and	mob	violence,	 I	 argue,	 are	 instances	of	 an	under-mediated	 law,	 in	which	 the	 law	takes	form	in	terms	of	the	will	of	the	expressive	subject	who	articulates	‘the	law’.	I	then	 return	 to	 the	 threatened	 ‘April	 12’	 protests	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 6,	 and	consider	how	the	threat	of	revolutionary	violence	might	be	understood	in	terms	of	an	unmediated	law.			
2	 Beginning	again		A	 Access	to	justice		In	2010,	officers	of	Liberia’s	Ministry	of	Justice	and	Judiciary	sat	down	with	Chiefs,	traditional	leaders	and	members	of	civil	society	for	the	first	time	since	the	end	of	the	 war	 to	 consider	 the	 relationship	 between	 ‘statutory’,	 ‘customary’,	 and	
																																																						12	See	also	E	P	Thompson,	‘The	Moral	Economy	of	the	English	Crowd	in	the	Eighteenth	Century’,	
Past	&	Present,	no	50	(1971).	
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263‘traditional’	 law	 in	 Liberia.13	 The	 occasion	 was	 the	 National	 Conference	 on	Enhancing	Access	to	Justice,14	and	at	stake	was	the	very	ethical	possibility	of	law	in	Liberia:	how	the	national	 legal	 system	could	be	reformed	 in	 light	of	 the	 fact	 that	the	national	law	is	not	law	for	the	vast	majority	of	Liberians,	and	other	law	is	not	law	in	fundamental	ways	under	the	Constitution	of	Liberia.15		In	 her	 opening	 statement,	 the	 President	 of	 Liberia,	 Ellen	 Johnson	 Sirleaf,	made	clear	that	the	Conference	was	about	nothing	less	than	beginning	again:	If	 you	 look	 across	 Africa	 our	 peoples	 and	 governments	 have	 made	significant	 progress	 in	 developing	 truly	 African	 approaches	 to	 justice.	 In	many	countries,	diverse	groups	have	come	together	and	developed	ways	to	enhance	 access	 to	 justice	 for	 all	 people—the	 rich,	 the	 poor,	 ethnic	minorities	and	majorities	alike.	This	conference	should	be	the	beginning	of	such	a	process	in	Liberia.16	The	Minister	of	Justice	echoed	the	President	in	her	foreword	to	the	report	on	the	Conference	proceedings:	this	 ‘is	not	the	end	of	the	process—in	many	ways,	it	 is	a	beginning’—a	 beginning	 to	make	 law	 in	 Liberia	 ‘responsive	 to	 the	 basic	 desires	and	values	of	all	Liberian	people’.17	Getting	to	this	beginning	was	not	easy.	By	2010	the	Government	of	Liberia	might	have	‘taken	to	heart’	the	importance	of	reforming	the	national	legal	system	in	light	of	the	plurality	of	difference	that	animates	law	in	the	country,18	but	in	the	years	leading	up	to	that	point,	and	even	in	2015,	the	idea	of	reforming	the	national	legal	system	in	light	of	law’s	pluralism	has	met	strong	resistance	from	government	officials	as	well	as	Liberia’s	ruling	class	more	generally.	For	foreign	actors	involved	
																																																						13	Author	interview	with	UN	officials,	24	May	2013	(MU1	and	MU2).	The	term	‘statutory	law’	is	used	in	Liberia	to	refer	to	the	law	articulated	by	Liberia’s	legislative	and	judicial	organs	of	government.	The	term	‘customary	law’	refers	to	the	law	articulated	by	members	of	the	Liberia’s	executive	organ	of	government,	primarily	in	the	Ministry	of	Interior,	most	frequently	Chiefs.	‘Traditional	law’	by	contrast	refers	to	the	law	articulated	by	‘unofficial’	organs	of	government,	such	as	the	sacred	institutions	of	the	poro	and	sande	societies.	On	poro	and	sande	see	Part	3	of	Chapter	6.	14	Held	15-17	April	2010,	Gbarnga,	Bong	County,	Liberia.	15	As	seen	in	Chapter	6.	16	Ellen	Johnson	Sirleaf,	‘Special	remarks	at	the	National	Conference	on	Enhancing	Access	to	Justice’	(15	April	2010),	4-5.	17	Christiana	Tah,	‘Foreword	from	the	Minister	of	Justice’,	Report	on	the	National	Conference	on	
Enhancing	Access	to	Justice	(Monrovia:	2010),	viii.	18	Amanda	C	Rawls,	‘Policy	Proposals	for	Justice	Reform	in	Liberia:	Opportunities	under	the	Current	Legal	Framework	to	Expand	Access	to	Justice’,	Traditional	Justice:	Practitioner’s	Perspectives	(IDLO	Working	Paper	Series,	2011):	4.	
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264	in	 the	 process,19	 it	 is	 obvious	 why	 members	 of	 government	 have	 resisted	 and	continue	to	resist	the	idea.	For	those	in	power	in	Monrovia,	the	national	law	as	it	stands	 is	 law.	For	the	 judiciary	and	members	of	the	national	 legal	profession,	but	also	for	Liberia’s	ruling	class	more	generally,	 ‘traditional	 law’	 is	not	 law	properly	so-called;20	 rather,	 it	 persists	 anachronistically	 as	 an	 outmoded	 social	 form	 that	will	eventually	wither	away	with	modernisation.21	Indeed,	from	this	perspective,	if	Liberia	 is	 to	modernise,	 the	only	 logical	development	 is	 towards	 the	abolition	of	traditional	law.22	This	 mind-set	 might	 be	 at	 an	 extreme	 end	 of	 how	 Liberia’s	 ruling	 class	thinks	 about	 legal	 pluralism	 in	 the	 country,	 but	 there	 is	 at	 least	 a	 common	reluctance	 to	 commit	 scarce	 resources	 to	 strengthening	 ‘traditional	 practices’	 in	the	course	of	establishing	a	state	based	on	the	rule	of	law.	As	a	UN	official	said	to	me,	 reflecting	on	 the	difficulty	 faced	by	UNMIL	 in	 convincing	 the	Government	 to	‘buy-in’	to	the	‘access	to	justice’	process	introduced	at	the	beginning	of	this	section:	‘They	see	no	reason	why	we	should	be	spending	time	and	energy	on	other	law’.23	This	is	not	surprising,	given	that	many	if	not	most	members	of	Liberia’s	ruling	class	have	no	 connection	with	 ‘other	 law’.	The	 same	UN	official,	 echoing	what	 I	 heard	elsewhere,	put	it	like	this:	‘How	do	you	sell	this	idea	to	people	who	are	not	subject	
																																																						19	UNMIL,	The	Carter	Center	in	Liberia,	and	The	United	States	Institute	of	Peace	were	instrumental	in	initiating	and	facilitating	the	process	leading	up	to	the	2010	Conference	on	Access	to	Justice,	over	several	years	and	against	significant	resistance	from	government.	20	Thus	it	is	called	‘informal	justice’,	‘traditional	justice’,	‘customary	justice’,	‘alternative	dispute	resolution’,	amongst	other	terms,	but	not	‘law’.	This	reflects	the	terminology	used	by	international	actors,	as	well	as	Western	governments.	For	instance,	in	2007,	in	explaining	why	Australia	voted	against	the	United	Nations	Declaration	of	Indigenous	Peoples	Rights,	Australia’s	Ambassador	to	the	UN,	Robert	Hill,	argued	that	‘[c]ustomary	law	is	not	“law”	in	the	sense	that	modern	democracies	use	the	term;	it	is	based	on	culture	and	tradition’,	effectively	limiting	‘law’	properly	so-called	to	‘state	law’.	See	UN	Doc	A/61/PV.107	(13	September	2007),	11.	See	also	Laura	Grenfell,	Promoting	the	
Rule	of	Law	in	Post-conflict	States	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2013),	54.	21	Grenfell	makes	a	similar	observation	with	respect	to	the	attitude	in	many	international	organisations:	see	Laura	Grenfell,	‘The	UN	and	"Rule-of-Law	Constitutions"’,	in	Strengthening	the	
Rule	of	Law	through	the	United	Nations	Security	Council,	ed	Jeremy	Matam	Farrall	and	Hilary	Charlesworth	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2016),	128.	22	This	is	how	one	very	senior	member	of	the	national	legal	profession	sees	it.	When	asked	by	officers	within	UNMIL	about	the	idea	of	initiating	a	process	to	‘harmonise’	what	is	referred	to	as	‘statutory	law’	and	‘customary	law’,	he	is	said	to	have	replied:	‘Why	do	you	want	to	do	this?	Let’s	just	abolish	this	customary	law.	Let’s	just	have	the	statutory	system’:	author	interview	with	MU1	and	MU2.		23	Ibid.	
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265to	 it,	 and	will	 never	 be	 subject	 to	 it—and	 in	 any	 event,	 over	 generations,	 over	 a	hundred	years,	it	hasn’t	ever	applied	to	them?’24		For	many	politically	and	economically	powerful	Liberians,	returning	to	the	country	from	abroad	post-war	and	concerned	with	turning	Liberia	into	a	modern	‘middle-income’	country,25	there	is	nothing	self-evident	about	the	need	to	address	law’s	 pluralism.26	 Or	 at	 least,	 if	 the	 problem	 of	 law’s	 pluralism	 was	 initially	recognised,	it	was	not	prioritised	as	such	in	the	first	six	years	of	post-war	rule-of-law	reform.	Whatever	 the	 reason	 for	 this,	 significant	persuasion	was	 required	 to	get	the	Government	to	the	point	of	beginning	again.		UNMIL	might	take	credit	for	getting	the	Government	to	this	point,27	but	as	an	organisation	and	as	a	mission,	UNMIL	was	even	less	prepared	to	see	the	need	to	address	 law’s	 pluralism	 as	 part	 of	 its	 mandate	 to	 provide	 rule-of-law	 reform	assistance.	 To	 start	with,	 the	UN	 Security	 Council	 resolution	 establishing	UNMIL	did	 not	 give	 it	 an	 explicit	 mandate	 to	 do	 so,	 nor	 has	 the	 Council	 done	 so	 in	subsequent	resolutions	amending	UNMIL’s	mandate.28	The	work	done	by	UNMIL’s	Legal	 and	 Judicial	 Services	 Support	Division	 on	 ‘informal	 justice	 systems’,	which	largely	underwrote	the	‘access	to	justice’	process,	only	came	about	as	a	result	of	a	generous	 interpretation	 of	 the	 mandate	 by	 UN	 officials	 who	 took	 a	 personal	interest	in	the	issue	of	legal	pluralism.29	
																																																						24	Ibid.	The	same	point	was	repeated	by	another	informant	working	within	the	Ministry	of	Justice:	author	interview	with	Government	officer,	28	May	2013	(MG3).	25	See	Republic	of	Liberia,	Agenda	for	Transformation:	Steps	Toward	Liberia	RISING	2030.	Liberia’s	
Medium	Term	Economic	and	Development	Strategy	(2012–2017)	(Monrovia:	Republic	of	Liberia,	2012).		26	Chelsea	Payne,	the	Country	Representative	and	Access	to	Justice	Project	Lead	for	The	Carter	Center	Liberia	during	this	period,	and	Peter	Chapman,	also	working	for	The	Carter	Center	Liberia	at	the	time,	note:	‘In	the	period	following	the	signing	of	the	Accra	Peace	Accords	in	2003,	donors	and	government	viewed	(re)creating	a	Liberian	justice	sector	as	a	centralized	initiative,	to	be	imposed	from	the	top	down,	and	from	the	capital	to	the	countryside.	Various	actors	envisioned	a	functioning	justice	sector,	modeled	on	“best	practices”,	believing	capacity	building,	technical	assistance,	and	financial	support	could	make	it	attainable.	The	United	Nations	Security	Council	authorized	the	United	Nations	Mission	in	Liberia	to	“reestablish	[…]	national	authority	throughout	the	country”	and	develop	“a	strategy	to	consolidate	governmental	institutions”,	including	the	justice	sector.	This	exercise	began	with	basic	infrastructure	improvements,	such	as	county-level	circuit	courts,	and	the	training	and	deployment	of	county	attorneys.	Such	an	approach	necessarily	directed	the	vast	majority	of	justice	sector	investment	to	state	institutions,	including	the	Ministry	of	Justice	and	the	Liberia	National	Police,	the	judiciary,	and	Liberia’s	only	law	school	at	the	University	of	Liberia.’	Peter	Chapman	and	Chelsea	Payne,	‘"You	Place	the	Old	Mat	with	the	New	Mat":	Legal	Empowerment,	Equitable	Dispute	Resolution,	and	Social	Cohesion	in	Post-Conflict	Liberia’,	Open	
Society	Justice	Initiative	(Autumn	2013):	15.	27	Author	interview	with	MU1	and	MU2.	28	For	a	discussion	of	UNMIL’s	mandate,	see	Chapter	5.	29	Author	interview	with	MU1	and	MU2.	
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266	 The	turning	point	 in	 the	process	came	in	2009	with	the	publication	of	 the	United	States	 Institute	of	Peace	 study	 led	by	Deborah	 Isser,	 Stephen	Lubkemann	and	 Saah	 N’Tow	 of	 ‘Liberian	 experiences	 with	 and	 perceptions	 of	 local	 justice	options’.30	Building	on	the	work	of	Liberian	Common	Law	jurist,	Philip	Banks,	this	was	the	 first	 in-depth	empirical	study	of	 ‘how	both	 formal	and	customary	 justice	systems	are	perceived	and	utilized	by	Liberians’.31	As	discussed	in	Chapter	6,	 the	results	provided	undeniable	evidence	of	the	relevancy	of	 local	systems	of	 law	for	the	vast	majority	of	Liberians,	and	the	 impotency	of	 the	national	 legal	system.	At	the	 same	 time,	 with	 the	 backing	 of	 UNMIL’s	 Legal	 and	 Judicial	 System	 Support	Division,	as	well	as	The	Carter	Center	Liberia,	the	US	Institute	of	Peace	facilitated	the	 formation	 of	 a	 Legal	 Working	 Group	 made	 up	 of	 Liberian	 scholars	 from	government,	 the	national	 legal	profession,	 and	 civil	 society.32	The	Legal	Working	Group’s	terms	of	reference	were	‘to	engage	both	members	of	the	legal	community	and	traditional	leaders	in	discussions	about	justice	reform	in	Liberia,	in	particular	regarding	 the	 dual	 legal	 system’.33	 Their	 findings,	 reflecting	 the	 US	 Institute	 of	Peace	 study,	 confirmed	 the	 need	 to	 address	 the	 serious	 ‘capacity	 and	 legitimacy	shortfalls’	of	the	national	legal	system.34	Indeed,	the	‘key	policy	question’	asked	by	the	Group	 in	 light	of	 the	national	 legal	 system’s	 ‘legitimacy	shortfall’	was	how	to	make	the	national	law	more	reflective:		As	 Liberia	 considers	 the	 future	 of	 its	 justice,	 how	 can	 it	 move	 toward	 a	system	that	inclusively	reflects	the	values	of	the	Liberian	people?35		The	recommendations	of	the	Legal	Working	Group,	combined	with	the	US	Institute	of	 Peace	 study	 and	 feedback	 from	 a	 series	 of	 national	 consultations	 held	 in	 the	lead-up	 to	 the	2010	Conference,	amounted	 to	a	call	 that	could	not	be	 ignored	by	government;	 and	 yet	 the	 mind-set	 that	 gave	 rise	 to	 the	 Government’s	 initial	resistance	had	not	changed.		All	of	this	culminated	in	the	2010	Conference	on	Access	to	Justice,	and	the	result	was	a	 fundamental	 tension	 running	 through	 the	proceedings.	A	US	 lawyer	
																																																						30	Deborah	H	Isser,	Stephen	C	Lubkemann,	and	Saah	N'Tow,	Looking	for	Justice:	Liberian	Experiences	
with	and	Perceptions	of	Local	Justice	Options	(Washington:	USIP	Peaceworks,	2009).	31	Ibid,	3.	32	Author	interview	with	MU1	and	MU2.	See	also	Rawls,	‘Justice	Reform	in	Liberia’,	2.	33	Findings	of	the	Legal	Working	Group	(Monrovia:	adopted	10	December	2009),	1.	34	Ibid,	‘Section	II:	Basic	principles	that	should	guide	justice	policies’,	5.	35	Ibid,	‘Section	III:	Key	policy	questions	and	options’,	7	(my	italics).	
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267who	was	working	within	the	Liberian	Ministry	of	Justice	at	the	time,	and	who	was	close	 to	 the	 process,	 notes	 that	 the	 Government’s	 preference	 was	 always	 ‘for	building	trust	in	the	formal	legal	system	and	using	law	and	policy	to	change	beliefs	and	behaviors’.36	At	the	same	time,	the	Government	could	not	ignore	the	evidence	that	Liberians	not	only	use,	but	also	prefer,	‘local’	legal	systems.	The	Government’s	preference	for	a	policy	of	social	transformation	thus	came	up	against	the	need	to	make	 the	 national	 legal	 system	 more	 reflective,	 or	 at	 least	 more	 responsive	 to	Liberia’s	 diverse	 social	 body.	 To	 the	 Government’s	 credit,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	Conference	took	place	with	high-level	attendance,	on	top	of	a	series	of	nation-wide	consultations,	demonstrated	a	degree	of	responsiveness	by	the	Government.		And	 yet,	 this	 responsiveness	 was	 selective,	 framed	 by	 an	 ideological	opposition	 between	 what	 is	 thought	 ‘modern’	 and	 what	 is	 denigrated	 as	‘traditional’.	 For	 the	 organisers	 of	 the	 Conference—the	 Ministry	 of	 Justice,	 the	Ministry	 of	 Internal	 Affairs,	 and	 the	 Supreme	 Court37—the	 bottom	 line	 running	through	the	Conference	was	that	the	very	integrity	of	a	‘modern’	legal	system	does	not	admit	certain	aspects	of	 ‘tradition’.	Or	more	 to	 the	point,	 if	 the	national	 legal	system	 is	 to	 be	 reformed	 as	 one	of	 the	 core	 institutions	 of	 a	 ‘modern’	 Liberia,	 it	cannot	also	be	traditional.	Other	systems	of	law	might	be	part	of	the	national	legal	system,	 but	 they	must	 be	 ‘modernised’	 in	 the	 process.	 This	 is	what	 is	meant	 by	‘harmonisation’,	 the	new	catchword	used	by	the	Government	under	the	influence	of	its	international	partners	to	describe	their	solution	to	law’s	pluralism.	Like	the	pre-1980	policy	of	National	Unification,38	 ‘harmonisation’	 is	directed	at	 resolving	the	problem	of	law’s	pluralism	by	ensuring	local	expressions	of	law	are	at	one	with	the	national	 law,	dissolving	them	within	 it	without	compromising	the	 integrity	of	the	national	legal	system.		This	 limited	 responsiveness	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 way	 the	 organisers	 of	 the	Access	 to	 Justice	Conference	 framed	the	proceedings	 in	 their	agenda.39	The	three	main	discussion	themes	were	‘enhancing	customary	justice’,	‘enhancing	the	formal	
																																																						36	Rawls,	‘Justice	Reform	in	Liberia’,	6.	Veronica	Taylor	also	points	to	a	possible	economic	rationale	for	this	position,	in	so	far	as	the	policy	directs	resources	to	the	centre	(personal	correspondence).	37	The	official	organisers	were	the	Ministry	of	Justice,	the	Ministry	of	Internal	Affairs,	and	the	Supreme	Court,	‘with	support	from	the	Ministry	of	Gender	and	Development,	the	National	Traditional	Council,	the	United	States	Institute	of	Peace,	the	Carter	Center,	the	United	Nations	Mission	in	Liberia	(UNMIL),	the	United	Nations	Development	Programme	(UNDP)’:	Report	on	the	
National	Conference	on	Enhancing	Access	to	Justice	(2010).	38	See	Part	3	of	Chapter	4.	39	Report	on	the	National	Conference	on	Enhancing	Access	to	Justice	(2010),	Annex	1,	68-74.	
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268	justice	 system’,	 and	 ‘reforming	 both	 systems	 to	 increase	 access	 to	 justice	 for	 all	Liberians’.40	The	session	on	 ‘enhancing	customary	 justice’	was	set	 to	open	with	a	discussion	 of	 ‘the	 empirical	 data	 on	 onerous	 customary	 practices’	 and	 ‘potential	mechanisms	 that	 could	be	developed	 to	address	 such	practices	 in	 the	 customary	system’.41	The	subgroup	was	then	to	consider	two	questions	in	breakout	sessions:	Breakout	Question	1:	How	should	trial	by	ordeal42	be	addressed?	–	What	are	the	alternatives	to	trial	by	ordeal?	–	Apart	from	making	trial	by	ordeal	illegal,	what	steps	can	the	Government	of	Liberia	take	to	discourage	the	practice?	Breakout	Question	2:	Cooperation	between	the	formal	and	customary	systems.	How	can	we	change	the	way	the	two	justice	systems	interact	to	
better	address	issues	of	customary	beliefs	and	practices	that	the	formal	
system	finds	problematic?	–	Should	there	be	specific	types	of	cases	that	are	under	initial	jurisdiction	of	the	customary	system?	–	How	should	cases	be	appealed	from	the	customary	system?	–	How	can	the	formal	system	provide	better	alternatives	to	problematic	customary	practices?43	Meanwhile	 another	 subgroup	 was	 to	 consider	 ‘enhancing	 the	 formal	 justice	system’,	beginning	with	consideration	of	‘the	empirical	data	on	unjust	practices	in	both	systems	[…]	before	beginning	a	discussion	of	potential	mechanisms	that	could	[be]	developed	to	address	[the]	problems.’44		Breakout	Question	1:	Making	formal	courts	more	effective	in	rural	areas.	–	How	can	the	Government	best	combat	corruption,	and	prevent	bias	in	the	formal	system?	–	When	corruption	or	bias	is	encountered	in	the	formal	system,	how	should	the	parties,	chiefs,	or	other	leaders	respond?	Breakout	Question	2:	Relationship	between	formal	courts	and	customary	Chiefs.	
																																																						40	Ibid.	41	Ibid,	70.	42	‘Trial	by	ordeal’	is	the	English	term	used	to	describe	judicial	procedures	for	determining	guilt	and	innocence.	‘Sassywood’,	which	is	often	used	synonymously	for	‘trial	by	ordeal’	in	Liberia,	is	one	such	procedure,	whereby	poison	extracted	from	the	bark	of	a	tree	is	administered	in	the	form	of	a	drink	to	the	accused	person.	For	discussion	of	similar	questions,	in	a	very	different	time	and	place,	see	Manderson’s	essay	on	the	Magna	Carta:	Desmond	Manderson,	‘The	Other	1215’,	Papers	on	
Parliament:	Magna	Carta	800	Symposium,	no	65	(Proceedings	of	a	symposium	held	by	the	Department	of	the	Senate	and	the	Rule	of	Law	Institute	of	Australia,	2016):	67-68.	43	Report	on	the	National	Conference	on	Enhancing	Access	to	Justice,	71	(italics	in	original).	44	Ibid,	72.	
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269–	What	types	of	cases	should	be	heard	first	by	traditional	leaders?	–	What	types	of	cases	should	be	heard	first	in	formal	courts?45	The	 juxtaposition	 of	 these	 two	 sessions	 is	 revealing.	 Whilst	 discussion	 of	 the	‘formal	 justice	 system’	 focused	 on	 its	 institutional	 dysfunction—ineffectiveness,	corruption,	 bias—discussion	 of	 ‘customary	 justice’	 focused	 on	 the	 ‘traditional	practices’	themselves,	and	specifically	on	their	unacceptability.	To	put	this	another	way,	 the	 normativity	 of	 the	 formal	 system	 was	 never	 put	 in	 question,	 whilst	‘onerous	customary	practices’	framed	the	line	of	enquiry	on	‘enhancing	customary	justice’.	It	is	also	not	surprising	that	‘trial	by	ordeal’	was	singled-out	as	exemplary	of	‘onerous	customary	practices’.46		Trial	 by	 ordeal	 represents	 in	 spectacular	 form	 precisely	 what	 modernity	has	 worked	 so	 hard	 to	 overcome,	 and	 what	 a	 modern-liberal	 ideology	 finds	 so	repugnant:	a	theory	of	causation	that	uses	a	powerful	ritual	to	enact	a	knowledge	of	 what	 is	 right	 that	 does	 not	 separate	 out	 the	 individual	 person	 from	 the	community.	 As	 a	 method	 of	 addressing	 conflict	 within	 a	 community,	 ‘trial	 by	ordeal’	is	not	about	what	is	right	for	any	particular	individual	but	what	is	right	for	individuals-in-community.	 In	this,	both	scientific	knowledge	and	individual	rights	are	 stepped	 over	 by	 a	 rationality	 that	 does	 not	 stop	 in	 the	 final	 analysis	 at	 the	individual	 human	 or	 individuated	 cause	 and	 effect.	 To	 a	 liberal	mind,	 especially	one	initiated	into	the	Anglo-American	Common	Law,	what	appears	to	take	place	in	a	‘trial	by	ordeal’	is	a	violation	of	natural	justice:	a	potentially	innocent	individual	suffering	 harm	 without	 being	 accorded	 due	 process	 (based	 on	 a	 scientific	determination	of	guilt).		Such	 ‘traditional	practices’	are	 intolerable	 to	 the	 international	 interveners	engaged	in	reforming	Liberia’s	legal	system,	such	as	The	Carter	Center,	US	Institute	of	 Peace,	 and	 the	 UN,	 whether	 because	 they	 personally	 find	 such	 practices	repugnant	 to	 their	 modern-liberal	 normative	 disposition,	 and/or	 because	institutionally	 they	 are	 required	 to	 uphold	 the	 normative	 order	 of	 international	law	as	set	out	in	its	largely	Western-liberal	human	rights	instruments.	The	result	is	also	 intolerable	 to	 members	 of	 the	 Government	 of	 Liberia,	 whether	 because	 of	their	personal	convictions	(many	having	been	raised	and/or	educated	in	Western-liberal	 societies	 such	 as	 the	 US)	 or	 because	 funding	 from	 Western	 states	 and	
																																																						45	Ibid.	46	On	‘trial	by	ordeal’,	see	note	42	above.	
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270	international	 organisations	 is	 contingent	 upon	 ensuring	 the	 national	 law	 is	‘consistent	with	international	human	rights	norms	and	standards’.47	And	yet,	despite	this	commitment	to	a	modern-liberal	normative	order,	and	a	policy	of	changing	Liberians’	beliefs	and	behaviour	to	bring	them	in	line	with	it,	the	 Government	 opened	 these	 questions	 up	 to	 debate	 during	 both	 the	 pre-Conference	 consultations	 and	 the	 Conference	 itself.	 And	 the	 result	 was	 truly	
modern—a	 littoral	 cacophony.	Having	 framed	 the	 debate	 in	 a	way	 that	 reflected	the	 organisers’	 standpoint,	 presumably	 with	 the	 hope	 of	 directing	 discussion	towards	 the	 ‘right’	 answer,	 the	 response	 was	 a	 resounding	 chorus	 of	 voices	supporting	 ‘onerous	 customary	 practices’,	 and	 above	 all	 trial	 by	 ordeal	 (also	referred	to	here	as	sassywood):	A	Maryland	chief	from	the	National	Traditional	Council	noted	that	there	is	a	need	to	understand	what	is	meant	by	trial	by	ordeal.		A	National	Traditional	Council	Chairman	from	River	Gee	added	[…]	we	need	to	distinguish	genuine	sassywood	from	fake	sassywood.		The	Paramount	Chief	from	Bong	County	agreed	that	there	is	a	need	to	test	sassywood	 practitioners	 to	 check	 if	 they	 are	 genuine.	However,	 he	 added	that	the	Government	cannot	do	away	with	the	tradition.	He	asked	whether	the	Government	was	willing	to	change	its	Constitution.		The	National	Traditional	Council	Chairwoman	from	Bong	County	said	 that	sassywood	 is	 effective,	 but	 human	 rights	 are	 confusing	 traditional	 justice	cases.	A	 female	 Clan	 Chief	 from	 Nimba	 County	 said	 that	 the	 administering	 of	sassywood	 is	good.	She	gave	an	example	of	one	Kollie-tambo	who	used	to	perform	 his	 Marico	 (traditional	 drum)	 to	 identify	 witchcraft	 during	President	Doe’s	time.	A	representative	from	the	Ministry	of	Gender	and	Development	noted	that	people	do	not	want	to	give	up	sassywood,	and	that	there	are	no	alternatives	to	sassywood	in	certain	cases.	A	Women’s	Representative	from	Grand	Cape	Mount	pointed	out	that	there	are	 non-harmful	 ways	 of	 administering	 sassywood.	 She	 also	 noted	 that	magic	is	real.48	
																																																						47	See	the	UN	Secretary-General’s	definition	of	the	rule	of	law,	which	requires	a	state’s	laws	to	be	‘consistent	with	international	human	rights	norms	and	standards’:	UN	Doc	S/2004/616	(23	August	2004),	para	6.	48	These	‘voices’	are	recorded	in	the	official	report	on	the	Conference	proceedings:	Report	on	the	
National	Conference	on	Enhancing	Access	to	Justice,	31-34.	On	law	and	magic,	see	also	Miranda	
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271This,	then,	was	the	beginning	for	a	government	that	could	no	longer	deny	the	need	to	be	responsive	but	found	itself	caught	between	an	‘agenda	for	transformation’,49	and	 subjects	 demanding	 greater	 critical	 reflection	 in	 the	 process	 of	 reforming	Liberia’s	national	legal	system.	It	is	this	tension,	running	through	the	dialogue	that	began	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 US	 Institute	 of	 Peace	 study	 and	 into	 the	 Conference	sessions,	 that	 ensures	 ‘access	 to	 justice’	 remains	 a	 critical	 concept	 in	 Liberia,	denying	the	possibility	of	law	becoming	a	positive	expression	of	either	a	‘modern-liberal’	or	a	‘traditional-customary’	mind-set.		For	 the	Government	and	 its	 international	supporters,	who	continue	to	see	the	 national	 law	 as	 the	 only	 law	 properly	 so-called,	 access	 to	 justice	 means	overcoming	the	‘justice	vacuum’	that	results	from	not	having	a	functioning	national	legal	system.50	If	other	systems	of	law	have	to	be	brought	within	the	national	legal	system	to	make	it	effective,	then	those	other	systems	must	become	‘modern’	in	the	process.51	At	the	same	time,	for	many	Liberians,	access	to	justice	has	the	opposite	meaning:	if	the	national	legal	system	is	to	be	a	truly	modern	institution,	it	must	be	capable	 of	 articulating	 normativity	 ‘responsably’,	 that	 is,	 in	 a	way	 that	 is	 able	 to	respond	to	the	normative	disposition	of	subjects	within	jurisdiction.52			
	B	 Security	sector	reform		If	this	represents	the	possibility	of	beginning	again	in	Liberia,	to	make	the	national	legal	system	more	responsive,	 it	 is	taking	place	in	the	shadow	of	another	process	that	 currently	 dominates	 national	 and	 international	 efforts	 to	 establish	 a	 state	based	on	the	rule	of	law	in	Liberia.	As	the	withdrawal	of	UNMIL	draws	closer,	with	a	 complete	 exit	 anticipated	 by	 2017,	 building	 the	 capacity	 of	 Liberia’s	 ‘security	
																																																																																																																																																														Forsyth	and	Richard	Eves,	‘The	Problems	and	Victims	of	Sorcery	and	Witchcraft	Practices	and	Beliefs	in	Melanesia:	An	Introduction’,	in	Talking	it	Through:	Responses	to	Sorcery	and	Witchcraft	
Beliefs	and	Practices	in	Melanesia,	ed	Miranda	Forsyth	and	Richard	Eves	(Canberra:	ANU	Press,	2015);	Miranda	Forsyth,	‘A	Pluralist	Response	to	the	Regulation	of	Sorcery	and	Witchcraft	in	Melanesia’,	in	Talking	it	Through:	Responses	to	Sorcery	and	Witchcraft	Beliefs	and	Practices	in	
Melanesia,	ed	Miranda	Forsyth	and	Richard	Eves	(Canberra:	ANU	Press,	2015).	49	Republic	of	Liberia,	Agenda	for	Transformation:	Steps	Toward	Liberia	RISING	2030.	50	See	Report	on	the	National	Conference	on	Enhancing	Access	to	Justice,	71.	51	See	also	ibid,	71-72.	52	‘“The	law”	thence	would	be	an	unconditional	law	of	utter	responsiveness	to	the	other,	a	responsability,	to	revive	an	old	usage.’	Peter	Fitzpatrick,	‘The	Revolutionary	Past:	Decolonizing	Law	and	Human	Rights’,	Metodo:	International	Studies	in	Phenomenology	and	Philosophy,	vol	2,	no	1	(2014):	128.			
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272	sector’	has	become	 the	main	priority	 for	 the	 first	 time	since	 the	peace	operation	began	in	2003.53	Fearful	of	a	 ‘security	vacuum’	that	would	allow	non-government	actors	 to	challenge	 the	Government’s	monopoly	on	 the	use	of	 force,	especially	 in	the	interior,	the	Government’s	priority	is	to	build	the	capacity	of	its	police	force.	As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 5,	 one	 the	 main	 security-sector	 projects	 is	 the	development	of	five	Regional	Justice	and	Security	Hubs—a	project	that	appears	to	have	very	little	to	do	with	the	kind	of	‘access	to	justice’	being	discussed	at	the	2010	Conference	 and	 everything	 to	 do	 with	 strengthening	 the	 police	 force	 in	 the	interior.54	 But	 as	 such,	 the	 Hub	 concept	 is	 entirely	 consistent	 with	 the	Government’s	preferred	direction	on	 ‘access	 to	 justice’	 and	national	 legal	 system	reform.	 Indeed	the	Hubs	were	originally	conceived	by	the	Government	of	Liberia	as	 regional	 command	 centres	 for	 the	 Liberian	 National	 Police	 to	 have	 ‘forward	operating	 bases’	 in	 the	 interior.55	 It	 is	 surely	 no	 coincidence	 that,	 just	 as	 the	Government	and	 its	 international	 supporters	have	begun	 to	 focus	 their	attention	and	resources	on	security	sector	reform	and	building	up	a	police	presence	 in	the	interior,	 the	 initiative	 on	 ‘access	 to	 justice’	 has	 gone	 backwards.	 After	 the	 2010	Conference	 an	 inter-Ministerial	 Committee	 on	 Access	 to	 Justice	 was	 formed	 to	consider	 policy	 options	 on	 legal	 system	 reform	 in	 light	 of	 the	 recommendations	coming	out	of	the	Conference.	Since	then	nothing	has	happened.	Not	only	has	the	Committee	not	built	on	the	momentum	leading	into	the	Conference,	but	as	of	2013,	a	newly-appointed	Solicitor-General,	 taking	over	the	Chair	of	the	Committee,	was	considering	returning	to	the	start	with	more	research	and	consultations.		Thus	at	the	same	time	as	the	Government	was	being	held	to	account	at	the	2010	Conference	on	Access	 to	 Justice	 in	a	way	that	was	offering	a	glimpse	of	 the	possibility	 of	 the	 national	 legal	 system	 being	 reformed	 in	 light	 of	 its	 ‘legitimacy	deficit’,	the	Government	was	moving	ahead	with	a	deal	to	build	a	series	of	Justice	and	 Security	 Hubs	 in	 the	 interior.56	 Brought	 together	 within	 the	 same	 complex,	
																																																						53	While	security	sector	reform	has	been	part	of	UNMIL’s	mandate	since	2003,	building	the	capacity	of	the	Liberia’s	security	sector,	with	a	focus	on	the	Liberian	National	Police	in	particular,	has	only	become	a	top	priority	with	UNMIL’s	withdrawal.	See	Part	2	of	Chapter	5.	54	Part	2	of	Chapter	5.	55	Ibid.	56	For	a	global	perspective	on	the	rule-of-law	industry	that	also	helps	explain	what	is	taking	place	here	in	Liberia,	in	terms	of	the	lack	of	concern	for	justice	on	the	ground,	see	Veronica	Taylor,	‘Big	Rule	of	Law©®℠™(pat.pending):	Branding	and	Certifying	the	Business	of	the	Rule	of	Law’,	in	
Strengthening	the	Rule	of	Law	through	the	United	Nations	Security	Council,	ed	Jeremy	Matam	Farrall,	and	Hilary	Charlesworth	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2016).	
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273‘justice’	and	 ‘security’	would	complement	each	other	 just	as	 the	Government	and	UN	 hoped	 they	 would:	 a	 new	 police	 force	 deployed	 in	 the	 interior,	 with	courthouses	 and	 lawyers	 co-located	 on-site	 for	 processing	 offenders	 of	 the	national	 law.	Without	 the	 need	 for	 the	 hard	 critical	 reflection	 demanded	 by	 the	delegates	at	the	2010	Access	to	Justice	Conference,	the	national	law	would	be	law.	
	C	 Legal	empowerment		Thus	 the	 2010	 Conference	 on	 Access	 to	 Justice	 might	 have	 represented	 a	 new	beginning	 in	 a	 national	 dialogue	 on	 legal	 system	 reform	 in	 Liberia,	 but	 it	 is	 not	taking	 place	 in	 isolation.	 Outside	 of	 these	meeting	 rooms,	 both	 government	 and	communities	 across	 Liberia	 are	working	 to	 strengthen	 their	 hand	 in	 the	 reform	process.	For	the	Government,	this	largely	means	strengthening	the	‘security	sector’	to	maintain	‘peace	and	stability’	as	it	pursues	its	policy	of	transforming	beliefs	and	behaviour.	 By	 contrast,	 for	 many	 communities,	 it	 means	 strengthening	 their	capacity	 to	 engage	with	 the	Government	 and	 international	 actors	 to	 ensure	 they	remain	responsive	in	the	process	of	reforming	the	legal	system.		To	 this	 end,	 local	 and	 international	 non-government	 organisations	 are	working	 to	 empower	 Liberians	 as	 both	 subjects	 and	 authorities	 of	 law.	 The	 two	most	prominent	NGOs	working	in	this	field	of	‘legal	empowerment’	are	The	Carter	Center	 in	Liberia	and	 the	Liberian	Catholic	 Justice	and	Peace	Commission.	These	two	 organisations	 work	 in	 partnership	 to	 provide	 legal	 advisory	 and	 dispute	resolution	services	in	communities,	and	to	strengthen	traditional	leaders’	dispute	resolution	capabilities.	Whilst	The	Carter	Center	provides	financial,	technical,	and	capacity-building	 support	 to	 the	 Justice	 and	 Peace	 Commission,	 primarily	 in	 the	form	of	 ‘monitoring	and	mentoring’,57	 the	 Justice	and	Peace	Commission	engages	directly	with	Liberians	 through	 its	nation-wide	network	of	offices	and	 local	staff.	The	major	component	of	their	‘legal	empowerment’	work	takes	place	through	their	Community	Justice	Advisor	program,	a	para-legal	service	that	employs	and	trains	
																																																						57	See	The	Carter	Center,	Handbook	for	Civil	Society	Partners	—	Community	Education	and	
Awareness	Program	on	the	Rule	of	Law	(Monrovia:	TCC,	2008).	See	also	Walter	Leitner	International	Human	Rights	Clinic,	A	Handbook	for	the	Justice	and	Peace	Commission:	Best	Practices	of	Community	
Legal	Advice	Programs,	Program	Assessment	and	Recommendations	(Fordham	Law	School,	2008),	commissioned	by	The	Carter	Center	and	the	Justice	and	Peace	Commission.	
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274	local	 Liberians	 to	 provide	 free	 legal	 education,	 advice,	 and	 dispute	 resolution	services	to	towns	and	remote	communities	throughout	Liberia.58		The	Carter	Center	and	 the	 Justice	and	Peace	Commission	are	not	 alone	 in	this	work.	 In	the	area	of	 land,	 the	Norwegian	Refugee	Council	pioneered	a	highly	successful	community-based	dispute	resolution	and	legal	education	program,	and	the	Liberian	Sustainable	Development	Initiative	has	been	at	the	forefront	of	policy	development	on	 land	rights	and	dispute	resolution.	Other	 local	and	 international	NGOs	are	carrying	out	similar	work	in	the	area	of	human	rights.		What	 brings	 these	 otherwise	 distinctive	 organisations	 together	 is	 their	approach	to	 law’s	pluralism.	At	 the	heart	of	 their	work	 is	a	motivation	to	 ‘bridge	the	gap’	between	different	systems	of	 law,	by	 increasing	Liberians’	knowledge	of	and	material	access	to	the	national	legal	system	whilst	at	the	same	time	supporting	community	 legal	 systems.	 As	 two	 practitioners	 who	 worked	 on	 the	 Access	 to	Justice	Project	for	The	Carter	Center	in	Liberia	explain:	Legal	 empowerment	 can	 promote	 locally-driven	 processes	 of	 change	capable	 of	 supporting	 peaceful	 and	 equitable	 outcomes	 in	 the	 near	 term,	while	simultaneously	enabling	citizens	to	influence	institutional	structures.	Prioritizing	 support	 for	 legal	empowerment	 represents	an	alternative	and	complement	 to	 the	 supply-side	 paradigm	 that	 is	 currently	 dominant	 in	Liberia.	 Rather	 than	 taking	 a	 top-down,	 Monrovia-centered	 approach,	supporting	 legal	 empowerment	 can	 provide	 a	 means	 to	 incorporate	community	aspirations	into	justice	reform.59	Such	 ‘legal	 empowerment’	 thus	 seeks	 to	 bring	 about	 social	 change	 from	 ‘within	and	 below’,	 transforming	 the	 legal	 landscape	 in	 a	 way	 that	 respects	 and	 even	strengthens	local	legal	systems	(promoting	‘locally-driven	processes	of	change	[…]	to	begin	to	meaningfully	incorporate	community	aspirations	into	justice	reform’).60	At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 has	 a	 missionary	 agenda:	 to	 bring	 about	 normative	transformation	 according	 to	 a	modern-liberal	 understanding	 of	 right.	 Just	 as	 the	organisers	 of	 the	 2010	 Access	 to	 Justice	 Conference	 were	 selective	 in	 their	response	to	what	‘legal	system	reform’	might	look	like	in	a	modern	nation-state—tolerating	 the	 idea	 of	 bringing	 other	 systems	 of	 law	 within	 the	 national	 legal	
																																																						58	See	also	Chapman	and	Payne,	‘"You	Place	the	Old	Mat	with	the	New	Mat"’,	26.	59	Ibid.	On	legal	empowerment,	see	also	Stephen	Golub,	‘The	Legal	Empowerment	Alternative’,	in	
Promoting	the	Rule	of	Law	Abroad:	In	Search	of	Knowledge,	ed	Thomas	Carothers	(Washington:	Carnegie	Endowment	for	International	Peace,	2006).	60	Chapman	and	Payne,	‘"You	Place	the	Old	Mat	with	the	New	Mat"’.		
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275system	so	 long	as	 they	are	harmonised	with	 it	 in	 the	process—the	organisations	working	 to	 support	 legal	 empowerment	 in	 Liberia	 are	 selective	 in	 what	 can	 be	‘empowered’.	And	the	limit	of	their	toleration	is	more	or	less	the	same,	based	on	a	particular	 view	 of	 what	 they	 deem	 normatively	 acceptable.	 In	 short,	 if	 ‘legal	empowerment’	is	directed	at	bridging	the	gap	between	local	and	national	systems	of	law,	the	‘bridge’	is	conceived	as	a	one-way	path	to	a	liberal-modernity.	From	my	conversations	with	the	members	of	the	organisations	working	on	such	 legal	 empowerment,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 their	 vision	 is	 circumscribed	 by	 a	commitment	 to	 human	 rights	 as	 the	 standard	 of	 what	 is	 acceptable,61	 and	 by	 a	concept	of	the	state	that	admits	only	one	legal	system	within	which	all	expressions	of	law	must	eventually	be	harmonised.	This	vision	of	‘legal	empowerment’	hardly	diverges	from	that	of	the	Government	and	Western	international	interveners,	and	in	 this	sense	remains	 ‘over-mediated’	 to	 the	extent	 that	 it	 is	under-written	by	an	agenda	 to	 transform	 the	 minds	 of	 Liberians	 according	 to	 an	 other	 normative	disposition.	There	is	a	difference,	however,	in	how	the	‘legal	empowerment’	actors	are	 trying	 to	 realise	 their	 mission,	 by	 providing	 Liberians	 with	 information	through	 education	 campaigns	 and	 material	 access	 to	 the	 institutions	 of	government.62	 Another	 difference	 is	 the	 involvement	 of	 Liberians.	 The	 Carter	Center,	 the	 Justice	 and	 Peace	 Commission,	 the	 Norwegian	 Refugee	 Council,	 the	Sustainable	 Development	 Initiative,	 as	 well	 as	 others	 working	 on	 ‘legal	empowerment’	in	Liberia,	could	not	do	this	work	without	Liberians	responding	to	their	offers	of	support.	Many	Liberians	that	engage	with	these	organisations	want	to	influence	the	changes	taking	place	in	their	country	‘from	within	and	below’.63	In	this	way,	‘legal	empowerment’	is	dependent	on	the	organisations	being	responsive	to	the	communities	they	are	motivated	to	transform.	These	 differences	 matter.	 Whilst	 the	 members	 of	 the	 organisations	 with	whom	 I	 spoke	 were	 unapologetic	 about	 their	 organisations’	 missionary	 agenda,	what	that	actually	means,	at	this	point	in	history,	is	not	obvious.	The	parallel	with	the	nineteenth-century	colonial	mission	to	civilise	Africa,	and	the	use	of	equivalent	‘legal	empowerment’	and	 ‘rule-of-law	reform’	 interventions	to	realise	 that	vision,	is	 striking.	 But	 the	 conclusion	 that	 what	 is	 taking	 place	 in	 post-war	 Liberia	 is	
																																																						61	See	the	discussion	of	the	perceived	inevitability	of	human	rights	in	Part	3	of	Chapter	6.	62	See,	eg,	the	handbooks	in	note	57	above.	63	On	the	notion	of	working	from	‘within	and	below’,	see	discussion	in	Part	1	of	the	chapter.	On	Liberians’	desire	to	influence	the	changes	taking	place	in	their	country,	see	also	Part	3	of	Chapter	6.	
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276	simply	 a	 neo-colonial	 intervention	 is	 complicated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 current	process	in	Liberia	is	being	led	in	fundamental	ways	by	Liberians,	‘from	within	and	below’.	A	powerful	example	is	the	women’s	movement	in	Liberia.	Throughout	the	country	 there	 is	 a	 broad	 constituency	 of	 women	 aligned	 with	 the	 national	 and	international	 intervention	 to	 end	 ‘onerous	 customary	 practices’,	 such	 as	 female	genital	cutting,	and	more	broadly	patriarchal	domination,	which	finds	expression	in	the	high	rates	of	violence	against	girls	and	women	by	men.	For	these	women—who	greatly	influenced	the	election	and	re-election	of	Ellen	Johnson	Sirleaf	to	the	Presidency	in	2005	and	201164—the	national	legal	system	holds	out	the	potential	to	 provide	 a	 critical	 medium	 for	 challenging	 oppressive	 community	 norms	 and	articulating	another	vision	of	how	they	can	continue	to	be	together	with	men.		Thus	‘legal	empowerment’	is	about	working	with	Liberians	to	bring	about	a	normative	 shift	 that	 is	 already	 taking	 place	 but	 remains	 contentious—to	 bring	about	a	transformation	‘from	above’	that	is	already	under-way	‘from	below’	but	by	no	means	resolved	into	any	broadly	accepted	normative	position.	Because	‘things	have	changed’,	because	‘you	can’t	go	back’65—but	even	more	importantly,	because	most	Liberians	do	not	want	to	‘go	back’—the	problem	becomes	as	much	or	more	of	an	internal	struggle	over	how	a	people	ought	to	continue	to	be	together	in	society.		
3	 Facing	the	contradiction		The	 fact	 that	 the	 national	 legal	 system	 articulates	 normativity	 in	 a	 way	 that	remains	 fundamentally	disconnected	 from	most	Liberians	 is	 compounded	by	 the	fact	that	the	national	legal	system	is	also	severely	dysfunctional.	This	is	especially	problematic	in	a	post-war	state	with	a	growing	demographic	who	are	neither	part	of	 the	 ‘traditional-customary’	 world	 of	 their	 parents	 nor	 part	 of	 the	 ‘modern-liberal’	world	of	Liberia’s	ruling	class.	This	includes	a	generation	of	young	men	and	women	who	 fought	 in	 the	wars,	and	more	generally	youth	born	since	 the	1980s.		Without	 effective	 and	 responsive	 social	 structures	 capable	 of	 articulating	 their	normative	 disposition,	 Liberia	 now	 faces	 a	 situation	 where	 subjects	 are	 giving	expression	to	the	law	for	themselves.		
																																																						64	See	African	Women	and	Peace	Support	Group,	Liberian	Women	Peacemakers	(Trenton:	African	Women	and	Peace	Support	Group,	2004).	65	See	Part	3	of	Chapter	6.	
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277This	 is	 manifesting	 in	 two	 ways	 in	 particular	 in	 post-war	 Liberia.	 The	dysfunctional	national	legal	system	opens	law	up	to	become	a	terrifyingly	violent	expression	of	 ‘mob	justice’.	However	it	also	opens	law	up	to	unofficial	mediation,	which	points	 to	 the	possibility	of	 a	genuinely	 responsive	 legal	 system.	 I	 examine	these	two	situations	in	the	following	two	sections.		A	 Mob	justice		The	 structural	 problems	 in	 the	 national	 legal	 system	 discussed	 at	 the	 2010	Conference	on	Access	to	Justice	are	symptomatic	of	a	legal	system	that	is	seriously	under-mediated:	 unaffordable,	 inaccessible,	 and	 untimely;	 non-transparent	 and	un-accountable;	 and	 generally	 ineffective	 in	 ‘delivering	 justice’.66	 The	 Liberian	National	Police	is	no	exception.	Rated	by	Liberians	in	national	surveys	as	the	most	corrupt	 institution	 of	 government,	 the	 police	 force	 is	 not	 only	 dysfunctional	 but	also	exploitative.67	At	the	same	time,	incidents	of	mob	violence	have	risen	since	the	end	 of	 the	 war,	 spiking	 in	 201368—the	 same	 year	 that	 Human	 Rights	 Watch	published	its	findings	on	police	corruption.69	Causation	is	hard	to	establish,	but	it	would	be	naïve	to	see	the	incidents	of	mob	violence	that	are	becoming	more	and	more	 common	 across	 Liberia	 as	 irrational	 outbursts	 disconnected	 from	 the	dysfunction	and	corruption	in	the	national	legal	system.		The	rationality	of	‘mob	justice’,	and	its	connection	to	the	dysfunction	in	the	national	legal	system,	was	pointed	out	to	me	during	one	of	my	trips	in	a	bush	taxi	in	the	interior	of	Liberia	in	2013,	when	a	news	report	on	the	radio	prompted	three	of	 my	 fellow	male	 passengers	 to	 swap	 stories	 about	 their	 experiences	 with	 the	national	 legal	 system.	 Their	 stories	 invariably	 ended	with	 a	 line	 about	 how	 one	could	not	expect	to	get	justice	from	the	police	or	the	courts.	When	I	asked	how	they	
could	get	justice,	given	the	dysfunction	in	the	national	legal	system,	they	laughed:	‘we	 have	 to	 get	 it	 ourselves’.	 They	 may	 have	 been	 laughing	 but	 they	 were	 not	
																																																						66	See	also	Isser,	Lubkemann,	and	N'Tow,	Looking	for	Justice,	3.	67	See	Human	Rights	Watch,	‘No	Money,	No	Justice’:	Police	Corruption	and	Abuse	in	Liberia	(New	York:	HRW,	August	2013).	68	Author	interview	with	UN	official,	11	October	2013	(MU6).	See	also	UN	Doc	S/2013/479	(12	August	2013),	Twenty-sixth	progress	report	of	the	Secretary-General	on	the	United	Nations	Mission	in	
Liberia;	UN	Doc	S/2014/123	(18	February	2014),	Twenty-seventh	progress	report	of	the	Secretary-
General	on	the	United	Nations	Mission	in	Liberia.	69	Human	Rights	Watch,	Police	Corruption	and	Abuse	in	Liberia.	
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278	joking.	Throughout	my	stay	in	Liberia	I	read	and	heard	reports	on	a	regular	basis	of	mostly	young	men	responding	in	this	way—‘getting	justice	for	themselves’—by	burning	trucks,	buses	or	cars	that	had	hit	a	motorcycle	or	pedestrian,	or	beating	up	thieves	caught	 in	 the	market.	 In	one	major	 incident	 in	2013,	 the	members	of	 the	motorcycle	 transport	 union	 in	 Gbarnga,	 apparently	 fed	 up	 with	 criminal	 gangs	operating	in	the	town,	responded	by	attacking	the	residential	quarters	where	the	‘criminals’	lived.	As	a	newspaper	reported	the	incident:	At	 least	 one	 person	 was	 reported	 dead	 and	 several	 others	 seriously	wounded	 after	 motorcyclists	 went	 on	 the	 rampage	 in	 Gbarnga	 and	 its	environs	 last	Saturday	destroying	ghettoes.	According	to	our	Bong	County	correspondent	the	riot	began	after	the	motorcyclists	visited	a	police	station	in	 the	 city	 in	 demand	 of	 a	 suspect	 detained	 for	 allegedly	 stealing	 a	motorcycle	 which	 they	 claimed	 belong	 to	 a	 colleague	 of	 theirs.	 As	 police	rejected	their	demand	to	 turn	over	 the	suspect	 to	 them	hundreds	of	 them	took	 to	 the	 streets	 of	 Gbarnga	 carrying	 cutlasses,	 axes	 and	 other	 metals	destroying	ghettoes	on	grounds	that	they	were	hide-ups	for	criminals.70	Less	 than	 two	 weeks	 earlier	 the	 police	 had	 held	 ‘peace	 talks’	 with	 the	 same	motorcycle	transport	union	at	the	Gbarnga	Regional	Justice	and	Security	Hub.	For	several	years	motorcycle	taxi	drivers—many	of	whom	are	former	combatants	who	fought	in	the	civil	war	as	children	and	young	men—had	clashed	with	government	security	forces	in	Gbarnga	(as	well	as	elsewhere	in	the	country).	According	to	the	President	 of	 the	 Bong	 Chapter	 of	 the	 Liberia	 Motorcyclist	 Transport	 Union,	harassment	by	police	was	a	major	reason	they	had	taken	up	arms,	and	the	peace	talks	 were	 intended	 to	 find	 a	 way	 to	 work	 together	 to	 maintain	 ‘peace	 and	stability’.	 Whilst	 the	 talks	 suggested	 a	 responsive	 approach	 to	 the	 problem,	 the	dialogue	 nonetheless	 took	 place	within	 the	 fortified	walls	 of	 the	Gbarnga	 Justice	and	Security	Hub.	That	could	send	only	one	message,	and	it	was	the	same	message	that	 the	 Minister	 of	 Defence	 issued	 in	 the	 lead-up	 to	 the	 threatened	 ‘April	 12’	protest.71	In	a	statement	that	sought	to	justify	a	threat	he	had	made	earlier	to	use	lethal	force	against	the	protesters,	the	Minister	of	Defence	declared:		You	can	understand;	when	a	Liberian	says,	 ‘I	want	to	demonstrate’	he	has	that	 right	 to	 demonstrate	 under	 the	 law,	 nobody	 stop	 you.	 We’ve	 had	demonstrations	here;	you	follow	the	provisions	as	stipulated	under	the	law,	you	 go	 and	have	 your	demonstration.	But	 then	when	you	hear	 a	 Liberian	
																																																						70	‘In	Gbarnga	Riot	One	Dead	Several	Injured’,	New	Dawn,	Monrovia,	23	September	2013.	71	See	discussion	in	Part	3	of	Chapter	6.	
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279saying	‘we	will	not	stop	until	the	Government	comes	down’,	what	you	want	me	to	do?	Put	my	hand	in	my	back	pocket	and	go	and	sit	down?72		
	
Figure	21.	Front	cover	of	a	RAND	Corporation	report	to	the	US	and	Liberian	Governments73		Like	the	motorcycle	transport	unionists	who	threatened	to	give	expression	to	the	law	 on	 their	 own	 terms,	 and	 Liberians	 who	 felt	 they	 had	 to	 get	 justice	 for	themselves	 through	mob	violence,	 the	April	12	protest	 threatened	something	 far	more	 dangerous	 than	 a	 random	 act	 of	 massive	 violence.	 It	 threatened	 to	 give	expression	 to	 a	 sense	 of	 right	 in	 an	 entirely	 negative	 form.	 As	 a	 newspaper	commented,	not	even	 the	 ‘positive	 intentions	of	 the	organisers’	would	be	able	 to	
																																																						72	Wade	Williams,	‘“No	Apologies”	–	Liberia’s	Defense	Chief	Stands	By	Pre-April	12	Statement’,	
Front	Page	Africa,	Monrovia,	22	April	2013.	73	[image	omitted	from	digital	version]	
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280	channel	this	demonstration	through	a	‘lawful’	protest.74	The	Defence	Minister	saw	this	threat,	as	did	the	police,	when	they	made	clear	their	own	threat	to	use	lethal	means	 to	maintain	peace	 and	 stability.	 ‘We	 are	 here	 to	maintain	peace’,	 a	 police	spokesperson	reassured	the	public	after	a	display	of	force	in	the	days	leading	up	to	12	April.	 ‘The	men	wearing	police	uniform	are	here	 for	peace.	We	are	 sending	a	message	to	those	who	think	they	can	undermine	the	peace	of	this	country.’75	Here	 too	 was	 ‘peace	 talk’	 in	 response	 to	 the	 threat	 of	 Liberians	 giving	immediate	expression	to	their	normative	disposition	in	a	way	that	would	threaten	‘peace	 and	 stability’.	 Without	 doubt	 the	 threat	 was	 of	 a	 short-sighted	 law—a	
revolutionary	 law—set	against	a	short-sighted	peace;	but	 the	extreme	violence	of	this	 threatened	act	of	 articulation	was	a	 response	 to	 the	extreme	violence	of	 the	‘peace’.		Despite	 the	violence	of	 this	 state	of	peace,	 in	 the	end	 the	April	12	protest	was	 called	 off.	 For	 a	 majority	 of	 Liberians,	 who	 know	 from	 experience	 the	terrifying	destructiveness	of	war	and	revolution,	it	was	still	preferable	to	face	the	contradictions	 inherent	 in	 this	 state/State	 of	 peace	 and	 that	 are	 felt	 with	 such	violence	by	the	majority	on	a	daily	basis	than	to	be	again	subject	to	a	revolutionary	law.	 This	was	 a	 passionate,	 knowledgeable	 and	 indisputable	 preference	 to	 begin	again	on	13	April	by	facing	the	contradiction	of	peaceful	violence	secured	through	the	rule	of	law	rather	than	return	to	the	rule	of	mob	justice.		B	 Peace-builders		It	 is	 in	 this	 preference	 to	 face	 the	 contradiction	 on	 a	 daily	 basis,	 rather	 than	through	a	revolutionary	event,	that	Liberians	are	realising	the	ethical	possibility	of	law.	 Largely	 out	 of	 sight	 of	 the	 national	 legal	 system	 reform	 process	 and	 the	Government’s	 concern	 with	 harmonising	 expressions	 of	 the	 law,	 communities	throughout	 Liberia	 are	 engaging	 in	 a	 more	 radical	 process	 of	 mediating	 the	articulation	of	normativity	in	a	way	that	makes	difference	the	basis	of	the	law.		These	 mediators	 are	 the	 every-day	 ‘peace-builders’	 found	 throughout	Liberia,	 in	 each	 town	 and	 village,76	 working	 to	 re-build	 relationships	 between	
																																																						74	‘Observing	the	Law	in	Protest’,	New	Democrat,	Monrovia,	1	April	2013.	75	‘Police	Flex	Muscles’,	New	Democrat,	Monrovia,	8	April	2013.	76	At	least	in	every	place	I	visited.	
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281people	whose	 shared	histories	 are	 of	 intimate	 friendship	 and	violence.	Women’s	leaders,	 youth	 leaders,	 religious	 leaders,	 elders,	 concerned	 members	 of	 the	community—whether	 ‘up-skilled’	 in	 Alternative	 Dispute	 Resolution	 by	 Western	interveners,	 or	 drawing	 on	 their	 own	 knowledge	 and	 experience	 as	members	 of	legal	 traditions	 that	 long	 pre-date	 the	 West’s	 ‘discovery’	 of	 ADR—it	 is	 these	women	and	men	who	are	facing	the	contradiction	on	the	ground	in	Liberia.	These	diverse	Liberians	share	an	awareness	that	their	communities,	and	by	extension	the	nation,	 can	 only	 continue	 to	 be	 together	 as	 communities	 and	 a	 nation	 if	 the	cleavages	that	run	through	them	are	made	the	basis	of	the	law.77	The	 differences	 between	 the	 approach	 taken	 by	 these	 ‘peace-builders’	 to	law,	 and	 the	approach	 taken	by	 the	national	 legal	 system,	 are	deeply	 considered	and	 discussed	 throughout	 Liberia.	 One	 reason	 is	 that	 the	 differences	mirror	 the	differences	 between	 ‘indigenous’	 legal	 traditions	 in	 Liberia,	 which	 are	 often	described	as	restorative,	and	the	Anglo-American	Common	Law	tradition	that	was	introduced	 by	 the	 American	 Colonisation	 Society	 and	 African-American	 settlers	and	 that	 informs	 the	 national	 legal	 system.	 As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 6,	 the	main	difference	is	between	a	restorative	legal	system	that	is	based	on	compromise	and	community	wellbeing	and	a	concern	 for	 the	past	and	 future,	and	a	national	 legal	system	that	seeks	a	determination	of	individualised	blame	and	remedy	through	an	oppositional	trial	process	concerned	only	with	a	temporally	limited	set	of	facts.	To	quote	 a	 veteran	 peace-builder	 in	 the	 northwest	 of	 Liberia	 who	 discussed	 these	differences	with	me:		If	we	are	 in	court,	 the	 law	 is	 talking	about	what	 I	did,	and	to	quote	 the	 law	that	I	was	wrong,	and	I’m	guilty.	And	I	have	to	go	to	jail	for	30	years,	or	pay	a	fine	of	 one	million	dollars.	And	 then	 the	 judge	 is	 finished	with	 it.	He	 is	not	looking	 at	 the	 future,	 what	 will	 happen—even	 with	 reference	 to	 your	generation	 and	 the	 next	 man’s	 generation.	 […]	 The	 legal	 system	 seeks	 to	promote	the	organic	law	of	the	land.	It’s	the	law	that	they	are	protecting,	the	Constitution.	 If	 you	 kill,	 you	 must	 be	 killed.	 There	 is	 no	 compromise.	 [By	contrast,	 our	 approach]	 is	 looking	 at	 relationship-building	 between	 the	parties,	 their	 children.	 These	 people	 came	 from	 the	 community,	 they	 are	going	to	be	living	together,	they	are	mourning.	[Our	approach	is	to	have]	both	parties	 sit	 down	 together,	 look	 at	 the	 positive	 side	 of	 one	 another	 in	 the	community,	before	coming	over	to	where	they	had	a	misunderstanding.	[We	
																																																						77	Compare	J	Wood,	C	Shearing,	and	J	Froestad,	‘Restorative	Justice	and	Nodal	Governance’,	
International	Journal	of	Comparative	and	Applied	Criminal	Justice,	vol	35,	no	1	(2011).	
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282	 then	focus	on]	how	do	they	work	together	to	make	their	future	brighter,	for	the	benefit	of	their	offspring.78	I	met	many	others	who	echoed	this	understanding	of	the	different	approaches	to	law,	and	they	were	not	just	Liberians	with	a	vocation	in	community	peace-building.	Government	 administrators,	 as	 well	 as	 official	 legal	 and	 para-legal	 officers,	frequently	 made	 the	 same	 point	 in	 conversations	 with	 me.	 This	 may	 not	 be	 a	comprehensive	sample,	but	 it	reflects	the	broader	pattern	of	evidence	about	how	Liberians	 think	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 law,	 justice,	 and	 peace.	 It	 also	highlights	the	fact	that	‘ADR’	increasingly	is	being	promoted	and	advanced	as	part	of	 the	 national	 legal	 system,	 despite	 strong	 resistance	 from	 the	 national	 legal	profession.	 This	 is	 remarkable	 because	 it	 suggests	 a	 critical	 turn	 within	government	towards	an	approach	to	law	that	has	the	potential	to	realise	its	ethical	possibility	 within	 the	 legal	 system	 as	 well	 as	 through	 the	 work	 of	 community	peace-builders.	Thus	at	a	point	in	history	when	Liberia	is	facing	its	contradictions	in	a	way	that	it	has	not	before,	perhaps	the	most	critical	work	is	being	done	in	communities	throughout	 the	 country	 in	 every-day	 acts	 of	mediation.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 as	 the	Government	 is	 beginning	 again	 to	 reform	 the	 national	 legal	 system—seeking	 to	harmonise	 expressions	 of	 law	 under	 the	 Constitution	 of	 the	 Republic,	 whilst	strengthening	 its	 enforcement	 through	 the	 security	 sector—in	 an	 effort	 to	overcome	 the	 contradictions	 that	 are	 seen	 to	 be	 the	 cause	 of	 conflict,	 these	community-based	peace-builders	are	doing	the	opposite.	The	elder	quoted	above	described	 the	 law	 that	 emerges	 in	 the	process	of	 the	 community	peace-builders’	mediation	 when	 he	 spoke	 of	 how	 ‘both	 parties	 sit	 down	 together,	 look	 at	 the	positive	side	of	one	another	in	the	community,	before	coming	over	to	where	they	had	a	misunderstanding’.	Facing	one	another,	 the	parties	articulate	how	they	can	continue	 to	 be	 together.	 The	 ‘parties’,	 however,	 are	 not	 just	 the	 individual	disputants	 but	 also	 the	 community	 members	 who	 have	 been	 divided	 by	 the	cleavage	 that	 is	 manifesting	 through	 the	 disputing	 individuals.	 That	 is	 why	 the	mediation	 takes	 place	 in	 the	most	 public	 place—such	 as	 a	 palava	 hut—with	 the	community	inseparably	a	part	of	what	takes	place.		This	 system	of	 law	 is	not	about	 resolving	conflict	by	providing	an	answer	either	this	way	or	that	way,	in	favour	of	this	outcome	or	that	outcome.	(By	law:	‘it	
																																																						78	Author	interview	with	elder	and	civil	society	actor,	16	September	2013	(Li25).	
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283is	this’;	or	by	law:	 ‘it	 is	that’.)	Such	an	approach,	which	characterises	the	national	legal	system,	denies	the	contradiction	between	this	and	that	and	makes	that	denial	the	 basis	 of	 the	 law	 (thus	 the	 judge	 rules:	 it	 is	 this	 and	 not	 that).	 As	 Liberians	repeated	 to	 me	 again	 and	 again,	 the	 law	 that	 emerges	 from	 the	 national	 legal	system	 is	 set	 against	 peace.	 It	 delivers	 ‘justice’	 by	 resolving	 the	 confusion	analytically,	dividing	 ‘right’	 from	‘wrong’,	 the	 ‘right	party’	 from	the	 ‘wrong	party’.	But	 as	 the	 elder	made	 clear,	 if	 the	 ethical	 possibility	 of	 reconciliation	 is	 to	 take	place,	 there	must	be	a	coming	over.	What	 is	 ‘wrong’	must	be	 included	within	 the	very	definition	of	what	is	‘right’,	so	that	what	is	‘right’	can	become	the	law	in	light	of	the	fact	that	at	 its	heart	 is	a	 ‘wrong’	that	cannot	be	dissolved	and	must	 live	on	through	the	law.		
4	 Conclusion		After	a	decade	of	peace,	and	more	 than	three	decades	after	 the	overthrow	of	 the	First	Republic,	Liberians	are	reforming	their	national	legal	system	in	the	process	of	establishing	 a	 state	 based	 on	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 In	 doing	 so,	 they	 are	 facing	 a	contradiction	in	the	rule	of	law	that	holds	the	potential	to	return	the	nation	to	war,	but	also	to	realise	the	ethical	possibility	of	being	together	post-war.	On	one	hand,	Liberians	 are	 seeking	 to	 bring	 about	 radical	 social	 transformation	 through	 the	national	 legal	 system;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 Liberians	 are	 demanding	 fundamental	reform	to	this	system,	to	make	it	better	reflect	them;	whilst	out	of	hand—outside	of	 the	 national	 legal	 system—Liberians	 are	 mediating	 the	 articulation	 of	normativity	in	their	own	ways.	In	every	case,	law,	force	and	justice	are	at	play;	and	in	every	case	Liberia	is	in	a	truly	revolutionary	position	of	beginning	again.	The	 aim	 of	 this	 chapter	 has	 been	 to	 examine	 how	 a	 legal	 system	 might	articulate	normativity	in	ways	that	make	law	more	or	less	reflective	and	more	or	less	transformative.	The	critical	question,	however,	is	not	whether	the	intention	is	to	bring	about	normative	change	according	to	law	or	to	make	the	law	better	reflect	the	normative	dispositions	of	its	subjects.	For	one,	‘the	law’	as	expressed	can	never	be	at	one	with	its	object,	that	is,	the	experience	of	its	subject.	Moreover,	whilst	the	contradiction	 opens	 law	up	 to	 being	 an	 instrument	 of	 domination,	 it	 also	makes	law	 potentially	 emancipatory,	 by	 providing	 a	 means	 for	 breaking	 through	oppressive	 norms	 and	 articulating	 different	 ways	 of	 being	 together.	 Thus	 the	
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284	critical	 question	 is	 not	 whether	 the	 intention	 is	 to	 make	 ‘the	 law’	 more	 or	 less	reflective	or	transformative,	because	neither	outcome	can	be	entirely	avoided,	and	moreover,	neither	outcome	 is	necessarily	good	or	bad	 in	 itself.	What	 is	critical	 is	how	 responsive	 the	 process	 of	 articulating	 normativity	 is.	 This	 is	 the	 critical	concern	of	a	legal	system:	not	with	what	takes	form	as	‘the	law’,	but	with	how	the	articulation	of	normativity	is	mediated.	Under-mediated,	the	system	is	incapable	of	structuring	 the	 process	 of	 articulation;	 over-mediated,	 the	 legal	 system	 is	unconcerned	with	remaining	responsive	to	its	subjects;	and	either	way,	what	takes	form	as	‘the	law’	becomes	an	arbitrary	expression,	and	potentially	terrifyingly	so.	I	began	in	Part	1	of	the	chapter	by	examining	how	law	can	be	mediated	in	ways	that	make	the	law	more	or	less	transformative	and	more	or	less	reflective,	to	the	point	where	law	becomes	an	instrument	of	domination	or	a	lawless	outburst—but	 also	 potentially	 a	 critical	 medium	 of	 peace-building.	 With	 this	 in	 mind,	 I	examined	 in	 Part	 2	 how	 the	 Government	 of	 Liberia	 is	 beginning	 to	 reform	 the	national	 legal	 system	 post-war.	 The	 view	was	 of	 a	 national	 legal	 system	 that	 is	being	reformed	in	a	way	that	risks	making	it	both	a	medium	for	a	modern-liberalist	agenda	 for	 transformation	 and	 an	 instrument	 of	 domination,	with	 a	 strong	 state	security	 sector	 enforcing	 through	 brute	 force	 the	 liberalist	 regime.	 According	 to	the	logic	of	this	regime,	every	recognised	subject	is	seen	to	be	equivalent,	reducing	them	 to	 an	 empirical	 individuality	 that	denies	 their	 subjective	differences.	As	 an	‘empirical	 individual’,	 the	 subject	 becomes	 the	 object	 of	 a	 universal	 subjectivity	that	 makes	 it	 not	 only	 legitimate	 but	 a	 categorical	 humanitarian	 imperative	 to	assist	 in	developing	 it	 to	 its	 full	potential	as	such.	On	this	 logic,	 legal	pluralism	is	seen	as	a	problem	that	will	be	transcended	as	subjects	gain	access	to	the	system	of	the	one	true	and	just	law.		As	I	also	showed	in	Part	2,	the	state	security	sector,	with	its	‘justice-chain’	of	police,	 courts,	 and	 corrections	 facilities,	 is	 being	developed	 to	 facilitate	 access	 to	this	 justice	 throughout	Liberia.	At	 the	same	time,	 international	and	national	non-government	 organisations	 are	 assisting	 Liberians	 to	 gain	 access	 to	 this	 justice	through	 ‘legal	 empowerment’.	 Like	 the	 Government’s	 vision	 of	 an	 enforced	transformation,	 there	 is	 little	 doubt	 that	 their	 agenda	 is	 also	 transformative,	informed	 by	 a	 modern-liberalist	 logic;	 and	 yet	 they	 remain	 responsive	 to	 the	communities	they	are	seeking	to	empower.	Indeed,	in	many	instances,	community	members	 are	 leading	 the	 transformation,	 as	 I	 showed	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Liberian	
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285women	 who	 are	 using	 international	 human	 rights	 law	 to	 overcome	 gender	violence.79	The	result,	nonetheless,	is	reform	to	the	national	legal	system	that	risks	making	the	national	law	an	over-mediated	instrument	of	transformation.	That	the	push	for	change	is	coming	both	‘from	outside’	and	‘from	within’	does	not	make	this	law	any	less	over-mediated.		At	the	same	time,	as	I	examined	in	Part	3	of	the	chapter,	the	national	legal	system	remains	dysfunctional,	marked	by	corruption	of	 the	police	and	courts,	 as	well	as	rising	incidences	of	mob	violence.	Both,	I	argued,	are	expressions	of	under-mediated	law,	in	which	the	law	is	taking	form	in	terms	of	the	will	of	the	expressive	subject	 who	 articulates	 ‘the	 law’.	 Alongside	 this,	 however,	 outside	 the	 national	legal	 system	 communities	 are	 also	 mediating	 the	 articulation	 of	 normativity	 in	ways	 that	 make	 the	 process	 of	 law	more	 genuinely	 responsive.	 What	 is	 critical	about	 these	 community	 ‘peace-builders’	 is	 not	 the	 law	 that	 takes	 form	 in	 the	process,	but	how	they	make	conflict	the	basis	of	a	legal	resolution.	The	‘peace’	they	work	to	uphold	every	day	is	a	peace	riven	by	conflict.	The	aim	is	not	to	overcome	the	conflicts	that	separate	individuals,	families,	neighbours,	communities—the	aim	is	 to	 recognise	 that	 living	 together	 in	 Liberia	 means	 living	 inseparably	 apart.80	More	specifically,	it	means	ensuring	the	law	is	not	simply	‘this’,	but	that	‘the	law	is	this’	always	 in	respect	of	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	also	not	 ‘this’.	To	recall	 the	elder,	 this	means	crossing	both	ways:	‘both	parties	sit	down	together,	look	at	the	positive	side	of	 one	 another	 in	 the	 community,	 before	 coming	 over	 to	 where	 they	 had	 a	misunderstanding.’	Crossing	both	ways,	what	 is	wrong	 is	 included	within	what	 is	right.	 Without	 doubt	 the	 result	 is	 unstable—but	 that	 is	 why	 Liberians	 are	beginning	again	each	day	to	face	the	contradiction.			
																																																						79	For	similar	cases,	see	also	Sally	Engle	Merry,	Human	Rights	and	Gender	Violence:	Translating	
International	Law	into	Local	Justice	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2006).	80	See	Valeria	Vázquez	Guevara,	‘Reconciliation	in	the	Basque	Case:	Will	they	live	happily	ever	after?’,	Oñati	Socio-Legal	Series	(forthcoming).	
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1	 Portrait	of	the	thesis	
	 	
	
Figure	22.	Painting	of	Liberian	women	by	F	B	Yekehson	(Zorzor,	Liberia:	2010)		
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291In	the	course	of	researching	this	thesis	I	stayed	several	weeks	in	the	small	town	of	Zorzor.	Each	day	 I	would	spend	several	hours	sitting	 in	 the	street-side	 tea	shops	that	 line	the	town’s	dusty,	and	more	often	muddy,	main	road.	These	open-air	 tea	shops	are	usually	little	more	than	a	zinc	roof	nailed	over	three	wooden	walls,	with	stools	 and	 sometimes	 a	 table	 or	 two,	 serving	 a	 variety	 of	 teas,	 including	 a	 local	favourite,	Chinese	Gunpowder	Tea	(the	ingredients	of	which	I	never	quite	worked	out,	but	it	seemed	to	keep	the	motorcycle-taxi	drivers	going	all	day,	and	long	into	the	night),	along	with	excellent	percolated	coffee,	baguettes,	and	eggs	in	any	style.	Across	Liberia	these	tea	shops	provide	the	meeting	place	for	mostly	men	to	gather	throughout	the	day,	to	discuss	current	affairs,	debate	intellectual	puzzles	(‘what	is	the	difference	between	 respect	 and	 fear?’,	 ‘what	do	Liberians	have	 in	 common?’,	‘how	can	you	have	the	rule	of	law	when	we	don’t	even	know	our	own	laws?’)—the	men	coming	and	going,	 joining	a	 common	 table	 to	 listen	or	 standing	at	 the	head	lecturing	to	the	group;	or	else	questioning	a	stranger.	After	a	few	days	in	these	tea	shops,	 there	would	not	be	a	person	 in	 town	who	was	not	aware	of	my	presence.	Such	familiarity	bred	curiosity,	making	conversations	and	interviews	much	easier.	Alongside	one	of	 these	 tea	 shops	 in	Zorzor	 is	 an	art	gallery.	 It	 too	 is	 little	more	than	a	zinc	roof	with	three	wooden	walls.	The	owner,	who	is	also	the	artist,	is	a	man	of	very	few	words,	and	I	never	heard	his	story.	But	one	of	his	small	water-colour	paintings	 caught	my	eye.	 It	 shows	 five	women	who	appear	 to	be	walking	together,	 their	 bodies	 identified	 in	 bold	 black	 outline	 and	 yet	 remaining	amorphous,	blending	 in	 to	 each	other	 as	well	 as	 into	 the	background;	whilst	 the	background,	 which	 is	 also	 the	 foreground,	 is	 a	 montage	 of	 colourful	 block-like	strokes,	 at	 once	 firm	 expressions,	 precise	 in	 their	 measure,	 and	 yet	 a	 messy	patchwork,	 with	 the	 blocks	 overlapping	 and	 leaving	 gaps	 exposed.	 Here	 is	 the	thesis	I	had	come	to	Liberia	to	examine;	here	is	an	image	that	expresses	the	life	of	law’s	rule.		 ∞		This	 is	a	portrait	of	 the	dialectic	of	 law	and	normativity	that	animates	 law’s	rule,	seen	from	the	vantage	of	a	tea	shop.	To	be	more	precise,	this	thesis	is	both	a	general	argument	about	the	rule	of	law	as	a	common	experience,	animated	by	a	dialectic	of	law	and	normativity,	and	a	portrait	of	that	dialectic	as	it	plays	out	in	the	rule	of	law	in	Liberia.	More	than	that,	
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292	this	 thesis	 is	 an	 argument	 for	 an	 approach	 to	 research	 that	 engages	 both	 the	empirical	and	the	imaginary.		Consider	 again	 the	 painting	 by	 Yekehson	 of	 the	 Liberian	 women	 (Figure	22).	Its	significance	is	not	merely	its	illustrative	quality.	The	painting	is	illustrative,	but	 its	 significance	 is	 also	 the	 painting’s	 form	 as	 an	 artwork.	 Even	 more,	 its	significance	is	what	the	social	scientist	might	 learn	from	the	method	of	analysing	the	artwork.	To	understand	 this	 is	 to	understand	 the	 three	main	arguments	 that	run	through	this	thesis.1		Thus	as	an	illustration,	Yekehson’s	painting	can	be	seen	as	a	portrayal	of	the	dialectic	of	law	and	normativity	that	I	have	argued	animates	law’s	rule	in	general.	The	 dialectic,	 examined	 in	 the	 abstract	 in	 Part	 I	 of	 the	 thesis	 in	 answering	 the	question	of	what	takes	place	 in	the	rule	of	 law,	can	be	seen	 in	the	relation	of	 the	montage	of	block-colours,	on	one	side,	and	the	amorphous	social	grouping,	on	the	other.	Like	the	blocks	of	colour,	expressions	of	the	law	provide	a	social-structural	background/foreground,	 although	 there	 is	 no	 easy	 analytical	 separation.	 The	relation	 is	 dialectical,	 with	 law	 giving	 form	 to	 the	 social	 body,	 as	well	 as	 to	 the	individual	bodies,	 and	everything	 else	besides,	whilst	 the	 shifting	dispositions	of	the	bodies	gives	form	to	law.	To	see	this	is	to	see	how	law	gives	form,	vividly,	and	how	law	takes	form,	socially,	in	a	dialectic	between	the	act	of	articulation	and	what	is	being	articulated.		In	this,	a	dialectic	might	be	seen	to	connect	the	forms	of	expression	and	the	amorphous	 subject	of	 the	portrait,	without	 the	 two	 finally	merging	or	 remaining	entirely	separate.	 It	 is	this	 irresolvable	contradiction	that	enlivens	law’s	rule.	But	much	 is	 missed	 if	 this	 portrait	 is	 seen	 ahistorically,	 as	 an	 empty	 signifier.	Yekehson’s	 painting	 expresses	 horror	 and	 heartbreak.	 Blood	 is	 everywhere.	 It	soaks	 the	women’s	hair.	 It	 smears	 their	 faces.	 It	 covers	 their	bodies.	The	women	walking	 together	 appear	 as	 ghosts,	 spectres	 of	 the	 recent	wars	 that	 tore	 Liberia	apart.	This	does	not	make	the	painting	merely	an	illustration	of	the	past,	any	more	than	 it	simply	presents	an	 image	 in	empty	and	homogenous	time	and	space.	 It	 is	precisely	as	spirits	that	the	women	in	this	painting	remain,	as	much	part	of	Liberia	now	as	the	empirical	individuals	who	continue	to	recall	their	names.		
																																																						1	As	noted	in	the	previous	paragraph,	these	three	arguments	are	on	(1)	the	‘form’	of	the	rule	of	law	as	a	common	experience,	(2)	the	‘substance’	of	the	rule	of	law	in	Liberia,	as	well	as	(3)	the	approach	to	the	study	of	the	rule	of	law.	See	also	Part	1	of	the	Introduction	where	I	introduced	these	three	lines	of	argument.	
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293I	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 approach	 I	 take	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	that	it	makes	law	essentially	plural,	by	bringing	and	keeping	law	in	dialogue	with	the	subjects	who	enliven	 its	 forms	as	a	normative	matter.	By	approaching	 law	as	only	really	meaningful,	or	 ‘whole’,	when	seen	in	relation	to	its	subjects,	pluralism	becomes	law’s	essential	condition.	But	this	is	not	only	true	of	present	expressions	of	 law,	as	 if	 law	only	 takes	place	on	a	horizontal-spatial	plane.	As	can	be	seen	 in	Yekehson’s	painting,	present	expressions	are	not	enlivened	by	subjects	isolated	in	time.	What	has	been—historically—informs	the	present,	mediating	how	it	is	now,	just	 as	 historical	 representations	 are	 mediated	 through-and-through	 by	 the	present	and	can	only	be	grasped	as	contemporary	 figurations	of	what	has	been.2	Just	as	there	is	nothing	historical	that	is	not	a	matter	of	the	here	and	now,	there	is	nothing	here	and	now	that	is	not	a	matter	of	history.3	Like	Yekehson’s	painting,	there	is	a	temporal	depth	to	law,	a	temporal	legal	pluralism,	 that	 makes	 what	 has	 been	 part	 of	 its	 expressions	 now.4	 It	 is	 this	temporal	dimension	that	makes	the	question	of	‘what	is	taking	place’	in	the	rule	of	law	an	historical	question	as	much	as	an	empirical	one.5	If	the	empirical	problem	is	that	the	rule	of	law	cannot	be	finally	separated	from	the	rule	of	humans	here	and	now,	 then	 the	 historical	 problem	 is	 that	 law’s	 rule	 here	 and	 now	 cannot	 be	
																																																						2	Writing	on	his	historical-materialist	methodology	for	The	Arcades	Project,	Benjamin	notes:	‘It	is	not	that	what	is	past	casts	its	light	on	what	is	present,	or	what	is	present	its	light	on	what	is	past;	rather,	an	image	is	that	wherein	what	has	been	comes	together	in	a	flash	with	the	now	to	form	a	constellation.	In	other	words:	image	is	dialectics	at	a	standstill.	For	while	the	relation	of	the	present	to	the	past	is	purely	temporal,	the	relation	of	what-has-been	to	the	now	is	dialectical:	not	temporal	in	nature	but	figural	<bildlich>.	Only	dialectical	images	are	genuinely	historical—that	is,	not	archaic—images.’	Walter	Benjamin,	The	Arcades	Project,	trans	Howard	Eiland	&	Kevin	McLaughlin	(Cambridge:	Belknap	Press,	1999),	463.		3	Whilst	it	is	a	dialectical	image	that	is	illuminated	in	this	discursive	construction	of	history,	this	is	nonetheless	‘genuinely	historical’,	against	the	‘vulgar	historical	naturalism’	that	lays	claim	to	history	by	amassing	facts	and	‘establishing	a	causal	nexus’	between	them	in	‘empty	and	homogenous	time’:	see	Walter	Benjamin,	‘On	the	Concept	of	History’,	Gesammelte	Schriften,	vol	1,	no	2	(1974):	Adendum	A.	See	also	Benjamin,	The	Arcades	Project,	461-462.	Compare	this	with	the	approach	to	history	influenced	by	Quentin	Skinner	that	‘dominates	Anglophone	history	today’,	according	to	which	‘historical	texts	must	not	be	approached	anachronistically	in	light	of	current	debates,	problems	and	linguistic	usages	or	in	the	search	for	the	development	of	canonical	themes,	fundamental	concepts	or	timeless	doctrines’:	for	discussion	see	Anne	Orford,	‘The	Past	as	Law	or	History?	The	Relevance	of	Imperialism	for	Modern	International	Law’,	Institute	for	International	
Law	and	Justice	Working	Paper	2012/2	(2012).	4	On	law,	time,	and	visual	representation,	see	Desmond	Manderson,	‘Blind	Justice’,	in	McGill	
Companion	to	Law,	ed	A	Popovici	and	L	Smith	(online:	2015).	On	time	and	legal	pluralism,	see	also	Keebet	von	Benda-Beckmann,	‘Trust	and	the	Temporalities	of	Law’,	Journal	of	Legal	Pluralism	and	
Unofficial	Law,	vol	46,	no	1	(2014).	5	See	also	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns,	‘Writing	History	and	Registering	Memory	in	Legal	Decisions	and	Legal	Practices:	An	Introduction’,	in	History,	Memory,	and	the	Law,	ed	Austin	Sarat	and	Thomas	R	Kearns	(Ann	Arbor:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	2009).	
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294	separated	 from	what	 has	 been.	 Just	 as	 spirits	mediate	 life	 in	 Liberia,6	 the	 spirit	world	mediates	the	 life	of	 law’s	rule.	 Indeed,	 the	rule	of	 law	cannot	be	separated	from	the	rule	of	humans	any	more	than	it	can	be	separated	from	the	rule	of	spirits.	When	the	Liberian	elder	spoke	of	including	what	is	wrong	within	every	expression	of	right,7	he	understood	this:	that	there	is	a	temporal	depth	to	law	that	makes	the	spirit	world	part	of	law’s	rule	no	less	than	the	empirical	confusion	that	makes	law	always	also	not	law	on	the	ground.	Whether	they	are	the	spirits	of	the	civil	dead,	whose	bodies	have	been	decimated	by	 the	 logic	of	 capital;	 the	 spirits	of	 the	 civil	wars,	whose	bodies	have	been	laid	to	rest;	or	the	spirits	of	the	living	dead,	whose	bodies,	yet	to	be	buried,	defy—and	even	mock—the	frameworks	that	confine	them:	these	spirits	mediate	expressions	of	law.		Recall	the	scene	in	Liberia’s	Central	Prison,	where	the	thesis	began.8	Recall	the	 drawing	 on	 the	 prison	 wall:	 an	 exact	 representation	 of	 the	 Liberian	 coat	 of	arms,	with	its	image	of	a	ship	sailing	towards	the	west	African	shore	carrying	the	‘free	 people	 of	 colour	 of	 the	 United	 States’	 who	 would	 establish	 what	 would	become	the	Republic	of	Liberia.	Hanging	over	this	coat	of	arms	was	a	slightly	larger	than	usual	banner—and	here,	I	suggested,	the	prisoner’s	hand	must	have	lingered	a	moment,	a	 flicker	of	a	 smile	must	have	crossed	his	 face,	 for	a	moment,	 if	not	a	burst	of	laughter,	shaking	the	foundations	of	the	Central	Prison	as	he	reprinted	the	line:	‘The	love	of	liberty	brought	us	here’.		This	was	an	act	of	articulation	that	confronted	an	institution	of	law	with	its	history,	 that	 placed	 this	 history	 in	 juxtaposition	with	 the	material	 reality	 of	 this	institution.	 The	 prisoner’s	 drawing	 requires	 this	 history	 to	 be	 seen	 from	 the	perspective	 of	 the	 prisoner	 within	 this	 institution;	 but	 it	 also	 requires	 this	institution	to	be	seen	from	the	perspective	of	this	history.	The	effect	is	to	place	the	institution	in	history—to	make	it	a	matter	not	only	of	the	here	and	now	but	also	a	matter	 of	 what	 has	 been.	 The	 effect	 is	 also	 to	 draw	 out	 the	 history	 from	 the	institution—to	make	 the	history	of	 Liberia	 a	matter	of	what	 is	 taking	place	here	and	now.	
																																																						6	See	also	M	C	Jedrej,	‘Cosmology	and	Symbolism	on	the	Central	Guinea	Coast’,	Anthropos,	vol	81,	no	4	(1986);	William	C	Siegmann,	‘Spirit	Manifestation	and	the	Poro	Society’,	Ethnologische	Zeitschrift	
Zürich,	vol	1	(1980).	7	See	Part	3	of	Chapter	7.	8	See	Prelude.	
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295What	 this	 historical-materialist	 analysis	 points	 to	 is	 a	 fundamental	contradiction,	writ	large	on	the	prison	wall,	concentrating	the	ironies	of	the	rule	of	law	 in	 Liberia	 in	 one	 scene.	Here	 is	 the	nineteenth-century	 vision	of	 liberty	 that	resulted	in	civil	death	for	the	majority	of	Liberians;	here	 is	the	ship	chartered	by	the	 American	 Colonization	 Society	 that	 brought	 the	 Constitution	 for	 the	
Government	of	the	African	Settlement	at	 						 	 ,	 which	 made	 the	 law	 of	Liberia	a	littoral	one	par	excellence,9	 its	lawfulness	requiring	a	restless	process	of	talking	 and	 talking	 back;	 and	 here	 they	 are,	 represented	 on	 the	 inside	 of	 a	 cell-block	of	Liberia’s	Central	Prison—a	fortification	designed	to	secure	a	state/State	of	peace	by	containing	within	it	any	body	that	contradicts	its	logics.	This	drawing	is	an	act	of	articulation	of	a	living-dead	man,	playing	with	the	logics	that	frame	him	in	the	most	concrete	way.	This	is	an	act	of	talking	back	that	confronts	the	institution	of	the	rule	of	law	with	the	spirits	of	Liberia’s	capitalist-colonial	history.	As	a	Liberian	portrait	of	 law’s	 rule,	 the	aim	of	Part	 II	of	 the	 thesis	was	 to	show	how	all	of	this	is	at	the	beating	heart	of	the	rule	of	law	in	Liberia.	As	I	said	in	introducing	the	thesis,	it	is	in	the	refuse	of	scattered	off-cuts	that	the	crystal	of	the	totality	 is	 to	 be	 discovered;	 not	 the	 totality	 itself,	 but	 in	 the	 assemblage	 of	 the	smallest	and	least	remarkable	data,	a	composite	that	refracts	a	dialectical	image	of	it.10	The	dialectical	image	of	the	rule	of	law	that	I	have	sought	to	illuminate	through	this	 discursive	 configuration	 may	 not	 be	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 law’	 as	 it	 is	 known	 by	 its	concepts.	And	yet	it	is	by	representing	the	life	of	law’s	rule	configuratively,	through	the	 imaginative	work	of	 the	 scholar,	 that	 one	might	obtain	 an	 image	of	 it	 that	 is	
more	real	than	these	concepts	admit	on	their	own.	That	is	what	I	have	attempted	to	create,	portraying	through	a	constellation	of	scenes	the	life	of	law’s	rule	in	Liberia.	But	this	thesis	is	not	only	about	Liberia.	It	is	also	a	general	argument	about	the	rule	of	law	as	a	common	experience.	In	its	form	as	an	artwork,	the	painting	by	Yekehson	 suggests	 how	 this	 thesis	 can	 be	 about	 both—how	 it	 can	 be	 both	 a	singular	portrayal	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 Liberia,	 enlivened	by	humans	 and	 spirits	alike,	as	well	as	a	generic	argument	about	the	life	of	law’s	rule.	As	I	have	sought	to	
																																																						9	As	discussed	in	Chapter	4,	Manderson	and	van	Rijswijk	describe	littoral	spaces	as	‘heightened	and	active,	places	of	contested	imaginaries’—‘an	environment	of	flux	and	change	par	excellence’;	Desmond	Manderson	and	Honni	van	Rijswick,	‘Introduction	to	Littoral	Readings:	Representations	of	Land	and	Sea	in	Law,	Literature,	and	Geography’,	Law	and	Literature,	vol	27,	no	2	(2015):	174.	On	littoral	law,	see	also	Desmond	Manderson,	Kangaroo	Courts	and	the	Rule	of	Law	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2012),	Chapter	10.	10	See	Part	2	of	the	Introduction.	
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296	show	 here,	 Yekehson’s	 painting	 expresses	 a	 content	 that	 is	 singular,	 being	 of	 a	particular	time	and	place	and	experiences	of	that	time	and	place	that	are	without	equivalence;	 and	 yet	 its	 form	 leaves	 its	 content	 open	 to	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 light	 of	different	times	and	places	and	experiences.11	This	 also	 demonstrates	 the	 methodology	 of	 the	 thesis,	 in	 its	 attempt	 to	bring	a	humanities	approach	to	bear	on	sociological	research	in	a	way	that	engages	both	 the	 empirical	 and	 the	 imaginary.	 In	 the	 same	way	 that	 an	 image	might	 be	analysed	 to	 see	 how	 its	 form	 makes	 a	 work	 of	 expression	 both	 singular	 and	generic,	 expressing	 a	 particular	 material	 history	 without	 the	 two	 becoming	identical,	 so	 too	 might	 law	 be	 analysed,	 as	 an	 expressive	 form	 that	 articulates	normativity	without	its	expressions	becoming	identical	with	its	object,	that	is,	the	experience	of	its	subjects.			
2	 Law’s	rule	in	Liberia	(or	elsewhere)		
‘What	more	has	 to	be	 studied?	You	don’t	need	 to	do	more	 research	 to	 see	 that	 the	
justice	system	is	broken	here’.12			The	challenge	I	took	up	in	this	thesis	was	to	see	how	law’s	rule	is	enlivened	by	a	struggle	 to	 make	 law	 predominant	 over	 its	 subjects	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 law	 is	given	form,	and	takes	 form,	 in	and	through	those	subjects’	 lives	and	 interactions.	And	the	challenge	was	to	do	this	in	a	way	that	speaks	to	the	prisoner	in	his	cell—speaks	to	him	directly,	face	to	face,	providing	an	answer	to	his	question	that	finds	its	justification	in	that	exchange.		The	 answer	 I	 have	 put	 forward	 in	 the	 thesis	 is	 that	 this	 study	matters	 to	you,	who	remains	abject	before	the	law,	because	it	makes	your	experience	critical	to	 law’s	 rule,	 in	 both	 positive	 and	 negative	 senses	 of	 the	 word.	 Positively,	 your	experience	constitutes	how	the	rule	of	law	is	taking	place—law’s	rule	always	taking	place	 in	 and	 through	 its	 subjects.13	 But	 for	 this	 very	 reason,	 negatively,	 your	experience	also	critiques	how	the	rule	of	 law	is	taking	place.	Thus	the	 ‘more’	that	
																																																						11	See	also	Desmond	Manderson,	‘Bodies	in	the	Water:	On	Reading	Images	More	Sensibly’,	Law	and	
Literature,	vol	27,	no	2	(2015).	12	See	Prelude.		13	In	this	positive	sense,	to	be	‘critical’	means	to	be	‘decisive,	crucial’,	‘to	determine	or	decide’:	see	entry	6	for	‘critical,	adj.’,	OED	Online,	March	2016.	
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297needs	 to	be	known	 is	your	experience,	 cut	 short	by	 the	 law,	but	which	 law	must	remain	responsive	to	if	its	rule	is	not	to	become	synonymous	with	death.		Law’s	rule	may	not	avoid	the	grim	association	with	death,	but	the	two	are	not	identical.14	Against	the	absolution	of	death,	law’s	rule	holds	out	the	possibility	of	 a	 living	 death.	 This	 is	 not	 necessarily	 a	 hopeless	 condition.	 As	 the	 studio	portraits	 by	 Joseph	Moise	Agbodjélou	 and	Leonce	Raphael	Agbodjélou	 suggest,15	and	 as	 the	 prisoners	 in	 Liberia’s	 Central	 Prison	 show,	 the	 living	 dead	 are	 never	mere	 bodies	 but	 always	 also	 subjects	 capable	 of	 critical	 acts	 of	 articulation,	 no	matter	how	well	an	institution	succeeds	in	containing	their	expression.	Against	the	logics	of	capital,	security,	or	a	liberal-internationalist	regime	that	would	reduce	the	subject	 to	an	exchangeable	object,	 the	subject	 remains,	until	 finally	death	comes.	But	at	that	point,	too—in	death—law	has	no	power,	and	ceases	to	rule.16	The	implication	for	theory	is	that	the	rule	of	law	might	be	seen	as	a	medium	for	subjects	to	give	expression	of	themselves,	without	the	law	becoming	identical	with	 its	 subjective	 expression.	 Neither	 over-mediating	 nor	 under-mediating	expressions	of	law,	law’s	rule	mediates	a	contradiction	that	holds	the	potential	to	make	law	both	dominating	and	emancipating.	This	is	what	distinguishes	the	rule	of	law	from	 law.	 It	 is	the	governance	of	the	articulation	of	normativity.	And	like	any	form	 of	 governance,	 the	 ethical	 potential	 of	 law’s	 rule	 is	 its	 responsiveness	 to	subjects,	which	requires	remaining	consistently	conscious	of	the	contradiction	that	leaves	subjects	abject	before	the	law	whilst	leaving	law	open	to	them.		The	negative-dialectical	approach	that	I	have	sought	to	model	in	the	thesis	allows	 one	 to	 appreciate	 this,	 the	 chasmic	 structure	 of	 law,	 whereby	 law	 is	simultaneously	singular,	 incorporating	all	subjects	within	 jurisdiction,	and	plural,	taking	place	in	non-identical	ways,	enlivened	by	the	subjects	over	whom	law	rules.	More	critically,	this	approach	enables	one	to	analyse	the	different	responses	to	the	contradiction—to	 see	 how	 these	 responses	 inform	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 and	 how	 the	rule	 of	 law	 provides	 a	 medium	 for	 them	 to	 take	 place.	 This	 is	 important	 for	understanding	 law	 and	 its	 rule	 as	 a	 common	 experience,	 but	 it	 is	 especially	
																																																						14	See	Austin	Sarat,	‘Introduction:	On	Pain	and	Death	as	Facts	of	Legal	Life’,	in	Pain,	Death,	and	the	
Law,	ed	Austin	Sarat	(Ann	Arbor:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	2001).	This	also	returns	to	Mbembe	and	how	expressions	of	sovereignty	can	create	‘death	worlds’,	‘in	which	vast	populations	are	subjected	to	conditions	of	life	conferring	upon	them	the	status	of	living	dead.’	Achille	Mbembe,	‘Necropolitics’,	Public	Culture,	vol	15,	no	1	(2003):	40	(italics	in	original).	15	See	Part	3	of	Chapter	4.	16	See	Sarat,	‘On	Pain	and	Death	as	Facts	of	Legal	Life’.	
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298	important	when	it	comes	to	the	question	of	what	is	taking	place	in	the	rule	of	law	in	particular	cases.		The	implication	for	practice	is	that	this	provides	an	approach	to	instituting	the	 rule	 of	 law	 that	 opens	 the	 concept	 to	 the	 non-conceptual,	making	 the	 living	realities	 of	 law’s	 rule	 critical	 to	 the	 conceptual	 schemas	 deployed	 to	 institute	 it.	This	 provides	 an	 approach	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 instituting	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	situations	of	social	diversity	that	makes	difference	essential	to	law’s	rule.	This	is	in	contrast	 to	 approaches	 that	 seek	 to	 erase	 from	 law	 all	 traces	 of	 pluralism,	 or,	where	 differences	 in	 law	 are	 recognised,	 that	 seek	 to	 establish	 a	 hierarchical	Constitution	 that	 places	 ‘other	 law’	 in	 a	 position	 of	 subordination	 to	 a	 higher	(national)	 law,	with	 any	 contradiction	 resolved	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 higher	 law.	 It	 is	also	 in	 contrast	 to	 approaches	 that	 seek	 to	 establish	 a	 radical	 separation	 of	 law,	seeking	 to	 avoid	 contradictions	 in	 law	by	 decentralising	 legal	 authority.	None	 of	these	 approaches	 takes	 seriously	 the	 challenge	 posed	 by	 law’s	 pluralism,	 which	cannot	 be	 wished	 away	 any	 more	 than	 it	 can	 be	 overcome	 through	 the	establishment	 of	 a	 hierarchical	 constitutional	 system	 or	 the	 decentralisation	 of	legal	authority.	Law’s	pluralism	remains	in	any	case	because	it	is	the	condition	of	law	in	its	every	expression.	At	 a	 time	when	 international	 organisations,	 governments,	 as	well	 as	 non-government	organisations	and	civil	society	actors	are	working	to	build	the	rule	of	law	 around	 the	 world,17	 understanding	 this	 could	 not	 be	 more	 important.	 For	those	 who	 repeat	 the	 mantra,	 ‘context	 matters’,	 this	 is	 what	 it	 means	 to	 take	context	seriously;	for	those	who	care	about	understanding	‘rule	of	law	cultures’,18	
this	is	the	cultural	life	of	law’s	rule.				
																																																						17	See	Per	Bergling,	Jenny	Ederlöf,	and	Veronica	Taylor,	eds,	Rule	of	Law	Promotion:	Global	
Perspectives,	Local	Applications	(Uppsala:	Iustus	Förlag,	2009);	Jeremy	Matam	Farrall	and	Hilary	Charlesworth,	eds,	Strengthening	the	Rule	of	Law	through	the	UN	Security	Council	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2016);	Laura	Grenfell,	Promoting	the	Rule	of	Law	in	Post-conflict	States	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2013);	Stephen	Humphreys,	Theatre	of	the	Rule	of	Law:	Transnational	Legal	
Intervention	in	Theory	and	Practice	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2012);	Charles	Sampford	and	Ramesh	Thakur,	eds,	Institutional	Supports	for	the	International	Rule	of	Law	(Oxon:	Routledge,	2015);	Richard	Zajac	Sannerholm,	Rule	of	Law	after	War	and	Crisis:	Ideologies,	Norms	
and	Methods	(Cambridge:	Intersentia,	2012);	Michael	Zürn,	André	Nollkaemper,	and	Randy	Peerenboom,	eds,	Rule	of	Law	Dynamics:	In	an	Era	of	International	and	Transnational	Governance	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2012).	18	Compare	McKay,	Leanne,	Toward	a	Rule	of	Law	Culture:	Exploring	Effective	Responses	to	Justice	
and	Security	Challenges	(Washington:	United	States	Institute	of	Peace,	2015).	
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Research	for	the	case	study	involved	six-months	fieldwork	in	Liberia	in	2013.	Four	of	
the	months	 I	 was	 in	Monrovia,	 and	 the	 other	 two	months	 I	 was	 in	 the	 interior	 of	
Liberia.	 I	 also	 visited	 New	 York	 City	 to	 meet	 with	 staff	 in	 the	 UN	 Headquarters	
working	on	global	issues	of	rule-of-law	assistance.		
During	 this	 fieldwork	 I	 conducted	 a	 total	 of	 78	 semi-structured	 interviews,	
listed	in	the	following	tables.	All	participants	were	promised	confidentiality.	For	this	
reason,	I	only	list	their	general	position,	the	general	location	of	the	interview,	and	the	
date	of	the	interview,	with	an	identifying	code.		
In	addition	to	these	interviews,	I	had	many	other	conversations	that	were	not	
officially	interviews	but	were	no	less	informative.	These	cannot	be	quantified.		
Monrovia,	Liberia	
	
Code	 Position	 Date	
Government	of	Liberia	MG1	 Ministry	of	Internal	Affairs		 22	May	2013	MG2	 Ministry	of	Internal	Affairs		 15	May	2013	MG3	 Ministry	of	Internal	Affairs		 28	May	2013	MG4	 Ministry	of	Justice	 15	May	2013	MG5	 Land	Commission		 14	August	2013	MG6	 Land	Commission		 7	August	2013	MG7	 Land	Commission		 14	August	2013	MG8	 Land	Commission		 14	August	2013	MG9	 Ministry	of	Internal	Affairs		 15	August	2013	
United	Nations	in	Liberia	MU1	 United	Nations	Mission	in	Liberia	 24	May	2013	MU2	 United	Nations	Mission	in	Liberia	 24	May	2013	MU3	 United	Nations	Mission	in	Liberia	 15	August	2013	MU4	 United	Nations	Development	Program	 19	June	2013	MU5	 United	Nations	Development	Program	 30	July	2013	MU6	 United	Nations	Mission	in	Liberia	 11	October	2013	
foreign	government	agencies	in	Liberia	MB1	 US	State	Department	/	Pacific	Architects	&	Engineers	 5	June	2013	MB2	 US	Agency	for	International	Development	 5	August	2013	MB3	 German	International	Cooperation	(GIZ)	 12	August	2013	MB4	 Australian	Agency	for	International	Development	 8	October	2013	
non-government	organisations	MN1	 The	Carter	Center	 9	April	2013	MN2	 The	Carter	Center	 13	April	2013	MN3	 The	Carter	Center	 6	August	2013	MN4	 former	legal	adviser	to	The	Carter	Center	 25	April	2013	MN5	 Sustainable	Development	Institute	 15	August	2013	MN6	 Norwegian	Refugee	Council	 16	August	2013	
Civil	society	MC1	 journalist	 1	April	2013	MC2	 researcher	 14	May	2013		
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Interior	of	Liberia	
	
Code	 Position	 Date	Li1	 Ministry	of	Justice	 26	August	2013	Li2	 Rural	Human	Rights	Activists	 26	August	2013	Li3	 Superintendent	 10	August	2013	Li4	 Land	Commissioner	 13	August	2013	Li5	 City	Mayor’s	Office	 11	August	2013	Li6	 Refugee	Repatriation	&	Resettlement	Commission	 10	August	2013	Li7	 Magistrate	 12	August	2013	Li8	 Magistrate	 12	August	2013	Li9	 Public	Defender	 9	August	2013	Li10	 United	Nations	Mission	in	Liberia	 10	August	2013	Li11	 United	Nations	Mission	in	Liberia	 9	August	2013	Li12	 FIND	 11	August	2013	Li13	 Lofa	Network	of	Local	NGOs		 7	August	2013	Li14	 journalist	 7	August	2013	Li15	 youth	leader,	member	of	county	Peace	Committee	 10	August	2013	Li16	 journalist	 30	August	2013	Li17	 journalist	 2	September	2013	Li18	 Land	Commission	 29	August	2013	Li19	 Paramount	Chiefdom	Clerk	 2	September	2013	Li20	 Paramount	Chiefdom	Assistant	Clerk	 2	September	2013	Li21	 town	leader	 2	September	2013	Li22	 Magistrate	 2	September	2013	Li23	 Police	Commander	 3	September	2013	Li24	 City	Mayor	 16	September	2013	Li25	 Lutheran	Trauma	Healing	&	Reconciliation	 16	September	2013	Li26	 City	Mayor’s	Office	 18	September	2013	Li27	 Magistrate	 19	September	2013	Li28	 Ears	for	the	Masses	 19	September	2013	Li29	 Paramount	Chief	 19	September	2013	Li30	 United	Nations	Mission	in	Liberia	 23	September	2013	Li31	 Community	Peace	Hut	 23	September	2013	Li32	 Magistrate	 24	September	2013	Li33	 Magistrate	 24	September	2013	Li34	 Catholic	Justice	and	Peace	Commission	 24	September	2013	Li35	 Catholic	Justice	and	Peace	Commission	 26	September	2013	Li36	 City	Mayor	 26	September	2013	Li37	 United	Nations	Mission	in	Liberia	 26	September	2013	Li38	 United	Nations	Mission	in	Liberia	 27	September	2013	Li39	 Land	Commission	 27	September	2013				
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New	York	City,	USA	
	
Code	 Position	 Date	NY1	 United	Nations	Department	of	Peacekeeping	Operations	 20	June	2013	NY2	 United	Nations	Department	of	Peacekeeping	Operations	 25	June	2013	NY3	 United	Nations	Department	of	Peacekeeping	Operations	 25	June	2013	NY4	 United	Nations	Department	of	Peacekeeping	Operations	 20	June	2013	NY5	 United	Nations	Department	of	Peacekeeping	Operations	 17	June	2013	NY6	 United	Nations	Department	of	Peacekeeping	Operations	 25	June	2013	NY7	 United	Nations	Department	of	Peacekeeping	Operations	 22	June	2013	NY8	 United	Nations	Department	of	Peacekeeping	Operations	 21	June	2013	NY9	 United	Nations	Department	of	Political	Affairs	 26	June	2013	NY10	 United	Nations	Development	Program	 26	June	2013	NY11	 United	Nations	Development	Program	 27	June	2013	NY12	 Human	Rights	Watch	 18	June	2013				 	
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